mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-12 06:08:51 +00:00
ea47d7c903
Pre-login rows previously persisted the OIDC state, nonce, and PKCE
verifier as plaintext columns; an operator restoring an unredacted
backup of oidc_pre_login_sessions to a debug environment leaked every
in-flight handshake. If the IdP also leaked the auth code in the same
window (logged at a misconfigured TLS terminator, etc.), the attacker
could exchange code + verifier directly. RFC 7636 §7 requires verifier
confidentiality.
This commit:
- Migration 000041 adds {state,nonce,pkce_verifier}_enc BYTEA columns
and makes the legacy plaintext columns nullable. A follow-up
migration drops the plaintext columns once the rolling deploy
completes.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go::Create encrypts the
three secrets via crypto.EncryptIfKeySet (v3 magic 0x03 + per-row
salt + nonce + AES-256-GCM tag) and writes only the encrypted
columns; legacy plaintext stays NULL on the write path.
- LookupAndConsume prefers encrypted columns via materialize(),
falling back to the legacy plaintext only when _enc is NULL — the
rolling-deploy compat layer that 000042 will retire.
- NewPreLoginRepository takes encryptionKey; cmd/server/main.go threads
cfg.Encryption.ConfigEncryptionKey in.
- Encryption key reuses CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY (same passphrase
already protecting OIDC client secrets and SessionSigningKey material).
No new env var.
Why encryption-at-rest, not HMAC: the spec's HMAC approach required
moving plaintext into the cookie (the cookie currently carries only
row ID + HMAC). Re-shaping the cookie wire format would be a larger
refactor; the audit explicitly admits encryption-at-rest is an
acceptable closure (weaker because backups still contain decryptable
ciphertext, but the encryption key is held separately from the DB
backup, and the 10-minute TTL further bounds usable secret window).
Three new regression tests in oidc_prelogin_encryption_test.go pin:
(a) _enc columns contain v3-format ciphertext, NOT plaintext
substrings, post-Create
(b) legacy plaintext columns are NULL post-Create (defends against
future patches that re-introduce plaintext writes)
(c) LookupAndConsume round-trips state/nonce/verifier byte-for-byte
A fourth test pins the legacy-row fallback for rolling-deploy compat.
Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-5
Spec: cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/09-high-5-prelogin-secret-protection.md
207 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
207 lines
8.2 KiB
Go
package postgres
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"database/sql"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
cryptopkg "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/crypto"
|
|
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// PreLoginRepository (Auth Bundle 2 Phase 5)
|
|
//
|
|
// Holds short-lived pre-login session rows that carry OIDC state +
|
|
// nonce + PKCE verifier across the IdP redirect. Distinct from the
|
|
// `sessions` table because sessions doesn't carry OIDC-specific
|
|
// columns and the row shape would be incoherent if merged.
|
|
//
|
|
// The 10-minute absolute TTL is enforced at the schema layer
|
|
// (oidc_pre_login_sessions.absolute_expires_at default of
|
|
// NOW() + INTERVAL '10 minutes') AND re-checked at the service
|
|
// layer at consume time.
|
|
//
|
|
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-5 closure — state, nonce, and pkce_verifier
|
|
// are encrypted at rest using v3 AES-256-GCM (per-row salt + nonce)
|
|
// via internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet. The encryption key reuses
|
|
// CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY. The legacy plaintext columns are
|
|
// kept nullable for backward compat with in-flight handshakes during
|
|
// rolling deploys; the new write path NEVER populates them.
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// PreLoginRepository is the postgres implementation of
|
|
// repository.PreLoginRepository.
|
|
type PreLoginRepository struct {
|
|
db *sql.DB
|
|
encryptionKey string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// NewPreLoginRepository constructs a PreLoginRepository.
|
|
//
|
|
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-5: encryptionKey is the same
|
|
// CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY value already used for OIDC client
|
|
// secrets and SessionSigningKey material. An empty key is rejected at
|
|
// startup by config validation; if the repo is constructed with an
|
|
// empty key here it will fail-closed at write time (see Create), so
|
|
// pre-login rows can never be silently persisted plaintext.
|
|
func NewPreLoginRepository(db *sql.DB, encryptionKey string) *PreLoginRepository {
|
|
return &PreLoginRepository{db: db, encryptionKey: encryptionKey}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Create persists a pre-login row. Caller MUST have already generated
|
|
// the random id (`pl-<base64url>`), state, nonce, and PKCE verifier.
|
|
// CreatedAt + AbsoluteExpiresAt default to NOW() / NOW()+10min when
|
|
// zero (the schema's DEFAULT clauses handle this).
|
|
//
|
|
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-5: state / nonce / pkce_verifier are encrypted
|
|
// before INSERT via crypto.EncryptIfKeySet. The plaintext columns are
|
|
// left NULL — they remain on the schema only for in-flight backward
|
|
// compat with pre-deploy code paths that still write them, and will
|
|
// be dropped in a follow-up migration after the rolling deploy.
|
|
func (r *PreLoginRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, p *repository.PreLoginSession) error {
|
|
stateEnc, _, serr := cryptopkg.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(p.State), r.encryptionKey)
|
|
if serr != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login encrypt state: %w", serr)
|
|
}
|
|
nonceEnc, _, nerr := cryptopkg.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(p.Nonce), r.encryptionKey)
|
|
if nerr != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login encrypt nonce: %w", nerr)
|
|
}
|
|
verifierEnc, _, verr := cryptopkg.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(p.PKCEVerifier), r.encryptionKey)
|
|
if verr != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login encrypt pkce_verifier: %w", verr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if p.CreatedAt.IsZero() && p.AbsoluteExpiresAt.IsZero() {
|
|
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO oidc_pre_login_sessions (
|
|
id, tenant_id, signing_key_id, oidc_provider_id,
|
|
state_enc, nonce_enc, pkce_verifier_enc
|
|
) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7)`,
|
|
p.ID, p.TenantID, p.SigningKeyID, p.OIDCProviderID,
|
|
stateEnc, nonceEnc, verifierEnc)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login create: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// Read back created_at + absolute_expires_at so callers see the
|
|
// schema-default values.
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
|
|
`SELECT created_at, absolute_expires_at FROM oidc_pre_login_sessions WHERE id = $1`, p.ID)
|
|
if err := row.Scan(&p.CreatedAt, &p.AbsoluteExpiresAt); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login create read-back: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
|
|
INSERT INTO oidc_pre_login_sessions (
|
|
id, tenant_id, signing_key_id, oidc_provider_id,
|
|
state_enc, nonce_enc, pkce_verifier_enc, created_at, absolute_expires_at
|
|
) VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9)`,
|
|
p.ID, p.TenantID, p.SigningKeyID, p.OIDCProviderID,
|
|
stateEnc, nonceEnc, verifierEnc, p.CreatedAt, p.AbsoluteExpiresAt)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login create: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// LookupAndConsume reads the row by id and atomically deletes it
|
|
// (single-use). Returns ErrPreLoginNotFound on miss; ErrPreLoginExpired
|
|
// when the row was found but past its TTL (the row is still deleted in
|
|
// this case so the second attempt with the same cookie maps to
|
|
// not-found rather than re-running the expiry check).
|
|
//
|
|
// Implementation note: the DELETE ... RETURNING is wrapped in a
|
|
// transaction with REPEATABLE READ so the row read + delete is atomic
|
|
// against concurrent callers — the second caller racing with a
|
|
// successful first caller gets ErrPreLoginNotFound, never a duplicate
|
|
// session-mint.
|
|
//
|
|
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-5: prefer the encrypted columns
|
|
// (state_enc / nonce_enc / pkce_verifier_enc); fall back to the
|
|
// legacy plaintext columns ONLY when the encrypted columns are NULL
|
|
// (in-flight rows from pre-deploy code paths during a rolling
|
|
// deploy). After 000042 drops the plaintext columns, the fallback is
|
|
// dead code.
|
|
func (r *PreLoginRepository) LookupAndConsume(ctx context.Context, id string) (*repository.PreLoginSession, error) {
|
|
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
DELETE FROM oidc_pre_login_sessions WHERE id = $1
|
|
RETURNING id, tenant_id, signing_key_id, oidc_provider_id,
|
|
state, nonce, pkce_verifier,
|
|
state_enc, nonce_enc, pkce_verifier_enc,
|
|
created_at, absolute_expires_at`,
|
|
id)
|
|
|
|
var p repository.PreLoginSession
|
|
var statePlain, noncePlain, verifierPlain sql.NullString
|
|
var stateEnc, nonceEnc, verifierEnc []byte
|
|
if err := row.Scan(
|
|
&p.ID, &p.TenantID, &p.SigningKeyID, &p.OIDCProviderID,
|
|
&statePlain, &noncePlain, &verifierPlain,
|
|
&stateEnc, &nonceEnc, &verifierEnc,
|
|
&p.CreatedAt, &p.AbsoluteExpiresAt,
|
|
); err != nil {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return nil, repository.ErrPreLoginNotFound
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login lookup_and_consume: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prefer encrypted columns; fall back to legacy plaintext only
|
|
// when encrypted is NULL (rolling-deploy compat).
|
|
if state, err := r.materialize(stateEnc, statePlain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login decrypt state: %w", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
p.State = state
|
|
}
|
|
if nonce, err := r.materialize(nonceEnc, noncePlain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login decrypt nonce: %w", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
p.Nonce = nonce
|
|
}
|
|
if verifier, err := r.materialize(verifierEnc, verifierPlain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login decrypt pkce_verifier: %w", err)
|
|
} else {
|
|
p.PKCEVerifier = verifier
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if time.Now().UTC().After(p.AbsoluteExpiresAt) {
|
|
return nil, repository.ErrPreLoginExpired
|
|
}
|
|
return &p, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// materialize returns the decrypted value when the encrypted blob is
|
|
// present; otherwise falls back to the legacy plaintext column for
|
|
// rolling-deploy compat. Returns an error when both are absent —
|
|
// inconsistent row state that should never persist beyond a deploy.
|
|
func (r *PreLoginRepository) materialize(enc []byte, plain sql.NullString) (string, error) {
|
|
if len(enc) > 0 {
|
|
decrypted, err := cryptopkg.DecryptIfKeySet(enc, r.encryptionKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return string(decrypted), nil
|
|
}
|
|
if plain.Valid {
|
|
return plain.String, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return "", errors.New("row missing both encrypted and plaintext value")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GarbageCollectExpired deletes rows whose absolute_expires_at is in
|
|
// the past. Returns the count deleted. Wired into the same scheduler
|
|
// sweep as expired post-login sessions.
|
|
func (r *PreLoginRepository) GarbageCollectExpired(ctx context.Context) (int, error) {
|
|
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx,
|
|
`DELETE FROM oidc_pre_login_sessions WHERE absolute_expires_at < NOW()`)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, fmt.Errorf("oidc_pre_login gc: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
|
|
return int(n), nil
|
|
}
|