certctl/docs/operator/approval-workflow.md

Issuance approval workflow

certctl can gate certificate issuance + renewal on a per-profile, two-person-integrity check. Compliance customers (PCI-DSS Level 1, FedRAMP Moderate / High, SOC 2 Type II, HIPAA) configure this on production-tier CertificateProfile rows so every renewal-loop tick or manual POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew blocks at JobStatusAwaitingApproval until a different actor approves.

Closes the procurement-checklist question "How do you enforce two-person integrity on cert issuance?" — without this surface the answer is "we don't"; with requires_approval=true on the profile, the answer is "here's the RBAC contract + here's the audit query that proves bypass mode is off in production."

End-to-end flow

sequenceDiagram
    autonumber
    participant A as Operator A<br/>(or scheduler)
    participant SVC as CertificateService<br/>.TriggerRenewal
    participant JOB as Job + ApprovalRequest
    participant B as Operator B
    participant APR as ApprovalService.Approve
    participant SCH as Scheduler

    A->>SVC: POST /api/v1/certificates/{id}/renew<br/>(or renewal-loop tick)
    SVC->>JOB: read profile.RequiresApproval;<br/>create Job @ JobStatusAwaitingApproval;<br/>create ApprovalRequest<br/>(state=pending, requested_by=Operator A)
    Note over JOB,SCH: Scheduler skips —<br/>AwaitingApproval is NOT a dispatchable status
    B->>JOB: GET /api/v1/approvals?state=pending
    B->>APR: POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/approve<br/>(decided_by=Operator B, note=...)
    APR->>APR: RBAC: reject if Operator B == Operator A<br/>→ ErrApproveBySameActor (HTTP 403)
    APR->>JOB: ApprovalRequest → state=approved;<br/>Job AwaitingApproval → Pending;<br/>audit row (action=approval_approved,<br/>actor=Operator B);<br/>certctl_approval_decisions_total<br/>{outcome=approved,profile_id=...}++
    SCH->>JOB: pick up Pending → dispatch to issuer connector
    JOB-->>A: cert issues normally

Configuration

Set requires_approval=true on a CertificateProfile:

curl -X PUT https://certctl/api/v1/profiles/p-prod-cdn \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
        "name": "Production CDN",
        "requires_approval": true,
        ...
      }'

Every certificate bound to that profile is now gated. The default is requires_approval=false — existing profiles keep the historical unattended renewal path.

RBAC: the two-person integrity rule

The actor that triggers a renewal cannot be the actor that approves it. The check happens at the service layer and surfaces as HTTP 403 at the handler. The error message contains the substring two-person integrity so server-log greps detect attempted self-approvals.

This is the load-bearing compliance contract. Pinned by:

• internal/service/approval_test.go::TestApproval_Approve_RejectsSameActor — service-level pin.
• internal/api/handler/approval_test.go::TestApproval_HandlerApproveAsSameActor_Returns403 — handler-level pin (HTTP 403 + body contains "two-person integrity").

Operator playbook: "I need to approve a renewal"

# 1. Find the pending request
curl -s "https://certctl/api/v1/approvals?state=pending" \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" | jq

# 2. Inspect the request — confirm CN, SANs, requester
curl -s "https://certctl/api/v1/approvals/ar-abc123" \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" | jq

# 3. Approve as a different actor than the requester
curl -X POST "https://certctl/api/v1/approvals/ar-abc123/approve" \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer $APPROVER_API_KEY" \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -d '{"note":"approved per ticket SECOPS-12345"}'

# 4. Confirm the job transitioned to Pending
curl -s "https://certctl/api/v1/jobs?certificate_id=mc-foo" \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" | jq '.[] | {id,status,type}'

To reject instead, swap the path: POST /api/v1/approvals/{id}/reject with the same body shape. The job transitions to Cancelled and the note is recorded in the audit row.

Operator playbook: "approval timed out"

The scheduler reaper transitions stale pending requests + their linked jobs after CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT (default 168h = 7 days):

• ApprovalRequest.state → expired
• Job.Status → Cancelled (with error_message="approval expired")
• One audit row per expiry (action=approval_expired, actor=system-reaper, actorType=System)
• certctl_approval_decisions_total{outcome="expired",profile_id="..."} increments

Resolve by re-triggering the renewal once the underlying delay is sorted:

curl -X POST "https://certctl/api/v1/certificates/mc-foo/renew" \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY"

Tighten the timeout for short-window deployments via the env var, e.g. CERTCTL_JOB_AWAITING_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT=24h.

Compliance control mapping

Standard	Control	What this surface satisfies
PCI-DSS 4.0	§6.4.5 (Separation of duties for production change-management)	Same-actor RBAC pin; audit row carries both requested_by and decided_by so reviewers see two distinct identities per change.
NIST SP 800-53	SA-15 (Development process; two-person review for security-relevant changes)	Service-layer ErrApproveBySameActor + TestApproval_Approve_RejectsSameActor pin the contract. Bypass-mode emits a typed audit row (action=approval_bypassed) so compliance reviewers detect dev-mode misuse via SELECT count(*) FROM audit_events WHERE actor='system-bypass' returning > 0.
SOC 2 Type II	CC6.1 (Logical access — restrict, monitor, terminate)	Per-decision audit row + certctl_approval_decisions_total{outcome,profile_id} Prometheus counter. Operators alert on sustained outcome="rejected" or outcome="expired" bursts.
HIPAA	§164.308(a)(4) (Information access management)	Same surface — the per-policy gating + audit trail is the access-management control.

Bypass mode (dev / CI ONLY)

Setting CERTCTL_APPROVAL_BYPASS=true short-circuits the workflow: every RequestApproval call auto-approves with decided_by=system-bypass and actorType=System. Used by dev / CI to keep renewal-scheduler tests fast without standing up an approver.

Production deploys MUST leave this unset. The bypass emits a typed audit event (action=approval_bypassed) so compliance auditors detect misuse via:

SELECT count(*) FROM audit_events WHERE actor = 'system-bypass';

returning zero rows in production and a high count in dev. The certctl-server logs a WARN line at boot when bypass is enabled — operators alert on that log line in production environments.

Prometheus metrics

certctl_approval_decisions_total{outcome,profile_id}        counter
certctl_approval_pending_age_seconds                        histogram
                                  (le buckets:
                                    60, 300, 1800, 3600,
                                    21600, 86400, +Inf)

outcome is one of approved, rejected, expired, bypassed. profile_id is the CertificateProfile.ID that triggered the gate (cardinality-bounded — operators have <100 profiles in production).

The pending-age histogram observes seconds-since-creation at the moment of decision. Alert when p99 hits hours/days — compliance customers usually have a same-day decision deadline.

Future free V2 work

• M-of-N approver chains. Today's primitive is single-approver. Future V2 work adds chains — e.g., "needs 2 of 3 platform-team members."
• Time-windowed auto-approve. Today's reaper hard-cancels at the static deadline. Policy-driven time-windowed auto-approve (T+30m unattended → cancel; T+24h business hours → escalate) is future work.
• External ticketing integration. ServiceNow / JIRA bridging so approval state mirrors the change-management record.
• Per-owner / per-team routing. Today's pool is global. Per-owner / per-team routing matches cert ownership to approver pools.
• Approval delegation. Today the same-actor rule is strict. Time-bounded delegation is future work.

Tracked in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md under the Future Free V2 Work section — every item ships free under BSL.