Files
certctl/internal/service/certificate.go
T
shankar0123 0e06f6c4fc cli: promote --force on renew + require --reason on revoke (closes P3-1, P3-2)
Closes findings P3-1 and P3-2 from the 2026-05-05 CLI/API/MCP↔GUI parity
audit (cowork/cli-gui-parity-audit-2026-05-05/RESULTS.md). Both findings
flagged hidden defaults that the CLI was sending without exposing them
to operators: `force=false` baked into every renew payload, and a silent
fallback to `reason="unspecified"` whenever --reason was omitted.

P3-1 — promote --force on `certs renew` (full end-to-end plumbing)

The pre-2026-05-05 CLI sent `{"force": false}` in the renew body. The
API handler never decoded it — a textbook "lying field" per the
operator's CLAUDE.md "complete path, not the easy path" rule: the body
field stored a value, claimed to do something, and silently did nothing
because the wire never reached the consumer. Adding a --force flag that
also went unread would have created another lying field.

This commit takes the complete path:

  service.CertificateService.TriggerRenewal grew a `force bool` parameter
  (internal/service/certificate.go). When force=true, the
  RenewalInProgress block is overridden so operators can recover stuck
  in-flight renewals where a previous job hung without releasing the
  status flag. Archived and Expired remain terminal blockers regardless
  of force — those are semantic dead-ends that --force should not paper
  over (archived = decommissioned, expired = issue a new cert instead of
  renewing a dead one).

  handler.CertificateHandler.TriggerRenewal parses force from
  ?force=true (or ?force=1) query param, OR {"force": true} JSON body,
  whichever the client picks. Defaults to false. Passes through to the
  service.

  internal/cli/client.go::RenewCertificate(id, force bool) sends
  ?force=true on the URL when --force is set. The historical hardcoded
  `{"force": false}` body is gone — no more lying field.

  cmd/cli/main.go dispatches `certs renew <id> [--force]` (ID-first
  flag-second convention matches the existing `agents retire <id>
  [--force]`).

P3-2 — require --reason on `certs revoke` (Option A: strict refusal)

The pre-2026-05-05 CLI dropped to `--reason unspecified` whenever the
operator omitted the flag. Compliance reporting (RFC 5280 §5.3.1, PCI-
DSS §3.6, HIPAA §164.312) relies on the reason code being meaningful;
silent fallback defeats the audit trail because every revocation looks
identical.

  cmd/cli/main.go dispatch refuses to send when --reason is empty,
  prints the canonical RFC 5280 §5.3.1 reason-code menu, and exits
  non-zero.

  internal/cli/client.go exposes ValidRevokeReasons() returning the
  canonical camelCase list (unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise,
  affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold,
  removeFromCRL, privilegeWithdrawn, aaCompromise) and
  NormalizeRevokeReason() that accepts both camelCase and snake_case
  inputs and normalises to the canonical wire form. Off-list reasons
  are rejected at dispatch with the menu re-printed.

Test pins:

  internal/cli/client_test.go::TestClient_RenewCertificate_ForceFlag —
  --force=true sends ?force=true with empty body; --force=false sends
  no query and no body.

  internal/cli/client_test.go::TestNormalizeRevokeReason +
  TestValidRevokeReasons — canonical-camelCase + snake_case + reject-
  off-enum behaviour.

  cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go::TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RequiresReason +
  TestHandleCerts_Revoke_RejectsUnknownReason +
  TestHandleCerts_Renew_ForceFlag — dispatch-layer pins for the same
  contracts.

  internal/api/handler/certificate_handler_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
  ForceQueryParam — query-param passthrough (no-flag, force=true,
  force=1, force=false) flows through to the service-layer parameter.

  internal/service/certificate_test.go::TestTriggerRenewal_
  ForceOverridesInProgress — force=false preserves the
  RenewalInProgress block; force=true clears it.

  Existing TestTriggerRenewal_Archived extended to assert force=true
  still blocks Archived (terminal-state guarantee).

Docs: docs/reference/cli.md updated with the --force example for renew
and the strict --reason semantics for revoke (including snake_case
input acceptance).

Acceptance gate (verified):
  - go build ./cmd/server/... ./cmd/agent/... ./cmd/cli/...
    ./cmd/mcp-server/... clean.
  - go vet ./... clean.
  - go test -short -count=1 ./... pass repo-wide.
  - bash scripts/ci-guards/openapi-handler-parity.sh clean
    (router 178, OpenAPI 144, exceptions 36 — unchanged; we add
    parameter parsing, not routes).
  - gofmt -l clean.
2026-05-05 19:49:34 +00:00

685 lines
25 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// CertificateService provides business logic for certificate management.
type CertificateService struct {
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository
targetRepo repository.TargetRepository
jobRepo repository.JobRepository
policyService *PolicyService
auditService *AuditService
revSvc *RevocationSvc
caSvc *CAOperationsSvc
// tx, when set, wraps the issuance write (cert insert + audit row)
// in a single transaction so the audit row cannot be silently lost
// after a successful cert insert. Closes the #3 audit-readiness
// blocker (atomic audit rows). Optional via SetTransactor — when
// nil, Create falls back to the legacy non-transactional path
// (cert.Create + best-effort RecordEvent) for backward compatibility.
tx repository.Transactor
// crlCacheSvc, when set, makes GenerateDERCRL serve from the
// pre-generated cache instead of regenerating per request. Bundle
// CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 4. Optional; when nil GenerateDERCRL
// falls back to the historical on-demand path via caSvc.
crlCacheSvc *CRLCacheService
keygenMode string
// approvalSvc + profileRepo, when both set, gate TriggerRenewal on
// CertificateProfile.RequiresApproval. The job is created at
// JobStatusAwaitingApproval (rather than Pending / AwaitingCSR) and
// a parallel ApprovalRequest row is created via approvalSvc. The
// scheduler does NOT dispatch until ApprovalService.Approve
// transitions the job to Pending. Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03
// Infisical deep-research deliverable. Both setters are optional —
// when either is nil, gating is skipped and TriggerRenewal falls
// back to the historical unattended path.
approvalSvc *ApprovalService
profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
}
// NewCertificateService creates a new certificate service.
func NewCertificateService(
certRepo repository.CertificateRepository,
policyService *PolicyService,
auditService *AuditService,
) *CertificateService {
return &CertificateService{
certRepo: certRepo,
policyService: policyService,
auditService: auditService,
}
}
// SetTransactor wires a Transactor for atomic issuance (cert insert +
// audit row) and atomic revocation (cert update + revocation row + audit
// row). Closes the #3 acquisition-readiness blocker from the 2026-05-01
// issuer coverage audit. Optional — when nil, Create falls back to the
// legacy non-transactional path for backward compat with callers that
// haven't been updated.
func (s *CertificateService) SetTransactor(tx repository.Transactor) {
s.tx = tx
}
// SetRevocationSvc sets the revocation service.
func (s *CertificateService) SetRevocationSvc(svc *RevocationSvc) {
s.revSvc = svc
}
// SetCAOperationsSvc sets the CA operations service.
func (s *CertificateService) SetCAOperationsSvc(svc *CAOperationsSvc) {
s.caSvc = svc
}
// SetCRLCacheSvc wires the CRL cache service. When set, GenerateDERCRL
// reads from the scheduler-pre-generated cache (cheap DB lookup) and
// only triggers an on-demand regeneration on cache miss / staleness.
// When unset, GenerateDERCRL falls back to the historical per-request
// regeneration via caSvc.
//
// Bundle CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 4.
func (s *CertificateService) SetCRLCacheSvc(svc *CRLCacheService) {
s.crlCacheSvc = svc
}
// SetTargetRepo sets the target repository for deployment queries.
func (s *CertificateService) SetTargetRepo(repo repository.TargetRepository) {
s.targetRepo = repo
}
// SetJobRepo sets the job repository for creating renewal/issuance jobs.
func (s *CertificateService) SetJobRepo(repo repository.JobRepository) {
s.jobRepo = repo
}
// SetKeygenMode sets the key generation mode (agent or server).
func (s *CertificateService) SetKeygenMode(mode string) {
s.keygenMode = mode
}
// SetApprovalService wires the approval-workflow service. When both this
// and SetProfileRepo are wired, TriggerRenewal gates on
// CertificateProfile.RequiresApproval. Rank 7 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical
// deep-research deliverable.
func (s *CertificateService) SetApprovalService(svc *ApprovalService) {
s.approvalSvc = svc
}
// SetProfileRepo wires the certificate-profile repository for the
// approval-workflow gate. Without it, TriggerRenewal cannot read the
// per-profile RequiresApproval flag and gating is skipped.
func (s *CertificateService) SetProfileRepo(repo repository.CertificateProfileRepository) {
s.profileRepo = repo
}
// List returns a paginated list of certificates matching the filter.
func (s *CertificateService) List(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]*domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
certs, total, err := s.certRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificates: %w", err)
}
return certs, total, nil
}
// ListCertificatesWithFilter returns a list of certificates with advanced filtering (M20).
// This method supports the new M20 filters and returns domain.ManagedCertificate (not pointers).
func (s *CertificateService) ListCertificatesWithFilter(ctx context.Context, filter *repository.CertificateFilter) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int, error) {
certs, total, err := s.certRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificates with filter: %w", err)
}
// Convert pointers to values for handler compatibility
result := make([]domain.ManagedCertificate, len(certs))
for i, cert := range certs {
result[i] = *cert
}
return result, total, nil
}
// Get retrieves a certificate by ID.
func (s *CertificateService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get certificate %s: %w", id, err)
}
return cert, nil
}
// Create validates and stores a new certificate.
func (s *CertificateService) Create(ctx context.Context, cert *domain.ManagedCertificate, actor string) error {
// Validate certificate structure
if cert.ID == "" || cert.CommonName == "" || cert.IssuerID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid certificate: missing required fields")
}
// Run policy validation
violations, err := s.policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("policy validation failed: %w", err)
}
if len(violations) > 0 {
// Record violations but do not block creation
for _, v := range violations {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"policy_violation_detected", "certificate", cert.ID,
map[string]interface{}{"rule_id": v.RuleID, "message": v.Message}); auditErr != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
}
auditDetails := map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}
// Atomic path (production): cert insert + audit row in a single
// transaction. Closes the #3 audit-readiness blocker — if the audit
// insert fails after the cert insert, the cert insert rolls back so
// the operator sees the failure and the audit trail is never silently
// incomplete.
if s.tx != nil {
return s.tx.WithinTx(ctx, func(q repository.Querier) error {
if err := s.certRepo.CreateWithTx(ctx, q, cert); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create certificate: %w", err)
}
if err := s.auditService.RecordEventWithTx(ctx, q, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"certificate_created", "certificate", cert.ID, auditDetails); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to record audit event: %w", err)
}
return nil
})
}
// Legacy non-transactional path — kept for callers that haven't
// wired SetTransactor yet. Fails open on audit-insert failure (logs
// and returns success), which is the pre-fix behavior; do not
// rely on this path for compliance-relevant audit trails.
if err := s.certRepo.Create(ctx, cert); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create certificate: %w", err)
}
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"certificate_created", "certificate", cert.ID, auditDetails); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
}
return nil
}
// Update modifies an existing certificate.
func (s *CertificateService) Update(ctx context.Context, cert *domain.ManagedCertificate, actor string) error {
existing, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, cert.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch existing certificate: %w", err)
}
// Run policy validation on updated cert
violations, err := s.policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("policy validation failed: %w", err)
}
if len(violations) > 0 {
for _, v := range violations {
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"policy_violation_detected", "certificate", cert.ID,
map[string]interface{}{"rule_id": v.RuleID, "message": v.Message}); auditErr != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
}
}
}
// Store updated certificate
if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, cert); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate: %w", err)
}
// Record audit event with diff info
changes := map[string]interface{}{}
if existing.Status != cert.Status {
changes["status"] = fmt.Sprintf("%s -> %s", existing.Status, cert.Status)
}
if existing.ExpiresAt != cert.ExpiresAt {
changes["expiry"] = fmt.Sprintf("%s -> %s", existing.ExpiresAt, cert.ExpiresAt)
}
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"certificate_updated", "certificate", cert.ID, changes); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
}
return nil
}
// Archive marks a certificate as archived.
func (s *CertificateService) Archive(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) error {
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
}
if err := s.certRepo.Archive(ctx, id); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to archive certificate: %w", err)
}
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"certificate_archived", "certificate", id,
map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
}
return nil
}
// GetVersions returns all versions of a certificate.
func (s *CertificateService) GetVersions(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]*domain.CertificateVersion, error) {
versions, err := s.certRepo.ListVersions(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificate versions: %w", err)
}
return versions, nil
}
// TriggerRenewal initiates a renewal job if the certificate is eligible.
// Creates a Renewal job (or Issuance for new certs) so the scheduler's job processor
// can pick it up and route it through the issuer connector.
//
// 2026-05-05 parity-defaults-cleanup (P3-1): the `force` parameter, when
// true, overrides the RenewalInProgress block — operators use this to
// recover from a stuck in-flight renewal where the previous job hung
// without releasing the status flag. Archived and Expired remain terminal
// blockers regardless of force; those are semantic dead-ends (archived =
// "this cert is decommissioned", expired = "issue a new cert, don't renew
// a dead one") that --force should not paper over.
func (s *CertificateService) TriggerRenewal(ctx context.Context, certID string, actor string, force bool) error {
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
}
// Validate eligibility
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusArchived {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot renew archived certificate")
}
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusExpired {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot renew expired certificate; reissue instead")
}
// Check if already renewing — overridable with force=true so operators
// can clear stuck in-flight renewals.
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusRenewalInProgress && !force {
return fmt.Errorf("certificate renewal already in progress")
}
// Update status
cert.Status = domain.CertificateStatusRenewalInProgress
if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, cert); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate status: %w", err)
}
// Create a renewal job so the job processor can pick it up.
// In agent keygen mode, the job starts as AwaitingCSR so the agent
// generates the key pair and submits a CSR. In server mode, it starts as Pending.
//
// Rank 7: if the cert's profile has RequiresApproval=true and the
// approval service + profile repo are wired, the job is created at
// JobStatusAwaitingApproval (overriding the keygen-mode default) and
// a parallel ApprovalRequest row is created. The scheduler does NOT
// dispatch until ApprovalService.Approve transitions the job to
// Pending. Profile lookup failures fall back to the historical
// unattended path so a transient profile-repo error never silently
// blocks renewal — the gate is fail-open from the operator's
// perspective + fail-loud via the slog warning.
if s.jobRepo != nil {
needsApproval := false
var approvalProfileID string
if s.approvalSvc != nil && s.profileRepo != nil && cert.CertificateProfileID != "" {
profile, profileErr := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, cert.CertificateProfileID)
if profileErr != nil {
slog.Warn("approval gate: profile lookup failed; falling back to unattended path",
"cert_id", cert.ID, "profile_id", cert.CertificateProfileID, "error", profileErr)
} else if profile != nil && profile.RequiresApproval {
needsApproval = true
approvalProfileID = profile.ID
}
}
jobStatus := domain.JobStatusPending
switch {
case needsApproval:
jobStatus = domain.JobStatusAwaitingApproval
case s.keygenMode == "agent":
jobStatus = domain.JobStatusAwaitingCSR
}
// Determine job type: Issuance for certs that have never been issued,
// Renewal for certs that already have a version.
jobType := domain.JobTypeRenewal
if cert.ExpiresAt.IsZero() || cert.ExpiresAt.Year() < 2000 {
jobType = domain.JobTypeIssuance
}
job := &domain.Job{
ID: generateID("job"),
CertificateID: cert.ID,
Type: jobType,
Status: jobStatus,
MaxAttempts: 3,
ScheduledAt: time.Now(),
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
}
if err := s.jobRepo.Create(ctx, job); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to create renewal job", "cert_id", cert.ID, "error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create renewal job: %w", err)
}
// Create the parallel ApprovalRequest row. If RequestApproval fails,
// transition the job to Cancelled so the scheduler doesn't dispatch
// a half-gated request (defense in depth — without this, a partial
// failure would leave the job at AwaitingApproval forever, blocking
// renewal until the operator manually intervenes).
if needsApproval {
metadata := map[string]string{
"common_name": cert.CommonName,
}
if _, apErr := s.approvalSvc.RequestApproval(ctx, cert, job.ID, approvalProfileID, actor, metadata); apErr != nil {
slog.Error("approval gate: failed to create ApprovalRequest row; cancelling gated job",
"cert_id", cert.ID, "job_id", job.ID, "error", apErr)
if cancelErr := s.jobRepo.UpdateStatus(ctx, job.ID, domain.JobStatusCancelled,
"approval request creation failed: "+apErr.Error()); cancelErr != nil {
slog.Error("approval gate: also failed to cancel orphan job",
"cert_id", cert.ID, "job_id", job.ID, "error", cancelErr)
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create approval request: %w", apErr)
}
slog.Info("approval gate fired", "cert_id", cert.ID, "job_id", job.ID,
"profile_id", approvalProfileID, "requested_by", actor)
}
slog.Info("created renewal job via API trigger",
"job_id", job.ID,
"cert_id", cert.ID,
"job_type", string(jobType),
"job_status", string(jobStatus),
"keygen_mode", s.keygenMode)
}
// Record audit event
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"renewal_triggered", "certificate", certID,
map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
}
return nil
}
// TriggerDeployment creates deployment jobs for all targets of a certificate.
// The targetID parameter is accepted from the handler interface but currently unused;
// deployment coordination happens per-certificate across all of its targets.
func (s *CertificateService) TriggerDeployment(ctx context.Context, certID string, targetID string, actor string) error {
_ = targetID
cert, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to fetch certificate: %w", err)
}
if cert.Status == domain.CertificateStatusArchived {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot deploy archived certificate")
}
// Note: In practice, the DeploymentService would be called to create jobs.
// This is a placeholder for the coordination logic.
if err := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser,
"deployment_triggered", "certificate", certID,
map[string]interface{}{"common_name": cert.CommonName}); err != nil {
slog.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", err)
}
return nil
}
// ListCertificates returns paginated certificates with optional filtering (handler interface method).
func (s *CertificateService) ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, status, environment, ownerID, teamID, issuerID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.ManagedCertificate, int64, error) {
if page < 1 {
page = 1
}
if perPage < 1 {
perPage = 50
}
// Build filter for repository
filter := &repository.CertificateFilter{
Status: status,
Environment: environment,
OwnerID: ownerID,
TeamID: teamID,
IssuerID: issuerID,
Page: page,
PerPage: perPage,
}
certs, total, err := s.certRepo.List(ctx, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificates: %w", err)
}
var result []domain.ManagedCertificate
for _, c := range certs {
if c != nil {
result = append(result, *c)
}
}
return result, int64(total), nil
}
// GetCertificate returns a single certificate (handler interface method).
func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
return s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
}
// CreateCertificate creates a new certificate (handler interface method).
func (s *CertificateService) CreateCertificate(ctx context.Context, cert domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
if cert.ID == "" {
cert.ID = generateID("cert")
}
now := time.Now()
if cert.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
cert.CreatedAt = now
}
if cert.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
cert.UpdatedAt = now
}
// Default status to Pending if not set (DB column DEFAULT only applies when column is omitted from INSERT)
if cert.Status == "" {
cert.Status = domain.CertificateStatusPending
}
// Default tags to empty map if nil (avoids JSON null in JSONB column)
if cert.Tags == nil {
cert.Tags = make(map[string]string)
}
if err := s.certRepo.Create(ctx, &cert); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create certificate: %w", err)
}
return &cert, nil
}
// UpdateCertificate modifies a certificate (handler interface method).
func (s *CertificateService) UpdateCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string, patch domain.ManagedCertificate) (*domain.ManagedCertificate, error) {
// Fetch existing certificate so partial updates don't zero out fields
existing, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, id)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
}
// Merge non-zero fields from patch into existing
if patch.Name != "" {
existing.Name = patch.Name
}
if patch.CommonName != "" {
existing.CommonName = patch.CommonName
}
if len(patch.SANs) > 0 {
existing.SANs = patch.SANs
}
if patch.Environment != "" {
existing.Environment = patch.Environment
}
if patch.OwnerID != "" {
existing.OwnerID = patch.OwnerID
}
if patch.TeamID != "" {
existing.TeamID = patch.TeamID
}
if patch.IssuerID != "" {
existing.IssuerID = patch.IssuerID
}
if patch.RenewalPolicyID != "" {
existing.RenewalPolicyID = patch.RenewalPolicyID
}
if patch.CertificateProfileID != "" {
existing.CertificateProfileID = patch.CertificateProfileID
}
if patch.Status != "" {
existing.Status = patch.Status
}
if patch.Tags != nil {
existing.Tags = patch.Tags
}
existing.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
if err := s.certRepo.Update(ctx, existing); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update certificate: %w", err)
}
return existing, nil
}
// ArchiveCertificate marks a certificate as archived (handler interface method).
func (s *CertificateService) ArchiveCertificate(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return s.certRepo.Archive(ctx, id)
}
// GetCertificateVersions returns certificate versions (handler interface method).
func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificateVersions(ctx context.Context, certID string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.CertificateVersion, int64, error) {
if page < 1 {
page = 1
}
if perPage < 1 {
perPage = 50
}
versions, err := s.certRepo.ListVersions(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list certificate versions: %w", err)
}
total := int64(len(versions))
start := (page - 1) * perPage
if start >= int(total) {
return nil, total, nil
}
end := start + perPage
if end > int(total) {
end = int(total)
}
var result []domain.CertificateVersion
for _, v := range versions[start:end] {
if v != nil {
result = append(result, *v)
}
}
return result, total, nil
}
// RevokeCertificate performs revocation with actor tracking. Delegates to RevocationSvc.
func (s *CertificateService) RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, certID string, reason string, actor string) error {
if s.revSvc == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("revocation service not configured")
}
return s.revSvc.RevokeCertificateWithActor(ctx, certID, reason, actor)
}
// GetRevokedCertificates returns all revoked certificate records (for CRL generation).
// Delegates to RevocationSvc.
func (s *CertificateService) GetRevokedCertificates(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateRevocation, error) {
if s.revSvc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("revocation service not configured")
}
return s.revSvc.GetRevokedCertificates(ctx)
}
// GenerateDERCRL returns the DER-encoded X.509 CRL for the given
// issuer. When the CRL cache service is wired (SetCRLCacheSvc), reads
// from the scheduler-pre-generated cache and only regenerates on miss
// / staleness — the cache layer's singleflight gate collapses
// concurrent miss requests to a single underlying generation.
//
// When the cache service is not wired, falls back to the historical
// on-demand path via CAOperationsSvc.GenerateDERCRL — every HTTP fetch
// triggers a fresh generation.
//
// Backward-compatible: existing callers that don't wire the cache see
// no behavioural change.
func (s *CertificateService) GenerateDERCRL(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) ([]byte, error) {
if s.crlCacheSvc != nil {
der, _, err := s.crlCacheSvc.Get(ctx, issuerID)
return der, err
}
if s.caSvc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CA operations service not configured")
}
return s.caSvc.GenerateDERCRL(ctx, issuerID)
}
// GetOCSPResponse generates a signed OCSP response for the given certificate serial.
// Back-compat wrapper around GetOCSPResponseWithNonce; passes nil nonce so the
// response omits the RFC 6960 §4.4.1 nonce extension.
func (s *CertificateService) GetOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string) ([]byte, error) {
return s.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx, issuerID, serialHex, nil)
}
// GetOCSPResponseWithNonce generates a signed OCSP response and (when
// nonce != nil) echoes the nonce in the response per RFC 6960 §4.4.1.
// Production hardening II Phase 1.
func (s *CertificateService) GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx context.Context, issuerID string, serialHex string, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if s.caSvc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("CA operations service not configured")
}
return s.caSvc.GetOCSPResponseWithNonce(ctx, issuerID, serialHex, nonce)
}
// GetCertificateDeployments returns all deployment targets for a certificate (M20).
func (s *CertificateService) GetCertificateDeployments(ctx context.Context, certID string) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
// Verify certificate exists
_, err := s.certRepo.Get(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate not found: %w", err)
}
if s.targetRepo == nil {
return []domain.DeploymentTarget{}, nil
}
// Get targets from repository
targets, err := s.targetRepo.ListByCertificate(ctx, certID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to list deployment targets: %w", err)
}
// Convert pointers to values
result := make([]domain.DeploymentTarget, len(targets))
for i, target := range targets {
result[i] = *target
}
return result, nil
}