Files
certctl/internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go
T
shankar0123 30f9f1e712 Bundle B: Auth & transport surface tightening — 5 findings closed
Closes M-001 + M-002 + M-013 + M-018 + M-025 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25.

M-001 (CWE-916) — PBKDF2 100k -> 600k via v3 blob format
  internal/crypto/encryption.go:
    - New v3Magic (0x03), pbkdf2IterationsV3 (600,000 — OWASP 2024
      Password Storage Cheat Sheet floor), v3SaltSize (16 bytes),
      deriveKeyWithSaltV3 helper.
    - EncryptIfKeySet now unconditionally writes v3:
        magic(0x03) || salt(16) || nonce(12) || ciphertext+tag
    - DecryptIfKeySet falls through v3 -> v2 -> v1 with AEAD verification
      at each step. Wrong-passphrase v3 reads cannot be silently
      misattributed to v2/v1.
    - IsLegacyFormat updated to recognize 0x03 as non-legacy.
  internal/crypto/encryption_v3_test.go (NEW, 7 tests):
    V3 round-trip / V2 read-fallback against deterministic v2 fixture /
    V3 wrong-passphrase fails / V3-vs-V2 dispatch order / V2 vs V3 keys
    differ for same (passphrase, salt) / iteration-count pin at OWASP
    2024 floor / IsLegacyFormat-recognises-V3.
  Coverage internal/crypto: 86.7% -> 88.2%.

M-002 (CWE-862) — Auth-exempt allowlist constants + AST regression test
  Recon found auth-exempt surface spans TWO layers (audit's claim was
  incomplete):
    Layer 1 (router.go direct r.mux.Handle):
      GET /health, GET /ready, GET /api/v1/auth/info, GET /api/v1/version
    Layer 2 (cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix dispatch):
      /.well-known/pki/*, /.well-known/est/*, /scep[/...]*
  internal/api/router/router.go:
    - New AuthExemptRouterRoutes constant with per-entry justifications.
    - New AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes constant.
  internal/api/router/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
    AST-walks router.go for every direct mux.Handle call and asserts
    set equals AuthExemptRouterRoutes; reads source bytes of Register /
    RegisterFunc and asserts they still wrap with middleware.Chain.
  cmd/server/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
    14-case table test on buildFinalHandler asserting documented
    prefixes route to noAuthHandler and authenticated routes route to
    apiHandler; inverse-overlap pin proves no documented bypass shadows
    an authenticated prefix.

M-013 (CWE-942) — CORS deny-by-default verified-already-clean + pin
  Audit claim 'default allows all origins if env-var unset' was WRONG.
  internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewCORS already denies cross-
  origin requests when len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 (no
  Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is emitted, same-origin policy
  applies).
  internal/api/middleware/cors_test.go: +TestNewCORS_NilOriginsDeniesAll
  + TestNewCORS_M013_ContractDocumentedInOrder (5-case table test
  pinning the 3-arm dispatch contract).

M-018 (CWE-319 / PCI-DSS Req 4) — Postgres TLS opt-in toggle
  deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: new postgresql.tls.{mode,caSecretRef}
    operator-facing knobs. Default 'disable' preserves in-cluster pod-
    network behavior; PCI-scoped operators set verify-full.
  deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: certctl.databaseURL helper
    pipes postgresql.tls.mode into ?sslmode=.
  deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-secret.yaml: uses the helper
    instead of hardcoded sslmode=disable.
  deploy/docker-compose.yml: CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL is now
    ${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-...} so operators override without editing.
  docs/database-tls.md (NEW): operator runbook covering 4 deployment
    shapes, RDS verify-full example with PGSSLROOTCERT mount, and
    pg_stat_ssl verification query.
  helm template + helm lint clean.

M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1) — Per-key rate limiting
  internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewRateLimiter rewritten from
  a single global tokenBucket to a keyedRateLimiter map keyed on
    'user:'+GetUser(ctx)  for authenticated callers
    'ip:'+RemoteAddr-host for unauthenticated
  - Empty UserKey strings treated as unauthenticated.
  - X-Forwarded-For intentionally NOT consulted (header-spoofing risk).
  - Create-on-demand bucket allocation under sync.RWMutex with double-
    check pattern.
  RateLimitConfig.PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize fields with env vars
    CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS / CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST
    allow per-user budgets distinct from per-IP.
  internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go (NEW, 5 tests):
    TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets / SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket /
    TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets / PerUserBudgetOverride /
    EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous.
  Coverage internal/api/middleware: 82.1% -> 83.7%.

Audit deliverables:
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
    25/55 -> 30/55 closed (High 7/9, Medium 7/27 -> 12/27, Low 8/19).
  cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 5 status flips
    open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle B mechanism.
  certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle B section under [unreleased].

Verification:
  go test -count=1 -short ./...                     all green
  staticcheck on changed packages                   no new SA*/ST* hits
    (the 4 pre-existing SA1019 sites in cmd/server/main_test.go are
    Bundle 9 / M-028 partial closure leftovers tracked in Bundle C)
  helm template + helm lint                         clean
  internal/repository/postgres setup-fail            sandbox disk pressure,
    same on master HEAD before this branch — environmental, not Bundle B
2026-04-26 23:09:10 +00:00

189 lines
6.3 KiB
Go

package middleware
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
)
// Bundle B / Audit M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1): per-key rate-limiter
// regression suite. Pre-bundle the limiter was global — a single noisy
// caller could exhaust everyone's budget. Post-bundle each authenticated
// user and each distinct IP gets an independent token bucket.
func newKeyedTestHandler(t *testing.T, cfg RateLimitConfig) http.Handler {
t.Helper()
return NewRateLimiter(cfg)(
http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}),
)
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets ensures one IP
// exhausting its bucket does not affect another IP.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
// IP A burns its single token.
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:54321"
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("IP A first request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// IP A's second request must 429.
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("IP A second request should 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// IP B's first request must still pass — independent bucket.
req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req2.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.2:54321"
rr2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr2, req2)
if rr2.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("IP B first request must pass (independent bucket); got %d", rr2.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket pins the keying
// rule that authenticated callers are bucketed by user identity, not by
// IP — so a user rotating between devices still shares one budget.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
mkReq := func(remote string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = remote
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "alice")
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
// Alice from IP X exhausts her bucket.
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.0.1:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("alice first request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// Alice from IP Y must 429 — same user-scoped bucket.
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.0.2:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("alice second request from different IP should still 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets pins the keying rule
// that two authenticated users share neither buckets nor side effects.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
mkReq := func(user string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.1:54321"
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, user)
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("alice"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("alice first request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("alice"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Fatalf("alice second request should 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// Bob shares the same RemoteAddr but his bucket is independent.
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("bob"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("bob's first request must pass despite alice exhausting hers; got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_PerUserBudgetOverride exercises the optional
// PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize knobs. Authenticated callers get the
// generous budget; unauthenticated callers stay on the strict default.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_PerUserBudgetOverride(t *testing.T) {
cfg := RateLimitConfig{
RPS: 0.0001,
BurstSize: 1, // strict for unauthenticated
PerUserRPS: 0.0001,
PerUserBurstSize: 5, // generous for authenticated
}
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, cfg)
// IP-keyed: 1 token, second request 429.
ipReq := func() *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.99:54321"
return req
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, ipReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("ip request 1 should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, ipReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("ip request 2 should 429; got %d", rr.Code)
}
// User-keyed: 5 tokens, sixth request 429.
userReq := func() *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = "10.0.0.42:54321"
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "carol")
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
for i := 1; i <= 5; i++ {
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, userReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("user request %d should pass; got %d", i, rr.Code)
}
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, userReq())
if rr.Code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("user request 6 should 429 (over PerUserBurstSize); got %d", rr.Code)
}
}
// TestRateLimiter_M025_EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous ensures a
// misconfigured auth middleware that puts an empty string under UserKey
// does NOT collapse every anonymous request onto a single bucket.
func TestRateLimiter_M025_EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous(t *testing.T) {
h := newKeyedTestHandler(t, RateLimitConfig{RPS: 0.0001, BurstSize: 1})
mkReq := func(remote string) *http.Request {
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
req.RemoteAddr = remote
ctx := context.WithValue(req.Context(), UserKey{}, "")
return req.WithContext(ctx)
}
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.1.1:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("first anonymous request should pass; got %d", rr.Code)
}
rr = httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServeHTTP(rr, mkReq("10.0.1.2:54321"))
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("second anonymous request from different IP should still pass (independent IP buckets); got %d", rr.Code)
}
}