Files
certctl/internal/trustanchor/holder.go
T
shankar0123 21aeed4f4e legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4)
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):

addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:

  // Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
  // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1

Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).

Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.

Generated via:
  addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
    -f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
    -ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
    cmd/ internal/

Verification:
  find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
    -not -path '*/testdata/*' \
    -exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l

  Returns: 0

gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
2026-05-13 21:23:35 +00:00

231 lines
8.1 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Package trustanchor provides a SIGHUP-reloadable PEM-bundle trust pool
// shared by the SCEP/Intune dispatcher (per-profile Microsoft Intune
// Connector signing-cert anchor), the EST mTLS sibling route (per-profile
// client-CA trust bundle for /.well-known/est-mtls/<pathID>/), and any
// future caller that needs the same pattern (operator rotates an on-disk
// PEM bundle, sends SIGHUP, certctl swaps the in-memory pool atomically
// without a restart).
//
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 2.1: extracted from
// internal/scep/intune/trust_anchor_holder.go where it originally lived.
// The intune package preserves a thin alias-style wrapper for back-compat
// (existing intune.TrustAnchorHolder + NewTrustAnchorHolder + LoadTrustAnchor
// callers compile unchanged); new callers SHOULD import this package
// directly.
//
// Concurrency contract:
//
// - Get returns the pool slice header by value; the slice itself is
// immutable per-snapshot (Reload swaps a fresh slice rather than
// mutating the existing one). Callers may iterate the returned slice
// without holding any lock.
// - Reload acquires a write lock briefly for the swap. Concurrent Get
// calls block only for that swap window (microseconds).
// - WatchSIGHUP runs at most one Reload at a time per holder.
//
// Threat model: the rationale for SIGHUP-as-reload-trigger (vs fsnotify
// or polling) is that the existing certctl rotation playbook (server TLS
// cert at cmd/server/tls.go::certHolder) already uses SIGHUP. Operators
// running the standard "rotate file, kill -HUP" workflow get every
// holder reloaded with one signal: server TLS + Intune trust anchors +
// EST mTLS trust bundles all swap atomically.
package trustanchor
import (
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"os"
"os/signal"
"sync"
"syscall"
"time"
)
// Holder is the SIGHUP-reloadable wrapper around a PEM-bundle trust
// pool. Construct via New. The zero value is NOT usable.
type Holder struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
certs []*x509.Certificate
path string
logger *slog.Logger
// labelForLog is used only in error / info log lines so an operator
// running multiple holders (per-profile EST mTLS, per-profile Intune,
// server TLS) can distinguish which one fired. Defaults to "trust
// anchor" when not set; callers SHOULD set this to a descriptive
// string like "intune trust anchor (PathID=corp)" or "EST mTLS
// client CA bundle (PathID=corp)".
labelForLog string
}
// New loads the trust bundle and returns a holder. Returns the same
// fail-loud error LoadBundle does on initial load — the startup gate at
// cmd/server/main.go is supposed to refuse boot when this fails.
// Subsequent Reload errors are non-fatal (logged + old pool retained).
//
// The logger is required (never nil); the caller passes a per-profile
// scoped logger so SIGHUP-reload events show the PathID for triage.
func New(path string, logger *slog.Logger) (*Holder, error) {
if logger == nil {
return nil, errors.New("trustanchor: New requires a non-nil logger")
}
certs, err := LoadBundle(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Holder{certs: certs, path: path, logger: logger, labelForLog: "trust anchor"}, nil
}
// SetLabelForLog records a descriptive label that future reload log
// lines use to distinguish this holder from others (e.g. "intune trust
// anchor (PathID=corp)"). Idempotent + safe for concurrent callers
// (the field is read only by the SIGHUP watcher goroutine after
// WatchSIGHUP starts).
func (h *Holder) SetLabelForLog(label string) {
if label == "" {
return
}
h.mu.Lock()
h.labelForLog = label
h.mu.Unlock()
}
// Get returns the current trust anchor pool. Safe for concurrent
// callers; the slice header is returned by value and the underlying
// slice is immutable per-snapshot.
func (h *Holder) Get() []*x509.Certificate {
h.mu.RLock()
defer h.mu.RUnlock()
return h.certs
}
// Path returns the on-disk path the holder reloads from.
func (h *Holder) Path() string {
return h.path
}
// Pool returns a fresh *x509.CertPool populated with the holder's
// current certs. Helper for callers that need a pool instead of a
// slice (the EST mTLS handler verifies client cert chains via
// cert.Verify(VerifyOptions{Roots: pool}); the Intune dispatcher uses
// the slice directly for signature-walk).
func (h *Holder) Pool() *x509.CertPool {
pool := x509.NewCertPool()
for _, c := range h.Get() {
pool.AddCert(c)
}
return pool
}
// Reload re-reads the trust anchor file at h.path and atomically swaps
// the pool. Returns the parse error if the new file is invalid; the
// OLD pool stays in place so a bad reload doesn't take dependent
// dispatch paths down. Same fail-safe pattern as cmd/server/tls.go::
// (*certHolder).Reload — a rotation that writes a half-file would
// otherwise crash the service mid-rotation.
func (h *Holder) Reload() error {
certs, err := LoadBundle(h.path)
if err != nil {
return err
}
h.mu.Lock()
h.certs = certs
h.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
// WatchSIGHUP installs a signal handler that calls Reload on each
// SIGHUP. The returned stop function closes the internal done channel
// and stops signal delivery so the goroutine can exit cleanly during
// shutdown.
//
// Errors from Reload are logged but do not terminate the watcher — the
// operator can fix the files and send another SIGHUP. Mirrors the
// (*certHolder).watchSIGHUP contract from cmd/server/tls.go exactly.
//
// Multiple holders coexist: each registers its own goroutine on the
// same SIGHUP signal. signal.Notify multicasts to every registered
// channel, so a single SIGHUP reloads every per-profile trust anchor
// + the server TLS cert in one operator action.
func (h *Holder) WatchSIGHUP() (stop func()) {
ch := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
signal.Notify(ch, syscall.SIGHUP)
done := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
for {
select {
case <-ch:
if err := h.Reload(); err != nil {
h.logger.Error(h.labelForLog+" reload failed; continuing with previous pool",
"error", err,
"path", h.path)
continue
}
h.logger.Info(h.labelForLog+" reloaded via SIGHUP",
"path", h.path,
"certs_loaded", len(h.Get()))
case <-done:
signal.Stop(ch)
return
}
}
}()
return func() { close(done) }
}
// LoadBundle reads a PEM bundle from disk + returns the parsed cert
// slice. Refuses empty bundles (zero CERTIFICATE blocks); refuses any
// bundle containing a cert past NotAfter (fail loud at boot rather than
// silently rejecting every request at runtime).
//
// Non-CERTIFICATE PEM blocks are skipped (so an operator can paste a
// chain that includes a private key by mistake without breaking the
// load — the priv key is just ignored). Operators rotating signing
// certs typically want this tolerance.
func LoadBundle(path string) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
if path == "" {
return nil, errors.New("trustanchor: bundle path is empty")
}
body, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trustanchor: read bundle %q: %w", path, err)
}
return parseBundlePEM(body, path, time.Now())
}
// parseBundlePEM is the file-IO-free core of LoadBundle. Split out so
// unit tests can hand it byte slices without writing temp files. `now`
// is taken as a parameter so expiry tests can pin a deterministic clock.
func parseBundlePEM(body []byte, sourceLabel string, now time.Time) ([]*x509.Certificate, error) {
var out []*x509.Certificate
rest := body
for {
var block *pem.Block
block, rest = pem.Decode(rest)
if block == nil {
break
}
if block.Type != "CERTIFICATE" {
continue
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trustanchor: parse cert in %q: %w", sourceLabel, err)
}
if now.After(cert.NotAfter) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trustanchor: cert in %q expired at %s (subject=%q) — operator must rotate the trust bundle before restart",
sourceLabel, cert.NotAfter.Format(time.RFC3339), cert.Subject.CommonName)
}
out = append(out, cert)
}
if len(out) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trustanchor: %q contains no CERTIFICATE PEM blocks", sourceLabel)
}
return out, nil
}