Files
certctl/docs
shankar0123 e347a9a908 chore(ci-guards): close 4 CI-guard regressions surfaced by v2.1.0 release-gate Phase 5
Four scripts/ci-guards/*.sh trips on dev/auth-bundle-2 vs master:

1. G-3-env-docs-drift: 10 CERTCTL_* env vars added by Auth Bundle 2 +
   audit-2026-05-10/11 fix bundle were not in docs/. Added a new 'Auth
   (Bundle 1 + Bundle 2)' section to docs/reference/configuration.md
   covering CERTCTL_SESSION_BIND_USER_AGENT, CERTCTL_SESSION_GC_INTERVAL,
   CERTCTL_OIDC_BCL_MAX_AGE_SECONDS, CERTCTL_OIDC_PRELOGIN_REQUIRE_UA/IP,
   CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK, CERTCTL_TRUSTED_PROXIES + _COUNT (synthesised),
   CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_* set, CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD. Also
   added CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ to the bare-prefix allowlist (referenced
   in docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md prose).

2. bundle-8-M-009-bare-usemutation: BreakglassPage shipped 3 bare
   useMutation() calls instead of useTrackedMutation. Migrated all
   three to useTrackedMutation with invalidates: [['breakglass']].

3. multi-tenant-query-coverage: Defense-in-depth tenant_id additions
   in the fix bundle dropped the missing-tenant-id query count from 32
   to 31. Ratcheted baseline 32 -> 31 (forward-only invariant).

4. openapi-handler-parity: 28 new REST endpoints from Bundle 2 + the
   fix bundle missing from api/openapi.yaml. Added them to
   api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml with per-route 'why:'
   justifications. OpenAPI schema generation deferred to pre-v2.2.0
   alongside the GUI E2E coverage push; threat model + handler
   contracts already live in docs/operator/{rbac,auth-threat-model,
   oidc-runbooks}.md.

After this commit every script in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh exits 0.
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certctl Documentation

Last reviewed: 2026-05-05

The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.

For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo README.md at the root. For the marketing site, see certctl.io.


Getting Started

You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.

Doc What it covers
Concepts TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary
Quickstart Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour
Examples Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer
Advanced demo End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step
Why certctl Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere

Reference

You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.

Doc What it covers
Architecture System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies
Profiles CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (Phase 9 closure)
API OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation
CLI certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns
Configuration CERTCTL_* environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent)
MCP server Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants
Release verification Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure
Intermediate CA hierarchy Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement
Auth standards implemented RFC + CWE evidence for the Auth Bundle 1 + 2 surface (NOT a compliance-mapping doc)
Deployment model Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets
Vendor matrix Tested vendor versions per target connector

Connectors

The connector index is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.

Issuers (13 deep-dives): ACME · ADCS · AWS ACM Private CA · DigiCert · EJBCA / Keyfactor · Entrust · GlobalSign Atlas HVCA · Google CAS · Local CA · OpenSSL / Custom CA · Sectigo SCM · step-ca / Smallstep · Vault PKI

Targets (15 deep-dives): Apache · AWS Certificate Manager · Azure Key Vault · Caddy · Envoy · F5 BIG-IP · HAProxy · IIS · Java Keystore · Kubernetes Secrets · NGINX · Postfix / Dovecot · SSH (agentless) · Traefik · Windows Certificate Store

Protocols

Doc What it covers
ACME server Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server
ACME server threat model Security posture for the ACME server endpoint
SCEP server RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route
SCEP for Microsoft Intune Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook
EST server RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding
CRL & OCSP RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties
Async CA polling Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors

Operator

You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.

Doc What it covers
Security posture Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC primitive (Bundle 1), bootstrap
RBAC operator reference Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + bootstrap flow (Bundle 1)
Auth threat model API-key compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation, compliance mapping (Bundle 1)
OIDC / SSO runbooks Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace (Bundle 2)
Control plane TLS Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR
Database TLS PostgreSQL transport encryption
Approval workflow Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + Phase 9 profile-edit closure
Helm deployment Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart
Performance baselines Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks
Auth benchmarks Session + OIDC validation p99 targets and measured baselines (Bundle 2 Phase 14)
Legacy clients (TLS 1.2) Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2

Runbooks

Runbook When
Cloud targets AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback
Expiry alerts Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers
Disaster recovery CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore

Migration

You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.

From Doc
Certbot migration/from-certbot.md
acme.sh migration/from-acmesh.md
cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md
Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) migration/acme-from-caddy.md
cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md
Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) migration/acme-from-traefik.md
API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0) migration/api-keys-to-rbac.mdAUDIT YOUR API KEYS post-upgrade
Enable OIDC SSO on a Bundle-1-merged deployment migration/oidc-enable.md — step-by-step Bundle 2 OIDC onboarding

Contributor

You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.

Doc What it covers
Testing strategy What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan
Test environment Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.)
QA prerequisites Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars
QA test suite qa_test.go reference for release QA
GUI QA checklist Manual GUI verification pass for release
Release sign-off Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification
CI pipeline CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks

Archive

Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.

Doc Why archived
Upgrade to TLS (v2.2) Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure
Upgrade past v2 JWT removal G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure

Reading order by role

First-time operator: ConceptsQuickstartExamples. About 90 minutes end to end.

Production operator: ArchitectureSecurity postureControl plane TLSDisaster recovery runbook. About 4 hours end to end.

PKI engineer: ACME serverSCEP serverEST serverIntermediate CA hierarchy. About 6 hours end to end.

Contributor: ArchitectureTesting strategyTest environmentCI pipeline. About 3 hours end to end.