mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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b767f579ef
Closes Bundle 4 of the 2026-05-02 deployment-target coverage audit
(see cowork/deployment-target-audit-2026-05-02/RESULTS.md). Pre-fix,
DeployCertificate called deploy.AtomicWriteFile twice — once for
cert at L123, once for key at L131 — instead of bundling both into
a single deploy.Plan and calling deploy.Apply. Three downstream
hazards:
1. If cert write succeeds and key write fails, the cert is already
on disk. The in-line best-effort cert rollback at L137-141 had
no error wrapping and the dedicated rollbackCertAndKey helper
only restored the cert.
2. Idempotency was per-file, not all-files. The verify gate
(if !certRes.Idempotent) skipped verify when cert was unchanged
but key was new — exactly the shape that produces a fresh key on
disk + a stale fingerprint served, and zero alarm.
3. Verify-failure rollback only handled the cert. Key was left in
whatever state the deploy reached.
This commit aligns Traefik with the canonical NGINX/Apache/HAProxy/
Postfix template:
- buildPlan() constructs deploy.Plan{Files: []{cert, key}}.
- deploy.Apply runs it all-or-nothing. SHA-256 idempotency is
all-files (Result.SkippedAsIdempotent).
- No PreCommit (Traefik has no validate-with-target command —
file watcher absorbs config errors).
- No PostCommit (file watcher auto-reloads on rename).
- runPostDeployVerify retained as-is (TLS handshake + SHA-256
fingerprint compare + retry/backoff).
- On verify failure, restoreFromBackups iterates
res.BackupPaths and rewrites each destination via
AtomicWriteFile{SkipIdempotent: true, BackupRetention: -1}.
Removed:
- The legacy rollbackCertAndKey helper (cert-only restore).
- The inline best-effort cert-rollback in DeployCertificate.
Tests added to traefik_atomic_test.go:
- TestTraefik_Atomic_KeyWriteFails_CertRollsBack — regression guard
for the original two-AtomicWriteFile bug. Pre-writes a sentinel
cert; sets the key path inside a read-only subdir so the key
write must fail; asserts the cert on disk still contains the
sentinel bytes (Apply's all-or-nothing rollback).
- TestTraefik_Atomic_AllFilesIdempotent — two subtests:
both_match_skips: pre-writes cert + key matching what Traefik
would write; asserts idempotent=true AND probe is never
called.
cert_match_key_new_runs_verify: pre-writes only the cert; key
is new; asserts idempotent=false AND probe IS called once.
Pre-fix per-file gate would have leaked through and skipped
the verify here.
- TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyMismatch_BothFilesRollBack — pre-writes
sentinel cert + key; stub probe returns wrong fingerprint;
asserts BOTH files are restored to sentinel bytes after the
rollback fires. Pre-fix rollbackCertAndKey only restored the
cert; the key would still be the new bytes.
The pre-existing TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyMismatch_Rollback (which
asserted only the cert restore) is left intact — it's a strict
subset of the new BothFilesRollBack assertion and serves as a
narrower regression guard.
docs/deployment-atomicity.md L84 unchanged — operator-facing claim
("atomic-write only; ValidateOnly returns sentinel") stays accurate.
Verified locally:
- gofmt -l ./internal/connector/target/traefik/ clean
- go vet ./... clean
- staticcheck ./internal/connector/target/traefik/... clean
- go build ./... clean
- go test -race -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/traefik/...
green (pre-existing tests + 3 new = 13 test functions; 14 with
the AllFilesIdempotent subtests)
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/... green
(no cross-connector regressions)
Audit reference: cowork/deployment-target-audit-2026-05-02/RESULTS.md
Bundle 4.
402 lines
14 KiB
Go
402 lines
14 KiB
Go
package traefik_test
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"sync/atomic"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/target/traefik"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/deploy"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/tlsprobe"
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)
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// Phase 7 of the deploy-hardening I master bundle: atomic + verify
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// for Traefik. No reload command (Traefik watches via inotify);
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// post-deploy TLS verify is the load-bearing safety check.
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const certA = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nQUxQSEEtQ0VSVA==\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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const keyA = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nZmFrZS1rZXk=\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
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func quietLogger() *slog.Logger {
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return slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.NewFile(0, os.DevNull), &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError}))
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}
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func fingerprintOfPEM(pem string) string {
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beg := strings.Index(pem, "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----") + len("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----")
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body := pem[beg:]
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end := strings.Index(body, "-----END CERTIFICATE-----")
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body = strings.TrimSpace(body[:end])
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body = strings.ReplaceAll(body, "\n", "")
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der, _ := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(body)
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h := sha256.Sum256(der)
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return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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func newC(_ *testing.T, dir string) *traefik.Connector {
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: "x"}
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})
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return c
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_Happy(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := newC(t, dir)
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA, KeyPEM: keyA})
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if err != nil || !res.Success {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyMatch(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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PostDeployVerifyAttempts: 1,
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PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: true, Endpoint: "h:443"},
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: fingerprintOfPEM(certA)}
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})
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if err != nil || !res.Success {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyMismatch_Rollback(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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cert := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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os.WriteFile(cert, []byte("OLD\n"), 0644)
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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PostDeployVerifyAttempts: 1,
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PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: true, Endpoint: "h:443"},
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: "0000"}
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})
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_, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected mismatch error")
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}
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if got, _ := os.ReadFile(cert); string(got) != "OLD\n" {
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t.Errorf("cert after rollback = %q, want OLD", got)
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyDialTimeout(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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PostDeployVerifyAttempts: 1,
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PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: true, Endpoint: "h:443"},
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: false, Error: "timeout"}
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})
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_, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected timeout")
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_Idempotency(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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cert := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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os.WriteFile(cert, []byte(certA+"\n"), 0644)
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c := newC(t, dir)
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if err != nil || !res.Success {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if res.Metadata["idempotent"] != "true" {
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t.Errorf("idempotent flag = %q", res.Metadata["idempotent"])
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_DefaultKeyMode_0600(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := newC(t, dir)
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c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA, KeyPEM: keyA})
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stat, _ := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem"))
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if stat.Mode().Perm() != 0600 {
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t.Errorf("key mode = %#o", stat.Mode().Perm())
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_KeyModeOverride(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem", KeyFileMode: 0640,
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: "x"}
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})
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c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA, KeyPEM: keyA})
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stat, _ := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem"))
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if stat.Mode().Perm() != 0640 {
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t.Errorf("key mode = %#o", stat.Mode().Perm())
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_BackupCreated(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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cert := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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os.WriteFile(cert, []byte("OLD"), 0644)
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c := newC(t, dir)
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c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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entries, _ := os.ReadDir(dir)
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found := false
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for _, e := range entries {
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if strings.Contains(e.Name(), deploy.BackupSuffix) {
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found = true
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}
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}
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if !found {
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t.Error("no backup")
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_NoChain(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := newC(t, dir)
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if err != nil || !res.Success {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_NoKey(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := newC(t, dir)
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c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")); err == nil {
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t.Error("key written despite empty KeyPEM")
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_ValidateOnly_Sentinel(t *testing.T) {
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c := newC(t, t.TempDir())
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if err := c.ValidateOnly(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{}); !errors.Is(err, target.ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported) {
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t.Errorf("got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyDisabled(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: false, Endpoint: "h:443"},
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}, quietLogger())
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var n int32
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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atomic.AddInt32(&n, 1)
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: "x"}
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})
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c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{CertPEM: certA})
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if n != 0 {
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t.Errorf("probe called %d times despite Enabled=false", n)
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Bundle 4 (deployment-target audit 2026-05-02): single-Plan deploy.Apply
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// refactor regression guards.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// TestTraefik_Atomic_KeyWriteFails_CertRollsBack is the regression guard for
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// the original two-AtomicWriteFile bug. Pre-Bundle-4, a key-write failure
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// after a successful cert write left the cert orphaned (the inline best-
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// effort cert rollback was incomplete; the dedicated rollbackCertAndKey
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// only restored the cert). Post-Bundle-4, deploy.Apply makes both writes
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// all-or-nothing — if the key path is unwritable, Apply rejects the plan
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// before any disk mutation OR rolls back the cert mid-rename.
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//
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// We trigger the failure via a key path inside a read-only subdirectory.
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// The cert path is in the writable root — pre-fix the cert would land,
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// post-fix Apply backs out atomically.
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_KeyWriteFails_CertRollsBack(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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// Pre-write sentinel cert bytes. After a failed deploy these
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// must remain unchanged.
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certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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const sentinel = "SENTINEL-CERT\n"
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if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, []byte(sentinel), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed cert: %v", err)
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}
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// Make the key destination unwritable: a read-only subdir.
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keyDir := filepath.Join(dir, "ro-keys")
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if err := os.Mkdir(keyDir, 0500); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("mkdir ro: %v", err)
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}
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defer os.Chmod(keyDir, 0700) // restore so t.TempDir cleanup can rm
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir,
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CertFile: "cert.pem",
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KeyFile: "ro-keys/key.pem", // unwritable target
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}, quietLogger())
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{
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CertPEM: certA,
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KeyPEM: keyA,
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})
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected error from unwritable key path; res=%+v", res)
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}
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// Cert on disk must still be the sentinel — Apply's all-files
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// atomicity guarantee. Pre-Bundle-4 this assertion would have
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// failed because cert was already written before the key error.
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got, _ := os.ReadFile(certPath)
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if string(got) != sentinel {
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t.Errorf("cert clobbered despite key-write failure: got %q want %q", string(got), sentinel)
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}
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}
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// TestTraefik_Atomic_AllFilesIdempotent pins the all-files SHA-256 short-
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// circuit. Pre-Bundle-4 idempotency was per-file (certRes.Idempotent only)
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// — a cert that matched but a key that was new would get reported as
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// idempotent skip even though the key actually changed. Post-fix
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// res.SkippedAsIdempotent is true only when EVERY File matched; the
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// negative case (cert match, key new) flips it to false and still runs
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// the verify path.
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_AllFilesIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
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t.Run("both_match_skips", func(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
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// Pre-write bytes that match exactly what Traefik would write
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// (cert + "\n").
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if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, []byte(certA+"\n"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed cert: %v", err)
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}
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if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte(keyA), 0600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed key: %v", err)
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}
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var probeCalls int32
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: true, Endpoint: "h:443"},
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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atomic.AddInt32(&probeCalls, 1)
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: "x"}
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})
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{
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CertPEM: certA,
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KeyPEM: keyA,
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})
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if err != nil || !res.Success {
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t.Fatalf("deploy: err=%v success=%v", err, res != nil && res.Success)
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}
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if res.Metadata["idempotent"] != "true" {
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t.Errorf("expected idempotent=true when both files match; got %q", res.Metadata["idempotent"])
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}
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if probeCalls != 0 {
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t.Errorf("probe called %d times on idempotent skip; want 0", probeCalls)
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}
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})
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t.Run("cert_match_key_new_runs_verify", func(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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// Pre-write cert matching what Traefik would write; do NOT
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// pre-write key — it'll be new.
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if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, []byte(certA+"\n"), 0644); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("seed cert: %v", err)
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}
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var probeCalls int32
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c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
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CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
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PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: true, Endpoint: "h:443"},
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PostDeployVerifyAttempts: 1,
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}, quietLogger())
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c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
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atomic.AddInt32(&probeCalls, 1)
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return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: fingerprintOfPEM(certA)}
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})
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res, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{
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CertPEM: certA,
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KeyPEM: keyA,
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})
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if err != nil || !res.Success {
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t.Fatalf("deploy: err=%v success=%v", err, res != nil && res.Success)
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}
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if res.Metadata["idempotent"] == "true" {
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t.Errorf("expected idempotent=false when key is new; got true (per-file idempotency leaked through?)")
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}
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if probeCalls != 1 {
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t.Errorf("probe should fire when key is new; called %d times want 1", probeCalls)
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}
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})
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}
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// TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyMismatch_BothFilesRollBack pins all-files rollback
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// on verify failure. Pre-Bundle-4 rollbackCertAndKey only restored the cert;
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// the key was left in whatever state the deploy reached. Post-fix
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// restoreFromBackups iterates res.BackupPaths and rewrites EVERY destination
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// from its backup.
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func TestTraefik_Atomic_VerifyMismatch_BothFilesRollBack(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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certPath := filepath.Join(dir, "cert.pem")
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keyPath := filepath.Join(dir, "key.pem")
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const sentinelCert = "SENTINEL-CERT\n"
|
|
const sentinelKey = "SENTINEL-KEY\n"
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(certPath, []byte(sentinelCert), 0644); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("seed cert: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte(sentinelKey), 0600); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("seed key: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c := traefik.New(&traefik.Config{
|
|
CertDir: dir, CertFile: "cert.pem", KeyFile: "key.pem",
|
|
PostDeployVerifyAttempts: 1,
|
|
PostDeployVerify: &traefik.PostDeployVerifyConfig{Enabled: true, Endpoint: "h:443"},
|
|
}, quietLogger())
|
|
c.SetTestProbe(func(_ context.Context, _ string, _ time.Duration) tlsprobe.ProbeResult {
|
|
return tlsprobe.ProbeResult{Success: true, Fingerprint: "deadbeef"}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
_, err := c.DeployCertificate(context.Background(), target.DeploymentRequest{
|
|
CertPEM: certA,
|
|
KeyPEM: keyA,
|
|
})
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("expected verify-mismatch error")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Both files must be restored to sentinel bytes — pre-Bundle-4
|
|
// rollbackCertAndKey only restored the cert; the key would still
|
|
// be the new bytes.
|
|
gotCert, _ := os.ReadFile(certPath)
|
|
if string(gotCert) != sentinelCert {
|
|
t.Errorf("cert not restored on rollback: got %q want %q", string(gotCert), sentinelCert)
|
|
}
|
|
gotKey, _ := os.ReadFile(keyPath)
|
|
if string(gotKey) != sentinelKey {
|
|
t.Errorf("key not restored on rollback (Bundle 4 regression: pre-fix this would fail because rollbackCertAndKey ignored the key): got %q want %q", string(gotKey), sentinelKey)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|