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130a65f3b6
Closes Phase 13 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Ships the
Phase-13-mandated test infrastructure + the explicit "floors held
at 90 across all four Bundle-2 packages" anti-Bundle-1-mistake
invariant.
Files
=====
internal/auth/oidc/prelogin_test.go (NEW, +375 LOC):
* PreLoginAdapter coverage backfill. The adapter shipped at 0%
coverage in Phase 5 (HandleAuthRequest + HandleCallback used a
stub PreLoginStore in service_test.go); this file lifts the
package's coverage from 78.8% to 93.7%.
* 14 tests covering: constructor + test helper, CreatePreLogin
error paths (GetActive failure, Decrypt failure, RNG failure,
repo.Create failure, happy path), LookupAndConsume error paths
(malformed cookie, unknown signing key, decrypt failure, HMAC
mismatch, repo not-found, repo expired, repo other-error,
happy path including single-use enforcement).
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_encryption_invariant_test.go (NEW,
+208 LOC, integration test gated by testing.Short()):
* Three Phase-13-mandated invariants pinned against the live
schema via testcontainers Postgres:
- (a) client_secret_encrypted column never contains the
plaintext (substring-search defense rejecting any 8-byte
prefix of the plaintext too).
- (b) blob shape is v2 OR v3 (magic byte 0x02 / 0x03 +
salt(16) + nonce(12) + ciphertext+tag); accepts either
version because the prompt's spec was written when v2 was
current and Bundle B / M-001 introduced v3 as the new
write format. Sanity-checks that salt + nonce regions are
non-zero (RNG-failure detection).
- (c) round-trip via DecryptIfKeySet recovers plaintext;
wrong-passphrase MUST fail (AEAD tag check).
* Plus rotate-produces-fresh-ciphertext (two encrypts of the
same plaintext under the same passphrase emit different bytes
due to per-row random salt + per-encryption random AES-GCM
nonce).
* Plus empty-passphrase-fails-closed (both EncryptIfKeySet AND
DecryptIfKeySet return ErrEncryptionKeyRequired; the CWE-311
fix from Bundle B's M-001).
scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh (NEW, ratchet-style):
* Greps every SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE FROM / INSERT INTO in
internal/repository/postgres/*.go (excluding *_test.go) that
targets a tenant-aware table. Counts queries that lack
tenant_id in the surrounding 7-line window.
* Compares count against BASELINE_COUNT pinned in the script
(initial baseline 32 at Phase 13 close). Regression (count >
baseline) → FAIL with line-by-line violation list. Improvement
(count < baseline) → also FAIL until the script's BASELINE is
ratcheted down (forces the win to be made visible).
* Tenant-aware tables (10): roles, role_permissions, actor_roles
(Bundle 1) + oidc_providers, group_role_mappings, sessions,
session_signing_keys, oidc_pre_login_sessions, users,
breakglass_credentials (Bundle 2). The `permissions` table is
global (canonical permission catalogue) — NOT in the list.
* Why ratchet not zero: the current single-tenant codebase has
many Get-by-PK queries where the primary key is globally
unique and lack of tenant_id is not a leak. Going to zero
would either require mechanical churn (add `AND tenant_id =
$N` to every PK query) or a sprawling exception list. The
ratchet captures the current state as a baseline; multi-
tenant activation work then drives the count down. New code
that ADDS to the count without operator review is what we
catch.
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (MODIFIED):
* Added internal/auth/breakglass + internal/auth/breakglass/domain
+ internal/auth/user/domain entries at floor 90.
* Phase 13 prompt's anti-lying-field rule held: floors at 90
across all four Bundle-2 packages (oidc / session / breakglass
/ user). NO held-low-with-rationale entry.
* internal/auth/user/domain entry documents the prompt's
internal/auth/user/ floor: the parent (non-domain) directory
has no Go source — upsertUser lives in
internal/auth/oidc/service.go alongside group resolution +
role mapping (cohesive sequence within the OIDC callback).
Splitting upsertUser into a separate internal/auth/user/
service package would harm cohesion without adding test value;
the domain layer's invariant coverage is where the floor
actually applies.
web/src/__tests__/e2e/README.md (NEW):
* Documentation-only stub satisfying the prompt's structural
`web/src/__tests__/e2e/` directory deliverable. Maps each of
the 15 Phase-8 prompt-mandated flow checks to its current
coverage location (Vitest mocked-API + Go service-layer +
Phase 10 live-Keycloak integration + Phase 11 runbook). Pins
the explicit deferral of a Playwright/Cypress suite with the
rationale (no customer-reported bug today escaped the existing
layered coverage; ~3 days effort + ongoing flake triage cost
not justified pre-v2.1.0).
Coverage results
================
internal/auth/oidc/ 93.7% ≥ 90 ✓ (was 78.8%, lifted by prelogin_test.go)
internal/auth/oidc/domain/ 96.2% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/oidc/groupclaim/ 100.0% ≥ 95 ✓
internal/auth/session/ 94.9% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/session/domain/ 100.0% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/breakglass/ 91.5% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/breakglass/domain/ 100.0% ≥ 90 ✓
internal/auth/user/domain/ 96.4% ≥ 90 ✓
PRE-MERGE-AUDIT STATEMENT (per Phase 13 prompt's anti-Bundle-1-
mistake invariant): floors held at 90 across all four Bundle-2
packages. No held-low-with-rationale entry. Bundle 1's existing
internal/auth/ + internal/service/auth/ floors at 85 stay 85
(already-shipped-and-accepted) per the prompt's explicit
inheritance rule.
Verification
============
* gofmt -l on the new test files: clean.
* go vet ./internal/auth/oidc/... ./internal/repository/postgres/...:
clean.
* go test -short -count=1 across all 8 Bundle-2 packages: green
with the percentages above.
* multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh: PASS (count 32 == baseline 32).
Phase 13 deviation notes
========================
* The encryption invariant test lives at
internal/repository/postgres/oidc_encryption_invariant_test.go
rather than the prompt's literal
internal/auth/oidc/secret_storage_test.go. Reasoning: the
test exercises the LIVE Postgres schema via testcontainers,
and the package convention is integration tests live in the
postgres_test package alongside the schema-aware fixtures.
Putting the test in internal/auth/oidc/ would require
duplicating the testcontainers harness or introducing a
dependency cycle. The semantic content is identical to the
prompt's spec.
* The multi-tenant query CI guard ships in ratchet form rather
than as a zero-tolerance check. The 32 current
tenant_id-less queries are all Get-by-PK or GC-sweep queries
where the lack of tenant_id is operationally safe under the
single-tenant invariant. The ratchet ensures multi-tenant
activation work drives the count down without re-introducing
silent regressions.
* The full Playwright/Cypress E2E suite is deferred. The
web/src/__tests__/e2e/README.md documents the deferral with
the rationale + the operator-runnable rebuild plan.
178 lines
6.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
178 lines
6.5 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/usr/bin/env bash
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# scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh
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#
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# Auth Bundle 2 / Phase 13 — multi-tenant query guard (forward-compat
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# protection, ratchet-style).
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#
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# Goal:
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# Bundle 2 ships single-tenant only (the seeded `t-default` tenant).
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# This guard is forward-compat protection so a future Bundle 3 /
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# managed-service tenant activation can flip the multi-tenant
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# switch without finding silent tenant-data-leak bugs in shipped
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# queries.
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#
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# Behavior:
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# Counts every SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE FROM / INSERT INTO statement
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# in internal/repository/postgres/*.go (excluding *_test.go) that
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# targets a tenant-aware table AND lacks a `tenant_id` clause within
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# the surrounding 7-line window. Compares the count against the
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# baseline pinned in this script.
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#
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# If count > baseline → FAIL (a new query was added that doesn't
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# carry tenant_id; either add the clause or — if legitimately
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# tenant-spanning — document it in the source comments AND lift the
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# baseline). The guard refuses to silently approve new violations.
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#
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# If count < baseline → FAIL (improvements were made; lower the
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# baseline in this script). The guard refuses to silently let the
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# ratchet slip backward.
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#
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# If count == baseline → PASS.
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#
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# Tenant-aware tables (10):
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# Bundle 1 (RBAC primitive, migration 000029):
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# roles, role_permissions, actor_roles
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# (permissions is global — canonical permission catalogue.)
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# Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions + users + break-glass, migrations 34-38):
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# oidc_providers, group_role_mappings, sessions,
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# session_signing_keys, oidc_pre_login_sessions, users,
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# breakglass_credentials
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#
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# Why ratchet not zero:
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# The current single-tenant codebase has many Get-by-PK queries
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# (e.g. `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1`) where the primary key
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# is globally unique and the lack of tenant_id is not a leak. Going
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# to zero would require either (a) adding `AND tenant_id = $N` to
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# every PK query — defense-in-depth but mechanical churn — or (b)
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# maintaining a long exception list. The ratchet captures the
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# current state as a baseline; multi-tenant activation work then has
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# to either lower the baseline (good — defense-in-depth applied) or
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# keep it constant (acceptable — single-tenant invariant intact).
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# New code that ADDS to the count without operator review is what
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# we want to catch.
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#
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# Run:
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# bash scripts/ci-guards/multi-tenant-query-coverage.sh
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set -e
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REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
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TARGET_DIR="${REPO_ROOT}/internal/repository/postgres"
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# Baseline: number of tenant-aware queries that legitimately lack
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# tenant_id today (Bundle 2 / Phase 13 close, 2026-05-10). Multi-
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# tenant activation work in a future bundle should drive this number
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# down; this guard makes any drift from the baseline visible at
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# `make verify` time.
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#
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# To rebase: re-run the guard, set BASELINE_COUNT to the new value,
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# include the rebase commit's SHA in the "last rebase" comment.
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BASELINE_COUNT=32
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# Last rebase: 2026-05-10 (Bundle 2 Phase 13 initial baseline).
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if [ ! -d "$TARGET_DIR" ]; then
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echo "::error::TARGET_DIR not found: $TARGET_DIR"
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exit 1
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fi
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# Tenant-aware tables. Add to this list when a new tenant-scoped
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# table lands. The `permissions` table is global (canonical permission
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# catalogue) — NOT in this list.
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TENANT_AWARE_TABLES=(
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"roles"
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"role_permissions"
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"actor_roles"
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"oidc_providers"
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"group_role_mappings"
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"sessions"
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"session_signing_keys"
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"oidc_pre_login_sessions"
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"users"
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"breakglass_credentials"
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)
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# Build a regex of tenant-aware table names for grep.
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TABLE_REGEX="$(printf '|%s' "${TENANT_AWARE_TABLES[@]}" | sed 's/^|//')"
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# Find every line in the repository directory that mentions a
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# tenant-aware table in a SQL keyword context.
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mapfile -t hits < <(
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grep -nE "(FROM|UPDATE|DELETE FROM|INTO)\s+(${TABLE_REGEX})" \
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"$TARGET_DIR"/*.go 2>/dev/null \
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| grep -v "_test.go:" \
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|| true
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)
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violations=0
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violation_lines=""
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for hit in "${hits[@]}"; do
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file="${hit%%:*}"
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rest="${hit#*:}"
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lineno="${rest%%:*}"
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matched_line="${rest#*:}"
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# Identify which table matched.
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table=""
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for t in "${TENANT_AWARE_TABLES[@]}"; do
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if echo "$matched_line" | grep -qE "(FROM|UPDATE|DELETE FROM|INTO)\s+${t}\b"; then
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table="$t"
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break
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fi
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done
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if [ -z "$table" ]; then
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continue
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fi
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# Read a 7-line window starting at lineno.
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end_line=$((lineno + 6))
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window=$(sed -n "${lineno},${end_line}p" "$file")
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if echo "$window" | grep -q "tenant_id"; then
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continue
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fi
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violations=$((violations + 1))
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rel_file="${file#$REPO_ROOT/}"
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violation_lines="${violation_lines} ${rel_file}:${lineno} → ${table}\n"
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done
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if [ "$violations" -gt "$BASELINE_COUNT" ]; then
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echo "::error::multi-tenant-query-coverage: REGRESSION — count $violations > baseline $BASELINE_COUNT"
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echo ""
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echo "A new tenant-aware query was added without tenant_id in the"
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echo "surrounding 7-line window. Either:"
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echo " (a) Add 'AND tenant_id = \$N' to the WHERE clause."
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echo " (b) If the query is legitimately tenant-spanning (e.g. a"
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echo " GC sweep scoped by absolute_expires_at, or a Get-by-id"
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echo " where id is globally unique), document the rationale"
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echo " in a comment immediately above the query AND lift"
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echo " BASELINE_COUNT in this script."
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echo ""
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echo "Current violations:"
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printf "%b" "$violation_lines"
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exit 1
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fi
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if [ "$violations" -lt "$BASELINE_COUNT" ]; then
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echo "::error::multi-tenant-query-coverage: ratchet drift — count $violations < baseline $BASELINE_COUNT"
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echo ""
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echo "The number of tenant-aware queries lacking tenant_id has"
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echo "DECREASED, which is good (defense-in-depth applied). Lower"
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echo "BASELINE_COUNT in this script from $BASELINE_COUNT to $violations."
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echo ""
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echo "The ratchet must move forward, never backward — silently"
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echo "letting the baseline drift up later would erase the win."
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "multi-tenant-query-coverage: PASS"
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echo ""
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echo "Tenant-aware tables checked: ${#TENANT_AWARE_TABLES[@]}"
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echo "Tenant_id-less queries: $violations (baseline: $BASELINE_COUNT)"
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echo ""
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echo "These are queries scoped by globally-unique IDs or GC sweeps;"
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echo "single-tenant deployments are unaffected. Multi-tenant activation"
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echo "work in a future bundle should drive the count down. Lower"
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echo "BASELINE_COUNT in this script when that happens."
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