Files
certctl/cmd/server/main_test.go
T
Shankar d4f559ebbb security: require SCEP challenge password when SCEP enabled (fixes H-2)
Problem (CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function):
internal/service/scep.go PKCSReq skipped the shared-secret check when
s.challengePassword was empty. An unconfigured-but-enabled SCEP server
accepted any unauthenticated client reaching /scep and issued a
certificate against the configured issuer for any CSR with a valid
signature. No audit trail distinguished authenticated from
unauthenticated enrollments. This matches the two-layer fail-closed
pattern already used for C-2 (fb4ce1a): reject at startup AND reject
at the service boundary.

Fix (two layers, defense-in-depth):

Layer 1 — startup pre-flight in cmd/server/main.go:
  preflightSCEPChallengePassword returns a non-nil error when SCEP is
  enabled and CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD is empty. main logs and
  os.Exit(1)s before the SCEP service is constructed. Disabled SCEP is
  unaffected. The helper is unit-testable in isolation.

Layer 2 — service-layer rejection in internal/service/scep.go:
  PKCSReq refuses enrollment when s.challengePassword == "" even though
  main already blocks this state — protects future call sites (tests,
  library reuse, a REST-over-HTTPS wrapper). When a secret is
  configured, the comparison now uses crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
  so response time does not leak the configured secret through a
  short-circuiting byte compare.

Files:
- cmd/server/main.go: preflightSCEPChallengePassword helper; call site
  inside the `if cfg.SCEP.Enabled` block before issuer lookup; fatal
  slog error references CWE-306 and names the env var so operators can
  diagnose the startup failure without reading code.
- cmd/server/main_test.go: TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword with five
  table-driven subtests (disabled empty, disabled set, enabled empty
  rejected, enabled set, single-char boundary). The enabled-empty case
  asserts the error string contains both CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD
  and CWE-306 so the log message remains actionable.
- internal/config/config.go: SCEPConfig.ChallengePassword godoc now
  states the field is REQUIRED when SCEP.Enabled and cross-references
  preflightSCEPChallengePassword.
- internal/service/scep.go: imports crypto/subtle; PKCSReq rewritten
  with the two-layer check; comment block cites H-2 / CWE-306 and the
  constant-time rationale.
- internal/service/scep_test.go: existing tests that relied on the
  vulnerable empty-password path now configure a secret on both sides.
  TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_NotRequired is replaced by
  TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_EmptyServerConfigRejected
  which iterates ["", "any-value", "guess"] against an unconfigured
  server and asserts "not configured" in the error. A new
  TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_ChallengePassword_ConstantTimeLengthIndependence
  exercises same-prefix-longer and wrong-case inputs to guard against a
  regression from ConstantTimeCompare to a short-circuiting byte compare.
- internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go: four tests
  (RejectsWeakKey, AcceptsStrongKey, MaxTTL_ForwardedToIssuer,
  NoProfileRepo_PassesThrough) constructed NewSCEPService with an empty
  challenge password and exercised PKCSReq through the now-rejected
  vulnerable path. All four now configure "secret123" on both sides with
  an inline H-2 comment; the crypto/MaxTTL/profile behavior they assert
  is unchanged.

Wire-format / behavioral invariants preserved:
- RFC 8894 SCEP handler is untouched (internal/api/handler/scep.go and
  internal/pkcs7/*): GetCACaps/GetCACert responses, PKIOperation request
  parsing, and the PKCS#7 certs-only response format are byte-identical.
- RFC 7030 EST handler is untouched
  (internal/api/handler/est.go + internal/pkcs7/*).
- Revocation idempotency composite key (H-1, migration 000012) untouched.
- AES-256-GCM config encryption (C-2) untouched.
- CRL DER bytes and OCSP response bytes unchanged.

Verification:
- go build ./...              silent success
- go vet ./...                silent success
- go test -race -count=1 ./internal/service/ ./cmd/server/
  ./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/integration/    all OK
- Coverage with comfortable headroom over CI gates:
    service     67.8% (gate 55%)
    handler     79.0% (gate 60%)
    domain      92.7% (gate 40%)
    middleware  80.0% (gate 30%)
    cmd/server  1.6%  (preflightSCEPChallengePassword: 100%)
  internal/service/scep.go PKCSReq statement coverage: 100%.
- rg sweeps: no `s.challengePassword != ""` remains;
  no `challengePassword != s.challengePassword` remains.

Operational note: operators with SCEP enabled but no challenge password
set will see a fatal startup error and a log line citing
CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD and CWE-306 after upgrading. This is the
intended fail-closed behavior. Fix by either setting the env var to a
non-empty shared secret or setting CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=false.

Audit report: certctl-audit-report.md (revision 5) logs this under
H-2 Resolution Log.
2026-04-16 22:22:51 +00:00

607 lines
17 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/api/router"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/config"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/service"
)
// TestMain_HealthEndpointBypassesAuth verifies that health check endpoints
// bypass auth middleware while protected API endpoints require auth.
// This is the most critical test — it validates the core routing pattern used in main.go.
func TestMain_HealthEndpointBypassesAuth(t *testing.T) {
// Simulate the finalHandler logic from main.go with minimal setup
// Create handler functions for health endpoints
healthHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
})
readyHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ready"}`))
})
authInfoHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"auth_type":"api-key"}`))
})
// Protected API endpoint
certHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`[]`))
})
// Build the handler chain the same way main.go does
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuth(middleware.AuthConfig{
Type: "api-key",
Secret: "test-secret-key",
})
// API handler with auth
authHandler := middleware.Chain(certHandler,
middleware.RequestID,
middleware.Recovery,
authMiddleware,
)
// Create finalHandler matching main.go logic
finalHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
path := r.URL.Path
switch path {
case "/health":
healthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
case "/ready":
readyHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
case "/api/v1/auth/info":
authInfoHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
case "/api/v1/certificates":
authHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
default:
http.Error(w, "Not Found", http.StatusNotFound)
}
})
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
method string
bypassesAuth bool
expectedStatus int
}{
{
name: "GET /health without auth",
path: "/health",
method: "GET",
bypassesAuth: true,
expectedStatus: http.StatusOK,
},
{
name: "GET /ready without auth",
path: "/ready",
method: "GET",
bypassesAuth: true,
expectedStatus: http.StatusOK,
},
{
name: "GET /api/v1/auth/info without auth",
path: "/api/v1/auth/info",
method: "GET",
bypassesAuth: true,
expectedStatus: http.StatusOK,
},
{
name: "GET /api/v1/certificates without auth (should fail)",
path: "/api/v1/certificates",
method: "GET",
bypassesAuth: false,
expectedStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
req := httptest.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.path, nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
finalHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if tt.bypassesAuth && w.Code != tt.expectedStatus {
t.Errorf("endpoint %s should bypass auth, got status %d, expected %d",
tt.path, w.Code, tt.expectedStatus)
}
if !tt.bypassesAuth && w.Code != tt.expectedStatus {
t.Logf("endpoint %s requires auth, got status %d, expected %d (auth middleware working)",
tt.path, w.Code, tt.expectedStatus)
}
})
}
}
// TestMain_HealthHandlersRespond verifies health endpoints return correct responses.
func TestMain_HealthHandlersRespond(t *testing.T) {
healthHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
})
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/health", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
healthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
if body := w.Body.String(); body != `{"status":"ok"}` {
t.Errorf("expected body '{\"status\":\"ok\"}', got '%s'", body)
}
}
// TestMain_AuthMiddlewareRejectsUnauthorized verifies auth middleware works.
func TestMain_AuthMiddlewareRejectsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
// Create a protected endpoint
protectedHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"protected"}`))
})
// Wrap with auth middleware
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuth(middleware.AuthConfig{
Type: "api-key",
Secret: "test-secret-key",
})
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
// Request without auth should be rejected
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/protected", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("expected status 401 for unauthorized request, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// TestMain_AuthMiddlewareAllowsWithValidKey verifies auth middleware allows valid keys.
func TestMain_AuthMiddlewareAllowsWithValidKey(t *testing.T) {
testKey := "test-secret-key"
// Create a protected endpoint
protectedHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"protected"}`))
})
// Wrap with auth middleware
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuth(middleware.AuthConfig{
Type: "api-key",
Secret: testKey,
})
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
// Request with valid auth should be allowed
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/protected", nil)
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testKey)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200 for authorized request, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// TestMain_ServerConfigFromEnvironment verifies config.Load() reads env vars correctly.
func TestMain_ServerConfigFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {
// Save original env vars
oldAuthType := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
oldServerHost := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST")
oldServerPort := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT")
defer func() {
if oldAuthType != "" {
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", oldAuthType)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
}
if oldServerHost != "" {
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST", oldServerHost)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST")
}
if oldServerPort != "" {
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", oldServerPort)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT")
}
}()
// Set test env vars
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "none")
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", "8080")
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to load config from env vars: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Auth.Type != "none" {
t.Errorf("Expected auth type 'none', got '%s'", cfg.Auth.Type)
}
if cfg.Server.Host != "127.0.0.1" {
t.Errorf("Expected server host '127.0.0.1', got '%s'", cfg.Server.Host)
}
if cfg.Server.Port != 8080 {
t.Errorf("Expected server port 8080, got %d", cfg.Server.Port)
}
}
// TestMain_AuthTypeConfiguration verifies auth type is read from config.
func TestMain_AuthTypeConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
// Save original env vars
oldAuthType := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
oldAuthSecret := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET")
defer func() {
if oldAuthType != "" {
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", oldAuthType)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
}
if oldAuthSecret != "" {
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", oldAuthSecret)
} else {
os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET")
}
}()
// Set auth secret for api-key mode
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
testCases := []string{"api-key", "none"}
for _, authType := range testCases {
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("auth_type_%s", authType), func(t *testing.T) {
os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", authType)
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to load config: %v", err)
}
if cfg.Auth.Type != authType {
t.Errorf("Expected auth type '%s', got '%s'", authType, cfg.Auth.Type)
}
})
}
}
// TestMain_MiddlewareChainConstruction tests that middleware can be properly chained.
func TestMain_MiddlewareChainConstruction(t *testing.T) {
// Test that the middleware.Chain function works as expected
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("success"))
})
// Chain with RequestID and Recovery middleware
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler,
middleware.RequestID,
middleware.Recovery,
)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
if body := w.Body.String(); body != "success" {
t.Errorf("expected body 'success', got '%s'", body)
}
}
// TestMain_RequestIDMiddleware verifies RequestID is added to responses.
func TestMain_RequestIDMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
// Wrap with RequestID middleware
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, middleware.RequestID)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// RequestID should be set in response header
if rid := w.Header().Get("X-Request-ID"); rid == "" {
t.Logf("X-Request-ID header not present (middleware may work differently)")
} else {
t.Logf("X-Request-ID header set: %s", rid)
}
}
// TestMain_RecoveryMiddlewareHandlesPanic verifies recovery middleware works.
func TestMain_RecoveryMiddlewareHandlesPanic(t *testing.T) {
panicHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
panic("test panic")
})
// Wrap with recovery middleware
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(panicHandler, middleware.Recovery)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
// Should not panic
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// Should return 500 error
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Logf("Expected 500 for panicked handler, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// TestMain_ServiceInitialization tests that services can be instantiated.
// This validates the initialization pattern from main.go without needing a real DB.
func TestMain_ServiceInitialization(t *testing.T) {
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelInfo,
}))
// Create test issuer registry (same as main.go does)
issuerRegistry := service.NewIssuerRegistry(logger)
if issuerRegistry == nil {
t.Fatal("issuer registry should not be nil")
}
// Verify the registry has a Len() method (used in main.go)
count := issuerRegistry.Len()
if count < 0 {
t.Errorf("issuer registry length should be >= 0, got %d", count)
}
}
// TestMain_CORSMiddlewareSetHeaders verifies CORS headers are set.
func TestMain_CORSMiddlewareSetHeaders(t *testing.T) {
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
corsMiddleware := middleware.NewCORS(middleware.CORSConfig{
AllowedOrigins: []string{"http://example.com"},
})
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, corsMiddleware)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
req.Header.Set("Origin", "http://example.com")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// CORS middleware should set access control headers
if acah := w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"); acah == "" {
t.Logf("Access-Control-Allow-Origin not set (may be by design)")
}
}
// TestMain_AuthNoneMode verifies auth can be disabled.
func TestMain_AuthNoneMode(t *testing.T) {
protectedHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"protected"}`))
})
// Wrap with auth middleware in "none" mode
authMiddleware := middleware.NewAuth(middleware.AuthConfig{
Type: "none",
})
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
// Request without auth should be allowed in "none" mode
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/protected", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200 in 'none' auth mode, got %d", w.Code)
}
}
// TestMain_RouterRegistration tests that router registration works.
func TestMain_RouterRegistration(t *testing.T) {
r := router.New()
// Register a test handler
r.RegisterFunc("GET /test", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte("test"))
})
// Request the route
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// Route should be registered and accessible
if w.Code == http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("route not registered, got 404")
} else if w.Code == http.StatusOK {
t.Logf("route registered successfully")
}
}
// TestMain_RateLimiterIntegration tests rate limiter middleware works.
func TestMain_RateLimiterIntegration(t *testing.T) {
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
// Create rate limiter with 10 RPS, 1 burst
rateLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(middleware.RateLimitConfig{
RPS: 10,
BurstSize: 1,
})
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, rateLimiter)
// First request should succeed
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code == http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
t.Logf("rate limiter is active")
} else {
t.Logf("rate limiter allowed request (status %d)", w.Code)
}
}
// TestMain_ContentTypeMiddleware verifies content type is set correctly.
func TestMain_ContentTypeMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
})
// Wrap with middleware that sets Content-Type
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, middleware.ContentType)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/test", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
// Verify response
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
}
// ContentType middleware should set header
if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "" {
t.Logf("Content-Type header set: %s", ct)
}
}
// TestMain_ContextPropagation verifies context is propagated through middleware.
func TestMain_ContextPropagation(t *testing.T) {
type contextKey string
testKey := contextKey("test-key")
testValue := "test-value"
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
val := r.Context().Value(testKey)
if val == testValue {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
} else {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}
})
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, middleware.RequestID)
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
// Add context value before request
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), testKey, testValue))
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Logf("Context value may not be propagated (status %d), this may be expected", w.Code)
}
}
// TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword is the H-2 regression guard for the
// startup pre-flight check. The helper MUST return a non-nil error whenever
// SCEP is enabled with an empty challenge password — that configuration
// previously allowed unauthenticated certificate enrollment (CWE-306).
// Disabled-SCEP and configured-password cases must pass cleanly.
func TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
enabled bool
challengePassword string
wantErr bool
wantErrSubstring string
}{
{
name: "disabled_empty_password_ok",
enabled: false,
challengePassword: "",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "disabled_with_password_ok",
enabled: false,
challengePassword: "leftover-value",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "enabled_empty_password_rejected",
enabled: true,
challengePassword: "",
wantErr: true,
wantErrSubstring: "CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD",
},
{
name: "enabled_with_password_ok",
enabled: true,
challengePassword: "hunter2",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "enabled_single_char_password_ok",
enabled: true,
challengePassword: "x",
wantErr: false,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := preflightSCEPChallengePassword(tt.enabled, tt.challengePassword)
if tt.wantErr {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
}
if tt.wantErrSubstring != "" && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSubstring) {
t.Errorf("expected error to mention %q, got: %v", tt.wantErrSubstring, err)
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "CWE-306") {
t.Errorf("expected error to cite CWE-306 for traceability, got: %v", err)
}
} else if err != nil {
t.Errorf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
}
})
}
}