Files
certctl/internal/repository/postgres/auth.go
T
shankar0123 a123263498 fix(auth/rbac): close HIGH-10 lying field — EffectivePermissions reads actor-role scope (A-1)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 closure. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md.

WHAT.

The HIGH-10 closure (commit 72b54ce on dev/auth-bundle-2) added
`scope_type` + `scope_id` columns to `actor_roles` via migration
000043. The handler accepted them on POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles.
The repo Grant INSERTed them. The uniqueness tuple was extended to
include them. The GUI exposed them as form inputs.

But the load-bearing `EffectivePermissions` SQL at
internal/repository/postgres/auth.go:470 never read them. The query
only JOINed against rp.scope_type/rp.scope_id (role-permission
scope) and ignored ar.scope_type/ar.scope_id (actor-role scope).

Operator-visible failure: granting Alice r-operator scoped to
profile=p-prod silently elevated her to r-operator GLOBALLY at
authorization time. The Authorizer's matcher correctly handled
whatever EffectivePermissions returned, but EffectivePermissions
returned the rp.scope (typically global), not the ar.scope
narrowing.

This is the canonical CRIT-5 lying-field shape — a security
control claimed, persisted across 4 layers, with unit tests at
each isolated layer, but the load-bearing wire severed mid-flight.
CLAUDE.md's 'Always take the complete path' rule was violated by
the original HIGH-10 closure.

Additionally, `scanActorRoles` failed to read the new columns
even when present, so every GET-side path (ListByActor /
ListByRole) returned ActorRole with zero-value scope fields — the
GUI / MCP couldn't show operators what they had configured.

HOW.

internal/repository/postgres/auth.go:
  - EffectivePermissions SQL extended to intersect ar.scope with
    rp.scope via a CASE-in-subquery. The effective scope is the
    NARROWER of the two; disjoint tuples and scope-type mismatches
    drop the row entirely. WHERE filter on effective_scope_type
    IS NOT NULL excludes dropped rows.

    Match matrix (encoded by the CASE):
      ar.scope    rp.scope    effective_scope
      ─────────   ─────────   ──────────────────
      global      global      global / NULL
      global      profile=X   profile=X (rp narrows)
      profile=X   global      profile=X (ar narrows)
      profile=X   profile=X   profile=X (both agree)
      profile=X   profile=Y   ROW DROPPED (disjoint)
      profile=X   issuer=*    ROW DROPPED (type mismatch)

  - ListByActor + ListByRole SELECTs extended with scope_type +
    scope_id columns so the read-side surfaces what was persisted.
  - scanActorRoles reads the new columns into ActorRole.ScopeType
    + ScopeID via the existing sql.NullString + ScopeType cast
    pattern (mirrors RolePermission scan).

internal/repository/postgres/auth_scope_test.go (NEW):
  Testcontainer-backed regression matrix. 8 cases:
  1. ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermGlobal — trivial happy path.
  2. ActorRoleGlobal_RolePermProfile — rp narrows.
  3. ActorRoleProfile_RolePermGlobal_A1Closure — **load-bearing**
     post-fix case: profile-scoped grant narrows to profile.
  4. BothScopedSameTuple_Matches — exact-match collapse.
  5. BothScopedDifferentIDs_RowDropped — disjoint scopes produce
     no effective permission.
  6. ScopeTypeMismatch_RowDropped — profile vs issuer mismatch.
  7. ExpiredGrant_Excluded — pre-fix behavior preserved.
  8. ListByActor_ReturnsScopeColumns — read-side surface check.

  Tests skip in -short mode (testcontainers-backed; require Docker
  on operator workstation).

internal/service/auth/service_test.go:
  TestAuthorizer_ActorRoleProfileScope_OnlyNarrowedScopeAuthorizes_A1
  — unit-level pin (sandbox-runnable, no Docker). Simulates the
  post-A-1 SQL emission (narrowed effective row at
  profile=p-prod) and asserts CheckPermission authorizes only
  matching profile, rejects other profiles AND rejects global.
  Existing matcher code is unchanged; this proves the integration
  point.

CHANGELOG.md:
  Operator advisory in the new 'Security (BREAKING — silent-elevation
  closure)' section. Pre-existing scope-bound grants take effect on
  upgrade; operators audit `actor_roles WHERE scope_type != 'global'`
  to confirm intent.

cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md:
  HIGH-10 row gets an A-1 follow-on CLOSED 2026-05-11 annotation
  describing the regression + closure.

VERIFY.

- gofmt -l <changed files>                                       (no diff)
- go vet ./internal/repository/postgres/... ./internal/service/auth/...
  ./internal/api/handler/... ./internal/auth/... ./cmd/server/...  PASS
- go test -short -count=1 ./internal/service/auth/...
  ./internal/repository/postgres/... ./internal/api/handler/...    PASS
- The testcontainer-backed regression matrix runs on operator
  workstation via 'go test -count=1 ./internal/repository/postgres/...'
  (skip in -short).

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-10 (A-1 follow-on)
      cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/01-crit-actor-role-scope-reads.md
      CLAUDE.md 'Always take the complete path' rule
2026-05-11 02:02:39 +00:00

691 lines
23 KiB
Go

package postgres
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"errors"
"fmt"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/lib/pq"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// canonicalPermissionSet is built once at package init from the
// authdomain.CanonicalPermissions catalogue. Lookup is O(1); used by
// PermissionRepository.IsCanonical so the service layer can fail-fast
// before issuing a DB round-trip.
var canonicalPermissionSet = func() map[string]struct{} {
m := make(map[string]struct{}, len(authdomain.CanonicalPermissions))
for _, p := range authdomain.CanonicalPermissions {
m[p] = struct{}{}
}
return m
}()
// =============================================================================
// TenantRepository
// =============================================================================
// TenantRepository is the postgres implementation of
// repository.TenantRepository.
type TenantRepository struct {
db *sql.DB
}
// NewTenantRepository constructs a TenantRepository.
func NewTenantRepository(db *sql.DB) *TenantRepository {
return &TenantRepository{db: db}
}
func (r *TenantRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Tenant, error) {
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, name, description, created_at, updated_at FROM tenants WHERE id = $1`, id)
var t authdomain.Tenant
if err := row.Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &t.Description, &t.CreatedAt, &t.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tenant.get: %w", err)
}
return &t, nil
}
func (r *TenantRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Tenant, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, name, description, created_at, updated_at FROM tenants ORDER BY id`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tenant.list: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []*authdomain.Tenant
for rows.Next() {
var t authdomain.Tenant
if err := rows.Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &t.Description, &t.CreatedAt, &t.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tenant.list scan: %w", err)
}
out = append(out, &t)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (r *TenantRepository) EnsureDefault(ctx context.Context) error {
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO tenants (id, name, description)
VALUES ($1, 'default', 'Single-tenant default seeded by Bundle 1 Phase 1.')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`, authdomain.DefaultTenantID)
return err
}
// =============================================================================
// RoleRepository
// =============================================================================
// RoleRepository is the postgres implementation of repository.RoleRepository.
type RoleRepository struct {
db *sql.DB
}
func NewRoleRepository(db *sql.DB) *RoleRepository {
return &RoleRepository{db: db}
}
func (r *RoleRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at
FROM roles WHERE id = $1`, id)
return scanRole(row)
}
func (r *RoleRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at
FROM roles WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND name = $2`, tenantID, name)
return scanRole(row)
}
func (r *RoleRepository) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at
FROM roles WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY name`, tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.list: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []*authdomain.Role
for rows.Next() {
var role authdomain.Role
if err := rows.Scan(&role.ID, &role.TenantID, &role.Name, &role.Description, &role.CreatedAt, &role.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.list scan: %w", err)
}
out = append(out, &role)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (r *RoleRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error {
if role.ID == "" {
role.ID = "r-" + uuid.NewString()
}
if role.TenantID == "" {
role.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
now := time.Now().UTC()
if role.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
role.CreatedAt = now
}
if role.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
role.UpdatedAt = now
}
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO roles (id, tenant_id, name, description, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
`, role.ID, role.TenantID, role.Name, role.Description, role.CreatedAt, role.UpdatedAt)
if err != nil {
var pqErr *pq.Error
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
}
return fmt.Errorf("role.create: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (r *RoleRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error {
role.UpdatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE roles SET name = $1, description = $2, updated_at = $3
WHERE id = $4
`, role.Name, role.Description, role.UpdatedAt, role.ID)
if err != nil {
var pqErr *pq.Error
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
}
return fmt.Errorf("role.update: %w", err)
}
n, _ := res.RowsAffected()
if n == 0 {
return repository.ErrAuthNotFound
}
return nil
}
func (r *RoleRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM roles WHERE id = $1`, id)
if err != nil {
var pqErr *pq.Error
if errors.As(err, &pqErr) && pqErr.Code == "23503" {
return repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse
}
return fmt.Errorf("role.delete: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (r *RoleRepository) ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT rp.role_id, rp.permission_id, rp.scope_type, rp.scope_id
FROM role_permissions rp
WHERE rp.role_id = $1
ORDER BY rp.permission_id, rp.scope_type
`, roleID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.listPermissions: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []*authdomain.RolePermission
for rows.Next() {
var rp authdomain.RolePermission
var scopeType string
var scopeID sql.NullString
if err := rows.Scan(&rp.RoleID, &rp.PermissionID, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role.listPermissions scan: %w", err)
}
rp.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
if scopeID.Valid {
s := scopeID.String
rp.ScopeID = &s
}
out = append(out, &rp)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (r *RoleRepository) AddPermission(ctx context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
// TODO(bundle-2): Bundle 1 Phase 12 deferral — scope_id is NOT
// currently FK-constrained against the resource tables
// (certificate_profiles, issuers). This means an operator can
// grant a permission at scope_type=profile / scope_id=p-bogus
// without the bogus profile existing; the gate still works
// (no permission rows match the bogus scope at request time)
// but a strict 404 on grant would be cleaner. Adding the FK
// requires a migration that confirms every existing
// role_permissions row references a real resource and is
// tracked as Bundle 2 work. See
// cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md negative-test path #12.
var scopeID interface{}
if g.ScopeID != nil {
scopeID = *g.ScopeID
}
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING
`, g.RoleID, g.PermissionID, string(g.ScopeType), scopeID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("role.addPermission: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (r *RoleRepository) RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, g *authdomain.RolePermission) error {
var scopeIDArg interface{}
scopeClause := "scope_id IS NULL"
args := []interface{}{g.RoleID, g.PermissionID, string(g.ScopeType)}
if g.ScopeID != nil {
scopeClause = "scope_id = $4"
scopeIDArg = *g.ScopeID
args = append(args, scopeIDArg)
}
q := fmt.Sprintf(
`DELETE FROM role_permissions WHERE role_id = $1 AND permission_id = $2 AND scope_type = $3 AND %s`,
scopeClause)
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, q, args...)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("role.removePermission: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func scanRole(row *sql.Row) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
var role authdomain.Role
if err := row.Scan(&role.ID, &role.TenantID, &role.Name, &role.Description, &role.CreatedAt, &role.UpdatedAt); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("role scan: %w", err)
}
return &role, nil
}
// =============================================================================
// PermissionRepository
// =============================================================================
type PermissionRepository struct {
db *sql.DB
}
func NewPermissionRepository(db *sql.DB) *PermissionRepository {
return &PermissionRepository{db: db}
}
func (r *PermissionRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, name, namespace FROM permissions ORDER BY name`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("permission.list: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []*authdomain.Permission
for rows.Next() {
var p authdomain.Permission
if err := rows.Scan(&p.ID, &p.Name, &p.Namespace); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("permission.list scan: %w", err)
}
out = append(out, &p)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (r *PermissionRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error) {
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
`SELECT id, name, namespace FROM permissions WHERE name = $1`, name)
var p authdomain.Permission
if err := row.Scan(&p.ID, &p.Name, &p.Namespace); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("permission.getByName: %w", err)
}
return &p, nil
}
// IsCanonical satisfies repository.PermissionRepository.
func (r *PermissionRepository) IsCanonical(name string) bool {
_, ok := canonicalPermissionSet[name]
return ok
}
// =============================================================================
// ActorRoleRepository
// =============================================================================
type ActorRoleRepository struct {
db *sql.DB
}
func NewActorRoleRepository(db *sql.DB) *ActorRoleRepository {
return &ActorRoleRepository{db: db}
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — include scope_type + scope_id in the
// SELECT so the GUI / MCP surface can render which scope an
// actor's grant is bound to. Pre-fix, these columns were
// persisted by Grant (HIGH-10 closure) but never surfaced on
// read — operators couldn't see what they configured.
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id
FROM actor_roles
WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND tenant_id = $3
ORDER BY granted_at
`, actorID, string(actorType), tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listByActor: %w", err)
}
return scanActorRoles(rows)
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id
FROM actor_roles
WHERE role_id = $1
ORDER BY granted_at
`, roleID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listByRole: %w", err)
}
return scanActorRoles(rows)
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error {
if ar.ID == "" {
ar.ID = "ar-" + uuid.NewString()
}
if ar.TenantID == "" {
ar.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
if ar.GrantedAt.IsZero() {
ar.GrantedAt = time.Now().UTC()
}
if ar.GrantedBy == "" {
ar.GrantedBy = "system"
}
var expires interface{}
if ar.ExpiresAt != nil {
expires = *ar.ExpiresAt
}
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-10 — per-actor scope columns. Default to
// "global"+NULL when the caller didn't supply them (back-compat
// with pre-migration code paths). Migration 000043's schema-level
// DEFAULT 'global' covers the same case; passing explicitly here
// makes the Go-level write deterministic.
scopeType := string(ar.ScopeType)
if scopeType == "" {
scopeType = string(authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal)
}
var scopeID interface{}
if ar.ScopeID != nil && *ar.ScopeID != "" {
scopeID = *ar.ScopeID
}
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO actor_roles (id, actor_id, actor_type, role_id, granted_at, expires_at, granted_by, tenant_id, scope_type, scope_id)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10)
ON CONFLICT (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, scope_type, scope_id, tenant_id) DO NOTHING
`, ar.ID, ar.ActorID, string(ar.ActorType), ar.RoleID, ar.GrantedAt, expires, ar.GrantedBy, ar.TenantID, scopeType, scopeID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("actorRole.grant: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) Revoke(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, tenantID string) error {
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
DELETE FROM actor_roles
WHERE actor_id = $1 AND actor_type = $2 AND role_id = $3 AND tenant_id = $4
`, actorID, string(actorType), roleID, tenantID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("actorRole.revoke: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) ListDistinctActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error) {
if tenantID == "" {
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT actor_id, actor_type,
array_agg(role_id ORDER BY role_id) AS role_ids
FROM actor_roles
WHERE tenant_id = $1
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
GROUP BY actor_id, actor_type
ORDER BY actor_id ASC
`, tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listDistinctActors: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []repository.ActorWithRoles
for rows.Next() {
var a repository.ActorWithRoles
var actorType string
// pq.StringArray decodes the postgres array_agg result.
var roles pq.StringArray
if err := rows.Scan(&a.ActorID, &actorType, &roles); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.listDistinctActors scan: %w", err)
}
a.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
a.TenantID = tenantID
a.RoleIDs = []string(roles)
out = append(out, a)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (bool, error) {
if tenantID == "" {
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
// Exclude the seeded synthetic demo actor so a demo deploy that
// later switches to api-key mode can still bootstrap the first
// real admin. Matches the carve-out documented on the interface.
var count int
err := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM actor_roles
WHERE role_id = $1
AND tenant_id = $2
AND actor_id != $3
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
`, authdomain.RoleIDAdmin, tenantID, authdomain.DemoAnonActorID).Scan(&count)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.adminExists: %w", err)
}
return count > 0, nil
}
func (r *ActorRoleRepository) EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error) {
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — effective scope is the intersection of
// the actor-role's scope (ar.scope_*) AND the role-permission's
// scope (rp.scope_*). Pre-fix, only rp.scope_* was read; an
// actor granted r-operator scoped to profile=p-prod silently
// got every r-operator permission at every scope rp emitted
// (typically global), defeating HIGH-10's per-actor scope knob.
//
// Matching rules (the inner CASE encodes them):
//
// ar.scope rp.scope effective_scope
// ───────── ───────── ──────────────────────
// global global global / NULL
// global profile=X profile=X (rp narrows)
// profile=X global profile=X (ar narrows)
// profile=X profile=X profile=X (both agree)
// profile=X profile=Y ROW DROPPED (disjoint scopes — no permission flows)
// profile=X issuer=* ROW DROPPED (scope-type mismatch)
//
// The HAVING-style filter is implemented via a subquery — Postgres
// doesn't allow referencing a CASE alias from HAVING in a SELECT
// DISTINCT context without a wrapping CTE.
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT DISTINCT permission_name, effective_scope_type, effective_scope_id
FROM (
SELECT
p.name AS permission_name,
CASE
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' AND rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN 'global'
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' THEN rp.scope_type
WHEN rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN ar.scope_type
WHEN ar.scope_type = rp.scope_type AND ar.scope_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM rp.scope_id THEN ar.scope_type
ELSE NULL
END AS effective_scope_type,
CASE
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' AND rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN NULL
WHEN ar.scope_type = 'global' THEN rp.scope_id
WHEN rp.scope_type = 'global' THEN ar.scope_id
WHEN ar.scope_type = rp.scope_type AND ar.scope_id IS NOT DISTINCT FROM rp.scope_id THEN ar.scope_id
ELSE NULL
END AS effective_scope_id
FROM actor_roles ar
JOIN role_permissions rp ON rp.role_id = ar.role_id
JOIN permissions p ON p.id = rp.permission_id
WHERE ar.actor_id = $1
AND ar.actor_type = $2
AND ar.tenant_id = $3
AND (ar.expires_at IS NULL OR ar.expires_at > NOW())
) AS intersected
WHERE effective_scope_type IS NOT NULL
`, actorID, string(actorType), tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.effective: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []repository.EffectivePermission
for rows.Next() {
var ep repository.EffectivePermission
var scopeType string
var scopeID sql.NullString
if err := rows.Scan(&ep.PermissionName, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole.effective scan: %w", err)
}
ep.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
if scopeID.Valid {
s := scopeID.String
ep.ScopeID = &s
}
out = append(out, ep)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func scanActorRoles(rows *sql.Rows) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error) {
defer rows.Close()
var out []*authdomain.ActorRole
for rows.Next() {
var ar authdomain.ActorRole
var actorType, scopeType string
var expires sql.NullTime
var scopeID sql.NullString
// Audit 2026-05-11 A-1 — scope_type + scope_id are persisted
// by Grant (HIGH-10 closure, migration 000043). Pre-fix they
// were never scanned, so callers received ActorRole with
// zero-value scope fields regardless of what the row held.
// EffectivePermissions narrowing depends on these being
// populated correctly.
if err := rows.Scan(&ar.ID, &ar.ActorID, &actorType, &ar.RoleID, &ar.GrantedAt, &expires, &ar.GrantedBy, &ar.TenantID, &scopeType, &scopeID); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("actorRole scan: %w", err)
}
ar.ActorType = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(actorType)
if expires.Valid {
t := expires.Time
ar.ExpiresAt = &t
}
ar.ScopeType = authdomain.ScopeType(scopeType)
if scopeID.Valid {
s := scopeID.String
ar.ScopeID = &s
}
out = append(out, &ar)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// =============================================================================
// APIKeyRepository (Bundle 1 Phase 6 — bootstrap path)
// =============================================================================
// APIKeyRepository is the postgres implementation of
// repository.APIKeyRepository. Stores SHA-256 hashes only; the
// plaintext key value is never persisted.
type APIKeyRepository struct {
db *sql.DB
}
// NewAPIKeyRepository constructs an APIKeyRepository.
func NewAPIKeyRepository(db *sql.DB) *APIKeyRepository {
return &APIKeyRepository{db: db}
}
func (r *APIKeyRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, k *authdomain.APIKey) error {
if k.ID == "" {
k.ID = "ak-" + uuid.NewString()
}
if k.TenantID == "" {
k.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
if k.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
k.CreatedAt = time.Now().UTC()
}
var expires interface{}
if k.ExpiresAt != nil {
expires = *k.ExpiresAt
}
_, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO api_keys (id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
`, k.ID, k.Name, k.KeyHash, k.TenantID, k.Admin, k.CreatedBy, k.CreatedAt, expires)
if err != nil {
// Translate UNIQUE-constraint violations to the canonical
// auth sentinel so the service layer can return 409.
if pqErr, ok := err.(*pq.Error); ok && pqErr.Code == "23505" {
return repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName
}
return fmt.Errorf("apiKey.create: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (r *APIKeyRepository) GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at
FROM api_keys WHERE name = $1
`, name)
var k authdomain.APIKey
var expires, lastUsed sql.NullTime
if err := row.Scan(&k.ID, &k.Name, &k.KeyHash, &k.TenantID, &k.Admin, &k.CreatedBy, &k.CreatedAt, &expires, &lastUsed); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
return nil, repository.ErrAuthNotFound
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.getByName: %w", err)
}
if expires.Valid {
t := expires.Time
k.ExpiresAt = &t
}
if lastUsed.Valid {
t := lastUsed.Time
k.LastUsedAt = &t
}
return &k, nil
}
func (r *APIKeyRepository) List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.APIKey, error) {
if tenantID == "" {
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, name, key_hash, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at
FROM api_keys WHERE tenant_id = $1 ORDER BY created_at DESC
`, tenantID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.list: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []*authdomain.APIKey
for rows.Next() {
var k authdomain.APIKey
var expires, lastUsed sql.NullTime
if err := rows.Scan(&k.ID, &k.Name, &k.KeyHash, &k.TenantID, &k.Admin, &k.CreatedBy, &k.CreatedAt, &expires, &lastUsed); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apiKey.list scan: %w", err)
}
if expires.Valid {
t := expires.Time
k.ExpiresAt = &t
}
if lastUsed.Valid {
t := lastUsed.Time
k.LastUsedAt = &t
}
out = append(out, &k)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
func (r *APIKeyRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error {
res, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `DELETE FROM api_keys WHERE name = $1`, name)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("apiKey.delete: %w", err)
}
if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
return repository.ErrAuthNotFound
}
return nil
}