Bundle 2 Phase 0 stages the dependencies + auth-type discriminator
literal that later phases consume. No handler chain wired yet; an
operator who sets CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=oidc on this commit gets a clear
refuse-to-start error rather than a silent fallback to api-key (the
G-1 failure mode that drove "jwt" out of the allowed set).
Deliverables:
* go.mod: github.com/coreos/go-oidc/v3 v3.18.0 added as a direct
require. Per the pre-bundle dependency audit (Apache-2.0, zero CVEs
ever per OSV.dev, 2,400+ stars, used by Hashicorp Vault + Dex +
Hydra + Authentik + every Kubernetes OIDC integration), this is the
ecosystem-standard Go OIDC client. Pinned to a specific minor
(v3.18.0) per the prompt's "no bare latest" rule.
* go.mod: golang.org/x/oauth2 promoted from // indirect to direct,
bumped from v0.34.0 to v0.36.0 by go mod tidy. Both versions are
OSV-clean. Maintained by the Go team.
* No JSON-path library added (forbidden by the dependency audit; the
group-claim resolver is hand-rolled in Phase 3).
* internal/config/config.go: AuthTypeOIDC constant added with a
load-bearing comment explaining (a) this is the AUTH-TYPE literal,
not a JWT alg literal, so the G-1 closure invariant is preserved
("jwt" stays out of ValidAuthTypes forever); (b) the runtime guard
in cmd/server/main.go intentionally refuses-to-start when oidc is
set pre-Phase-6 to avoid the silent-downgrade failure mode.
ValidAuthTypes() now returns {api-key, none, oidc}.
* internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None
renamed to TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None_OIDC and now pins
the 3-entry set. TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (G-1 closure
test) still passes because "jwt" is never added back.
TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType's bad-types list updated:
"oidc" removed (now valid), "saml" added (correctly rejected per
Decision 5's SAML deferral).
* cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime auth-type guard now
has an explicit AuthTypeOIDC case that exit(1)s with an actionable
message: "the OIDC auth chain is not yet wired in this build (Auth
Bundle 2 Phase 6 ships the session middleware that consumes this
auth-type literal)." This closes the lying-field gap the literal
would otherwise create. Phase 6 of Bundle 2 relaxes this case to
fall through alongside api-key + none.
* api/openapi.yaml: /v1/auth/info auth_type enum extended from
[api-key, none] to [api-key, none, oidc] with an in-line comment
explaining the Phase-0-vs-Phase-6 timing so an OpenAPI consumer
isn't surprised by "oidc" appearing here pre-Bundle-2-merge.
* deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.validateAuthType:
valid set extended to include "oidc". Chart-time validation now
passes for type=oidc; the binary's runtime guard takes over to
refuse the start. Once Bundle 2 ships, the runtime guard relaxes
and OIDC works end-to-end with no further chart edits.
* .env.example: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block updated to document
the three valid values + the Phase-0-vs-Phase-6 timing.
* internal/auth/oidc/doc.go: new package directory with package doc
+ transitional blank imports for coreos/go-oidc/v3 + x/oauth2 so
go mod tidy keeps both deps as direct requires until Phase 3's
service.go replaces the blanks with real symbol use. Doc explains
the package layout (oidc/ + oidc/domain/ + oidc/groupclaim/ +
oidc/testfixtures/) so the post-Bundle-2 reader can navigate.
Verifications:
* gofmt clean on every changed file.
* go vet clean on internal/config + cmd/server + internal/auth/oidc.
* go test -short -count=1 green on internal/config (including the
G-1 closure + new validation tests), cmd/server, internal/auth (all
Bundle 1 packages), internal/service/auth.
* govulncheck ./... clean (M-024 hard CI gate).
* All 24 ci-guards pass locally.
Phase 0 exit criteria from cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md:
* go.mod shows coreos/go-oidc/v3 as direct: yes.
* golang.org/x/oauth2 is direct (not indirect): yes.
* govulncheck ./... clean: yes.
* No JSON-path library in go.mod / go.sum deltas: confirmed (only
v3 of go-oidc + the x/oauth2 bump landed).
* make verify green: gofmt + vet + go test pass; full make verify
(which would invoke golangci-lint) deferred to CI since the
sandbox doesn't have golangci-lint installed; the operator runs
make verify locally before pushing per CLAUDE.md operating rule.
certctl Helm Chart
Production-ready Helm chart for deploying certctl on Kubernetes. Wires up the certctl server (Deployment), PostgreSQL (StatefulSet with PVC), and the agent (DaemonSet — one per node) on a private cluster, with health probes, security contexts, and optional Ingress.
Quick install
helm install certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--create-namespace --namespace certctl \
--set server.auth.apiKey="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" \
--set postgresql.auth.password="$(openssl rand -base64 24)"
This brings up:
<release>-serverDeployment (HTTPS-only on port 8443; TLS 1.3)<release>-postgresStatefulSet (PostgreSQL 16-alpine, 1 replica, 10Gi PVC by default)<release>-agentDaemonSet (polls server, generates ECDSA P-256 keys locally)- Service objects, optional Ingress, and ServiceAccount with RBAC
See values.yaml for the full configuration surface — issuer settings, target connectors, scheduler intervals, notifier credentials, and resource requests/limits all live there.
Operational notes
Postgres password rotation — read this before changing postgresql.auth.password
The trap. postgresql.auth.password is bound to pg_authid exactly once — when the StatefulSet's PVC is provisioned and initdb runs. The official postgres:16-alpine image only runs initdb when /var/lib/postgresql/data is empty, so on every subsequent rollout the POSTGRES_PASSWORD env var is read into the container but ignored by postgres itself. The certctl-server container also picks up the new value (via the database URL helper template), so the two halves diverge: server presents the new password, postgres still expects the old one.
Symptom. The certctl-server pod's startup log shows:
failed to ping database: postgres rejected the configured credentials
(SQLSTATE 28P01 — invalid_password). If you recently rotated POSTGRES_PASSWORD ...
That diagnostic is emitted by internal/repository/postgres/db.go::wrapPingError — it points operators at the two remediation paths below.
Remediation, non-destructive (preferred for any environment with real data):
# 1. Rotate the password in postgres directly
kubectl -n certctl exec -it <release>-postgres-0 -- \
psql -U certctl -c "ALTER ROLE certctl PASSWORD '<new-password>';"
# 2. Update the secret / Helm values to the same value
helm upgrade <release> deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--reuse-values \
--set postgresql.auth.password='<new-password>'
# 3. Bounce the certctl-server pod so it re-reads the secret
kubectl -n certctl rollout restart deployment/<release>-server
Remediation, destructive (DESTROYS ALL CERTCTL DATA — only acceptable on dev/demo clusters):
helm uninstall <release> -n certctl
kubectl -n certctl delete pvc -l \
app.kubernetes.io/name=certctl,app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres
helm install <release> deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--namespace certctl \
--set postgresql.auth.password='<new-password>'
The PVC re-creates empty, initdb runs on first boot of the new postgres pod, and pg_authid is seeded with the new password.
Why we don't fix this in the chart. The env-vs-pg_authid divergence is intrinsic to how the upstream postgres image bootstraps — initdb is run-once-per-empty-data-dir, and there is no upstream-supported way to make subsequent boots re-seed pg_authid from POSTGRES_PASSWORD. The ergonomic answer is the runtime diagnostic plus this operational note.
Cross-references. Same root cause is documented for the docker-compose path in docs/quickstart.md (Warning callout after the cp .env.example .env block) and in deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md (Stateful volume — first-boot password binding section). The runtime diagnostic itself lives in internal/repository/postgres/db.go::wrapPingError with regression coverage in internal/repository/postgres/db_test.go.
Server API key rotation
Unlike the postgres password, server.auth.apiKey accepts a comma-separated list, so zero-downtime rotation is straightforward:
# 1. Add the new key alongside the old
helm upgrade <release> deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--reuse-values \
--set server.auth.apiKey='new-key,old-key'
# 2. Roll your agents / clients over to the new key
# 3. Remove the old key
helm upgrade <release> deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--reuse-values \
--set server.auth.apiKey='new-key'
JWT / OIDC via authenticating gateway
certctl's in-process auth surface is intentionally narrow: server.auth.type=api-key for production deployments and server.auth.type=none for development. There is no in-process JWT, OIDC, mTLS, or SAML middleware. (server.auth.type=jwt was accepted pre-G-1 but silently routed every request through the api-key bearer middleware — silent auth downgrade. The chart now fails at helm install/helm upgrade template time via the certctl.validateAuthType helper if you set it. See ../../../docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md if you previously had this in your values.)
For deployments that need JWT/OIDC, the canonical Kubernetes-flavored shape is to put oauth2-proxy in front of the certctl Service, attach an authenticating Ingress middleware, and run certctl with server.auth.type=none:
# 1. Install oauth2-proxy (or any OIDC-terminating sidecar) in the same namespace
helm install oauth2-proxy oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy \
--namespace certctl \
--set config.clientID="$OIDC_CLIENT_ID" \
--set config.clientSecret="$OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET" \
--set config.cookieSecret="$(openssl rand -base64 32)" \
--set config.configFile='|
provider = "oidc"
oidc_issuer_url = "https://your-issuer/"
upstreams = ["http://<release>-server.certctl.svc.cluster.local:8443"]
pass_authorization_header = true
set_authorization_header = true
email_domains = ["*"]
'
# 2. Install certctl with type=none (gateway terminates auth)
helm install certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--namespace certctl \
--set server.auth.type=none \
--set postgresql.auth.password="$(openssl rand -base64 24)"
# 3. Attach an Ingress that routes through oauth2-proxy
# (Traefik ForwardAuth, nginx auth_request, Envoy ext_authz, etc.)
Same root pattern works with Pomerium, Authelia, Caddy forward_auth, Apache mod_auth_openidc, or any service-mesh ext_authz. See ../../../docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" for the full design rationale and ../../../docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough.
TLS certificate sourcing
By default the chart provisions a self-signed cert via the same init-container pattern as the docker-compose deploy. For production, supply an operator-managed Secret (cert-manager, internal CA, etc.) — see docs/tls.md for the full provisioning matrix and docs/upgrade-to-tls.md for upgrade-from-HTTP procedures.
Disabling embedded postgres
If you have an existing PostgreSQL cluster, disable the embedded one and point at it directly:
helm install certctl deploy/helm/certctl/ \
--set postgresql.enabled=false \
--set server.databaseUrl='postgres://certctl:<pw>@my-pg-host:5432/certctl?sslmode=require'
The volume-trap section above does not apply to this configuration — your postgres operator (or cloud DB) handles password rotation, and you control pg_authid directly.
Uninstall
helm uninstall <release> -n certctl
# Optional — also delete the postgres PVC (DESTROYS DATA):
kubectl -n certctl delete pvc -l \
app.kubernetes.io/name=certctl,app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres
By default helm uninstall retains the StatefulSet's PVCs, so reinstalling with the same release name preserves the database. If you've changed postgresql.auth.password in your values between uninstall and reinstall, you'll hit the trap on the reinstall — apply the non-destructive remediation above, or also delete the PVC.