Files
certctl/cmd/server/auth_backfill.go
T
shankar0123 3c605d5618 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

106 lines
3.5 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
)
// assembleNamedAPIKeys translates the operator's CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED
// env-var (preferred) or CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET (legacy) into the
// auth.NamedAPIKey slice the rest of the boot path consumes.
//
// Authentication unification (M-002): every authenticated request now
// carries a named actor in the request context so audit events record
// the real key identity instead of the hardcoded "api-key-user"
// string. Named keys come from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED (preferred). For
// backward compatibility CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is synthesized into
// legacy-key-N entries with Admin=false.
func assembleNamedAPIKeys(cfg *config.Config, logger *slog.Logger) []auth.NamedAPIKey {
if config.AuthType(cfg.Auth.Type) == config.AuthTypeNone {
return nil
}
var out []auth.NamedAPIKey
for _, nk := range cfg.Auth.NamedKeys {
out = append(out, auth.NamedAPIKey{
Name: nk.Name,
Key: nk.Key,
Admin: nk.Admin,
})
}
if len(out) == 0 && cfg.Auth.Secret != "" {
idx := 0
for _, p := range strings.Split(cfg.Auth.Secret, ",") {
p = strings.TrimSpace(p)
if p == "" {
continue
}
out = append(out, auth.NamedAPIKey{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
Key: p,
Admin: false,
})
idx++
}
if len(out) > 0 && logger != nil {
logger.Warn("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET is deprecated — set CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED for named actor attribution and admin gating",
"synthesized_keys", len(out))
}
}
return out
}
// actorRoleGranter is the narrow interface backfillNamedKeyActorRoles
// needs from the postgres ActorRoleRepository. Pulled out so the unit
// test can inject a fake without spinning up the full repo / DB.
type actorRoleGranter interface {
Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
}
// backfillNamedKeyActorRoles is the Bundle 1 Phase 3 closure (C2)
// startup hook that ensures every CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED entry — and
// every legacy CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET synthesized fallback — has an
// actor_roles row before the HTTP server accepts requests. Admin-flagged
// keys grant `r-admin` (full canonical permission set); non-admin keys
// grant `r-viewer` (read-only surface), matching the pre-Phase-3.5
// capability shape.
//
// Idempotent via ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING in the repo Grant — reboots
// don't create duplicates. Failures are logged but non-fatal: the server
// still starts, and the operator can fix the grant via the RBAC API.
//
// The function is package-private + extracted from main() so the unit
// test in auth_backfill_test.go can pin the role-mapping invariant
// without depending on the full server bootstrap path.
func backfillNamedKeyActorRoles(
ctx context.Context,
repo actorRoleGranter,
keys []auth.NamedAPIKey,
logger *slog.Logger,
) {
for _, nk := range keys {
role := authdomain.RoleIDViewer
if nk.Admin {
role = authdomain.RoleIDAdmin
}
if err := repo.Grant(ctx, &authdomain.ActorRole{
ActorID: nk.Name,
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
RoleID: role,
TenantID: authdomain.DefaultTenantID,
GrantedBy: "bootstrap",
}); err != nil {
if logger != nil {
logger.Warn("api-key actor-role backfill failed; key authenticates but RBAC routes will 403 until grant is added via /v1/auth/keys",
"key", nk.Name, "role", role, "err", err)
}
}
}
}