Files
certctl/internal/repository/auth.go
T
shankar0123 21aeed4f4e legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4)
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):

addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:

  // Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
  // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1

Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).

Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.

Generated via:
  addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
    -f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
    -ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
    cmd/ internal/

Verification:
  find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
    -not -path '*/testdata/*' \
    -exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l

  Returns: 0

gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
2026-05-13 21:23:35 +00:00

217 lines
10 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
package repository
import (
"context"
"errors"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
)
// Sentinel errors for the RBAC repositories. Postgres implementations
// translate SQLSTATE codes (23505 unique-violation, 23503 FK-violation,
// no-rows) into these so handler / service code branches via errors.Is.
var (
// ErrAuthNotFound is returned by Get / GetByName when no row matches.
// Maps to HTTP 404.
ErrAuthNotFound = errors.New("auth: row not found")
// ErrAuthDuplicateName is returned by Create when a UNIQUE constraint
// fires (e.g. roles.name within a tenant). Maps to HTTP 409.
ErrAuthDuplicateName = errors.New("auth: duplicate name")
// ErrAuthRoleInUse is returned by RoleRepository.Delete when active
// actor_roles still reference the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
// Maps to HTTP 409.
ErrAuthRoleInUse = errors.New("auth: role still has active actor assignments")
// ErrAuthReservedActor is returned when a mutation targets a system-
// reserved actor (currently `actor-demo-anon`). Maps to HTTP 409.
ErrAuthReservedActor = errors.New("auth: reserved system actor cannot be modified")
// ErrAuthUnknownPermission is returned when a RolePermission grant
// references a permission name not in the canonical catalog.
// Maps to HTTP 400.
ErrAuthUnknownPermission = errors.New("auth: permission not in canonical catalog")
// ErrActorRoleNotFound is returned by ActorRoleRepository.Revoke
// when the caller passes a non-empty `RevokeOptions.ScopeType` that
// doesn't match any persisted (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id)
// tuple. The legacy no-opts "revoke all variants" call never
// returns this — pre-A-4 callers cannot start seeing the error.
// Maps to HTTP 404. Audit 2026-05-11 A-4.
ErrActorRoleNotFound = errors.New("auth: no actor_role row matches the requested scope")
)
// ActorRoleRevokeOptions narrows ActorRoleRepository.Revoke to a
// specific (scope_type, scope_id) variant when set. Audit 2026-05-11
// A-4 — HIGH-10's UNIQUE (actor, role, scope_type, scope_id, tenant)
// uniqueness extension allows multiple scoped grants of the same role
// to the same actor; without scope plumbing on Revoke an operator who
// granted Alice `r-operator` against both `profile=p-acme` and
// `profile=p-globex` cannot selectively revoke one.
//
// Semantics:
//
// - Zero value (ScopeType="") preserves the legacy "revoke all
// variants" behaviour. Every actor_roles row matching
// (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) is deleted regardless
// of scope. Pre-A-4 callers that don't pass options stay correct.
//
// - Non-empty ScopeType filters to that one variant. `global`
// requires ScopeID==nil; `profile` / `issuer` require
// ScopeID!=nil. The SQL uses `scope_type = $5 AND scope_id IS NOT
// DISTINCT FROM $6` so the NULL case matches cleanly.
//
// - If the filter doesn't match any row, the repository returns
// ErrActorRoleNotFound — the caller (service / handler) maps it
// to HTTP 404. The legacy "revoke all" semantic stays best-effort
// (deleting zero rows is not an error) because the GUI used to
// fire it as a clean-up and operators rely on the idempotence.
type ActorRoleRevokeOptions struct {
ScopeType authdomain.ScopeType
ScopeID *string
}
// TenantRepository wraps the tenants table. Bundle 1 ships single-tenant
// (one seeded `t-default`); the future managed-service offering activates
// multi-tenant by inserting additional tenants.
type TenantRepository interface {
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Tenant, error)
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Tenant, error)
EnsureDefault(ctx context.Context) error
}
// RoleRepository wraps the roles + role_permissions tables.
type RoleRepository interface {
Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
Create(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error
Update(ctx context.Context, role *authdomain.Role) error
// Delete fails with ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still
// reference the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
// ListPermissions returns the (Permission, ScopeType, ScopeID)
// triples granted to the role.
ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
// AddPermission creates a row in role_permissions. ON CONFLICT DO
// NOTHING preserves idempotency for re-applied seeds.
AddPermission(ctx context.Context, grant *authdomain.RolePermission) error
// RemovePermission deletes a specific (role, permission, scope) row.
RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, grant *authdomain.RolePermission) error
}
// PermissionRepository wraps the permissions table.
type PermissionRepository interface {
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.Permission, error)
// IsCanonical returns true when name is in
// authdomain.CanonicalPermissions. The migration seeds the catalog;
// this is an in-memory check so callers (RoleService.AddPermission)
// can fail-fast without a DB roundtrip.
IsCanonical(name string) bool
}
// ActorRoleRepository wraps the actor_roles table.
type ActorRoleRepository interface {
// ListByActor returns all standing role grants for an actor.
ListByActor(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
// ListByRole returns all actors holding a given role. Used by
// RoleService.Delete to enforce the in-use guard.
ListByRole(ctx context.Context, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
// Grant creates an actor_roles row. Idempotent via ON CONFLICT.
// The reserved actor `actor-demo-anon` admin grant is seeded by
// the migration; this method will create additional grants for it
// only if the operator explicitly wires that, which the API
// layer rejects.
Grant(ctx context.Context, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
// Revoke deletes actor_roles row(s). Without opts (the legacy
// no-options call shape) every variant matching
// (actor_id, actor_type, role_id, tenant_id) is deleted regardless
// of (scope_type, scope_id). With opts.ScopeType set, only the
// matching variant is deleted; no-match returns
// ErrActorRoleNotFound. The API layer must reject revocations
// targeting `actor-demo-anon` to preserve the demo path. Audit
// 2026-05-11 A-4 — see ActorRoleRevokeOptions for semantics.
Revoke(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, roleID, tenantID string, opts ActorRoleRevokeOptions) error
// EffectivePermissions returns the deduplicated set of
// (permission_name, scope_type, scope_id) triples granted to the
// actor across all roles they hold. The middleware-level
// auth.RequirePermission gate (Phase 3) calls this on every
// gated request; implementations should cache or use SQL JOINs
// for performance.
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, actorID string, actorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue, tenantID string) ([]EffectivePermission, error)
// AdminExists reports whether ANY actor in the tenant currently
// holds the r-admin role. Bundle 1 Phase 6's bootstrap probe
// uses this to gate the day-0 endpoint: once the answer flips
// from false to true the bootstrap path stays closed forever
// (the seeded actor-demo-anon admin only exists in demo mode;
// in api-key mode the operator either uses bootstrap or
// CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED to mint the first admin). The query
// excludes the synthetic actor-demo-anon so demo-mode deploys
// can still bootstrap a real admin if/when the operator
// switches to api-key mode without re-migrating.
AdminExists(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) (bool, error)
// ListDistinctActors returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type)
// pair with at least one actor_roles grant in the tenant.
// Bundle 1 Phase 7's `auth keys list` + scope-down helper use
// this to enumerate the actor population without joining
// against the env-var-loaded namedKeys (whose canonical record
// is the actor_roles backfill from Phase 1 / C2). The synthetic
// actor-demo-anon is included so the GUI can render it as
// "system-managed, scope-down hidden"; Phase 7's interactive
// flow filters it out of the prompt loop.
ListDistinctActors(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]ActorWithRoles, error)
}
// ActorWithRoles is the (actor, roles) projection returned by
// ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Roles is the slice of role
// IDs the actor holds; the caller can resolve role names via the
// RoleRepository or the CLI's already-cached role list.
type ActorWithRoles struct {
ActorID string
ActorType authdomain.ActorTypeValue
TenantID string
RoleIDs []string
}
// EffectivePermission is the (permission, scope) pair returned by
// ActorRoleRepository.EffectivePermissions. Multiple actor_roles rows
// may grant the same permission at different scopes; callers receive
// every grant and the matcher handles "global beats specific" semantics.
type EffectivePermission struct {
PermissionName string
ScopeType authdomain.ScopeType
ScopeID *string // NULL = global
}
// APIKeyRepository wraps the api_keys table. Bundle 1 Phase 6 ships
// this so the bootstrap endpoint (POST /v1/auth/bootstrap) can mint
// the first admin API key without needing the operator to roundtrip
// through CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED. Operator-tier keys live here;
// agent-tier keys remain on the agents table (`api_key_hash` column).
type APIKeyRepository interface {
// Create stores a new key row. ID + CreatedAt default if zero.
// The plaintext key is NOT stored — callers pass only the
// SHA-256 hex hash. Returns ErrAuthDuplicateName when the
// (name) UNIQUE constraint fires.
Create(ctx context.Context, key *authdomain.APIKey) error
// GetByName returns a single row by operator-visible name.
// Returns ErrAuthNotFound when no row matches.
GetByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (*authdomain.APIKey, error)
// List returns every key row across the tenant. Bundle 1 ships
// single-tenant so tenantID is typically t-default.
List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*authdomain.APIKey, error)
// Delete removes a key row by name. Used by the RBAC API's key
// rotation/revocation paths.
Delete(ctx context.Context, name string) error
}