Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/auth_bootstrap.go
T
shankar0123 3ef45e2ad4 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

128 lines
4.4 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/bootstrap"
)
// BootstrapHandler exposes the Bundle 1 Phase 6 day-0 admin path.
//
// Threat model (from cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md): the control
// plane comes up with no admin actors. The operator hands the
// CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to a single curl call; the server mints
// the first admin key and locks the door. No subsequent invocation
// can mint another admin via this path — the strategy state and the
// "admin already exists" probe both close it. After bootstrap the
// operator manages keys via /v1/auth/keys/...
//
// Handler shape:
//
// GET /v1/auth/bootstrap → 200 {available:true|false}
// POST /v1/auth/bootstrap → 201 {api_key, key_value, actor_id}
//
// The GET surface is intentionally probable from any caller; it
// returns availability (no token, no admin probe) so the GUI and the
// install one-liner can decide whether to render the bootstrap
// affordance. The POST surface requires the bootstrap token and
// returns the plaintext key value once.
type BootstrapHandler struct {
svc *bootstrap.Service
}
// NewBootstrapHandler constructs a BootstrapHandler. svc may be nil
// to disable both methods (handler returns 410 Gone on every call).
func NewBootstrapHandler(svc *bootstrap.Service) BootstrapHandler {
return BootstrapHandler{svc: svc}
}
type bootstrapAvailableResponse struct {
Available bool `json:"available"`
}
type bootstrapRequest struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
ActorName string `json:"actor_name"`
}
type bootstrapResponse struct {
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
APIKeyID string `json:"api_key_id"`
KeyValue string `json:"key_value"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
Message string `json:"message"`
}
// Available is the GET probe. Returns {available: true} when the
// strategy is callable AND no admin actors exist; otherwise {available:
// false}. The endpoint never reveals the bootstrap token's existence
// independently of admin actor state — the GUI uses this to decide
// whether to render the "first-time setup" wizard.
func (h BootstrapHandler) Available(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
available := false
if h.svc != nil {
ok, err := h.svc.Available(r.Context())
if err == nil {
available = ok
}
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, bootstrapAvailableResponse{Available: available})
}
// Mint is the POST handler that consumes the token + creates the
// first admin key.
//
// Status mapping:
//
// 410 Gone → strategy disabled (no token, admin exists, or one-shot already consumed)
// 401 Unauthorized → token mismatch
// 400 Bad Request → invalid actor_name
// 201 Created → key minted; response carries the plaintext key value
func (h BootstrapHandler) Mint(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
if h.svc == nil {
// No service wired = endpoint disabled. Same status as the
// "already consumed" path so callers can't differentiate
// configuration from state.
Error(w, http.StatusGone, "bootstrap endpoint disabled")
return
}
var body bootstrapRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 4096)).Decode(&body); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid JSON body")
return
}
body.ActorName = strings.TrimSpace(body.ActorName)
result, err := h.svc.ValidateAndMint(r.Context(), body.Token, body.ActorName)
if err != nil {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, bootstrap.ErrDisabled):
Error(w, http.StatusGone, "bootstrap endpoint disabled")
case errors.Is(err, bootstrap.ErrInvalidToken):
Error(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Invalid bootstrap token")
case errors.Is(err, bootstrap.ErrInvalidActorName):
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid actor_name (3-64 chars, lowercase alnum + - + _)")
default:
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Bootstrap failed")
}
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusCreated, bootstrapResponse{
ActorID: result.APIKey.Name,
APIKeyID: result.APIKey.ID,
KeyValue: result.KeyValue,
CreatedAt: result.APIKey.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
Message: "Admin API key created. This is the only time the key value is shown — capture it now.",
})
}