mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 15:51:30 +00:00
8b75e0311b
Mechanical sed across the main go.mod's module declaration, the f5-mock-icontrol
sub-module's go.mod, every Go file's import path (361 files), and a rebuild of
the checked-in f5-mock-icontrol binary so its embedded build-info reflects the
new module path. No behavior change.
Choice B from cowork/transfer-certctl-to-org.md, executed 2026-05-04. Choice A
(keep module path declared as github.com/shankar0123/certctl regardless of
repo URL) shipped on the day of the org transfer (2026-05-03) since we had no
external Go consumers; this commit closes that deferral.
Backward-compat: GitHub HTTP redirects continue to forward
github.com/shankar0123/certctl → github.com/certctl-io/certctl at the URL
level, but Go's module proxy uses the path declared in go.mod as the
canonical name. Pre-fix, anyone trying `go get github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
hit a "module path mismatch" error because go.mod said
github.com/shankar0123/certctl and the URL they fetched it from said
certctl-io/certctl. Post-fix, the canonical name and the URL agree, so
go get / go install / external Go consumers / Go-tooling integrations
work cleanly via either the new path (preferred) or the old path (which
redirects and Go follows the redirect for source fetch).
Anyone still importing the old path inside their own code keeps working
provided they update their go.mod's `require` line to match — the module
path declared in their consumer's go.sum / go.mod is the authoritative
import name, so a mass sed across their import statements is the migration
on the consumer side. No external consumers exist today.
Diff shape:
361 *.go files — import path replacement only
2 go.mod — module declaration replacement only
1 binary — deploy/test/f5-mock-icontrol/f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt
so embedded build-info reflects the new path (8618965 vs
8618933 bytes; 32-byte diff is the build-info change)
Total: 364 files, 730 insertions / 730 deletions, net-zero size, pure
mechanical substitution.
Verification:
gofmt: 17 files needed re-alignment after sed (the new path is one char
shorter than the old, so column-aligned import groups drifted). Applied
`gofmt -w` to fix.
go mod tidy: clean exit on both modules.
go vet ./...: clean exit.
go build ./...: clean exit.
go test -short -count=1 on representative packages: all green
(internal/domain, internal/validation, internal/crypto, internal/crypto/signer,
cmd/agent). Test output now reads `ok github.com/certctl-io/certctl/...`
confirming the module path resolves correctly.
binary: f5-mock-icontrol rebuilt; `strings | grep shankar0123` returns
nothing; `strings | grep certctl-io/certctl` shows the new module path
embedded in build-info.
Files intentionally NOT touched in this commit:
README.md / CHANGELOG.md / docs/ / etc. — already swept to certctl-io
URLs in commit 0729ee4 (the post-transfer URL refresh). This commit is
purely the Go-tooling layer.
Scarf pixels (`shankar0123.docker.scarf.sh/...`) — Scarf-account
namespace, not a Go import or GitHub repo URL. Stays.
This is a non-blocking, non-customer-impacting change. Operators pulling
container images, running `make verify`, hitting the API, or installing the
agent see no functional difference. Only Go-tooling consumers (none today)
are affected, and they're enabled — not broken — by this commit.
957 lines
30 KiB
Go
957 lines
30 KiB
Go
package service
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"encoding/json"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
func TestCreateRule(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: make(map[string]*domain.PolicyRule),
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{Events: []*domain.AuditEvent{}}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
config := map[string]interface{}{"issuers": []string{"iss-acme"}}
|
|
configJSON, _ := json.Marshal(config)
|
|
|
|
rule := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Config: configJSON,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err := policyService.CreateRule(ctx, rule, "user-1")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("CreateRule failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(policyRepo.Rules) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 rule, got %d", len(policyRepo.Rules))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(auditRepo.Events) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 audit event, got %d", len(auditRepo.Events))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestGetRule(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
rule := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
retrieved, err := policyService.GetRule(ctx, "rule-001")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("GetRule failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if retrieved.Name != "Allowed Issuers" {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected name Allowed Issuers, got %s", retrieved.Name)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestGetRule_NotFound(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: make(map[string]*domain.PolicyRule),
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
_, err := policyService.GetRule(ctx, "nonexistent")
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("expected error for nonexistent rule")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestListRules(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
rule1 := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
rule2 := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-002",
|
|
Name: "Required Metadata",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule1, "rule-002": rule2},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
rules, err := policyService.ListRules(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ListRules failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(rules) != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 2 rules, got %d", len(rules))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestUpdateRule(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
originalRule := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": originalRule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{Events: []*domain.AuditEvent{}}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
updatedRule := *originalRule
|
|
updatedRule.Enabled = false
|
|
|
|
err := policyService.UpdateRule(ctx, &updatedRule, "user-1")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("UpdateRule failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stored := policyRepo.Rules["rule-001"]
|
|
if stored.Enabled {
|
|
t.Error("expected rule to be disabled")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(auditRepo.Events) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 audit event, got %d", len(auditRepo.Events))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestDeleteRule(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
rule := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{Events: []*domain.AuditEvent{}}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
err := policyService.DeleteRule(ctx, "rule-001", "user-1")
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("DeleteRule failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(policyRepo.Rules) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 rules, got %d", len(policyRepo.Rules))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(auditRepo.Events) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 audit event, got %d", len(auditRepo.Events))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateCertificate(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
rule := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
|
|
ID: "cert-001",
|
|
CommonName: "example.com",
|
|
IssuerID: "iss-acme",
|
|
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
|
|
ExpiresAt: now.AddDate(1, 0, 0),
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
violations, err := policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(violations) > 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected no violations, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateCertificate_WithViolation(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
rule := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
|
|
ID: "cert-001",
|
|
CommonName: "example.com",
|
|
IssuerID: "", // Missing issuer
|
|
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
|
|
ExpiresAt: now.AddDate(1, 0, 0),
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
violations, err := policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 violation, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if violations[0].CertificateID != "cert-001" {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected violation for cert-001, got %s", violations[0].CertificateID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestValidateCertificate_MultipleViolations(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
rule1 := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Allowed Issuers",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
rule2 := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-002",
|
|
Name: "Required Metadata",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule1, "rule-002": rule2},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
cert := &domain.ManagedCertificate{
|
|
ID: "cert-001",
|
|
CommonName: "example.com",
|
|
IssuerID: "", // Missing issuer
|
|
Tags: nil, // Missing metadata
|
|
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
|
|
ExpiresAt: now.AddDate(1, 0, 0),
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
violations, err := policyService.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(violations) != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 2 violations, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestListPolicies(t *testing.T) {
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
rule1 := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-001",
|
|
Name: "Rule 1",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
rule2 := &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: "rule-002",
|
|
Name: "Rule 2",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
UpdatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{"rule-001": rule1, "rule-002": rule2},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
policies, total, err := policyService.ListPolicies(context.Background(), 1, 50)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ListPolicies failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(policies) != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 2 policies, got %d", len(policies))
|
|
}
|
|
if total != 2 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected total 2, got %d", total)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func TestCreatePolicy(t *testing.T) {
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: make(map[string]*domain.PolicyRule),
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditRepo := &mockAuditRepo{}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(auditRepo)
|
|
|
|
policyService := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
policy := domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
Name: "Test Policy",
|
|
Type: domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers,
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
CreatedAt: now,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
created, err := policyService.CreatePolicy(context.Background(), policy)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("CreatePolicy failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if created.ID == "" {
|
|
t.Fatal("expected non-empty policy ID")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(policyRepo.Rules) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 rule in repo, got %d", len(policyRepo.Rules))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
// D-008 regression tests
|
|
//
|
|
// These pin the behavior that closes the D-006 loop:
|
|
// 1. evaluateRule copies rule.Severity onto every violation (pre-D-008 the
|
|
// engine hardcoded Warning regardless of the rule's configured severity).
|
|
// 2. evaluateRule parses rule.Config per-arm so rules enforce real thresholds
|
|
// and allowlists (pre-D-008 the configs were ignored; rules fired only on
|
|
// the missing-field shape).
|
|
// 3. An empty/zero Config preserves the pre-D-008 missing-field violation
|
|
// (backward-compat invariant).
|
|
// 4. Malformed Config returns an error; the caller logs and skips the rule
|
|
// instead of producing a zero-value violation.
|
|
// 5. CertificateLifetime (new 6th arm) reads NotBefore/NotAfter from the
|
|
// latest CertificateVersion via the cert repo wired with SetCertRepo.
|
|
// ============================================================================
|
|
|
|
// mkRule is a tiny constructor used by the D-008 tests to keep the table rows
|
|
// readable. Every rule is enabled; test-specific fields layer on top.
|
|
func mkRule(id string, t domain.PolicyType, sev domain.PolicySeverity, cfg string) *domain.PolicyRule {
|
|
return &domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
ID: id,
|
|
Name: id,
|
|
Type: t,
|
|
Config: json.RawMessage(cfg),
|
|
Enabled: true,
|
|
Severity: sev,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// evalCert is a minimal cert used by the arms that don't look at much beyond
|
|
// the shape of the field they're testing. Tests shadow fields as needed.
|
|
func evalCert() *domain.ManagedCertificate {
|
|
return &domain.ManagedCertificate{
|
|
ID: "cert-001",
|
|
CommonName: "example.com",
|
|
Status: domain.CertificateStatusActive,
|
|
ExpiresAt: time.Now().AddDate(1, 0, 0),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEvaluateRule_SeverityPassThrough pins invariant #1 — every arm stamps
|
|
// rule.Severity onto the violation. The pre-D-008 bug was that arms
|
|
// independently hardcoded PolicySeverityWarning. We test each arm with a
|
|
// severity that isn't the legacy default so a regression would be visible.
|
|
func TestEvaluateRule_SeverityPassThrough(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
|
|
// Cert shaped to fail every non-empty-config check via the backward-compat
|
|
// missing-field path. Each row picks a severity intentionally ≠ Warning to
|
|
// make a stray hardcoded default obvious.
|
|
cases := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
rule *domain.PolicyRule
|
|
cert *domain.ManagedCertificate
|
|
setupFn func(svc *PolicyService)
|
|
expected domain.PolicySeverity
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "AllowedIssuers Critical via missing IssuerID",
|
|
rule: mkRule("r-ai", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers, domain.PolicySeverityCritical, ""),
|
|
cert: func() *domain.ManagedCertificate {
|
|
c := evalCert()
|
|
c.IssuerID = ""
|
|
return c
|
|
}(),
|
|
expected: domain.PolicySeverityCritical,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "AllowedDomains Error via empty SANs",
|
|
rule: mkRule("r-ad", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedDomains, domain.PolicySeverityError, ""),
|
|
cert: func() *domain.ManagedCertificate {
|
|
c := evalCert()
|
|
c.SANs = nil
|
|
return c
|
|
}(),
|
|
expected: domain.PolicySeverityError,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "RequiredMetadata Critical via empty Tags",
|
|
rule: mkRule("r-rm", domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata, domain.PolicySeverityCritical, ""),
|
|
cert: func() *domain.ManagedCertificate {
|
|
c := evalCert()
|
|
c.Tags = nil
|
|
return c
|
|
}(),
|
|
expected: domain.PolicySeverityCritical,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "AllowedEnvironments Warning via empty Environment",
|
|
rule: mkRule("r-ae", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedEnvironments, domain.PolicySeverityWarning, ""),
|
|
cert: func() *domain.ManagedCertificate {
|
|
c := evalCert()
|
|
c.Environment = ""
|
|
return c
|
|
}(),
|
|
expected: domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "RenewalLeadTime Critical via short remaining validity",
|
|
rule: mkRule("r-rl", domain.PolicyTypeRenewalLeadTime, domain.PolicySeverityCritical, `{"lead_time_days": 60}`),
|
|
cert: func() *domain.ManagedCertificate {
|
|
c := evalCert()
|
|
c.ExpiresAt = time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, 30) // 30d remaining < 60d lead
|
|
return c
|
|
}(),
|
|
expected: domain.PolicySeverityCritical,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "CertificateLifetime Error via 365d span vs 90d max",
|
|
rule: mkRule("r-cl", domain.PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime, domain.PolicySeverityError, `{"max_days": 90}`),
|
|
cert: evalCert(),
|
|
setupFn: func(svc *PolicyService) {
|
|
// Seed a version with 365d lifetime on the same cert ID used
|
|
// by evalCert().
|
|
cr := &mockCertRepo{
|
|
Certs: map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate{},
|
|
Versions: map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion{},
|
|
}
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
cr.Versions["cert-001"] = []*domain.CertificateVersion{{
|
|
ID: "ver-001",
|
|
CertificateID: "cert-001",
|
|
NotBefore: now.AddDate(0, 0, -10),
|
|
NotAfter: now.AddDate(1, 0, -10), // ~365d lifetime
|
|
}}
|
|
svc.SetCertRepo(cr)
|
|
},
|
|
expected: domain.PolicySeverityError,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tc := range cases {
|
|
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{tc.rule.ID: tc.rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(&mockAuditRepo{})
|
|
svc := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
if tc.setupFn != nil {
|
|
tc.setupFn(svc)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
violations, err := svc.ValidateCertificate(ctx, tc.cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
if violations[0].Severity != tc.expected {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected severity %q, got %q", tc.expected, violations[0].Severity)
|
|
}
|
|
if violations[0].RuleID != tc.rule.ID {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected rule ID %q, got %q", tc.rule.ID, violations[0].RuleID)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEvaluateRule_ConfigConsumed pins invariant #2 — non-empty Config drives
|
|
// arm behavior (allowlists, thresholds, keys). Each subtest supplies a config
|
|
// that the cert would satisfy under the backward-compat missing-field path
|
|
// but violates under the config-aware path. A regression to the pre-D-008
|
|
// "config silently dropped" behavior would make these pass with 0 violations.
|
|
func TestEvaluateRule_ConfigConsumed(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
|
|
t.Run("AllowedIssuers rejects issuer not in allowlist", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-ai", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"allowed_issuer_ids": ["iss-acme"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.IssuerID = "iss-wrong"
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation for disallowed issuer, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(violations[0].Message, "iss-wrong") {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected message to mention issuer ID, got %q", violations[0].Message)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("AllowedIssuers accepts issuer in allowlist", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-ai", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"allowed_issuer_ids": ["iss-acme"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.IssuerID = "iss-acme"
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations for allowed issuer, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("AllowedDomains rejects SAN outside allowlist", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-ad", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedDomains, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"allowed_domains": ["*.foo.com"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.SANs = []string{"bar.elsewhere.com"}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation for disallowed SAN, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("AllowedDomains wildcard matches single-label subdomain", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-ad", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedDomains, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"allowed_domains": ["*.foo.com"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.SANs = []string{"bar.foo.com"}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations for single-label wildcard match, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("AllowedDomains wildcard rejects multi-label subdomain", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// X.509 wildcard semantics: *.foo consumes exactly one label.
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-ad", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedDomains, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"allowed_domains": ["*.foo.com"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.SANs = []string{"baz.bar.foo.com"}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 violation for multi-label wildcard (X.509 semantics), got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RequiredMetadata rejects missing key", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rm", domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"required_keys": ["owner"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.Tags = map[string]string{"team": "platform"}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation for missing owner key, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(violations[0].Message, "owner") {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected message to mention the missing key, got %q", violations[0].Message)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RequiredMetadata accepts all required keys present", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rm", domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"required_keys": ["owner"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.Tags = map[string]string{"owner": "alice"}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations when all required keys present, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("AllowedEnvironments rejects env outside allowlist", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-ae", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedEnvironments, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"allowed": ["production", "staging"]}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.Environment = "wild-west"
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation for disallowed env, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RenewalLeadTime fires when remaining < configured lead", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rl", domain.PolicyTypeRenewalLeadTime, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"lead_time_days": 60}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.ExpiresAt = time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, 30) // 30d < 60d lead
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation for 30d remaining vs 60d lead, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RenewalLeadTime quiet when remaining > configured lead", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rl", domain.PolicyTypeRenewalLeadTime, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"lead_time_days": 14}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.ExpiresAt = time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, 60) // 60d > 14d lead
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations when plenty of runway remains, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("CertificateLifetime fires when lifetime exceeds max", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-cl", domain.PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"max_days": 90}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
certRepo := &mockCertRepo{
|
|
Certs: map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate{},
|
|
Versions: map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion{},
|
|
}
|
|
certRepo.Versions["cert-001"] = []*domain.CertificateVersion{{
|
|
ID: "ver-001",
|
|
CertificateID: "cert-001",
|
|
NotBefore: now.AddDate(0, 0, -1),
|
|
NotAfter: now.AddDate(1, 0, -1), // ~365d > 90d
|
|
}}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, certRepo)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 violation for 365d lifetime vs 90d max, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(violations[0].Message, "90 days") {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected message to mention max_days threshold, got %q", violations[0].Message)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("CertificateLifetime quiet when lifetime within max", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-cl", domain.PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime, domain.PolicySeverityWarning,
|
|
`{"max_days": 90}`)
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
|
|
certRepo := &mockCertRepo{
|
|
Certs: map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate{},
|
|
Versions: map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion{},
|
|
}
|
|
certRepo.Versions["cert-001"] = []*domain.CertificateVersion{{
|
|
ID: "ver-001",
|
|
CertificateID: "cert-001",
|
|
NotBefore: now.AddDate(0, 0, -10),
|
|
NotAfter: now.AddDate(0, 0, 60), // 70d lifetime < 90d
|
|
}}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, certRepo)
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations for 70d lifetime under 90d max, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEvaluateRule_EmptyConfig_BackCompat pins invariant #3 — a rule with no
|
|
// Config (e.g., a legacy row from a pre-D-008 migration) still fires on the
|
|
// pre-D-008 missing-field shape using its configured severity. This is how
|
|
// we let existing deployments migrate without a schema rewrite.
|
|
func TestEvaluateRule_EmptyConfig_BackCompat(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RequiredMetadata fires on zero tags", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rm", domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata, domain.PolicySeverityError, "")
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.Tags = nil
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected 1 backcompat violation, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
if violations[0].Severity != domain.PolicySeverityError {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected severity Error (passed through from rule), got %q", violations[0].Severity)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RequiredMetadata quiet when any tags present under empty config", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Empty config means "only fire on missing-field shape" — so a cert
|
|
// with any tags (even not what a human would call meaningful) passes.
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rm", domain.PolicyTypeRequiredMetadata, domain.PolicySeverityError, "")
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.Tags = map[string]string{"arbitrary": "value"}
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations under backcompat shape w/ tags set, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("RenewalLeadTime uses 30d default under empty/zero config", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-rl", domain.PolicyTypeRenewalLeadTime, domain.PolicySeverityWarning, "")
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.ExpiresAt = time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, 15) // 15d < 30d default
|
|
|
|
violations := runEval(ctx, t, rule, cert, nil)
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 1 violation under 30d backcompat default, got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEvaluateRule_BadConfig_SkipsRule pins invariant #4 — malformed JSON in
|
|
// Config returns an error from evaluateRule, which ValidateCertificate logs
|
|
// and swallows. The pass continues; no zero-value violation is emitted.
|
|
// Co-located rules still fire normally.
|
|
func TestEvaluateRule_BadConfig_SkipsRule(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
|
|
// Rule 1 has malformed JSON — should log+skip.
|
|
// Rule 2 is a healthy AllowedIssuers rule that should still emit its
|
|
// violation on the missing-IssuerID cert. If the bad rule poisoned the
|
|
// loop, we'd see 0 or 2 violations instead of exactly 1.
|
|
badRule := mkRule("r-bad", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedIssuers, domain.PolicySeverityError,
|
|
`{"allowed_issuer_ids": [`) // unterminated JSON
|
|
goodRule := mkRule("r-good", domain.PolicyTypeAllowedEnvironments, domain.PolicySeverityWarning, "")
|
|
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{
|
|
badRule.ID: badRule,
|
|
goodRule.ID: goodRule,
|
|
},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
auditService := NewAuditService(&mockAuditRepo{})
|
|
svc := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, auditService)
|
|
|
|
cert := evalCert()
|
|
cert.IssuerID = "" // would trigger the bad rule if it wasn't skipped
|
|
cert.Environment = "" // triggers goodRule via missing-field backcompat
|
|
|
|
violations, err := svc.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate should swallow rule-eval errors, got %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(violations) != 1 {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 violation (bad rule skipped, good rule fires), got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
if violations[0].RuleID != goodRule.ID {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected violation from r-good, got %q", violations[0].RuleID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestEvaluateRule_CertificateLifetime_RepoScenarios pins the setter-injection
|
|
// pattern for the 6th arm. SetCertRepo wires the dependency; without it the
|
|
// arm errors (logged+skipped by the caller). With it but no version present,
|
|
// the arm silently returns nil (matching the missing-field backcompat shape).
|
|
func TestEvaluateRule_CertificateLifetime_RepoScenarios(t *testing.T) {
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
|
|
t.Run("repo not wired logs and skips", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-cl", domain.PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime, domain.PolicySeverityError,
|
|
`{"max_days": 90}`)
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{rule.ID: rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
svc := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, NewAuditService(&mockAuditRepo{}))
|
|
// deliberately do NOT call SetCertRepo
|
|
|
|
violations, err := svc.ValidateCertificate(ctx, evalCert())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate should swallow the nil-repo error, got %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations when repo unwired (rule skipped), got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("version missing silently skips", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-cl", domain.PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime, domain.PolicySeverityError,
|
|
`{"max_days": 90}`)
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{rule.ID: rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
svc := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, NewAuditService(&mockAuditRepo{}))
|
|
// Empty Versions map — GetLatestVersion returns errNotFound, arm skips.
|
|
svc.SetCertRepo(&mockCertRepo{
|
|
Certs: map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate{},
|
|
Versions: map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion{},
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
violations, err := svc.ValidateCertificate(ctx, evalCert())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations when no version exists (nothing to measure), got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
t.Run("max_days zero/absent means no enforcement", func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
// Even with a version, max_days=0 is a no-op (matches the
|
|
// no-threshold-configured guard in the arm).
|
|
rule := mkRule("r-cl", domain.PolicyTypeCertificateLifetime, domain.PolicySeverityError, "")
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{rule.ID: rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
svc := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, NewAuditService(&mockAuditRepo{}))
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
svc.SetCertRepo(&mockCertRepo{
|
|
Certs: map[string]*domain.ManagedCertificate{},
|
|
Versions: map[string][]*domain.CertificateVersion{
|
|
"cert-001": {{
|
|
CertificateID: "cert-001",
|
|
NotBefore: now.AddDate(0, 0, -1),
|
|
NotAfter: now.AddDate(10, 0, 0), // 10 years — huge but unchecked
|
|
}},
|
|
},
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
violations, err := svc.ValidateCertificate(ctx, evalCert())
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if len(violations) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected 0 violations when max_days absent (no enforcement), got %d", len(violations))
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// runEval is a test helper that exercises ValidateCertificate against a
|
|
// single-rule configuration and returns the violation slice. Optionally
|
|
// wires a cert repo for the CertificateLifetime arm.
|
|
func runEval(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, rule *domain.PolicyRule, cert *domain.ManagedCertificate, certRepo *mockCertRepo) []*domain.PolicyViolation {
|
|
t.Helper()
|
|
policyRepo := &mockPolicyRepo{
|
|
Rules: map[string]*domain.PolicyRule{rule.ID: rule},
|
|
Violations: []*domain.PolicyViolation{},
|
|
}
|
|
svc := NewPolicyService(policyRepo, NewAuditService(&mockAuditRepo{}))
|
|
if certRepo != nil {
|
|
svc.SetCertRepo(certRepo)
|
|
}
|
|
violations, err := svc.ValidateCertificate(ctx, cert)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ValidateCertificate failed: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
return violations
|
|
}
|