Files
certctl/docs/operator/observability.md
T
shankar0123 f7fcd1e187 docs(observability): DEPL-006 follow-up — document CERTCTL_OTEL_ENABLED (G-3 ci-guard)
Sprint 6 ACQ DEPL-006 closure follow-up. The G-3-env-docs-drift
ci-guard scans `internal/` + `cmd/` for every CERTCTL_*
env-var reference and cross-checks against README + docs/ +
deploy/helm/ + deploy/ENVIRONMENTS.md. The OTel-seed commit
(35277c0) introduced `CERTCTL_OTEL_ENABLED` in
`internal/config/config.go` + `cmd/server/main.go` but didn't
add the matching doc entry, so the guard caught the drift on
the next CI run with:

  G-3 regression: env var(s) defined in Go source but never documented:
  CERTCTL_OTEL_ENABLED

Replaces the existing "Tracing — explicitly not yet shipped"
subsection in docs/operator/observability.md with an honest
"Tracing — OTLP surface available, instrumentation pending"
section that:

- Documents the env var + the standard OTEL_* env vars the SDK
  honors (OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME, etc.).
- Explains the OTLP/HTTP transport choice (vs gRPC) per the
  rationale in internal/observability/otel.go's header.
- Pins what the current release DOES (surface + lazy connect +
  graceful shutdown) vs DOES NOT (per-handler / per-DB /
  per-connector spans).
- Notes the no-op-shutdown contract so operators can defer
  unconditionally.
- Cross-references the existing request_id correlation + per-
  issuer Prometheus histogram as the interim correlation surface.
- Repoints the "future work" tracker from the old "v3 item"
  framing to WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md §2 (Phase 4 in the path-b
  build plan).

Verified locally: `bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh`
exits 0 ("G-3 env-docs-drift: clean").
2026-05-16 22:10:05 +00:00

16 KiB
Raw Blame History

Observability — what certctl emits, what it doesn't, and what survives a restart

Last reviewed: 2026-05-13

Use this when:

  • You're sizing certctl's observability surface against your existing metrics + tracing + logging stack and want to know exactly what drops in cleanly and what gaps you'll need to bridge.
  • You're investigating a "weird metric" or planning a Grafana dashboard and need the canonical list of what's exposed.
  • You're running multi-replica or restarting frequently and need to understand which counters reset.

certctl's observability posture is deliberately minimal-but-honest: ship the surfaces an operator actually needs to wire into a Prometheus

  • Grafana + Loki stack, and don't make claims the implementation can't back. This document is the canonical statement of what's emitted, what's deferred, and why.

Metrics — what's emitted

certctl exposes metrics through two endpoints on the control plane:

Endpoint Content-Type Audience
GET /api/v1/metrics application/json Dashboards that prefer JSON, ad-hoc curl
GET /api/v1/metrics/prometheus text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8 (Prometheus exposition) Prometheus, Grafana Agent, Datadog Agent, Victoria Metrics, any OpenMetrics-compatible scraper

The Prometheus endpoint emits standard # HELP / # TYPE / metric lines following the conventions at prometheus.io/docs/instrumenting/exposition_formats. Metric names are lowercase, snake_case, and prefixed with certctl_.

The implementation is at internal/api/handler/metrics.go.

What's covered

Run the endpoint against a live deployment for the authoritative list (it expands as the service ships more metrics). At time of writing the exposition includes:

  • Certificate-inventory gauges: certctl_certificate_total, certctl_certificate_active, certctl_certificate_expiring_soon, certctl_certificate_expired, certctl_certificate_revoked.
  • Per-issuer-type issuance histograms: certctl_issuance_duration_seconds{issuer_type=…} (the 2026-05-01 issuer-coverage audit closure #4 — this is the load-bearing metric for per-issuer SLOs).
  • Server uptime: certctl_uptime_seconds.

Prometheus library vs hand-rolled exposition (acquisition diligence)

certctl writes Prometheus exposition format with fmt.Fprintf from the metrics handler, not via the github.com/prometheus/client_golang library. This is intentional for v2.x:

  • The metric surface is shallow (gauges + a handful of histograms with static labels). The client library's value is on the registration + thread-safe accumulation side, neither of which is load-bearing for the current surface.
  • The exposition output is pinned to the spec version explicitly (version=0.0.4) and is unit-tested against expected output at internal/api/handler/stats_handler_test.go.
  • Swapping in client_golang is a mechanical migration when the metric surface grows (per-connector counters + RED-method histograms on every handler are the natural next surface), but it has no operator-visible behavior change today.

The migration is on the WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md as a v3 item. If you're an acquirer reading this: the question to ask is "does the metric surface meet our SLO needs today" — not "is the right library under the hood." If the answer to the first question is yes, the second is a refactor, not a feature gap.

Tracing — OTLP surface available, instrumentation pending

Sprint 6 ACQ DEPL-006 closure (2026-05-16) stood up the OTel tracer- provider surface. Operators with an OTel collector can opt in via:

CERTCTL_OTEL_ENABLED=true
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=https://otel-collector.example.com:4318

When CERTCTL_OTEL_ENABLED is true, cmd/server/main.go calls internal/observability.Init which:

  • Constructs an OTLP/HTTP exporter (chosen over OTLP/gRPC to keep the dependency surface narrow — see internal/observability/otel.go header for the transport-choice rationale).
  • Registers a real sdktrace.TracerProvider as the otel global.
  • Honors the standard OTel env vars (OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_INSECURE, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME overrides the default certctl-server, etc.).
  • Defers a graceful shutdown that flushes the in-flight batcher.

What this does not ship yet:

  • No per-handler / per-DB / per-connector span instrumentation in the certctl code base. The OTel SDK emits the spans it generates internally (process resource attributes, eventual stdlib HTTP spans), but certctl-domain spans (issuance, renewal, deployment, agent enrollment) are a v2.3 roadmap follow-up.
  • No tracing-correlated metric exemplars in the Prometheus histograms above. Those still ship the per-issuer latency signal without per-request fan-out.
  • No backwards-compat shim — operators who never set CERTCTL_OTEL_ENABLED (the default) see zero behavior change. The init returns a no-op shutdown so the deferred call is safe to invoke unconditionally.

When this matters today:

  • Operators wiring up a v3 instrumentation effort have the OTel surface in place; they only need to add tracer.Start(ctx, "…") call sites in the handler/service code.
  • Operators evaluating certctl for acquisition / due-diligence see an opt-in OTel surface in the current release rather than a "v3 roadmap item" — a useful signal for buyer credibility per the acquisition-thesis framing in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md §3.

Existing correlation surfaces stay in place until span coverage ships:

  • Structured logs include a request_id you can correlate across the server log stream. See internal/api/middleware/request_id.go.
  • The Prometheus histogram certctl_issuance_duration_seconds{issuer_type=…} carries the same per-issuer latency signal a trace span would, just without the per-request fan-out.

Per-handler / per-query / per-connector span instrumentation is tracked in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md under §2 (NHI / Agent Identity, Phase 4 in the path-b build plan).

Logging

certctl emits structured JSON logs to stdout via the stdlib log/slog package. Every line carries time, level, msg, and — where relevant — request_id, actor_id, and a contextual subject (certificate_id, issuer_id, agent_id, etc.).

Log level is controlled by CERTCTL_LOG_LEVEL (debug / info / warn / error); defaults to info. There is no in-process log ingest — operators are expected to collect from container stdout into their existing log pipeline (Loki, CloudWatch Logs, Datadog, ELK, Splunk, etc.).

No log line contains private-key material, bearer tokens, OIDC client secrets, or session cookies. The break-glass login path explicitly scrubs the password before it reaches the audit subsystem (see docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md § "Break-glass token leak").

Rate-limit behavior — configurable backend (memory or postgres)

The sliding-window-log rate limiters used across certctl's authenticated-but-shared-credential code paths (break-glass login, OCSP per-IP, cert-export per-actor, EST per-principal, EST failed-basic source-IP) carry a configurable backend. The operator picks between two implementations via CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND:

Value When to use
memory Default. Single-replica deploys; sketchpad / dev.
postgres HA deploys (server.replicas > 1). Cross-replica-consistent.

Phase 13 Sprint 13.2/13.3 (architecture diligence audit ARCH-M1 closure) replaced the prior single-process limitation with a substantive close: when the operator opts into postgres, all replicas share the same rate_limit_buckets table (migration 000046) and per-key access is arbitrated via SELECT FOR UPDATE row locks. A 3-replica cluster hitting one rate-limited endpoint concurrently sees exactly the configured cap succeed across the cluster — not 3× the cap as the old per-process backend would have allowed.

Operator decision tree

Single replica (server.replicas = 1, the helm chart default)?
  └─ Use CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND=memory (the default; no action
     required). Bucket lookups stay in-process; zero DB round-trips
     on the hot path.

Two or more replicas?
  └─ Use CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND=postgres. Two extra DB round-trips
     per Allow call (BEGIN ... SELECT FOR UPDATE ... UPDATE ... COMMIT);
     acceptable on the gated hot path. The Sprint 13.2 multi-replica
     integration test pins exactly-cap enforcement across N replicas
     as the closure proof.

Inventory

Limiter Scope Window Cap
Break-glass login (per source-IP) internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go 60s 5 attempts
OCSP query (per source-IP) internal/api/handler/certificates.go 60s configurable (CERTCTL_OCSP_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP_MIN)
Cert export (per actor) internal/api/handler/export.go 1h configurable (CERTCTL_CERT_EXPORT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_ACTOR_HR)
EST per-principal CSR enrollment internal/api/handler/est.go 24h configurable (per-profile RateLimitPerPrincipal24h)
EST HTTP-Basic source-IP failed-auth internal/api/handler/est.go 60m 10 attempts
SCEP/Intune per-device challenge internal/scep/intune/ 60s configurable (*_PER_MINUTE)
ACME per-account orders / key-change / challenge-respond internal/service/acme.go 1h configurable

The CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND selector applies to the first five (the cmd/server-wired limiters). The SCEP/Intune wrapper + the ACME per-account limiter ride their own internal accounting today; both are tracked as follow-ups in WORKSPACE-ROADMAP.md.

Backend internals

Both backends share the algorithm: sliding-window log + per-key bucket + prune-on-Allow.

Memory backend (memory) — per-process map keyed by bucket key; mutex-guarded; package-level LRU cap prevents unbounded growth under adversarial key cardinality (default 100,000 keys per limiter instance; oldest-by-newest-timestamp evicted under pressure). Implemented at internal/ratelimit/sliding_window.go.

Postgres backend (postgres) — same algorithm against the rate_limit_buckets table:

CREATE TABLE rate_limit_buckets (
    bucket_key TEXT          PRIMARY KEY,
    timestamps TIMESTAMPTZ[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
    updated_at TIMESTAMPTZ   NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
);

Allow(key, now) opens a transaction, ensures the row exists (INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING), acquires the row lock (SELECT ... FOR UPDATE), prunes timestamps older than now-window, compares the post-prune count against maxN, conditionally appends now, persists, and commits. The row lock is what arbitrates across replicas: replicas A and B firing simultaneous Allow("k") never race because Postgres serializes the per-key row update across the cluster. Implemented at internal/ratelimit/postgres_sliding_window.go.

Janitor sweep (postgres backend only)

The scheduler runs a rate_limit_buckets janitor every CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_JANITOR_INTERVAL (default 5m, minimum 1m). The sweep deletes rows whose updated_at is older than the longest configured window any limiter uses (24h today, matching the EST per-principal limiter). Idempotent; repeated sweeps find zero rows. The memory backend's prune-on-Allow path keeps buckets short-lived without a separate sweep, so the loop is a no-op when backend=memory.

Falsifiable closure proof

The Phase 13 Sprint 13.2 integration test internal/integration/ratelimit_multi_replica_test.go (//go:build integration) fires 100 concurrent Allow("test-key") calls round-robined across 3 independent PostgresSlidingWindowLimiter instances sharing one Postgres database (cap=10, window=1m) and asserts exactly 10 succeed + 90 return ErrRateLimited. If the cross-replica row lock weren't arbitrating, each replica would independently let through ~3-4 requests, giving 12-15 successes total. Re-run:

go test -tags=integration -count=1 -run TestRateLimit_MultiReplica \
    ./internal/integration/...

Helm chart wiring

The helm chart at deploy/helm/certctl/ exposes the backend via server.rateLimiting.backend (default memory). To opt into the postgres backend for an HA deploy:

helm upgrade --install certctl deploy/helm/certctl \
    --set server.replicas=3 \
    --set server.rateLimiting.backend=postgres \
    --set server.rateLimiting.janitorInterval=5m

server.replicas > 1 without flipping backend to postgres works fine — the limits stay per-process — but the operator gets a 2× / 3× / Nx effective cap depending on replica count. The chart does NOT auto-flip on replicas > 1 because some HA deploys deliberately want per-process limits (sticky-session ingress + tight per-replica caps to detect bot traffic at the edge before it hits the application).

Where these numbers live

The configurable caps are exposed as CERTCTL_*_PER_MINUTE / CERTCTL_ACME_*_PER_HOUR env vars — see the security posture doc for the operator-facing configuration surface. The hard-coded ones (break-glass 5/min) are intentionally non-configurable as a defense-in-depth measure; the auth subsystem owns that policy decision.

Performance harness scope

The load-test harness at deploy/test/loadtest/ covers the API-tier hot paths (issuance acceptance + cert list). It does NOT load-test issuer-connector round-trips (you'd be load- testing someone else's API), full multi-RTT ACME enrollment flows, bulk-revoke / bulk-renew admin paths, or scheduler concurrency under bulk renewal. Each exclusion is justified in deploy/test/loadtest/README.md under "What it explicitly does NOT measure." If your evaluation requires a benchmark on one of those exclusions, the right next step is a follow-up scenario in that directory.

The per-component benchmarks ship in-tree as Go Benchmark* functions:

  • internal/auth/session/bench_test.go — session signing + validation steady state and cold-process timing.
  • internal/auth/oidc/bench_test.go — OIDC verify steady state.
  • internal/auth/oidc/bench_keycloak_test.go — OIDC cold-cache timing (gated //go:build integration).

Authoritative benchmark numbers + threshold contracts: docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md (auth subsystem) and docs/operator/performance-baselines.md (general API tier).