mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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5ea45a19b9
Acquisition-audit Sprint 5 ACQ closure (2026-05-16). Two
independent findings ship together because they share Load() /
main.go wiring; the closure comments tie each line to its finding.
PART A — RED-003 (agent-bootstrap deny-empty cutover)
=====================================================
Phase 2 SEC-H1 closure (2026-05-13) introduced the
CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY staged feature flag with
default `false` so v2.1.x operators wouldn't get a surprise
fail-closed on upgrade. This commit flips the default to `true`
(per the staged plan in the existing CHANGELOG "Breaking changes
(scheduled for v2.2.0)" block). Operators who haven't generated a
real bootstrap token yet keep the v2.1.x warn-mode pass-through
for one upgrade window by setting
CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_DENY_EMPTY=false explicitly.
Demo-mode escape hatch: CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true skips the
fail-closed gate so the screenshot/demo path stays one-command-up.
The accompanying boot-banner WARN at cmd/server/main.go:124-126
keeps demo mode visible in every log scraper, so this override
cannot silently re-enable warn-mode in production.
internal/config/config.go
- Load() default for AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty flipped to true
- Validate() gate now also checks !c.Auth.DemoModeAck so the demo
override line up with the boot-banner WARN
- Closure comment block updated to cross-reference Sprint 5 ACQ
and the CHANGELOG v2.2.0 entry
cmd/server/main.go
- Updated boot-time WARN message to reflect the new default
(deny-empty=true) — the warn now fires only in the two
explicit override scenarios (warn-mode opt-back or demo mode),
and explains the operator action either way
- Info-line on configured-token path unchanged
PART B — SEC-009 + RED-005 (opt-in RFC1918 outbound block)
==========================================================
internal/validation/ssrf.go::IsReservedIP has always intentionally
left RFC 1918 ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) NOT-reserved
because certctl is designed to manage certificates inside private
networks. For operators on hosted IaaS where RFC1918 IS internal
trust (kubeadm-default 10.96.0.0/12 service CIDR exposes the
Kubernetes API on 10.96.0.1; cloud-provider internal monitoring;
hosted-bastion subnets), this default is a real exposure path.
Add a package-level atomic.Bool toggle in internal/validation/ssrf.go
that, when on, extends IsReservedIP to ALSO return true for the
three RFC1918 ranges. Every IsReservedIP-derived path
(SafeHTTPDialContext, ValidateSafeURL, the network scanner, the
webhook + OIDC + ACME callers) picks up the new policy
transitively without per-call-site changes.
internal/validation/ssrf.go
- blockRFC1918Outbound atomic.Bool + SetBlockRFC1918Outbound /
BlockRFC1918OutboundEnabled accessor pair
- rfc1918Nets pre-parsed at package init (panic on parse failure
surfaces a misconfigured ssrf package immediately, not via a
silently disabled toggle)
- IsReservedIP checks the toggle after the existing reserved-IP
checks
- Header comment rewritten to document the toggle + the
transitive coverage
internal/config/config.go
- New NetworkConfig sub-config; Config gains a Network field
- Load() reads CERTCTL_BLOCK_RFC1918_OUTBOUND env var (default
false; preserves the existing self-hosted threat model)
- NetworkConfig docstring lists the operator-trap (enabling this
also blocks RFC1918 from the network scanner) so an operator
cert-discovering their own RFC1918 space doesn't get a
silently-empty scan result
cmd/server/main.go
- Wires validation.SetBlockRFC1918Outbound after config.Load and
near the demo-mode banner / agent-bootstrap-token block; emits
a one-shot INFO line when the toggle is enabled so the policy
is visible in journals
Tests
=====
internal/config/config_test.go
- TestLoad_AgentBootstrapTokenDenyEmpty_DefaultIsTrue — pins the
default flip at the boot path (Load returns the flipped value)
- TestValidate_DenyEmptyDefault_RefusesWithoutToken — pins the
fail-closed behavior under the new default
- TestValidate_DenyEmptyExplicitFalse_AllowsEmpty — pins the
v2.1.x back-compat escape hatch
- TestValidate_DenyEmpty_DemoModeAckOverride_AllowsEmpty — pins
the demo-mode override
internal/validation/ssrf_test.go
- TestIsReservedIP_RFC1918_OptIn — pins toggle-off / toggle-on
behavior across all three RFC1918 ranges, edge cases
immediately outside the ranges, and the toggle-back-off path
- TestSafeHTTPDialContext_RFC1918_OptIn — pins that the toggle
reaches the dial-time SSRF check transitively (not just
IsReservedIP in isolation)
Test-helper updates (Sprint-5-induced churn):
- internal/config/config_test.go::setMinimalValidEnv now sets
CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN to a placeholder so Load()-based
tests that don't specifically exercise the empty-token gate
keep passing under the new fail-closed default. Tests that DO
exercise the empty-token path explicitly override back to "".
- internal/config/config_est_profiles_test.go +
internal/config/config_scep_profiles_test.go: same placeholder
fix for the four Load()-based EST/SCEP profile tests.
- cmd/server/main_test.go::TestMain_ServerConfigFromEnvironment +
TestMain_AuthTypeConfiguration: same fix at the main.go test
layer with prior-value restore.
Verified locally: gofmt -l clean; go vet clean; staticcheck clean
across internal/config, internal/validation, cmd/server; short
tests green on all three packages; targeted -v run of all six new
test names confirms PASS.
733 lines
23 KiB
Go
733 lines
23 KiB
Go
package main
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/router"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/config"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service"
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)
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// TestMain_HealthEndpointBypassesAuth verifies that health check endpoints
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// bypass auth middleware while protected API endpoints require auth.
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// This is the most critical test — it validates the core routing pattern used in main.go.
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func TestMain_HealthEndpointBypassesAuth(t *testing.T) {
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// Simulate the finalHandler logic from main.go with minimal setup
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// Create handler functions for health endpoints
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healthHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
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})
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readyHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ready"}`))
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})
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authInfoHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"auth_type":"api-key"}`))
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})
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// Protected API endpoint
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certHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`[]`))
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})
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// Build the handler chain the same way main.go does
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authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]auth.NamedAPIKey{
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{Name: "test", Key: "test-secret-key"},
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})
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// API handler with auth
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authHandler := middleware.Chain(certHandler,
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middleware.RequestID,
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middleware.Recovery,
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authMiddleware,
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)
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// Create finalHandler matching main.go logic
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finalHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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path := r.URL.Path
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switch path {
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case "/health":
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healthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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case "/ready":
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readyHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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case "/api/v1/auth/info":
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authInfoHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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case "/api/v1/certificates":
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authHandler.ServeHTTP(w, r)
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default:
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http.Error(w, "Not Found", http.StatusNotFound)
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}
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})
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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path string
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method string
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bypassesAuth bool
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expectedStatus int
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}{
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{
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name: "GET /health without auth",
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path: "/health",
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method: "GET",
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bypassesAuth: true,
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expectedStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "GET /ready without auth",
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path: "/ready",
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method: "GET",
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bypassesAuth: true,
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expectedStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "GET /api/v1/auth/info without auth",
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path: "/api/v1/auth/info",
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method: "GET",
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bypassesAuth: true,
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expectedStatus: http.StatusOK,
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},
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{
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name: "GET /api/v1/certificates without auth (should fail)",
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path: "/api/v1/certificates",
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method: "GET",
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bypassesAuth: false,
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expectedStatus: http.StatusUnauthorized,
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},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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req := httptest.NewRequest(tt.method, tt.path, nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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finalHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if tt.bypassesAuth && w.Code != tt.expectedStatus {
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t.Errorf("endpoint %s should bypass auth, got status %d, expected %d",
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tt.path, w.Code, tt.expectedStatus)
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}
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if !tt.bypassesAuth && w.Code != tt.expectedStatus {
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t.Logf("endpoint %s requires auth, got status %d, expected %d (auth middleware working)",
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tt.path, w.Code, tt.expectedStatus)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestMain_HealthHandlersRespond verifies health endpoints return correct responses.
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func TestMain_HealthHandlersRespond(t *testing.T) {
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healthHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
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})
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/health", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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healthHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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if body := w.Body.String(); body != `{"status":"ok"}` {
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t.Errorf("expected body '{\"status\":\"ok\"}', got '%s'", body)
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}
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}
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// TestMain_AuthMiddlewareRejectsUnauthorized verifies auth middleware works.
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func TestMain_AuthMiddlewareRejectsUnauthorized(t *testing.T) {
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// Create a protected endpoint
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protectedHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"protected"}`))
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})
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// Wrap with auth middleware
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authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]auth.NamedAPIKey{
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{Name: "test", Key: "test-secret-key"},
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})
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chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
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// Request without auth should be rejected
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/protected", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
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t.Errorf("expected status 401 for unauthorized request, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestMain_AuthMiddlewareAllowsWithValidKey verifies auth middleware allows valid keys.
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func TestMain_AuthMiddlewareAllowsWithValidKey(t *testing.T) {
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testKey := "test-secret-key"
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// Create a protected endpoint
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protectedHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"protected"}`))
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})
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// Wrap with auth middleware
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authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys([]auth.NamedAPIKey{
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{Name: "test", Key: testKey},
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})
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chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
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// Request with valid auth should be allowed
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/protected", nil)
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testKey)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("expected status 200 for authorized request, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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}
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// TestMain_ServerConfigFromEnvironment verifies config.Load() reads env vars correctly.
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func TestMain_ServerConfigFromEnvironment(t *testing.T) {
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// Save original env vars
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oldAuthType := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
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oldServerHost := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST")
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oldServerPort := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT")
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oldTLSCert := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH")
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oldTLSKey := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH")
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defer func() {
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if oldAuthType != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", oldAuthType)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
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}
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if oldServerHost != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST", oldServerHost)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST")
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}
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if oldServerPort != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", oldServerPort)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT")
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}
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if oldTLSCert != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", oldTLSCert)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH")
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}
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if oldTLSKey != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", oldTLSKey)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH")
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}
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}()
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// HTTPS-only control plane: Validate() refuses to pass without a readable
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// cert/key pair on disk. Materialize a throwaway ECDSA P-256 pair using the
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// same generator cmd/server/tls_test.go uses for the certHolder tests.
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dir := t.TempDir()
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certPath := dir + "/server.crt"
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keyPath := dir + "/server.key"
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generateTestCert(t, certPath, keyPath, "main-test-cn")
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// Set test env vars
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", "none")
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_PORT", "8080")
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", certPath)
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
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// Acquisition-audit RED-003 closure (Sprint 5 ACQ, 2026-05-16):
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// deny-empty default flipped to true; supply a placeholder token
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// so Load() succeeds. The defer below restores prior env.
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oldBootstrap := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN")
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", "test-bootstrap-token-placeholder")
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defer func() {
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if oldBootstrap != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", oldBootstrap)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN")
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}
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}()
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cfg, err := config.Load()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Failed to load config from env vars: %v", err)
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}
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if cfg.Auth.Type != "none" {
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t.Errorf("Expected auth type 'none', got '%s'", cfg.Auth.Type)
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}
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if cfg.Server.Host != "127.0.0.1" {
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t.Errorf("Expected server host '127.0.0.1', got '%s'", cfg.Server.Host)
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}
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if cfg.Server.Port != 8080 {
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t.Errorf("Expected server port 8080, got %d", cfg.Server.Port)
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}
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}
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// TestMain_AuthTypeConfiguration verifies auth type is read from config.
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func TestMain_AuthTypeConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
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// Save original env vars
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oldAuthType := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
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oldAuthSecret := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET")
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oldTLSCert := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH")
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oldTLSKey := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH")
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defer func() {
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if oldAuthType != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", oldAuthType)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE")
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}
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if oldAuthSecret != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", oldAuthSecret)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET")
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}
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if oldTLSCert != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", oldTLSCert)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH")
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}
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if oldTLSKey != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", oldTLSKey)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH")
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}
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}()
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// HTTPS-only control plane: config.Load()→Validate() refuses to pass
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// without a readable cert/key pair. Mint one throwaway pair for the whole
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// sub-test cohort — auth type toggles don't care about the TLS surface.
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dir := t.TempDir()
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certPath := dir + "/server.crt"
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keyPath := dir + "/server.key"
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generateTestCert(t, certPath, keyPath, "main-test-cn")
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_CERT_PATH", certPath)
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_SERVER_TLS_KEY_PATH", keyPath)
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// Set auth secret for api-key mode
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET", "test-secret")
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// Acquisition-audit RED-003 closure (Sprint 5 ACQ, 2026-05-16):
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// deny-empty default flipped to true; supply a placeholder token
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// so Load() succeeds.
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oldBootstrap := os.Getenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN")
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", "test-bootstrap-token-placeholder")
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defer func() {
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if oldBootstrap != "" {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN", oldBootstrap)
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} else {
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os.Unsetenv("CERTCTL_AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN")
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}
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}()
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testCases := []string{"api-key", "none"}
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for _, authType := range testCases {
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t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("auth_type_%s", authType), func(t *testing.T) {
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os.Setenv("CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE", authType)
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cfg, err := config.Load()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Failed to load config: %v", err)
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}
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if cfg.Auth.Type != authType {
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t.Errorf("Expected auth type '%s', got '%s'", authType, cfg.Auth.Type)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestMain_MiddlewareChainConstruction tests that middleware can be properly chained.
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func TestMain_MiddlewareChainConstruction(t *testing.T) {
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// Test that the middleware.Chain function works as expected
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baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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w.Write([]byte("success"))
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})
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// Chain with RequestID and Recovery middleware
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chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler,
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middleware.RequestID,
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middleware.Recovery,
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)
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req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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|
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chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
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|
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if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
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t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
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}
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|
|
if body := w.Body.String(); body != "success" {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected body 'success', got '%s'", body)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_RequestIDMiddleware verifies RequestID is added to responses.
|
|
func TestMain_RequestIDMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
|
|
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Wrap with RequestID middleware
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, middleware.RequestID)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
// RequestID should be set in response header
|
|
if rid := w.Header().Get("X-Request-ID"); rid == "" {
|
|
t.Logf("X-Request-ID header not present (middleware may work differently)")
|
|
} else {
|
|
t.Logf("X-Request-ID header set: %s", rid)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_RecoveryMiddlewareHandlesPanic verifies recovery middleware works.
|
|
func TestMain_RecoveryMiddlewareHandlesPanic(t *testing.T) {
|
|
panicHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
panic("test panic")
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Wrap with recovery middleware
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(panicHandler, middleware.Recovery)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
|
|
// Should not panic
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
// Should return 500 error
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
|
|
t.Logf("Expected 500 for panicked handler, got %d", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_ServiceInitialization tests that services can be instantiated.
|
|
// This validates the initialization pattern from main.go without needing a real DB.
|
|
func TestMain_ServiceInitialization(t *testing.T) {
|
|
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{
|
|
Level: slog.LevelInfo,
|
|
}))
|
|
|
|
// Create test issuer registry (same as main.go does)
|
|
issuerRegistry := service.NewIssuerRegistry(logger)
|
|
|
|
if issuerRegistry == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("issuer registry should not be nil")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify the registry has a Len() method (used in main.go)
|
|
count := issuerRegistry.Len()
|
|
if count < 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("issuer registry length should be >= 0, got %d", count)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_CORSMiddlewareSetHeaders verifies CORS headers are set.
|
|
func TestMain_CORSMiddlewareSetHeaders(t *testing.T) {
|
|
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
corsMiddleware := middleware.NewCORS(middleware.CORSConfig{
|
|
AllowedOrigins: []string{"http://example.com"},
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, corsMiddleware)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
|
|
req.Header.Set("Origin", "http://example.com")
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
// CORS middleware should set access control headers
|
|
if acah := w.Header().Get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin"); acah == "" {
|
|
t.Logf("Access-Control-Allow-Origin not set (may be by design)")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_AuthNoneMode verifies auth can be disabled.
|
|
func TestMain_AuthNoneMode(t *testing.T) {
|
|
protectedHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
w.Write([]byte(`{"data":"protected"}`))
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Wrap with auth middleware in "none" mode
|
|
// auth=none equivalent: empty named-keys list is a no-op pass-through.
|
|
authMiddleware := auth.NewAuthWithNamedKeys(nil)
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(protectedHandler, authMiddleware)
|
|
|
|
// Request without auth should be allowed in "none" mode
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/protected", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected status 200 in 'none' auth mode, got %d", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_RouterRegistration tests that router registration works.
|
|
func TestMain_RouterRegistration(t *testing.T) {
|
|
r := router.New()
|
|
|
|
// Register a test handler
|
|
r.RegisterFunc("GET /test", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
w.Write([]byte("test"))
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Request the route
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
|
|
r.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
// Route should be registered and accessible
|
|
if w.Code == http.StatusNotFound {
|
|
t.Errorf("route not registered, got 404")
|
|
} else if w.Code == http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Logf("route registered successfully")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_RateLimiterIntegration tests rate limiter middleware works.
|
|
func TestMain_RateLimiterIntegration(t *testing.T) {
|
|
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Create rate limiter with 10 RPS, 1 burst
|
|
rateLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(middleware.RateLimitConfig{
|
|
RPS: 10,
|
|
BurstSize: 1,
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, rateLimiter)
|
|
|
|
// First request should succeed
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
if w.Code == http.StatusServiceUnavailable {
|
|
t.Logf("rate limiter is active")
|
|
} else {
|
|
t.Logf("rate limiter allowed request (status %d)", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_ContentTypeMiddleware verifies content type is set correctly.
|
|
func TestMain_ContentTypeMiddleware(t *testing.T) {
|
|
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
w.Write([]byte(`{"status":"ok"}`))
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Wrap with middleware that sets Content-Type
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, middleware.ContentType)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/test", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
// Verify response
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected status 200, got %d", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ContentType middleware should set header
|
|
if ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "" {
|
|
t.Logf("Content-Type header set: %s", ct)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestMain_ContextPropagation verifies context is propagated through middleware.
|
|
func TestMain_ContextPropagation(t *testing.T) {
|
|
type contextKey string
|
|
testKey := contextKey("test-key")
|
|
testValue := "test-value"
|
|
|
|
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
val := r.Context().Value(testKey)
|
|
if val == testValue {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
} else {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
chainedHandler := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, middleware.RequestID)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/test", nil)
|
|
// Add context value before request
|
|
req = req.WithContext(context.WithValue(req.Context(), testKey, testValue))
|
|
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
chainedHandler.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Logf("Context value may not be propagated (status %d), this may be expected", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword is the H-2 regression guard for the
|
|
// startup pre-flight check. The helper MUST return a non-nil error whenever
|
|
// SCEP is enabled with an empty challenge password — that configuration
|
|
// previously allowed unauthenticated certificate enrollment (CWE-306).
|
|
// Disabled-SCEP and configured-password cases must pass cleanly.
|
|
func TestPreflightSCEPChallengePassword(t *testing.T) {
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
enabled bool
|
|
challengePassword string
|
|
wantErr bool
|
|
wantErrSubstring string
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "disabled_empty_password_ok",
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
challengePassword: "",
|
|
wantErr: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "disabled_with_password_ok",
|
|
enabled: false,
|
|
challengePassword: "leftover-value",
|
|
wantErr: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "enabled_empty_password_rejected",
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
challengePassword: "",
|
|
wantErr: true,
|
|
wantErrSubstring: "CERTCTL_SCEP_CHALLENGE_PASSWORD",
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "enabled_with_password_ok",
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
challengePassword: "hunter2",
|
|
wantErr: false,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "enabled_single_char_password_ok",
|
|
enabled: true,
|
|
challengePassword: "x",
|
|
wantErr: false,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
err := preflightSCEPChallengePassword(tt.enabled, tt.challengePassword)
|
|
if tt.wantErr {
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
|
|
}
|
|
if tt.wantErrSubstring != "" && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), tt.wantErrSubstring) {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected error to mention %q, got: %v", tt.wantErrSubstring, err)
|
|
}
|
|
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "CWE-306") {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected error to cite CWE-306 for traceability, got: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
} else if err != nil {
|
|
t.Errorf("expected no error, got: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
// SEC-003 closure (Sprint 1, 2026-05-16). Pin that the rate-limit-enabled
|
|
// middleware stack still emits the five security headers (HSTS, XFO,
|
|
// nosniff, Referrer-Policy, CSP) that the default stack carries.
|
|
//
|
|
// Pre-fix the stack rebuild at main.go ~L2079 dropped
|
|
// securityHeadersMiddleware so flipping CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED=true
|
|
// silently turned off five browser-side defenses. This test exercises
|
|
// the same middleware composition main.go now builds when the flag is
|
|
// on, and asserts each header lands on the wire. A future regression
|
|
// that removes securityHeadersMiddleware (or reorders it after the
|
|
// rate limiter such that a 429 response misses the headers) would
|
|
// surface here.
|
|
// =============================================================================
|
|
|
|
func TestMain_RateLimitedStack_EmitsSecurityHeaders(t *testing.T) {
|
|
baseHandler := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// Mirror the rate-limit-enabled middlewareStack from main.go.
|
|
rateLimiter := middleware.NewRateLimiter(middleware.RateLimitConfig{
|
|
RPS: 1000, // high enough that the single test request isn't dropped
|
|
BurstSize: 1000,
|
|
})
|
|
securityHeaders := middleware.SecurityHeaders(middleware.SecurityHeadersDefaults())
|
|
bodyLimit := middleware.NewBodyLimit(middleware.BodyLimitConfig{MaxBytes: 1 << 20})
|
|
|
|
stack := []func(http.Handler) http.Handler{
|
|
middleware.RequestID,
|
|
middleware.Recovery,
|
|
bodyLimit,
|
|
securityHeaders,
|
|
rateLimiter,
|
|
// Skip the CORS/auth/csrf/audit layers — they aren't relevant
|
|
// to the headers-on-response invariant we're pinning.
|
|
}
|
|
chained := middleware.Chain(baseHandler, stack...)
|
|
|
|
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/test", nil)
|
|
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
|
|
chained.ServeHTTP(w, req)
|
|
|
|
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
|
|
t.Fatalf("status = %d; want 200 (rate limit should not trip on a single request)", w.Code)
|
|
}
|
|
wantHeaders := map[string]string{
|
|
"Strict-Transport-Security": "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains",
|
|
"X-Frame-Options": "DENY",
|
|
"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff",
|
|
"Referrer-Policy": "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
|
|
"Content-Security-Policy": "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; script-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'",
|
|
}
|
|
for name, want := range wantHeaders {
|
|
got := w.Header().Get(name)
|
|
if got != want {
|
|
t.Errorf("rate-limited stack: %s = %q; want %q", name, got, want)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|