Files
certctl/internal/scep/intune/rate_limit.go
T
shankar0123 21aeed4f4e legal: addlicense headers + normalize legacy variants (Phase 0 RED-4)
Phase 0 closure (Path B2, post-rewrite):

addlicense sweep — adds the canonical certctl LLC copyright + BUSL-1.1
SPDX header to every production Go file. Template:

  // Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
  // SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1

Coverage: 338 / 338 production Go files (cmd/ + internal/, excluding
*_test.go and **/testdata/**). Pre-sweep coverage was 22 / 338 (6.5%);
post-sweep is 338 / 338 (100%).

Normalized 22 pre-existing legacy headers (`// Copyright (c) certctl`
+ `// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSL-1.1`) and 1 file using a
`Certctl Contributors` attribution. The legacy SPDX ID `BSL-1.1`
is non-standard; the official SPDX identifier for Business Source
License 1.1 is `BUSL-1.1` (capital U). All 338 files now share the
canonical form.

Generated via:
  addlicense -c "certctl LLC" -y 2026 \
    -f cowork/legal/copyright-header.tpl \
    -ignore '**/testdata/**' -ignore '**/*_test.go' \
    cmd/ internal/

Verification:
  find cmd internal -name '*.go' -not -name '*_test.go' \
    -not -path '*/testdata/*' \
    -exec grep -L '^// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC' {} \; | wc -l

  Returns: 0

gofmt clean. Header additions are comments only, no compile impact.

Closes: cowork/certctl-architecture-diligence-audit.html#fix-RED-4
2026-05-13 21:23:35 +00:00

91 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

// Copyright 2026 certctl LLC. All rights reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
package intune
import (
"time"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/ratelimit"
)
// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 8.6.
//
// PerDeviceRateLimiter is the second line of defense behind the replay
// cache from Phase 7. The replay cache catches the same challenge being
// submitted twice (within the challenge TTL); this rate limiter catches a
// compromised Connector signing key (or a stolen key+cert pair) issuing
// many DIFFERENT valid challenges for the same device subject in a short
// window.
//
// Threat model:
//
// - Replay cache (Phase 7): nonce-keyed; catches duplicate submission.
// - This limiter: (Subject, Issuer)-keyed; catches enrollment-flooding.
//
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 4.1: the implementation that
// used to live in this file was extracted to internal/ratelimit (where it
// can be shared with EST per-principal + EST HTTP-Basic source-IP rate
// limiters). PerDeviceRateLimiter is now a thin wrapper around
// ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter that preserves the original
// (subject, issuer) → key composition in the Allow signature so existing
// SCEP/Intune callers don't have to change.
//
// New callers SHOULD use ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter directly. The
// EST RFC 7030 Phase 4.2 EST per-principal cap uses the shared package.
// ErrRateLimited is the typed error returned when the per-device rate
// limit fires. Aliased to ratelimit.ErrRateLimited so errors.Is matches
// against either name (the SCEP audit closure already pinned the
// "rate_limited" metric label against this sentinel; the alias preserves
// sentinel identity across the package boundary).
var ErrRateLimited = ratelimit.ErrRateLimited
// PerDeviceRateLimiter wraps ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter with the
// (subject, issuer)-composed-key Allow signature the Intune dispatcher
// uses. Concurrency-safe (the underlying limiter holds the mutex).
type PerDeviceRateLimiter struct {
inner *ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter
}
// NewPerDeviceRateLimiter returns a limiter with the given per-key cap +
// window. maxN ≤ 0 disables the limiter (all Allow calls return nil);
// this is operator opt-out for the rare case where the per-device cap is
// undesirable (e.g. test harnesses, sketchpad deploys).
//
// Window defaults to 24h when zero. Map cap defaults to 100,000 when zero
// (matches the replay cache cap; see internal/scep/intune/replay.go).
func NewPerDeviceRateLimiter(maxN int, window time.Duration, mapCap int) *PerDeviceRateLimiter {
return &PerDeviceRateLimiter{inner: ratelimit.NewSlidingWindowLimiter(maxN, window, mapCap)}
}
// Allow checks whether an enrollment for the given (subject, issuer)
// tuple is permitted right now. Returns nil when allowed (and records
// the timestamp in the bucket) or ErrRateLimited when the bucket is at
// maxN.
//
// Empty subject is treated as "skip the limiter" — the caller's claim
// validation should have rejected an empty-subject claim already; this
// is belt-and-suspenders to prevent a single empty-subject bucket from
// becoming a fleet-wide chokepoint.
func (l *PerDeviceRateLimiter) Allow(subject, issuer string, now time.Time) error {
if subject == "" {
// Empty-subject early return preserved from the pre-Phase-4.1
// behavior: ratelimit.SlidingWindowLimiter also short-circuits
// on empty key, but the explicit check here documents the
// (subject, issuer) → empty-key contract and saves one call
// frame in the hot path.
return nil
}
key := subject + "|" + issuer
return l.inner.Allow(key, now)
}
// Len returns the approximate number of distinct (subject, issuer) keys
// currently tracked. For observability + tests.
func (l *PerDeviceRateLimiter) Len() int { return l.inner.Len() }
// Disabled reports whether the limiter is in opt-out mode (maxN ≤ 0).
// Useful for handler-side gating + admin-endpoint observability.
func (l *PerDeviceRateLimiter) Disabled() bool { return l.inner.Disabled() }