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certctl/deploy/test/loadtest/k6/acme_flow.js
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shankar0123 bee47f0318 acme-server: cert-manager integration test + production hardening (Phase 5/7)
Closes the production-readiness loop on the ACME surface. After this
commit, certctl ships per-account rate limits + a GC sweeper for
expired ACME state + a kind-driven cert-manager 1.15 integration test
+ a lego-driven RFC conformance harness + a k6 loadtest scenario for
the unauthenticated ACME path.

Architecture:
  - Rate limits live in-memory + per-replica. Restart wipes the
    counters; orders/hour caps are eventual-consistency anyway. A
    3-replica certctl-server fleet behind an LB effectively has 3x
    the configured throughput per account; persistent rate limiting
    is a follow-up if production telemetry shows abuse patterns we
    can't catch in a single restart cycle. Per-key + per-action
    isolation: ActionNewOrder/acc-1, ActionKeyChange/acc-1, and
    ActionChallengeRespond/<challenge-id> are independent buckets.
  - GC loop follows the existing scheduler-loop pattern (atomic.Bool
    + sync.WaitGroup; see crlGenerationLoop for shape). Three
    independent SQL sweeps per tick (DELETE expired nonces; UPDATE
    pending authzs whose expires_at < now() to expired; UPDATE
    pending/ready/processing orders whose expires_at < now() to
    invalid). Each sweep is a single statement; failures are logged-
    and-continued so a failing nonces sweep doesn't block authzs.
    Per-sweep 1m timeout bounds a stuck Postgres.
  - cert-manager integration test is gated on KIND_AVAILABLE so CI
    skips it cleanly (kind is too heavy for per-PR). Operators run
    locally via 'make acme-cert-manager-test'; the harness brings up
    a fresh cluster each run + tears it down on Cleanup.
  - lego conformance harness drives a real ACME client through
    register → run → cert-PEM-landed against a hermetic certctl
    stack. Catches RFC-shape regressions third-party clients would
    hit before they ship.
  - k6 ACME-flow scenario hammers the unauthenticated surface
    (directory + new-nonce + ARI synthetic-id) at 100 VUs × 5m. JWS-
    signed flows are out of scope for k6 (no JWS support); they're
    covered by the lego harness above.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/ratelimit.go (+ ratelimit_test.go: 7 cases —
    disable-when-perHour-zero, capacity, per-key isolation, per-
    action isolation, refill-over-time, RetryAfter, concurrent-access
    with -race + 200 goroutines × 200 calls).
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: 4 new methods —
    CountActiveOrdersByAccount + GCExpiredNonces + GCExpireAuthorizations
    + GCInvalidateExpiredOrders. Each a single SQL statement.
  - internal/service/acme.go: SetRateLimiter + GarbageCollect +
    rate-limit gates at 3 entry points (CreateOrder + RotateAccountKey
    + RespondToChallenge) + concurrent-orders gate at CreateOrder.
    2 new sentinels (ErrACMERateLimited, ErrACMEConcurrentOrdersExceeded);
    5 new GC metrics (gc_runs / gc_run_failures / gc_nonces_reaped /
    gc_authzs_expired / gc_orders_invalidated).
  - internal/scheduler/scheduler.go: ACMEGarbageCollector interface +
    acmeGCRunning atomic.Bool + acmeGCInterval + 2 setters (SetACME-
    GarbageCollector + SetACMEGCInterval) + acmeGCLoop following the
    crlGenerationLoop shape.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: writeServiceError gains rateLimited
    (429 + RFC 8555 §6.7) + concurrent-orders-exceeded mappings.
  - internal/config/config.go: 5 new env vars
    (CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_ORDERS_PER_HOUR=100,
    CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_CONCURRENT_ORDERS=5,
    CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_KEY_CHANGE_PER_HOUR=5,
    CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_RATE_LIMIT_CHALLENGE_RESPONDS_PER_HOUR=60,
    CERTCTL_ACME_SERVER_GC_INTERVAL=1m).
  - cmd/server/main.go: NewRateLimiter() + SetRateLimiter() at
    startup; conditional SetACMEGarbageCollector(acmeService) +
    SetACMEGCInterval(cfg.ACMEServer.GCInterval) when Enabled+
    GCInterval > 0.
  - deploy/test/acme-integration/: kind-config.yaml + cert-manager-
    install.sh + clusterissuer-trust-authenticated.yaml +
    clusterissuer-challenge.yaml + certificate-test.yaml + conformance-
    lego.sh + certmanager_test.go (//go:build integration + KIND_AVAILABLE
    gate).
  - deploy/test/loadtest/k6/acme_flow.js + README ACME-flows section.
  - Makefile: 2 new PHONY targets (acme-cert-manager-test +
    acme-rfc-conformance-test).
  - docs/acme-server.md: status flipped to Phase 5; Configuration
    table grows 5 rows; new 'Phase 5 — operational guidance' section
    explaining rate-limit math + GC sweeper semantics + cert-manager
    integration + lego conformance + k6 baseline.

Tests:
  - 'go vet ./...' clean across the repo.
  - 'go test -short -count=1 ./internal/...' green across every
    affected package (service / acme / handler / scheduler / repo /
    config).
  - 'go vet -tags=integration ./deploy/test/acme-integration/' clean
    (the integration test compiles cleanly with the build tag).
  - The kind/cert-manager harness is gated behind KIND_AVAILABLE so
    CI skips by default; operators run locally via 'make acme-cert-
    manager-test'.

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md 'ACME-Server-5'.
2026-05-03 19:42:03 +00:00

81 lines
2.7 KiB
JavaScript

// Phase 5 — k6 scenario for the ACME issuance loop. Each VU executes
// directory + new-nonce + new-account + new-order + finalize + cert
// download against an operator-provided certctl-server. Per-step
// duration histograms feed the baseline numbers in
// deploy/test/loadtest/README.md (ACME flows section).
//
// Default scenario: 100 concurrent VUs for 5 minutes. Override via
// K6_VUS / K6_DURATION env vars.
//
// Note on signing: this scenario runs as a *load* generator, not as a
// JWS-signing client. It exercises the unauthenticated surface
// (directory + new-nonce + GET renewal-info) and validates that the
// server holds throughput under concurrency. JWS-signed flow load is
// a follow-up that requires bundling lego or a dedicated Go driver
// inside the k6 binary — k6 itself doesn't ship JWS.
import http from "k6/http";
import { check, sleep } from "k6";
import { Trend } from "k6/metrics";
const directoryURL =
__ENV.CERTCTL_ACME_DIRECTORY ||
"https://certctl:8443/acme/profile/prof-test/directory";
export const options = {
scenarios: {
acme_directory_and_nonce: {
executor: "constant-vus",
vus: parseInt(__ENV.K6_VUS || "100", 10),
duration: __ENV.K6_DURATION || "5m",
gracefulStop: "30s",
},
},
insecureSkipTLSVerify: true, // self-signed bootstrap cert
thresholds: {
"directory_duration": ["p(95)<500"],
"new_nonce_duration": ["p(95)<300"],
"renewal_info_duration": ["p(95)<800"],
"http_req_failed": ["rate<0.01"],
},
};
const directoryDuration = new Trend("directory_duration", true);
const newNonceDuration = new Trend("new_nonce_duration", true);
const renewalInfoDuration = new Trend("renewal_info_duration", true);
export default function () {
// Step 1 — directory.
let res = http.get(directoryURL);
directoryDuration.add(res.timings.duration);
check(res, { "directory 200": (r) => r.status === 200 });
if (res.status !== 200) return;
const dir = res.json();
// Step 2 — new-nonce.
if (dir.newNonce) {
res = http.head(dir.newNonce);
newNonceDuration.add(res.timings.duration);
check(res, {
"new-nonce 200 + Replay-Nonce": (r) =>
r.status === 200 && !!r.headers["Replay-Nonce"],
});
}
// Step 3 — ARI smoke (with a deliberately-malformed cert-id to
// exercise the error path; full happy-path needs a real cert which
// requires JWS signing — out of scope for this baseline scenario).
if (dir.renewalInfo) {
res = http.get(dir.renewalInfo + "/" + "aaaa.bbbb");
renewalInfoDuration.add(res.timings.duration);
// 400 (malformed cert-id, expected) OR 404 (cert not found).
check(res, {
"renewal-info 4xx for synthetic cert-id": (r) =>
r.status === 400 || r.status === 404,
});
}
sleep(1);
}