Files
certctl/internal/repository/postgres/profile.go
T
shankar0123 c351bba41a acme-server: orders + authorizations + finalize + cert download (Phase 2/7)
Closes the issuance loop in trust_authenticated mode (commits ec88a61
+ 44a85d6 wired the foundation + JWS-verified account resource).
After this commit, an ACME client running against a profile with
acme_auth_mode='trust_authenticated' end-to-end-issues a real cert:

  POST /acme/profile/<id>/new-order      → 201 + order URL (status=ready)
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/order/<oid>    → POST-as-GET fetch
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/order/<oid>/finalize  → 200 + status=valid + cert URL
  POST /acme/profile/<id>/cert/<cid>     → 200 + PEM chain

Profiles with acme_auth_mode='challenge' get the same code path with
authz/challenge rows in `pending` state until Phase 3's validators
wire up. The mode is read from the bound profile's column at request
time, NOT cached at server start — operators flipping the column via
SQL take effect on the next order without restart.

Architecture (the load-bearing part):
  - Finalize routes through service.CertificateService.Create — the
    canonical certctl issuance entry point that wraps the
    managed_certificates row insert + audit row in s.tx.WithinTx.
    RenewalPolicy / CertificateProfile / per-issuer-type Prometheus
    metrics / audit rows all apply uniformly to ACME-issued certs via
    the same code path that already serves EST/SCEP/agent/REST issuance.
  - Identifier validation runs BEFORE order creation. Rejected
    identifiers return RFC 7807 with per-identifier subproblems and
    create no order row.
  - Source stamp on managed_certificates: domain.CertificateSourceACME.
    Operators bulk-revoke ACME-issued certs by filtering on Source=ACME.
  - 3-step atomicity boundary documented in code + this commit msg:
    (A) WithinTx-A marks order processing + audit row.
    (B) IssuerConnector.IssueCertificate + CertificateService.Create
        (each in its own WithinTx — Create wraps cert row + audit
        atomically).
    (C) WithinTx-C creates certificate_versions row + transitions order
        to valid + sets certificate_id + audit row.
    The brief window between B and C can leave a managed_certificates
    row whose order is still in `processing`. Phase 5's GC scheduler
    reconciles. Documented inline.

What ships:
  - internal/api/acme/order.go: OrderResponseJSON + AuthorizationResponseJSON
    + ChallengeResponseJSON + NewOrderRequest + FinalizeRequest wire
    shapes; ValidateIdentifiers (Phase 2 syntactic checks, dns-only);
    CSRMatchesIdentifiers (RFC 8555 §7.4 strict equality, case-folded).
  - internal/domain/acme.go: ACMEOrder + ACMEAuthorization + ACMEChallenge
    + ACMEIdentifier + ACMEProblem domain types + closed status enums
    for each (order: pending|ready|processing|valid|invalid; authz:
    pending|valid|invalid|deactivated|expired|revoked; challenge:
    pending|processing|valid|invalid; challenge type: http-01|dns-01|
    tls-alpn-01).
  - internal/domain/profile.go: new ACMEAuthMode field reading from
    certificate_profiles.acme_auth_mode (added in migration 25).
  - internal/domain/certificate.go: new CertificateSourceACME enum value.
  - internal/repository/postgres/profile.go: extended SELECT/scanProfile
    to read the per-profile acme_auth_mode column with a COALESCE
    default of trust_authenticated.
  - internal/repository/postgres/acme.go: full order/authz/challenge
    CRUD (CreateOrderWithTx + GetOrderByID + UpdateOrderWithTx +
    CreateAuthzWithTx + GetAuthzByID + ListAuthzsByOrder +
    ListChallengesByAuthz + CreateChallengeWithTx) with proper
    sql.NullTime + JSONB handling. scanACMEOrder /
    scanACMEAuthz / scanACMEChallenge helpers.
  - internal/service/acme.go: extended ACMERepo interface; new
    SetIssuancePipeline wires certificateService + certificateRepo +
    issuerRegistry. CreateOrder (auth-mode-dispatched: trust_authenticated
    auto-marks order ready + authz valid + 1 placeholder http-01
    challenge valid; challenge mode keeps everything pending). LookupOrder
    (with account-ownership assertion). LookupAuthz. ListAuthzsByOrder.
    FinalizeOrder (3-step atomicity boundary as above; CSR-vs-order
    SAN strict-equality check before issuance; persists FinalizeOrderResult
    {Order, CertID}). LookupCertificate. randIDSuffix + base32encode
    helpers for the human-readable acme-ord-* / acme-authz-* /
    acme-chall-* prefixes (CLAUDE.md "TEXT primary keys with human-
    readable prefixes" architecture decision). 8 new per-op metrics.
  - internal/service/acme_test.go: extended fakeACMERepo with Phase 2
    interface stubs; new orderTrackingRepo for observable persistence;
    2 new tests asserting trust_authenticated → auto-ready/valid and
    challenge → stays-pending.
  - internal/api/handler/acme.go: NewOrder + Order + OrderFinalize +
    Authz + Cert handler methods. orderURL / authzURL / certURL /
    challengeURLBuilder helpers; marshalOrderForResponse fetches
    per-order authzs to populate the URL list. parseOptionalTime for
    notBefore / notAfter.
  - internal/api/handler/acme_handler_test.go: extended mockACMEService
    with Phase 2 method stubs; 4 new handler tests (NewOrder happy +
    rejected-identifier + OrderFinalize bad-CSR + Cert happy).
  - internal/api/router/router.go: 10 new Register calls (5 per-profile
    + 5 shorthand) for new-order, order/{ord_id}, order/{ord_id}/finalize,
    authz/{authz_id}, cert/{cert_id}.
  - internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go + api/openapi-handler-exceptions.yaml:
    10 new exception entries.
  - cmd/server/main.go: SetIssuancePipeline at startup, threading
    certificateService + certificateRepo + issuerRegistry into ACMEService.
  - docs/acme-server.md: phase status updated; endpoints table grows
    5 rows for new-order/order/finalize/authz/cert (per-profile +
    shorthand variants); new section "Finalize routing through
    CertificateService.Create" documenting the 3-step atomicity
    boundary + the actor-string convention `acme:<account-id>`.

Tests: ACME package + service + handler + router + config + domain
all green under -short. New cases:
  - TestCreateOrder_TrustAuthenticated_AutoReady (asserts auto-ready
    transition + valid-status authz/challenge + audit row + metric bump).
  - TestCreateOrder_ChallengeMode_StaysPending (asserts pending-status
    cascading authz/challenge for challenge mode).
  - TestACMEHandler_NewOrder_HappyPath (asserts 201 + Location +
    finalize URL shape).
  - TestACMEHandler_NewOrder_RejectedIdentifier (asserts 400 + RFC 7807
    rejectedIdentifier + per-identifier subproblems for type=ip).
  - TestACMEHandler_OrderFinalize_BadCSR (asserts 400 + badCSR for
    non-base64 CSR field).
  - TestACMEHandler_Cert_HappyPath (asserts 200 + PEM content-type +
    PEM chain in body).

Engineering history: cowork/WORKSPACE-CHANGELOG.md "ACME-Server-2".
2026-05-03 13:46:10 +00:00

258 lines
7.8 KiB
Go

package postgres
import (
"context"
"database/sql"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// ProfileRepository implements repository.CertificateProfileRepository
type ProfileRepository struct {
db *sql.DB
}
// NewProfileRepository creates a new ProfileRepository
func NewProfileRepository(db *sql.DB) *ProfileRepository {
return &ProfileRepository{db: db}
}
// List returns all certificate profiles
func (r *ProfileRepository) List(ctx context.Context) ([]*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
rows, err := r.db.QueryContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, name, description, allowed_key_algorithms, max_ttl_seconds,
allowed_ekus, required_san_patterns, spiffe_uri_pattern,
allow_short_lived, must_staple, required_csr_attributes,
COALESCE(acme_auth_mode, 'trust_authenticated'),
enabled, created_at, updated_at
FROM certificate_profiles
ORDER BY created_at DESC
`)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query profiles: %w", err)
}
defer rows.Close()
var profiles []*domain.CertificateProfile
for rows.Next() {
p, err := scanProfile(rows)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
profiles = append(profiles, p)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error iterating profile rows: %w", err)
}
return profiles, nil
}
// Get retrieves a certificate profile by ID
func (r *ProfileRepository) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
row := r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
SELECT id, name, description, allowed_key_algorithms, max_ttl_seconds,
allowed_ekus, required_san_patterns, spiffe_uri_pattern,
allow_short_lived, must_staple, required_csr_attributes,
COALESCE(acme_auth_mode, 'trust_authenticated'),
enabled, created_at, updated_at
FROM certificate_profiles
WHERE id = $1
`, id)
p, err := scanProfile(row)
if err != nil {
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("profile not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to query profile: %w", err)
}
return p, nil
}
// Create stores a new certificate profile
func (r *ProfileRepository) Create(ctx context.Context, profile *domain.CertificateProfile) error {
if profile.ID == "" {
profile.ID = uuid.New().String()
}
if profile.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
profile.CreatedAt = time.Now()
}
if profile.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
profile.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
}
algJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.AllowedKeyAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal allowed_key_algorithms: %w", err)
}
ekuJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.AllowedEKUs)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal allowed_ekus: %w", err)
}
sanJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.RequiredSANPatterns)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal required_san_patterns: %w", err)
}
// Phase 6.1: required_csr_attributes is the per-profile EST csrattrs hint
// list. Marshal as JSONB; nil → "[]" via the json.Marshal stdlib contract.
csrAttrsJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.RequiredCSRAttributes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal required_csr_attributes: %w", err)
}
err = r.db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
INSERT INTO certificate_profiles (
id, name, description, allowed_key_algorithms, max_ttl_seconds,
allowed_ekus, required_san_patterns, spiffe_uri_pattern,
allow_short_lived, must_staple, required_csr_attributes,
enabled, created_at, updated_at
) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11, $12, $13, $14)
RETURNING id
`, profile.ID, profile.Name, profile.Description, algJSON, profile.MaxTTLSeconds,
ekuJSON, sanJSON, profile.SPIFFEURIPattern,
profile.AllowShortLived, profile.MustStaple, csrAttrsJSON,
profile.Enabled, profile.CreatedAt, profile.UpdatedAt).Scan(&profile.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create profile: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Update modifies an existing certificate profile
func (r *ProfileRepository) Update(ctx context.Context, profile *domain.CertificateProfile) error {
profile.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
algJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.AllowedKeyAlgorithms)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal allowed_key_algorithms: %w", err)
}
ekuJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.AllowedEKUs)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal allowed_ekus: %w", err)
}
sanJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.RequiredSANPatterns)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal required_san_patterns: %w", err)
}
csrAttrsJSON, err := json.Marshal(profile.RequiredCSRAttributes)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal required_csr_attributes: %w", err)
}
result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, `
UPDATE certificate_profiles SET
name = $1,
description = $2,
allowed_key_algorithms = $3,
max_ttl_seconds = $4,
allowed_ekus = $5,
required_san_patterns = $6,
spiffe_uri_pattern = $7,
allow_short_lived = $8,
must_staple = $9,
required_csr_attributes = $10,
enabled = $11,
updated_at = $12
WHERE id = $13
`, profile.Name, profile.Description, algJSON, profile.MaxTTLSeconds,
ekuJSON, sanJSON, profile.SPIFFEURIPattern,
profile.AllowShortLived, profile.MustStaple, csrAttrsJSON,
profile.Enabled, profile.UpdatedAt, profile.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update profile: %w", err)
}
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
}
if rows == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("profile not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
}
return nil
}
// Delete removes a certificate profile
func (r *ProfileRepository) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
result, err := r.db.ExecContext(ctx, "DELETE FROM certificate_profiles WHERE id = $1", id)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete profile: %w", err)
}
rows, err := result.RowsAffected()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get rows affected: %w", err)
}
if rows == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("profile not found: %w", repository.ErrNotFound)
}
return nil
}
// scanProfile scans a certificate profile from a row or rows
func scanProfile(scanner interface {
Scan(...interface{}) error
}) (*domain.CertificateProfile, error) {
var p domain.CertificateProfile
var algJSON, ekuJSON, sanJSON, csrAttrsJSON []byte
err := scanner.Scan(
&p.ID, &p.Name, &p.Description, &algJSON, &p.MaxTTLSeconds,
&ekuJSON, &sanJSON, &p.SPIFFEURIPattern,
&p.AllowShortLived, &p.MustStaple, &csrAttrsJSON,
&p.ACMEAuthMode,
&p.Enabled, &p.CreatedAt, &p.UpdatedAt,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to scan profile: %w", err)
}
if len(algJSON) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(algJSON, &p.AllowedKeyAlgorithms); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal allowed_key_algorithms: %w", err)
}
} else {
p.AllowedKeyAlgorithms = domain.DefaultKeyAlgorithms()
}
if len(ekuJSON) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(ekuJSON, &p.AllowedEKUs); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal allowed_ekus: %w", err)
}
} else {
p.AllowedEKUs = domain.DefaultEKUs()
}
if len(sanJSON) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(sanJSON, &p.RequiredSANPatterns); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal required_san_patterns: %w", err)
}
}
// Phase 6.1: required_csr_attributes column ships with default '[]', so
// every existing row scans into an empty slice (back-compat 204 stub
// behavior). Older rows from before the migration could land here as
// empty bytes — guard against that with the same len() check pattern.
if len(csrAttrsJSON) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(csrAttrsJSON, &p.RequiredCSRAttributes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal required_csr_attributes: %w", err)
}
}
return &p, nil
}