shankar0123 b0ac24fbf8 auth-bundle-2 Phase 1: OIDC + Session + User + Breakglass domain types ...

Phase 1 ships the persisted-shape types Bundle 2 needs end-to-end.
No DB migrations, no service layer, no HTTP handlers; Phase 2 ships
the SQL, Phase 3+ ship the consumers. Each type has a Validate()
method that enforces the on-disk invariants the schema will mirror,
and a focused _test.go that pins each invariant's failure mode.

Per-package summary:

internal/auth/oidc/domain/ (OIDCProvider + GroupRoleMapping):
* OIDCProvider carries the operator-configured IdP record. Fields
  match the prompt's Phase 1 list plus IATWindowSeconds and
  JWKSCacheTTLSeconds (Phase 3 references these by name; landing
  them in Phase 1's domain type avoids the lying-field gap).
  ClientSecretEncrypted is opaque from this layer; it is the v2 blob
  produced by internal/crypto/encryption.go and is `json:"-"` so it
  never wire-leaks.
* Validate() rejects: invalid id prefix, empty name, non-https
  issuer_url (matches Phase 3's "JWKS endpoint MUST be HTTPS"),
  empty client_id, empty client_secret_encrypted, non-https
  redirect_uri, invalid groups_claim_format, scopes missing openid,
  IAT window outside (0, 600], JWKS cache TTL below 60s. Defaults
  applied in-place: GroupsClaimPath="groups", GroupsClaimFormat=
  "string-array", Scopes=["openid","profile","email"],
  IATWindowSeconds=300, JWKSCacheTTLSeconds=3600,
  TenantID="t-default".
* GroupRoleMapping carries the operator-configured group-to-role
  rule. Validate() pins prefix conventions ("grm-", "op-", "r-")
  and non-empty group name.
* 18 tests across happy-path + every negative invariant.

internal/auth/session/domain/ (Session + SessionSigningKey):
* Session covers BOTH the post-login row (full 1h-idle/8h-absolute
  cookie lifecycle) AND the Phase 5 pre-login row (10-minute TTL,
  carries OIDC state+nonce+PKCE verifier across the IdP redirect).
  IsPreLogin discriminates. CSRFTokenHash holds SHA-256 of the
  CSRF token plaintext (the plaintext lives in a JS-readable
  certctl_csrf cookie; storing only the hash on the row defends
  against DB-read leaks per the Phase 4 CSRF contract).
* Validate() pins: id prefix "ses-", non-empty actor id/type,
  signing key id prefix "sk-", AbsoluteExpiresAt strictly > Idle,
  IdleExpiresAt strictly > CreatedAt, CSRFTokenHash exactly 64
  lowercase hex chars when set.
* Cookie naming constants pinned by a separate test
  (TestCookieNamingConstants) so a future rename can't silently
  break the GUI's web/src/api/client.ts which reads these names by
  string.
* SessionSigningKey stores the v2-encrypted HMAC key material; the
  retired-before-created invariant catches malformed rows. 14
  tests across both types.

internal/auth/user/domain/ (User):
* Federated-human identity for SSO logins. Distinct from Bundle 1's
  free-form actor_id strings: actor_roles.actor_id = User.ID for
  federated humans (per the prompt's note about how the two
  identity systems intersect).
* WebAuthnCredentials JSONB column reserved for v3 (Decision 12);
  defaults to "[]" on Validate() so Bundle 2 + v3 share the same
  on-disk format from day one.
* Email validation is intentionally loose (basic shape: one @,
  non-empty local + domain, no whitespace, dot in domain). RFC 5321
  / 5322 grammars are not enforced; the IdP issued the email and
  we trust its shape, only rejecting gross corruption.
* 8 tests across happy-path + invalid-id + empty-email +
  malformed-email + invalid-provider-id + tenant defaulting +
  WebAuthn-credentials passthrough.

internal/auth/breakglass/domain/ (BreakglassCredential):
* Phase 7.5 type. Argon2id PHC-format password hash; Validate()
  pins the Argon2id magic prefix so non-Argon2id formats (bcrypt,
  pbkdf2, plaintext) are rejected at the persistence boundary.
* MinPasswordLengthBytes (12) + MaxPasswordLengthBytes (256)
  constants pinned by a dedicated test so the operator-facing
  password-strength contract can't drift silently.
* IsLocked(now) helper exposes the lockout state machine for the
  Phase 7.5 service to consume; the lockout window default is
  15min in the service layer.
* 9 tests across happy-path + per-invariant negative + lockout
  state machine + tenant defaulting.

Cross-cutting:
* Every type has json:"-" on the encrypted-credential field
  (ClientSecretEncrypted, KeyMaterialEncrypted, PasswordHash,
  CSRFTokenHash) so even a misconfigured handler that marshals the
  domain type directly into a response body cannot leak the
  secret. Mirrors Bundle 1's pattern for issuer/target credentials.
* Every type carries TenantID with Validate() defaulting to
  authdomain.DefaultTenantID. Forward-compat for the future
  managed-service multi-tenant activation; Bundle 2 ships
  single-tenant.

Verifications:
* gofmt -l clean across all 8 new files (one round-trip required to
  satisfy Go 1.19+ doc-comment list-formatting rules in
  session/domain/types.go).
* go vet clean on internal/auth/oidc/... + session/... + user/... +
  breakglass/...
* go test -short -count=1 green on all four new domain packages
  (49 test functions total).
* go test -short -count=1 still green on Bundle 1 packages
  (internal/auth, internal/auth/bootstrap, internal/service/auth,
  internal/config).
* govulncheck ./... clean (M-024 hard CI gate).
* All 24 ci-guards pass locally.

Phase 1 exit criteria from cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md:
* All types compile: yes.
* Validators have at least 5 test cases each: yes (smallest is
  User with 8 tests; OIDCProvider has 13).
* make verify equivalent green: gofmt + vet + go test pass
  (golangci-lint deferred to CI per the same operating-rule
  pattern Phase 0 used).

2026-05-10 03:41:46 +00:00

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domain

auth-bundle-2 Phase 1: OIDC + Session + User + Breakglass domain types

2026-05-10 03:41:46 +00:00