Files
certctl/internal/service/auth/role_service.go
T
shankar0123 bd54d5f7fa auth-bundle-1 Phase 2: RBAC service layer + Authorizer primitive
Bundle 1 / Phase 2: ships PermissionService, RoleService, ActorRoleService, and the Authorizer primitive that Phase 3 RequirePermission middleware calls on every gated request.

Authorizer.CheckPermission semantics: a grant matches when (a) the permission name equals the requested permission AND (b) the grant is global-scoped OR the grant scope_type+scope_id exactly match the request. Global beats specific; per-resource grants widen the effective set rather than shadowing global. Hot-path query is one ActorRoleRepository.EffectivePermissions JOIN call (already shipped in Phase 1) plus an in-memory walk; Phase 12 will add benchmarks + caching if the JOIN cost shows up at scale.

Privilege-escalation guard: ActorRoleService.Grant and Revoke require the caller to hold auth.role.assign globally. Without it, ErrSelfRoleAssignment. System callers (AsSystemCaller()) bypass the check; bootstrap, migrations, scheduler-initiated grants use this path. Reserved actor actor-demo-anon is rejected on Grant + Revoke so the demo path stays alive even after a misclick (ErrAuthReservedActor).

Caller abstraction: every service entry point takes *Caller (ActorID, ActorType, TenantID, IsSystem). CallerFromContext is a stub returning ErrUnauthenticated; Phase 3 wires the middleware-context bridge that fills the Caller from request context. The contract is pinned by TestCallerFromContext_Phase2ReturnsUnauthenticated so the Phase 3 upgrade is observable.

Audit recording: every mutating service operation calls AuditService.RecordEvent. Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the event_category column + parameter and back-fills 'auth' for these calls; until then the rows go in with the default category.

Test coverage: in-memory fakeRoleRepo / fakePermissionRepo / fakeActorRoleRepo / fakeAudit pin the privilege-escalation invariants (ErrUnauthenticated for nil caller, ErrForbidden for missing perm, ErrInvalidPermission for non-canonical permission name, ErrSelfRoleAssignment for Grant without auth.role.assign, ErrAuthReservedActor for actor-demo-anon mutations, system-caller bypass) without requiring testcontainers. Phase 12 will add live-Postgres integration coverage.

Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Phase 1 was 19497ee (RBAC schema + repo). Phase 3 (middleware integration) is the next commit on this branch.
2026-05-09 16:20:04 +00:00

205 lines
6.7 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
)
// RoleService manages roles + role-permission grants.
type RoleService struct {
repo repository.RoleRepository
permRepo repository.PermissionRepository
authorizer *Authorizer
audit AuditService
}
// NewRoleService constructs a RoleService.
func NewRoleService(repo repository.RoleRepository, permRepo repository.PermissionRepository, authorizer *Authorizer, audit AuditService) *RoleService {
return &RoleService{
repo: repo,
permRepo: permRepo,
authorizer: authorizer,
audit: audit,
}
}
// List returns every role in the caller's tenant. Requires
// `auth.role.list`.
func (s *RoleService) List(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error) {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
tenantID := caller.TenantID
if tenantID == "" {
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
return s.repo.List(ctx, tenantID)
}
// Get returns the role with the given ID. Requires `auth.role.list`.
func (s *RoleService) Get(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error) {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s.repo.Get(ctx, id)
}
// Create stores a new role. Requires `auth.role.create`.
func (s *RoleService) Create(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.create"); err != nil {
return err
}
if role.TenantID == "" {
role.TenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
if err := s.repo.Create(ctx, role); err != nil {
return err
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.create", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name, "tenant_id": role.TenantID})
return nil
}
// Update modifies an existing role. Requires `auth.role.edit`.
func (s *RoleService) Update(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := s.repo.Update(ctx, role); err != nil {
return err
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.update", "role", role.ID, map[string]interface{}{"name": role.Name})
return nil
}
// Delete removes a role. Requires `auth.role.delete`. Returns
// repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse when active actor_roles still reference
// the role (FK ON DELETE RESTRICT).
func (s *RoleService) Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, id string) error {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.delete"); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := s.repo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
return err
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.delete", "role", id, nil)
return nil
}
// ListPermissions returns the (permission, scope) grants on the role.
// Requires `auth.role.list`.
func (s *RoleService) ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error) {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.list"); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s.repo.ListPermissions(ctx, roleID)
}
// AddPermission grants a permission to a role at the given scope.
// Requires `auth.role.edit`. Returns ErrInvalidPermission if the
// permission name is not in the canonical catalogue.
func (s *RoleService) AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
return err
}
if !s.permRepo.IsCanonical(permissionName) {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrInvalidPermission, permissionName)
}
perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
RoleID: roleID,
PermissionID: perm.ID,
ScopeType: scopeType,
ScopeID: scopeID,
}
if err := s.repo.AddPermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
return err
}
details := map[string]interface{}{
"role_id": roleID,
"permission": permissionName,
"scope_type": string(scopeType),
}
if scopeID != nil {
details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.add", "role", roleID, details)
return nil
}
// RemovePermission revokes a previously-granted permission from a role.
// Requires `auth.role.edit`.
func (s *RoleService) RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, roleID, permissionName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error {
if err := s.requirePermission(ctx, caller, "auth.role.edit"); err != nil {
return err
}
perm, err := s.permRepo.GetByName(ctx, permissionName)
if err != nil {
return err
}
grant := &authdomain.RolePermission{
RoleID: roleID,
PermissionID: perm.ID,
ScopeType: scopeType,
ScopeID: scopeID,
}
if err := s.repo.RemovePermission(ctx, grant); err != nil {
return err
}
details := map[string]interface{}{
"role_id": roleID,
"permission": permissionName,
"scope_type": string(scopeType),
}
if scopeID != nil {
details["scope_id"] = *scopeID
}
s.recordAudit(ctx, caller, "role.permission.remove", "role", roleID, details)
return nil
}
// requirePermission is the gate every public method runs first. System
// callers bypass; everyone else must hold the named permission globally.
// Returns ErrUnauthenticated when caller is nil, ErrForbidden when the
// caller exists but lacks the permission.
func (s *RoleService) requirePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, perm string) error {
if caller == nil {
return ErrUnauthenticated
}
if caller.IsSystem {
return nil
}
tenantID := caller.TenantID
if tenantID == "" {
tenantID = authdomain.DefaultTenantID
}
ok, err := s.authorizer.CheckPermission(ctx, caller.ActorID, authdomain.ActorTypeValue(caller.ActorType), tenantID, perm, authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %q", ErrForbidden, perm)
}
return nil
}
// recordAudit emits an audit row tied to the caller. Best-effort: audit
// failures are logged via panic-recover but do not fail the operation.
func (s *RoleService) recordAudit(ctx context.Context, caller *Caller, action, resourceType, resourceID string, details map[string]interface{}) {
if s.audit == nil || caller == nil {
return
}
_ = s.audit.RecordEvent(ctx, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType, action, resourceType, resourceID, details)
}
// Ensure the compile-time pin: domain.ActorType is convertible to
// authdomain.ActorTypeValue via string equality. If the underlying
// types ever diverge this won't compile.
var _ authdomain.ActorTypeValue = authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey)