Closes M-001 + M-002 + M-013 + M-018 + M-025 from
comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25.
M-001 (CWE-916) — PBKDF2 100k -> 600k via v3 blob format
internal/crypto/encryption.go:
- New v3Magic (0x03), pbkdf2IterationsV3 (600,000 — OWASP 2024
Password Storage Cheat Sheet floor), v3SaltSize (16 bytes),
deriveKeyWithSaltV3 helper.
- EncryptIfKeySet now unconditionally writes v3:
magic(0x03) || salt(16) || nonce(12) || ciphertext+tag
- DecryptIfKeySet falls through v3 -> v2 -> v1 with AEAD verification
at each step. Wrong-passphrase v3 reads cannot be silently
misattributed to v2/v1.
- IsLegacyFormat updated to recognize 0x03 as non-legacy.
internal/crypto/encryption_v3_test.go (NEW, 7 tests):
V3 round-trip / V2 read-fallback against deterministic v2 fixture /
V3 wrong-passphrase fails / V3-vs-V2 dispatch order / V2 vs V3 keys
differ for same (passphrase, salt) / iteration-count pin at OWASP
2024 floor / IsLegacyFormat-recognises-V3.
Coverage internal/crypto: 86.7% -> 88.2%.
M-002 (CWE-862) — Auth-exempt allowlist constants + AST regression test
Recon found auth-exempt surface spans TWO layers (audit's claim was
incomplete):
Layer 1 (router.go direct r.mux.Handle):
GET /health, GET /ready, GET /api/v1/auth/info, GET /api/v1/version
Layer 2 (cmd/server/main.go::buildFinalHandler URL-prefix dispatch):
/.well-known/pki/*, /.well-known/est/*, /scep[/...]*
internal/api/router/router.go:
- New AuthExemptRouterRoutes constant with per-entry justifications.
- New AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes constant.
internal/api/router/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
AST-walks router.go for every direct mux.Handle call and asserts
set equals AuthExemptRouterRoutes; reads source bytes of Register /
RegisterFunc and asserts they still wrap with middleware.Chain.
cmd/server/auth_exempt_test.go (NEW, 2 tests):
14-case table test on buildFinalHandler asserting documented
prefixes route to noAuthHandler and authenticated routes route to
apiHandler; inverse-overlap pin proves no documented bypass shadows
an authenticated prefix.
M-013 (CWE-942) — CORS deny-by-default verified-already-clean + pin
Audit claim 'default allows all origins if env-var unset' was WRONG.
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewCORS already denies cross-
origin requests when len(cfg.AllowedOrigins) == 0 (no
Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is emitted, same-origin policy
applies).
internal/api/middleware/cors_test.go: +TestNewCORS_NilOriginsDeniesAll
+ TestNewCORS_M013_ContractDocumentedInOrder (5-case table test
pinning the 3-arm dispatch contract).
M-018 (CWE-319 / PCI-DSS Req 4) — Postgres TLS opt-in toggle
deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: new postgresql.tls.{mode,caSecretRef}
operator-facing knobs. Default 'disable' preserves in-cluster pod-
network behavior; PCI-scoped operators set verify-full.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: certctl.databaseURL helper
pipes postgresql.tls.mode into ?sslmode=.
deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-secret.yaml: uses the helper
instead of hardcoded sslmode=disable.
deploy/docker-compose.yml: CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL is now
${CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL:-...} so operators override without editing.
docs/database-tls.md (NEW): operator runbook covering 4 deployment
shapes, RDS verify-full example with PGSSLROOTCERT mount, and
pg_stat_ssl verification query.
helm template + helm lint clean.
M-025 (OWASP ASVS L2 §11.2.1) — Per-key rate limiting
internal/api/middleware/middleware.go::NewRateLimiter rewritten from
a single global tokenBucket to a keyedRateLimiter map keyed on
'user:'+GetUser(ctx) for authenticated callers
'ip:'+RemoteAddr-host for unauthenticated
- Empty UserKey strings treated as unauthenticated.
- X-Forwarded-For intentionally NOT consulted (header-spoofing risk).
- Create-on-demand bucket allocation under sync.RWMutex with double-
check pattern.
RateLimitConfig.PerUserRPS / PerUserBurstSize fields with env vars
CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_RPS / CERTCTL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_USER_BURST
allow per-user budgets distinct from per-IP.
internal/api/middleware/ratelimit_keyed_test.go (NEW, 5 tests):
TwoIPsHaveIndependentBuckets / SameUserDifferentIPsShareBucket /
TwoUsersHaveIndependentBuckets / PerUserBudgetOverride /
EmptyUserKeyTreatedAsAnonymous.
Coverage internal/api/middleware: 82.1% -> 83.7%.
Audit deliverables:
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/audit-report.md: score
25/55 -> 30/55 closed (High 7/9, Medium 7/27 -> 12/27, Low 8/19).
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/findings.yaml: 5 status flips
open -> closed with closure notes citing the Bundle B mechanism.
certctl/CHANGELOG.md: Bundle B section under [unreleased].
Verification:
go test -count=1 -short ./... all green
staticcheck on changed packages no new SA*/ST* hits
(the 4 pre-existing SA1019 sites in cmd/server/main_test.go are
Bundle 9 / M-028 partial closure leftovers tracked in Bundle C)
helm template + helm lint clean
internal/repository/postgres setup-fail sandbox disk pressure,
same on master HEAD before this branch — environmental, not Bundle B
5.1 KiB
Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption
Audit reference: Bundle B / M-018. PCI-DSS v4.0 Req 4 §2.2.5; CWE-319.
certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL env var. The sslmode query parameter on that URL
selects the transport-encryption posture. Pre-Bundle-B all the bundled
deployment artifacts (Helm chart, docker-compose) hard-coded sslmode=disable.
Bundle B exposes that as an operator-facing knob with a documented default and
explicit opt-in / opt-out paths for the four real-world deployment shapes.
Quick reference
| Deployment shape | Default sslmode |
When to change |
|---|---|---|
| Helm chart, bundled Postgres, in-cluster | disable |
When the cluster does not provide pod-network encryption (CNI without WireGuard / IPSec) and the workload is in PCI-DSS scope. |
| Helm chart, external Postgres (RDS / Cloud SQL / Azure DB) | not auto-set | Always set to verify-full and provide the cloud provider's server CA bundle. |
| docker-compose, bundled Postgres on docker bridge | disable |
Demo/dev only; not a deployment shape we expect operators to harden. |
| docker-compose / k8s with external Postgres | not auto-set | Always set CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL to a connection string with sslmode=verify-full. |
sslmode values come from lib/pq (the underlying driver). The full set is:
disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-ca, verify-full. PCI-DSS
Req 4 v4.0 §2.2.5 considers verify-ca the floor for sensitive-data transport;
verify-full is the floor for systems exposed to spoofing risk (it adds
hostname validation against the server cert's CN/SAN).
Helm chart (Bundle B)
Bundle B adds two values under postgresql.tls:
postgresql:
tls:
mode: disable # disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full
caSecretRef: "" # Secret with ca.crt key (required for verify-ca / verify-full)
The chart pipes postgresql.tls.mode into the ?sslmode= parameter of the
generated CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL (see templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.databaseURL).
For external Postgres, set postgresql.enabled: false and override
server.env.CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL directly with the full connection string —
the operator authoring an external-DB values file owns the entire URL.
Example: external RDS with verify-full
postgresql:
enabled: false # Disable bundled Postgres
server:
env:
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: |
postgres://certctl:STRONGPW@my-db.cabc12345.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full
# Provide the AWS RDS root CA bundle as a secret + mount.
# AWS publishes per-region root certs at https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/
extraVolumes:
- name: rds-ca
secret:
secretName: rds-ca-bundle # kubectl create secret generic rds-ca-bundle --from-file=ca.crt=...
extraVolumeMounts:
- name: rds-ca
mountPath: /etc/postgresql-ca
readOnly: true
# lib/pq honors PGSSLROOTCERT for the verify-{ca,full} CA bundle path.
server:
env:
PGSSLROOTCERT: /etc/postgresql-ca/ca.crt
docker-compose (development / demo)
The bundled deploy/docker-compose.yml keeps sslmode=disable as the default
because the Postgres container shares the docker bridge network with the certctl
server and the compose file is not a production deployment artifact. To opt in:
export CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL='postgres://certctl:certctl@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full'
docker compose up
Verification
For any non-disable mode, confirm the connection actually negotiated TLS:
# From inside the certctl-server container or any host with psql + the same URL:
psql "$CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL" -c "SELECT ssl, version, cipher FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid();"
# Expected output for verify-full: ssl=t, version=TLSv1.3 (or TLSv1.2), cipher=...
If ssl=f appears, the connection silently fell back to plaintext — investigate
the cert chain or sslmode value before treating the deployment as PCI-compliant.
What this does NOT cover
- Postgres-to-Postgres replication — if you run a replica, replica-primary
TLS is configured via the Postgres server itself (
pg_hba.conf+ssl=on); it is independent of certctl'sCERTCTL_DATABASE_URL. - Backup transport —
pg_dump/pg_basebackuphonor the samesslmodeparameter when invoked with the URL form, but the bundled chart's backup story (if any) is operator-owned. - Encryption at rest —
sslmodeis a transport concern only. Disk encryption is the cloud provider's storage layer (RDS, EBS, etc.) or the operator's Postgres TDE / disk LUKS / etc.
Reverting
If sslmode=verify-full causes connection failures (most common: missing CA
bundle, wrong hostname), drop temporarily to sslmode=require to confirm TLS
is at least negotiated, then add the CA bundle and ratchet back up. Never
revert to sslmode=disable on a system carrying real cert metadata —
audit_events alone contains enough operator/issuer/target identity to justify
TLS in any scoped environment.