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9c679a5960
pre-login store, OpenID Connect Back-Channel Logout 1.0, cookieAuth
scheme, 7 new auth permissions, CI guard, handler tests
Phase 5 of the bundle puts the Phase 3 OIDC service + Phase 4 session
service on the wire. 13 HTTP endpoints split into three logical groups:
Public OIDC handshake (auth-exempt; protocol-mediated):
GET /auth/oidc/login?provider=<id> -> 302 to IdP authorization URL
+ sets certctl_oidc_pending cookie
(10-min TTL, Path=/auth/oidc/,
SameSite=Lax)
GET /auth/oidc/callback?code=...&state=... -> consume pre-login row,
run Phase 3's 11-step token
validation, mint post-login
session, 302 to dashboard
POST /auth/oidc/back-channel-logout -> OpenID Connect BCL 1.0 — IdP
POSTs logout_token JWT; certctl
validates signature against IdP
JWKS via Phase 3 alg allow-list,
required claims (iss/aud/iat/jti/
events; exactly one of sub/sid;
nonce ABSENT per spec §2.4),
revokes matching sessions,
returns 200 with
Cache-Control: no-store
POST /auth/logout -> revoke caller's session
Session management (RBAC-gated auth.session.*):
GET /api/v1/auth/sessions -> auth.session.list (own / all)
DELETE /api/v1/auth/sessions/{id} -> auth.session.revoke (own bypass)
OIDC provider + group-mapping CRUD (RBAC-gated auth.oidc.*):
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.list
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers -> auth.oidc.create
(client_secret encrypted
at rest via
internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet)
PUT /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id} -> auth.oidc.delete
(refused via
ErrOIDCProviderInUse → 409
when users authenticated
via this provider)
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh -> auth.oidc.edit
(re-runs IdP downgrade
defense via
OIDCService.RefreshKeys)
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.list
POST /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings -> auth.oidc.edit
DELETE /api/v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id} -> auth.oidc.edit
Migration 000037 ships:
- oidc_pre_login_sessions table (10-min absolute TTL, FK CASCADE on
oidc_provider_id, FK RESTRICT on signing_key_id; index on
absolute_expires_at for the GC sweep);
- 7 new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
auth.session.list, auth.session.list.all, auth.session.revoke,
auth.oidc.list, auth.oidc.create, auth.oidc.edit, auth.oidc.delete
CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep at internal/domain/auth/
validate.go.
Pre-login machinery:
- internal/repository/oidc.go gains PreLoginRepository interface +
PreLoginSession struct + ErrPreLoginNotFound / ErrPreLoginExpired
sentinels.
- internal/repository/postgres/oidc_prelogin.go ships the impl;
LookupAndConsume uses DELETE ... RETURNING for atomic single-use.
- internal/auth/oidc/prelogin.go is the PreLoginAdapter that bridges
the OIDC service's Phase 3 PreLoginStore interface to the new
repository, signing the cookie value under the active
SessionSigningKey via the same v1.<id>.<key>.<HMAC> wire format
Phase 4 uses for post-login cookies. Defense-in-depth: the
pre-login `pl-` prefix is enforced by ParseCookieValue(prefix);
a stolen pre-login cookie cannot be replayed against the
post-login Validate path (pinned by
TestService_Validate_RejectsPreLoginCookieAtPostLoginGate).
Session package extension:
- internal/auth/session/service.go gains exported SignCookieValue,
ParseCookieValue (with caller-supplied id-1 prefix), ComputeCookieHMAC,
DecryptKeyMaterial wrappers so the OIDC pre-login adapter shares
the same length-prefixed HMAC math without code duplication.
- parseCookie no longer hardcodes the `ses-` prefix check (moved to
Validate as defense-in-depth; pre-login cookie verification uses
the `pl-` prefix via ParseCookieValue).
Cookie attributes (all Phase 5 endpoints honor CERTCTL_SESSION_SAMESITE
+ Secure=true via SessionCookieAttrs from Phase 4 config):
- certctl_oidc_pending: Path=/auth/oidc/, MaxAge=600s, SameSite=Lax
(cannot be Strict because the IdP-initiated callback is a top-level
navigation from a different origin).
- certctl_session: Path=/, Expires=8h, SameSite=Lax|Strict, HttpOnly.
- certctl_csrf: Path=/, Expires=8h, HttpOnly=false (intentional —
GUI must read it to echo into X-CSRF-Token header).
Audit logging on every mutating operation (event_category="auth"):
auth.oidc_login_succeeded / failed / unmapped_groups
auth.oidc_back_channel_logout / failed
auth.session_revoked
auth.oidc_provider_{created,updated,deleted,refreshed}
auth.group_mapping_{added,removed}
OpenAPI updates:
- cookieAuth security scheme added to api/openapi.yaml under
components.securitySchemes (apiKey / cookie / certctl_session).
- The 13 Phase 5 routes are added to SpecParityExceptions with a
deferral note: full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows land in a follow-on
commit alongside the GUI work (Phase 8) so the ergonomic shape can
be validated against the live GUI client.
CI guard: scripts/ci-guards/N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh
asserts api/openapi.yaml has ≥ 14 'security: []' occurrences (the
pre-Bundle-2 baseline). Reducing the count below 14 would silently
force a Bearer-or-cookie requirement onto an endpoint that legitimately
runs without certctl-issued credentials; the guard fires before that
regression lands.
Handler tests (internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc_test.go):
- All 6 prompt-mandated negative cases:
BCL with missing events claim -> 400
BCL with nonce present -> 400 (per spec §2.4)
BCL with sig signed by an unknown key -> 400
Callback with replayed state -> 400
Callback with PKCE verifier mismatch -> 400
Callback with expired pre-login row -> 400
- Plus happy paths for every endpoint, edge cases (missing-cookie,
duplicate-name, in-use-409, wrong-tenant), and the Helper-function
coverage (peekIssuer, classifyOIDCFailure, defaultIfBlank,
defaultIntIfZero, clientIPFromRequest, encryptClientSecret).
Coverage on internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go: 80.9% per-function
(above the Phase 5 spec's ≥ 80% floor).
Server wiring (cmd/server/main.go):
Wired AFTER sessionService (Phase 4) so the OIDC PreLoginAdapter can
sign pre-login cookies under the active SessionSigningKey:
oidcProviderRepo + oidcMappingRepo + oidcUserRepo + oidcPreLoginRepo
-> preLoginAdapter -> oidcService -> authSessionOIDCHandler.
sessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create to the
oidcsvc.SessionMinter port the OIDC service consumes.
Router wiring (internal/api/router/router.go):
4 public OIDC routes via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt; pinned in
AuthExemptRouterRoutes); 9 RBAC-gated routes via r.Register +
rbacGate(checker, perm, h). Routes only register when
reg.AuthSessionOIDC != nil so pre-Phase-5 builds skip the block
entirely.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/api/handler (74 tests +
new Phase 5 batch), internal/api/router (parity + auth-exempt
allowlist), internal/auth/oidc + session (no regressions), full domain
+ scheduler + config sweeps green, ci-guard
N-bundle-2-security-empty-preserved.sh green (17 ≥ 14 baseline).
159 lines
7.0 KiB
Go
159 lines
7.0 KiB
Go
package repository
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"time"
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oidcdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth/oidc/domain"
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)
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// Sentinel errors for the OIDC repositories. Postgres implementations
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// translate SQLSTATE codes into these so handler / service code can
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// branch via errors.Is.
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var (
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// ErrOIDCProviderNotFound: Get / GetByName returned no row. HTTP 404.
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ErrOIDCProviderNotFound = errors.New("oidc: provider not found")
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// ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName: Create tripped the (tenant_id, name)
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// UNIQUE constraint. HTTP 409.
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ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName = errors.New("oidc: provider with this name already exists in tenant")
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// ErrOIDCProviderInUse: Delete failed because at least one users row
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// references the provider via oidc_provider_id (FK ON DELETE
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// RESTRICT). HTTP 409.
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ErrOIDCProviderInUse = errors.New("oidc: provider has authenticated users; revoke all sessions before delete")
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// ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound: Get returned no row. HTTP 404.
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ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound = errors.New("oidc: group-role mapping not found")
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// ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate: Add tripped the
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// (provider_id, group_name, role_id) UNIQUE constraint. HTTP 409.
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ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate = errors.New("oidc: group-role mapping already exists")
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)
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// OIDCProviderRepository wraps the oidc_providers table. Phase 3's
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// OIDCService consumes List + Get to look up the IdP for token
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// validation; the GUI / CLI wire Create / Update / Delete behind
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// auth.oidc.* permission gates per Phase 5.
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type OIDCProviderRepository interface {
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// List returns every configured provider in the tenant. Order:
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// created_at ASC for stable GUI rendering.
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List(ctx context.Context, tenantID string) ([]*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error)
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// Get returns one provider by id. ErrOIDCProviderNotFound on miss.
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Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error)
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// GetByName returns one provider by (tenant_id, name).
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// ErrOIDCProviderNotFound on miss.
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GetByName(ctx context.Context, tenantID, name string) (*oidcdomain.OIDCProvider, error)
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// Create persists a new provider. Caller MUST have already called
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// p.Validate() and encrypted the client_secret_encrypted byte
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// stream via internal/crypto/encryption.go. Returns
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// ErrOIDCProviderDuplicateName when the (tenant_id, name) UNIQUE
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// constraint fires.
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Create(ctx context.Context, p *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider) error
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// Update writes the full mutable field set back to the row.
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// Immutable fields (id, tenant_id, created_at) are read-only;
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// updated_at is set to NOW() by the implementation.
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Update(ctx context.Context, p *oidcdomain.OIDCProvider) error
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// Delete removes a provider by id. Returns ErrOIDCProviderInUse
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// when at least one users row references this provider (FK ON
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// DELETE RESTRICT). Phase 5's handler maps to HTTP 409.
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Delete(ctx context.Context, id string) error
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}
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// GroupRoleMappingRepository wraps the group_role_mappings table.
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// Phase 3's OIDCService.HandleCallback uses Map() to translate IdP
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// group claims into role IDs; the GUI / CLI wire ListByProvider /
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// Add / Remove for operator configuration.
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type GroupRoleMappingRepository interface {
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// ListByProvider returns every mapping for the named provider.
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// Order: group_name ASC for stable GUI rendering.
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ListByProvider(ctx context.Context, providerID string) ([]*oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping, error)
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// Get returns one mapping by id. ErrGroupRoleMappingNotFound on miss.
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Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping, error)
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// Add persists a new mapping. Caller MUST have called m.Validate().
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// Returns ErrGroupRoleMappingDuplicate when the
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// (provider_id, group_name, role_id) UNIQUE constraint fires.
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Add(ctx context.Context, m *oidcdomain.GroupRoleMapping) error
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// Remove deletes a mapping by id.
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Remove(ctx context.Context, id string) error
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// Map resolves an IdP-supplied list of group names against the
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// provider's mappings. Returns the deduplicated set of role IDs
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// the user should hold. Empty result means the user matches no
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// mapping (Phase 3 fail-closed: no session minted, audit row
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// `auth.oidc_login_unmapped_groups`).
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Map(ctx context.Context, providerID string, groupNames []string) ([]string, error)
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}
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// =============================================================================
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// PreLoginRepository — Bundle 2 Phase 5.
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//
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// Holds short-lived rows that carry OIDC state + nonce + PKCE verifier
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// across the IdP redirect. Distinct from the sessions table because
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// sessions doesn't carry OIDC-specific columns. 10-minute absolute TTL
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// at the schema layer (oidc_pre_login_sessions.absolute_expires_at);
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// the GC sweep deletes expired rows.
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//
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// Cookie wire format `v1.<pl-id>.<sk-id>.<HMAC-SHA256>` matches the
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// post-login session cookie format exactly; signing-key id is the
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// active SessionSigningKey at handshake time.
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// =============================================================================
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// PreLoginSession is the row shape for oidc_pre_login_sessions. Held
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// here (not in oidc/domain) because it's a Phase-5 storage primitive,
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// not a domain concept the wider service layer reasons about.
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type PreLoginSession struct {
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ID string // prefix `pl-`
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TenantID string
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SigningKeyID string // FK to session_signing_keys.id
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OIDCProviderID string // FK to oidc_providers.id
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State string
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Nonce string
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PKCEVerifier string
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CreatedAt time.Time
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AbsoluteExpiresAt time.Time
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}
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// Sentinel errors for PreLoginRepository.
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var (
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// ErrPreLoginNotFound: LookupAndConsume found no row with the
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// supplied id. The handler maps to HTTP 400 (replay or forgery).
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ErrPreLoginNotFound = errors.New("oidc: pre-login session not found or already consumed")
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// ErrPreLoginExpired: the row was found but absolute_expires_at is
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// in the past. The handler maps to HTTP 400. The row is also
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// deleted (the consume side of LookupAndConsume).
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ErrPreLoginExpired = errors.New("oidc: pre-login session expired (10-minute TTL exceeded)")
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)
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// PreLoginRepository wraps the oidc_pre_login_sessions table.
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type PreLoginRepository interface {
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// Create persists a new pre-login row. Caller MUST have already
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// generated the random id, state, nonce, and PKCE verifier;
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// CreatedAt + AbsoluteExpiresAt default to NOW() and NOW()+10min
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// at the schema layer when zero.
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Create(ctx context.Context, p *PreLoginSession) error
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// LookupAndConsume reads the row by id AND deletes it atomically
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// (single-use). Returns ErrPreLoginNotFound if no row matches OR
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// if the row was already consumed by a concurrent caller.
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// Returns ErrPreLoginExpired if the row was found but expired
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// (the row is still deleted in this case so retries don't
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// re-trigger the expiry check).
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LookupAndConsume(ctx context.Context, id string) (*PreLoginSession, error)
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// GarbageCollectExpired deletes pre-login rows whose
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// absolute_expires_at is in the past. Returns the count deleted.
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// Wired into the same scheduler sweep as expired post-login sessions.
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GarbageCollectExpired(ctx context.Context) (int, error)
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}
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