Files
certctl/internal/mcp/types.go
T
shankar0123 b09bd0984a auth-bundle-2 Phase 9: 11 OIDC + session MCP tools (Phase-5 surface parity)
Closes Phase 9 of cowork/auth-bundle-2-prompt.md. Every Phase-5 HTTP
endpoint now has a matching MCP tool so operators driving certctl
from Claude / VS Code / any MCP client get the same OIDC-provider +
group-mapping + session management capability the GUI + CLI already
expose.

Coverage map (each tool → HTTP endpoint → permission)
=====================================================

  certctl_auth_list_oidc_providers      GET    /v1/auth/oidc/providers                   auth.oidc.list
  certctl_auth_get_oidc_provider        GET    /v1/auth/oidc/providers (filtered)        auth.oidc.list
  certctl_auth_create_oidc_provider     POST   /v1/auth/oidc/providers                   auth.oidc.create
  certctl_auth_update_oidc_provider     PUT    /v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}              auth.oidc.edit
  certctl_auth_delete_oidc_provider     DELETE /v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}              auth.oidc.delete
  certctl_auth_refresh_oidc_provider    POST   /v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}/refresh      auth.oidc.edit
  certctl_auth_list_group_mappings      GET    /v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings?provider_id  auth.oidc.list
  certctl_auth_add_group_mapping        POST   /v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings              auth.oidc.edit
  certctl_auth_remove_group_mapping     DELETE /v1/auth/oidc/group-mappings/{id}         auth.oidc.edit
  certctl_auth_list_sessions            GET    /v1/auth/sessions[?actor_id=&actor_type=] auth.session.list (own) | auth.session.list.all (other)
  certctl_auth_revoke_session           DELETE /v1/auth/sessions/{id}                    auth.session.revoke (or own-bypass)

Implementation notes
====================

internal/mcp/tools_auth_bundle2.go (NEW): 11 tools wired through three
focused register functions (registerAuthOIDCProviderTools,
registerAuthGroupMappingTools, registerAuthSessionTools). Every tool
routes through the existing Client (Get/Post/Put/Delete) so permission
gates fire server-side via the Phase-5 rbacGate wrappers — a non-admin
caller's MCP tool invocation gets whatever 403 the underlying HTTP
handler emits, not an MCP-side bypass.

Empty-id guard
--------------

Every path-id tool short-circuits to errorResult(fmt.Errorf("id is required"))
BEFORE the HTTP call. Defense against url.PathEscape("") collapsing a
singular op into the list endpoint (which would silently succeed against
a permissive backend). Same pattern across all 6 path-id tools (get,
update, delete, refresh provider; remove mapping; revoke session).

auth_get_oidc_provider list-then-filter
---------------------------------------

The Phase-5 HTTP API doesn't expose a singular GET /v1/auth/oidc/providers/{id}
endpoint — the GUI's OIDCProviderDetailPage fetches the full list and
filters in-process. The MCP tool mirrors that pattern exactly: GET the
list, JSON-decode the providers envelope, walk the array filtering by
id, return the matching raw JSON object on hit or an explicit "oidc
provider not found: <id>" error on miss. This keeps the MCP surface
in lockstep with the GUI's permission boundary (auth.oidc.list grants
"see any provider", as it does on the GUI) without inventing a new HTTP
endpoint.

internal/mcp/types.go (MODIFIED): 8 new input types matching the
Phase-5 wire shapes (oidcProviderRequest at internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go).
client_secret on Update is optional — empty preserves the existing
ciphertext on the server, providing a value rotates. Mirrors the GUI's
edit-without-rotate UX from web/src/pages/auth/OIDCProviderDetailPage.tsx.

internal/mcp/tools.go (MODIFIED): registerAuthBundle2Tools wired into
RegisterTools alongside the Bundle 1 Phase 11 registerAuthTools.

Test coverage
=============

internal/mcp/tools_auth_bundle2_test.go (NEW), 5 test cases:

* TestAuthBundle2MCP_AllToolsRegister — registerAuthBundle2Tools
  doesn't panic; catches duplicate-name regressions before CI.
* TestAuthBundle2MCP_PathsAndMethods — 11 cases (one per tool) +
  the admin-other-actor variant of list_sessions; asserts the right
  method + path + body + query string fires against the mock API.
* TestAuthBundle2MCP_ForbiddenSurfacesError — every tool's underlying
  HTTP path returns a propagated error containing "forbidden" / "403"
  when the mock returns 403, exercising the errorResult fence path.
* TestAuthBundle2MCP_GetProviderFiltersListByID — pins the list-then-
  filter shape end-to-end with both the hit-and-return (returns the
  matching raw JSON object) and miss-returns-error (sentinel string
  "oidc provider not found") branches.
* TestAuthBundle2MCP_EmptyIDInputShortCircuits — pins the
  strings.TrimSpace empty-id guard at the top of every path-id handler.
* TestAuthBundle2MCP_PromptCoverage — every tool the prompt enumerates
  is also present in tools_per_tool_test.go's allHappyPathCases (so
  the live-dispatch + 5xx error-path tests cover all 11 tools).

internal/mcp/tools_per_tool_test.go (MODIFIED): 11 new toolCase entries
in allHappyPathCases (live in-memory MCP dispatch + happy-path fence
shape + 5xx error-path fence shape) + a mock-API special case for
GET /api/v1/auth/oidc/providers that returns the right envelope shape
({"providers":[{"id":"op-okta",...}]}) so the get_oidc_provider tool's
in-process filter resolves under the live dispatch.

Verification
============

* gofmt + go vet — clean across internal/mcp/...
* go test -short -count=1 — green across internal/mcp + internal/auth/...
  + internal/api/handler + internal/api/router (13 packages, 0 failures).
* MCP tool count re-derive (CLAUDE.md command):
    grep -cE 'mcp\.AddTool\(' internal/mcp/tools*.go
  → tools.go=121, tools_auth.go=12, tools_auth_bundle2.go=11 (new),
  tools_est.go=6 — total 150. Matches the live count
  TestMCP_RegisterTools_DispatchableToolCount asserts.
* staticcheck deferred — sandbox /tmp at 99% disk, can't install the
  binary; all SA*/ST* lints would have run via the staticcheck-CI step
  on push. go vet caught the only real issue (an unused context import)
  before commit.

Not in this commit (deferred)
=============================

* Break-glass admin MCP tools (4 endpoints from Phase 7.5). The Phase 9
  prompt does NOT enumerate break-glass tools; its exit criteria is
  "Every API endpoint from Phase 5 has an MCP tool". Phase 5 does not
  include the break-glass surface (Phase 7.5 ships those endpoints with
  surface-invisibility semantics: 404 when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false,
  which complicates LLM tool-discovery UX). If the operator wants
  break-glass MCP parity, that's a follow-on bundle.
2026-05-10 07:40:34 +00:00

692 lines
44 KiB
Go

package mcp
// Input types for MCP tool arguments.
// The jsonschema struct tags provide descriptions for LLM tool discovery.
// ── Pagination ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type ListParams struct {
Page int `json:"page,omitempty" jsonschema:"Page number (default 1)"`
PerPage int `json:"per_page,omitempty" jsonschema:"Results per page (default 50, max 500)"`
}
// ── Certificates ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type ListCertificatesInput struct {
ListParams
Status string `json:"status,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by status: Pending, Active, Expiring, Expired, RenewalInProgress, Failed, Revoked, Archived"`
Environment string `json:"environment,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by environment"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by owner ID"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by team ID"`
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by issuer ID"`
}
type GetByIDInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Resource ID (e.g. mc-api-prod, t-platform)"`
}
type CreateCertificateInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Certificate ID (auto-generated if empty)"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Display name"`
CommonName string `json:"common_name" jsonschema:"Certificate common name (e.g. api.example.com)"`
SANs []string `json:"sans,omitempty" jsonschema:"Subject Alternative Names"`
Environment string `json:"environment,omitempty" jsonschema:"Environment (e.g. production, staging)"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id" jsonschema:"Owner ID (required)"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id" jsonschema:"Team ID (required)"`
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id" jsonschema:"Issuer connector ID"`
TargetIDs []string `json:"target_ids,omitempty" jsonschema:"Deployment target IDs"`
RenewalPolicyID string `json:"renewal_policy_id" jsonschema:"Renewal policy ID (required)"`
ProfileID string `json:"certificate_profile_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Certificate profile ID"`
Tags map[string]string `json:"tags,omitempty" jsonschema:"Key-value tags"`
}
type UpdateCertificateInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Certificate ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Display name"`
Environment string `json:"environment,omitempty" jsonschema:"Environment"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Owner ID"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team ID"`
TargetIDs []string `json:"target_ids,omitempty" jsonschema:"Deployment target IDs"`
RenewalPolicyID string `json:"renewal_policy_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Renewal policy ID"`
ProfileID string `json:"certificate_profile_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Certificate profile ID"`
Tags map[string]string `json:"tags,omitempty" jsonschema:"Key-value tags"`
}
type TriggerDeploymentInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Certificate ID"`
TargetID string `json:"target_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional specific target ID"`
}
type RevokeCertificateInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Certificate ID to revoke"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty" jsonschema:"RFC 5280 reason: unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise, affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold, privilegeWithdrawn"`
}
type BulkRevokeCertificatesInput struct {
Reason string `json:"reason" jsonschema:"RFC 5280 reason: unspecified, keyCompromise, caCompromise, affiliationChanged, superseded, cessationOfOperation, certificateHold, privilegeWithdrawn"`
ProfileID string `json:"profile_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Revoke all certs matching this profile ID"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Revoke all certs owned by this owner"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Revoke all certs deployed via this agent"`
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Revoke all certs issued by this issuer"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Revoke all certs owned by members of this team"`
CertificateIDs []string `json:"certificate_ids,omitempty" jsonschema:"Explicit list of certificate IDs to revoke"`
}
// BulkRenewCertificatesInput is the MCP tool input for bulk-renew (L-1
// master closure, cat-l-fa0c1ac07ab5). Mirrors BulkRevokeCertificatesInput
// field-for-field minus Reason.
type BulkRenewCertificatesInput struct {
ProfileID string `json:"profile_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Renew all certs matching this profile ID"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Renew all certs owned by this owner"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Renew all certs deployed via this agent"`
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Renew all certs issued by this issuer"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Renew all certs owned by members of this team"`
CertificateIDs []string `json:"certificate_ids,omitempty" jsonschema:"Explicit list of certificate IDs to renew"`
}
// BulkReassignCertificatesInput is the MCP tool input for bulk-reassign
// (L-2 closure, cat-l-8a1fb258a38a). IDs-only — no criteria-mode.
type BulkReassignCertificatesInput struct {
CertificateIDs []string `json:"certificate_ids" jsonschema:"Explicit list of certificate IDs to reassign"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id" jsonschema:"Required. New owner_id for every cert in certificate_ids"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional. When non-empty, also updates team_id on every cert"`
}
type ListVersionsInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Certificate ID"`
ListParams
}
// ── CRL & OCSP ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type GetDERCRLInput struct {
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id" jsonschema:"Issuer ID for DER-encoded CRL"`
}
type OCSPInput struct {
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id" jsonschema:"Issuer ID"`
Serial string `json:"serial" jsonschema:"Hex-encoded certificate serial number"`
}
// ── Issuers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreateIssuerInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Issuer ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Issuer display name"`
Type string `json:"type" jsonschema:"Issuer type: ACME, GenericCA, StepCA"`
Config interface{} `json:"config,omitempty" jsonschema:"Issuer-specific configuration"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the issuer is enabled"`
}
type UpdateIssuerInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Issuer ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Issuer display name"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Issuer type"`
Config interface{} `json:"config,omitempty" jsonschema:"Issuer-specific configuration"`
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the issuer is enabled"`
}
// ── Targets ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreateTargetInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Target display name"`
Type string `json:"type" jsonschema:"Target type: NGINX, Apache, HAProxy, F5, IIS"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id" jsonschema:"Agent ID that manages this target (required)"`
Config interface{} `json:"config,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target-specific configuration"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the target is enabled"`
}
type UpdateTargetInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Target ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target display name"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target type"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Agent ID"`
Config interface{} `json:"config,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target-specific configuration"`
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the target is enabled"`
}
// ── Agents ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type RegisterAgentInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Agent ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Agent display name"`
Hostname string `json:"hostname" jsonschema:"Agent hostname"`
}
type AgentCSRInput struct {
AgentID string `json:"agent_id" jsonschema:"Agent ID"`
CSRPEM string `json:"csr_pem" jsonschema:"PEM-encoded certificate signing request"`
CertificateID string `json:"certificate_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Certificate ID for the CSR"`
}
type AgentPickupInput struct {
AgentID string `json:"agent_id" jsonschema:"Agent ID"`
CertID string `json:"cert_id" jsonschema:"Certificate ID to pick up"`
}
type AgentJobStatusInput struct {
AgentID string `json:"agent_id" jsonschema:"Agent ID"`
JobID string `json:"job_id" jsonschema:"Job ID"`
Status string `json:"status" jsonschema:"Job status to report"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty" jsonschema:"Error message if job failed"`
}
// RetireAgentInput pins the MCP tool surface for certctl_retire_agent. I-004
// introduces a soft-retirement flow that the handler exposes on DELETE
// /api/v1/agents/{id} with two optional query flags: force=true cascades
// through dependent active targets/certs/jobs, and reason is the human-readable
// string captured in the audit trail. The handler enforces
// ErrForceReasonRequired when force=true is sent without a reason; we surface
// both as separate fields so the LLM can populate them independently and so
// the retire_agent_test shape assertion stays aligned with the JSON-wire
// contract. ID is always emitted (no omitempty) because a retire call without
// a target agent is meaningless; Force and Reason are omitempty so the default
// soft-retire path sends no query suffix at all.
type RetireAgentInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Agent ID to soft-retire"`
Force bool `json:"force,omitempty" jsonschema:"Cascade-retire downstream active targets, certs, and jobs (requires reason)"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty" jsonschema:"Human-readable reason (required when force=true)"`
}
// ── Jobs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type ListJobsInput struct {
ListParams
Status string `json:"status,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by status: Pending, AwaitingCSR, AwaitingApproval, Running, Completed, Failed, Cancelled"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by type: Issuance, Renewal, Deployment, Validation"`
}
type RejectJobInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Job ID to reject"`
Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty" jsonschema:"Reason for rejection"`
}
// ── Notifications ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ListNotificationsInput adds the I-005 status filter on top of the standard
// pagination params. Status="dead" drives the Dead letter tab use case;
// empty status preserves the pre-I-005 list-all behavior.
type ListNotificationsInput struct {
ListParams
Status string `json:"status,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by status: pending, sent, failed, dead, read"`
}
// ── Policies ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreatePolicyInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Policy display name"`
Type string `json:"type" jsonschema:"Policy type: AllowedIssuers, AllowedDomains, RequiredMetadata, AllowedEnvironments, RenewalLeadTime"`
Config interface{} `json:"config,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy-specific configuration"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the policy is enabled"`
Severity string `json:"severity,omitempty" jsonschema:"Violation severity: Warning, Error, or Critical (default: Warning)"`
}
type UpdatePolicyInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Policy ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy display name"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy type"`
Config interface{} `json:"config,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy-specific configuration"`
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the policy is enabled"`
Severity string `json:"severity,omitempty" jsonschema:"Violation severity: Warning, Error, or Critical"`
}
type ListViolationsInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Policy ID"`
ListParams
}
// ── Profiles ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreateProfileInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Profile ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Profile display name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Profile description"`
AllowedKeyAlgorithms interface{} `json:"allowed_key_algorithms,omitempty" jsonschema:"Allowed key algorithms and minimum sizes"`
MaxTTLSeconds int `json:"max_ttl_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Maximum certificate TTL in seconds"`
AllowedEKUs []string `json:"allowed_ekus,omitempty" jsonschema:"Allowed Extended Key Usages"`
RequiredSANPatterns []string `json:"required_san_patterns,omitempty" jsonschema:"Required SAN patterns"`
AllowShortLived bool `json:"allow_short_lived,omitempty" jsonschema:"Allow short-lived certificates (TTL < 1 hour)"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the profile is enabled"`
}
type UpdateProfileInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Profile ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Profile display name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Profile description"`
AllowedKeyAlgorithms interface{} `json:"allowed_key_algorithms,omitempty" jsonschema:"Allowed key algorithms and minimum sizes"`
MaxTTLSeconds *int `json:"max_ttl_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Maximum certificate TTL in seconds"`
AllowedEKUs []string `json:"allowed_ekus,omitempty" jsonschema:"Allowed Extended Key Usages"`
RequiredSANPatterns []string `json:"required_san_patterns,omitempty" jsonschema:"Required SAN patterns"`
AllowShortLived *bool `json:"allow_short_lived,omitempty" jsonschema:"Allow short-lived certificates"`
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the profile is enabled"`
}
// ── Teams ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreateTeamInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Team name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team description"`
}
type UpdateTeamInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Team ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team description"`
}
// ── Owners ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreateOwnerInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Owner ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Owner display name"`
Email string `json:"email,omitempty" jsonschema:"Owner email for notifications"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team ID the owner belongs to"`
}
type UpdateOwnerInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Owner ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Owner display name"`
Email string `json:"email,omitempty" jsonschema:"Owner email"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Team ID"`
}
// ── Agent Groups ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type CreateAgentGroupInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Agent group ID"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Group display name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Group description"`
MatchOS string `json:"match_os,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by OS (e.g. linux, darwin, windows)"`
MatchArchitecture string `json:"match_architecture,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by architecture (e.g. amd64, arm64)"`
MatchIPCIDR string `json:"match_ip_cidr,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by IP CIDR range"`
MatchVersion string `json:"match_version,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by version"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the group is enabled"`
}
type UpdateAgentGroupInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Agent group ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Group display name"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Group description"`
MatchOS string `json:"match_os,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by OS"`
MatchArchitecture string `json:"match_architecture,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by architecture"`
MatchIPCIDR string `json:"match_ip_cidr,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by IP CIDR range"`
MatchVersion string `json:"match_version,omitempty" jsonschema:"Match agents by version"`
Enabled *bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the group is enabled"`
}
// ── Stats ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type TimelineInput struct {
Days int `json:"days,omitempty" jsonschema:"Number of days to look back (default 30, max 365)"`
}
// ── Discovered Certificates (I-2 closure) ──────────────────────────
// ClaimDiscoveredCertificateInput is the MCP tool input for claiming a
// discovered certificate (POST /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}/claim).
// I-2 closure (cat-i-b0924b6675f8). The HTTP handler at
// internal/api/handler/discovery.go::ClaimDiscovered links the discovered
// row (DC-*) to a managed certificate (mc-*); operators use this to
// bring an out-of-band cert under management without re-issuing.
type ClaimDiscoveredCertificateInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Discovered certificate ID (dc-*)"`
ManagedCertificateID string `json:"managed_certificate_id" jsonschema:"Existing managed certificate ID (mc-*) to link to"`
}
// DismissDiscoveredCertificateInput is the MCP tool input for dismissing
// a discovered certificate (POST /api/v1/discovered-certificates/{id}/dismiss).
// I-2 closure (cat-i-b0924b6675f8). Marks the row as not-of-interest
// (e.g. expired self-signed test certs found by a network scan); the row
// stops appearing in the unmanaged-list view but is preserved in the DB
// for audit history.
type DismissDiscoveredCertificateInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Discovered certificate ID (dc-*)"`
}
// ── Approvals (P1-28..P1-31, MCP coverage expansion) ───────────────
// ListApprovalsInput is the MCP tool input for listing approval requests
// (GET /api/v1/approvals). State filter accepts pending|approved|rejected|expired.
// CertificateID and RequestedBy are optional pre-filters that narrow the
// returned set; pagination matches the standard envelope.
type ListApprovalsInput struct {
ListParams
State string `json:"state,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by state: pending, approved, rejected, expired"`
CertificateID string `json:"certificate_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by certificate ID"`
RequestedBy string `json:"requested_by,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by requesting actor (API-key name)"`
}
// ApprovalDecisionInput is the MCP tool input for approve / reject endpoints.
// The decided_by actor is derived server-side from the authenticated API-key
// name (auth.UserKey) — NOT from this body. The two-person-integrity
// contract (ErrApproveBySameActor) is enforced regardless of who pushes the
// decision through MCP, so as long as the MCP server's API key identity is
// distinct from the requesting actor, the contract holds.
type ApprovalDecisionInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Approval request ID"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional decision note (e.g. 'approved per ticket SECOPS-12345')"`
}
// ── Health Checks (P1-20..P1-27, MCP coverage expansion) ───────────
// ListHealthChecksInput pages + filters /api/v1/health-checks.
// Status accepts healthy|degraded|down|cert_mismatch|unknown.
type ListHealthChecksInput struct {
ListParams
Status string `json:"status,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by health status: healthy, degraded, down, cert_mismatch, unknown"`
CertificateID string `json:"certificate_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by linked certificate ID"`
NetworkScanTargetID string `json:"network_scan_target_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by linked network-scan target ID"`
Enabled string `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by enabled state: 'true' or 'false' (omit for all)"`
}
// CreateHealthCheckInput maps to the POST /api/v1/health-checks body
// (domain.EndpointHealthCheck JSON shape). Only `endpoint` is enforced
// at the handler layer; defaults are applied server-side for thresholds.
type CreateHealthCheckInput struct {
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint" jsonschema:"TLS endpoint to monitor (host:port)"`
CertificateID string `json:"certificate_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional managed-certificate ID to bind"`
NetworkScanTargetID string `json:"network_scan_target_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional network-scan target ID to bind"`
ExpectedFingerprint string `json:"expected_fingerprint,omitempty" jsonschema:"Expected SHA-256 fingerprint for cert-pin alerts"`
CheckIntervalSecs int `json:"check_interval_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Probe interval in seconds (default 300)"`
DegradedThreshold int `json:"degraded_threshold,omitempty" jsonschema:"Consecutive failures before degraded (default 2)"`
DownThreshold int `json:"down_threshold,omitempty" jsonschema:"Consecutive failures before down (default 5)"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the check is active"`
}
// UpdateHealthCheckInput maps to PUT /api/v1/health-checks/{id}. The handler
// performs a merge update: non-zero fields overwrite, zero fields preserve.
type UpdateHealthCheckInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Health-check ID to update"`
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint,omitempty" jsonschema:"TLS endpoint to monitor"`
ExpectedFingerprint string `json:"expected_fingerprint,omitempty" jsonschema:"Expected SHA-256 fingerprint"`
CheckIntervalSecs int `json:"check_interval_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Probe interval in seconds"`
DegradedThreshold int `json:"degraded_threshold,omitempty" jsonschema:"Consecutive failures before degraded"`
DownThreshold int `json:"down_threshold,omitempty" jsonschema:"Consecutive failures before down"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the check is active"`
}
// HealthCheckHistoryInput maps to GET /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/history.
// Limit is clamped server-side to 1000.
type HealthCheckHistoryInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Health-check ID"`
Limit int `json:"limit,omitempty" jsonschema:"Max history entries to return (default 100, max 1000)"`
}
// AcknowledgeHealthCheckInput maps to POST /api/v1/health-checks/{id}/acknowledge.
// Actor is sent in the body for the audit trail; the handler accepts an empty
// actor and falls back to "unknown".
type AcknowledgeHealthCheckInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Health-check ID to acknowledge"`
Actor string `json:"actor,omitempty" jsonschema:"Actor recording the acknowledgement (defaults to 'unknown')"`
}
// ── Renewal Policies (P1-1..P1-5, MCP coverage expansion) ──────────
// CreateRenewalPolicyInput maps to POST /api/v1/renewal-policies. Required:
// name. The remaining fields drive the renewal-window, retry, and alert
// behavior; reasonable defaults exist server-side.
type CreateRenewalPolicyInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy ID (auto-generated if empty)"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Policy display name (required)"`
RenewalWindowDays int `json:"renewal_window_days,omitempty" jsonschema:"Days before expiry to start renewal (e.g. 30)"`
AutoRenew bool `json:"auto_renew,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the scheduler renews automatically"`
MaxRetries int `json:"max_retries,omitempty" jsonschema:"Maximum renewal retry attempts on failure"`
RetryInterval int `json:"retry_interval_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Seconds between renewal retry attempts"`
AlertThresholdsDays []int `json:"alert_thresholds_days,omitempty" jsonschema:"Days-before-expiry at which to fire alerts (e.g. [30,14,7,0])"`
CertificateProfileID string `json:"certificate_profile_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional certificate-profile binding"`
AlertChannels map[string]any `json:"alert_channels,omitempty" jsonschema:"Per-severity channel matrix (informational/warning/critical → channel list)"`
AlertSeverityMap map[string]any `json:"alert_severity_map,omitempty" jsonschema:"Threshold-day → severity tier map (off-map defaults to informational)"`
}
// UpdateRenewalPolicyInput maps to PUT /api/v1/renewal-policies/{id}.
// Replace-style update — the handler decodes into a fresh domain.RenewalPolicy
// and forwards it to the service layer.
type UpdateRenewalPolicyInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Policy ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Policy display name"`
RenewalWindowDays int `json:"renewal_window_days,omitempty" jsonschema:"Days before expiry to start renewal"`
AutoRenew bool `json:"auto_renew,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the scheduler renews automatically"`
MaxRetries int `json:"max_retries,omitempty" jsonschema:"Maximum renewal retry attempts on failure"`
RetryInterval int `json:"retry_interval_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Seconds between renewal retry attempts"`
AlertThresholdsDays []int `json:"alert_thresholds_days,omitempty" jsonschema:"Days-before-expiry at which to fire alerts"`
CertificateProfileID string `json:"certificate_profile_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional certificate-profile binding"`
AlertChannels map[string]any `json:"alert_channels,omitempty" jsonschema:"Per-severity channel matrix"`
AlertSeverityMap map[string]any `json:"alert_severity_map,omitempty" jsonschema:"Threshold-day → severity tier map"`
}
// ── Network-Scan Targets (P1-14..P1-19, MCP coverage expansion) ────
// CreateNetworkScanTargetInput maps to POST /api/v1/network-scan-targets.
// CIDRs / Ports are required for a scan to do anything; the handler
// itself only enforces JSON parse, so the operator gets a downstream
// error for empty CIDR / Port slices.
type CreateNetworkScanTargetInput struct {
ID string `json:"id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target ID (auto-generated if empty)"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Target display name"`
CIDRs []string `json:"cidrs,omitempty" jsonschema:"CIDR ranges to scan (e.g. ['10.0.0.0/24'])"`
Ports []int `json:"ports,omitempty" jsonschema:"TCP ports to probe (e.g. [443, 8443])"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the target is active"`
ScanIntervalHours int `json:"scan_interval_hours,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scan interval in hours (default 24)"`
TimeoutMs int `json:"timeout_ms,omitempty" jsonschema:"Per-endpoint TLS handshake timeout in milliseconds"`
}
// UpdateNetworkScanTargetInput maps to PUT /api/v1/network-scan-targets/{id}.
type UpdateNetworkScanTargetInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Target ID to update"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"Target display name"`
CIDRs []string `json:"cidrs,omitempty" jsonschema:"CIDR ranges to scan"`
Ports []int `json:"ports,omitempty" jsonschema:"TCP ports to probe"`
Enabled bool `json:"enabled,omitempty" jsonschema:"Whether the target is active"`
ScanIntervalHours int `json:"scan_interval_hours,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scan interval in hours"`
TimeoutMs int `json:"timeout_ms,omitempty" jsonschema:"Per-endpoint TLS handshake timeout in milliseconds"`
}
// ── Discovery (P1-10..P1-13, MCP coverage expansion) ───────────────
// ListDiscoveredCertificatesInput maps to GET /api/v1/discovered-certificates.
// Status filter accepts the enum from domain.DiscoveryStatus
// (Unmanaged|Managed|Dismissed|...).
type ListDiscoveredCertificatesInput struct {
ListParams
AgentID string `json:"agent_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by reporting agent ID"`
Status string `json:"status,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by discovery status (Unmanaged, Managed, Dismissed)"`
}
// ListDiscoveryScansInput maps to GET /api/v1/discovery-scans.
type ListDiscoveryScansInput struct {
ListParams
AgentID string `json:"agent_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Filter by reporting agent ID"`
}
// ── Intermediate CAs (P1-6..P1-9, MCP coverage expansion) ──────────
// CreateIntermediateCAInput maps to POST /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates.
// Admin-gated route. Discriminator on body shape: when ParentCAID is empty
// AND RootCertPEM + KeyDriverID are set, the call registers an operator-
// supplied root; otherwise it signs a child under the named parent.
type CreateIntermediateCAInput struct {
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id" jsonschema:"Parent issuer ID (path param)"`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Intermediate CA display name"`
ParentCAID string `json:"parent_ca_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Parent CA ID (empty for root registration)"`
RootCertPEM string `json:"root_cert_pem,omitempty" jsonschema:"PEM-encoded root cert (root path only)"`
KeyDriverID string `json:"key_driver_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Signer-driver ID (root path only)"`
Subject map[string]any `json:"subject,omitempty" jsonschema:"X.509 subject (common_name, organization[], country[], ...)"`
Algorithm string `json:"algorithm,omitempty" jsonschema:"Key algorithm: ECDSA-P256, RSA-3072, ..."`
TTLDays int `json:"ttl_days,omitempty" jsonschema:"Validity period in days"`
PathLenConstraint *int `json:"path_len_constraint,omitempty" jsonschema:"X.509 BasicConstraints pathLen"`
NameConstraints []map[string]any `json:"name_constraints,omitempty" jsonschema:"X.509 NameConstraints (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10)"`
OCSPResponderURL string `json:"ocsp_responder_url,omitempty" jsonschema:"OCSP responder URL embedded as AIA extension"`
Metadata map[string]string `json:"metadata,omitempty" jsonschema:"Free-form metadata"`
}
// ListIntermediateCAsInput maps to GET /api/v1/issuers/{id}/intermediates.
type ListIntermediateCAsInput struct {
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id" jsonschema:"Parent issuer ID"`
}
// RetireIntermediateCAInput maps to POST /api/v1/intermediates/{id}/retire.
// Two-phase: first call (Confirm=false) transitions active→retiring; second
// call (Confirm=true) transitions retiring→retired.
type RetireIntermediateCAInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Intermediate CA ID to retire"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty" jsonschema:"Audit-trail note"`
Confirm bool `json:"confirm,omitempty" jsonschema:"Set true on the second call to transition to fully retired"`
}
// ── Misc (P1-32..P1-35, MCP coverage expansion) ────────────────────
// VerifyJobInput maps to POST /api/v1/jobs/{id}/verify. All four body fields
// after target_id are required at the handler layer (manual emptiness checks).
type VerifyJobInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Job ID to record verification against"`
TargetID string `json:"target_id" jsonschema:"Deployment target ID (required)"`
ExpectedFingerprint string `json:"expected_fingerprint" jsonschema:"Expected SHA-256 fingerprint (required)"`
ActualFingerprint string `json:"actual_fingerprint" jsonschema:"Probed SHA-256 fingerprint (required)"`
Verified bool `json:"verified" jsonschema:"Whether the verification probe matched"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional probe error message"`
}
// ── Empty ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
type EmptyInput struct{}
// ── Auth (Bundle 1 Phase 11 — RBAC) ────────────────────────────────
// AuthRoleIDInput is the role-id-only input shape used by the get +
// delete tools. Distinct from the certificate-shaped GetByIDInput so
// the jsonschema description points at the role prefix specifically.
type AuthRoleIDInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Role ID (e.g. r-admin, r-operator)"`
}
// AuthCreateRoleInput is the body for certctl_auth_create_role.
type AuthCreateRoleInput struct {
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Role display name (required, must be unique within the tenant)"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional human-readable description of what the role grants"`
}
// AuthUpdateRoleInput is the body for certctl_auth_update_role.
type AuthUpdateRoleInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Role ID to update (e.g. r-release-manager)"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty" jsonschema:"New role display name. Empty = unchanged"`
Description string `json:"description,omitempty" jsonschema:"New description. Empty = unchanged"`
}
// AuthRolePermissionGrantInput is the body for
// certctl_auth_add_permission_to_role.
type AuthRolePermissionGrantInput struct {
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to grant the permission to"`
Permission string `json:"permission" jsonschema:"Canonical permission name (e.g. cert.read, auth.role.assign). Must be in the catalogue returned by certctl_auth_list_permissions"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scope type: global (default) | profile | issuer"`
ScopeID string `json:"scope_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Scope ID; required when scope_type is profile or issuer"`
}
// AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput is the input for
// certctl_auth_remove_permission_from_role.
type AuthRolePermissionRevokeInput struct {
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to revoke the permission from"`
Permission string `json:"permission" jsonschema:"Canonical permission name to revoke"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional scope type to disambiguate when the permission is granted at multiple scopes"`
ScopeID string `json:"scope_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional scope ID for scope_type=profile|issuer revocations"`
}
// AuthAssignKeyRoleInput is the body for
// certctl_auth_assign_role_to_key.
type AuthAssignKeyRoleInput struct {
KeyID string `json:"key_id" jsonschema:"API-key actor ID (the named-key Name from CERTCTL_API_KEYS_NAMED, or an ak-<slug> ID minted by the bootstrap path)"`
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to assign (e.g. r-operator)"`
}
// AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput is the input for
// certctl_auth_revoke_role_from_key.
type AuthRevokeKeyRoleInput struct {
KeyID string `json:"key_id" jsonschema:"API-key actor ID. Reserved actor-demo-anon is rejected server-side"`
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"Role ID to revoke"`
}
// =============================================================================
// Bundle 2 Phase 9 — OIDC + session MCP tool input types.
//
// 11 tools that route through the same Phase-5 HTTP handlers the GUI
// uses; permission gates fire server-side. Each input is the
// minimal shape the underlying handler expects (the request bodies
// match the wire format from internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go).
// =============================================================================
// AuthOIDCProviderIDInput is the input for tools that target a
// single provider by id (get, delete, refresh).
type AuthOIDCProviderIDInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"OIDC provider ID (e.g. op-okta, op-keycloak)"`
}
// AuthCreateOIDCProviderInput is the body for certctl_auth_create_oidc_provider.
// Mirrors handler.oidcProviderRequest at internal/api/handler/auth_session_oidc.go.
// client_secret is plaintext on the wire ONLY at create/update; the server
// encrypts at rest via internal/crypto.EncryptIfKeySet (AES-256-GCM v3 blob).
type AuthCreateOIDCProviderInput struct {
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Display name (e.g. \"Okta production\"). Tenant-unique."`
IssuerURL string `json:"issuer_url" jsonschema:"Discovery doc base (e.g. https://example.okta.com). Server fetches /.well-known/openid-configuration on create + caches per jwks_cache_ttl_seconds."`
ClientID string `json:"client_id" jsonschema:"OAuth2 client_id registered with the IdP for certctl."`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret" jsonschema:"OAuth2 client_secret. Plaintext on the wire; AES-256-GCM-encrypted at rest. Required on create."`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri" jsonschema:"certctl-side redirect URI registered with the IdP (e.g. https://certctl.example.com/auth/oidc/callback)."`
GroupsClaimPath string `json:"groups_claim_path,omitempty" jsonschema:"Path into the ID token claim set (e.g. groups, realm_access.roles, https://your-namespace/groups). Default: \"groups\"."`
GroupsClaimFormat string `json:"groups_claim_format,omitempty" jsonschema:"Closed enum: string-array | json-path. Default: string-array."`
FetchUserinfo bool `json:"fetch_userinfo,omitempty" jsonschema:"When true, falls back to the IdP /userinfo endpoint when the ID token's groups claim is empty."`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes,omitempty" jsonschema:"OAuth2 scopes requested at the authorize step. openid is REQUIRED; profile + email + groups are optional."`
AllowedEmailDomains []string `json:"allowed_email_domains,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional allowlist; empty = any domain accepted."`
IATWindowSeconds int `json:"iat_window_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"Maximum clock-skew tolerance for the ID token's iat claim, in seconds (1..600). Default 300."`
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds int `json:"jwks_cache_ttl_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"How long the server caches the IdP's JWKS before refresh, in seconds (>=60). Default 3600."`
}
// AuthUpdateOIDCProviderInput is the body for certctl_auth_update_oidc_provider.
// Same shape as Create; client_secret may be omitted to keep the existing
// ciphertext (matches the GUI's edit-without-rotate UX).
type AuthUpdateOIDCProviderInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"OIDC provider ID to update (e.g. op-okta)."`
Name string `json:"name" jsonschema:"Display name."`
IssuerURL string `json:"issuer_url" jsonschema:"Discovery doc base."`
ClientID string `json:"client_id" jsonschema:"OAuth2 client_id."`
ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret,omitempty" jsonschema:"OAuth2 client_secret. Empty preserves the existing ciphertext on the server (no rotate). Provide a new value to rotate."`
RedirectURI string `json:"redirect_uri" jsonschema:"certctl-side redirect URI."`
GroupsClaimPath string `json:"groups_claim_path,omitempty" jsonschema:"Path into the ID token claim set."`
GroupsClaimFormat string `json:"groups_claim_format,omitempty" jsonschema:"string-array | json-path."`
FetchUserinfo bool `json:"fetch_userinfo,omitempty" jsonschema:"Fall back to /userinfo when ID token groups claim is empty."`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes,omitempty" jsonschema:"OAuth2 scopes requested."`
AllowedEmailDomains []string `json:"allowed_email_domains,omitempty" jsonschema:"Email-domain allowlist."`
IATWindowSeconds int `json:"iat_window_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"iat clock-skew tolerance, seconds (1..600)."`
JWKSCacheTTLSeconds int `json:"jwks_cache_ttl_seconds,omitempty" jsonschema:"JWKS cache TTL, seconds (>=60)."`
}
// AuthListGroupMappingsInput is the input for certctl_auth_list_group_mappings.
type AuthListGroupMappingsInput struct {
ProviderID string `json:"provider_id" jsonschema:"OIDC provider ID to scope the mapping list to. Required (server returns 400 when omitted)."`
}
// AuthAddGroupMappingInput is the body for certctl_auth_add_group_mapping.
type AuthAddGroupMappingInput struct {
ProviderID string `json:"provider_id" jsonschema:"OIDC provider ID the mapping belongs to."`
GroupName string `json:"group_name" jsonschema:"IdP-supplied group name (e.g. engineers, realm-admins, the literal string an Auth0 namespaced claim emits)."`
RoleID string `json:"role_id" jsonschema:"certctl role ID to grant on group match (e.g. r-operator). Must already exist."`
}
// AuthRemoveGroupMappingInput is the input for certctl_auth_remove_group_mapping.
type AuthRemoveGroupMappingInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Group-mapping ID (e.g. gm-abc123). Returned by certctl_auth_list_group_mappings."`
}
// AuthListSessionsInput is the input for certctl_auth_list_sessions. When
// actor_id is empty the call lists the caller's own sessions; when set
// (with auth.session.list.all) it lists the targeted actor's sessions.
type AuthListSessionsInput struct {
ActorID string `json:"actor_id,omitempty" jsonschema:"Empty = caller's own sessions (auth.session.list). Non-empty = admin all-actors view (auth.session.list.all required)."`
ActorType string `json:"actor_type,omitempty" jsonschema:"Optional actor_type filter. Defaults to User on the server when actor_id is set."`
}
// AuthRevokeSessionInput is the input for certctl_auth_revoke_session.
type AuthRevokeSessionInput struct {
ID string `json:"id" jsonschema:"Session ID (e.g. ses-abc123). Server-side own-bypass: caller may revoke their own session even without auth.session.revoke."`
}