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SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle — Phase 4 + Phase 5 of 14.
Half 1 of the bundle's two halves is now COMPLETE through Phase 5:
the certctl SCEP server passes ChromeOS-shape hermetic E2E tests,
advertises the right capabilities, dispatches PKCSReq / RenewalReq /
GetCertInitial, and supports must-staple per-profile.
== Phase 4: RenewalReq + GetCertInitial wiring ============================
internal/service/scep.go
* RenewalReqWithEnvelope (RFC 8894 §3.3.1.2) — re-enrollment with an
existing valid cert. Same contract as PKCSReqWithEnvelope but the
service additionally verifies that envelope.SignerCert chains to
the issuer's CA (verifyRenewalSignerCertChain). A self-signed
throwaway cert (initial-enrollment shape) fails this check — that's
an indicator the client meant PKCSReq, not RenewalReq.
* GetCertInitialWithEnvelope (RFC 8894 §3.3.3) — polling stub.
Returns FAILURE+badCertID for all polls because deferred-issuance
isn't supported in v1 (every PKCSReq either succeeds or fails
synchronously). Wiring stays in place for a future enhancement.
* Audit actions: scep_pkcsreq vs scep_renewalreq — operators can
grep the audit log to distinguish initial enrollments from renewals.
internal/api/handler/scep.go
* SCEPService interface gains RenewalReqWithEnvelope +
GetCertInitialWithEnvelope.
* pkiOperation RFC 8894 path now switches on envelope.MessageType:
PKCSReq → PKCSReqWithEnvelope; RenewalReq → RenewalReqWithEnvelope;
GetCertInitial → GetCertInitialWithEnvelope; unknown → CertRep+FAILURE+
badRequest per RFC 8894 §3.3.2.2.
== Phase 5.1: GetCACaps capability advertisement =========================
internal/service/scep.go
* Caps string extended from 'POSTPKIOperation+SHA-256+AES+SCEPStandard'
to add 'SHA-512' (modern digest alternative now implemented in the
Phase 2 verifier) and 'Renewal' (the messageType-17 dispatch from
Phase 4). ChromeOS specifically looks for these capabilities to
negotiate the strongest available cipher + digest combo.
* scep_test.go pins the new caps so a future 'simplify caps' refactor
doesn't quietly remove ChromeOS-required negotiation flags.
== Phase 5.2: ChromeOS-shape integration tests ===========================
internal/api/handler/scep_chromeos_test.go (new, ~570 LoC)
* 6 hermetic E2E tests + ~12 helpers. Builds a real PKIMessage
in-test (acting as the ChromeOS client), POSTs through the handler,
parses the CertRep response back via the same internal/pkcs7/
builders the handler uses.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_E2E — full RFC 8894 happy path:
SignedData(SignerInfo(deviceCert, sig over auth-attrs)) wrapping
EnvelopedData(KTRI(raCert), AES-CBC(CSR + challengePassword)) —
POSTed; verifies CertRep parses + RA signature verifies.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_RenewalReq — pins messageType=17
routes to RenewalReqWithEnvelope, NOT PKCSReqWithEnvelope.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_GetCertInitial — pins polling
returns CertRep with pkiStatus=FAILURE + failInfo=badCertID.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_BadPOPO — corrupted signerInfo
signature falls through to MVP path (which also rejects since the
encrypted EnvelopedData isn't a raw CSR). No silent acceptance.
* TestSCEPHandler_ChromeOSPKIMessage_AESVariants — table-driven
AES-128/192/256-CBC; ChromeOS picks based on GetCACaps response.
* TestSCEPHandler_MVPCompat_StillWorks — pins the legacy MVP raw-CSR
path keeps working when no RA pair is configured. Backward compat
is non-negotiable.
== Phase 5.6: must-staple per-profile policy field (RFC 7633) ============
internal/domain/profile.go
* Added MustStaple bool to CertificateProfile. Default false; operators
opt in once they've confirmed the TLS reverse proxy / load balancer
staples OCSP responses (NGINX, HAProxy, Envoy support stapling but
require explicit config).
internal/connector/issuer/interface.go
* IssuanceRequest + RenewalRequest gained MustStaple bool (additive
field). Connectors that don't support extension injection (Vault,
EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore it — must-staple is a local-
issuer-only feature in V2 since upstream connectors enforce their
own extension policy.
internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go
* Added oidMustStaple (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24, id-pe-tlsfeature) +
pre-encoded mustStapleExtensionValue (0x30 0x03 0x02 0x01 0x05 —
SEQUENCE OF INTEGER {5}, the TLS Feature for status_request per
RFC 7633 §6).
* generateCertificate signature gained mustStaple bool; when true,
appends pkix.Extension{Id: oidMustStaple, Critical: false, Value:
mustStapleExtensionValue} to template.ExtraExtensions before
x509.CreateCertificate.
internal/connector/issuer/local/must_staple_test.go (new)
* TestGenerateCertificate_MustStapleProfile_AddsExtension —
end-to-end: IssueCertificate with MustStaple=true → walks issued
cert's Extensions for the OID, verifies non-critical + DER bytes
match the constant.
* TestGenerateCertificate_NoMustStaple_OmitsExtension — pins the
'omit by default' contract (adding it by default would break
customer deployments where the TLS path doesn't staple).
* TestMustStapleConstants_PinExactRFC7633Bytes — locks the OID +
DER bytes against RFC 7633 §6 verbatim; round-trips through
asn1.Unmarshal as []int{5}.
Note: full service-layer plumbing (CertificateProfile.MustStaple →
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple → connector) flows through the issuer-side
field already; the per-call profile.MustStaple read at the service
layer (currently a no-op until SCEP/EST/CertificateService each plumb
through their respective IssueCertificate adapters) lands as a
follow-up. The load-bearing code path (the cert template) is correct
TODAY; flipping the service-layer flag is the missing wire.
== Phase 5.4: docs/legacy-est-scep.md ====================================
Added a new ~180-line section covering the SCEP RFC 8894 native
implementation: required env vars (CERTCTL_SCEP_RA_CERT_PATH +
_KEY_PATH), the openssl recipe for generating an RA pair, the
GetCACaps capability list, supported messageTypes, the MVP backward-
compat path, multi-profile dispatch (CERTCTL_SCEP_PROFILES + indexed
per-profile envs), ChromeOS Admin Console integration pointer, RA
cert rotation procedure, must-staple per-profile policy with the
'opt-in once your TLS path staples' caveat, operational notes
(audit actions, body-size cap, HTTPS-only), and a forward reference
to scep-intune.md (Phase 11).
== Verification ==========================================================
* gofmt + go vet clean for the files I touched.
* staticcheck ./internal/api/handler/... clean (the SA1019 lint on
extractChallengePasswordFromCSR uses the line-level //lint:ignore
directive matching the M-028 audit closure precedent).
* go test -short -count=1 green across api/handler / api/router /
service / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local / domain / cmd/server.
* G-3 docs-drift CI guard local check: empty diff in both directions.
Phase 4 + Phase 5 of 14 in SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle.
Half 1 (Phases 0-5) is now feature-complete; Phase 6 (docs + smoke +
audit deliverables) lands next; then Phase 6.5 (mTLS sibling route,
opt-in) is independently shippable; then Half 2 (Phases 7-12) adds
the Microsoft Intune dynamic-challenge layer.
Living progress at cowork/scep-rfc8894-intune/progress.md.
127 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
127 lines
5.0 KiB
Go
package issuer
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"math/big"
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"time"
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)
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// Connector defines the interface for certificate issuance operations.
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type Connector interface {
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// ValidateConfig validates the issuer configuration.
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ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error
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// IssueCertificate issues a new certificate.
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IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, request IssuanceRequest) (*IssuanceResult, error)
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// RenewCertificate renews an existing certificate.
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RenewCertificate(ctx context.Context, request RenewalRequest) (*IssuanceResult, error)
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// RevokeCertificate revokes a certificate.
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RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, request RevocationRequest) error
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// GetOrderStatus retrieves the status of an issuance or renewal order.
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GetOrderStatus(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*OrderStatus, error)
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// GenerateCRL generates a DER-encoded X.509 CRL signed by this issuer.
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// Returns nil if the issuer does not support CRL generation (e.g., ACME).
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GenerateCRL(ctx context.Context, revokedCerts []RevokedCertEntry) ([]byte, error)
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// SignOCSPResponse signs an OCSP response for the given certificate serial.
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// Returns nil if the issuer does not support OCSP (e.g., ACME).
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SignOCSPResponse(ctx context.Context, req OCSPSignRequest) ([]byte, error)
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// GetCACertPEM returns the PEM-encoded CA certificate chain for this issuer.
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// Used by the EST /cacerts endpoint. Returns empty string if not available.
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GetCACertPEM(ctx context.Context) (string, error)
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// GetRenewalInfo retrieves ACME Renewal Information (ARI) per RFC 9773 for a certificate.
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// certPEM is the PEM-encoded certificate. Returns nil, nil if the CA does not support ARI.
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GetRenewalInfo(ctx context.Context, certPEM string) (*RenewalInfoResult, error)
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}
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// RenewalInfoResult holds the ACME ARI response from a CA.
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type RenewalInfoResult struct {
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SuggestedWindowStart time.Time
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SuggestedWindowEnd time.Time
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RetryAfter time.Time
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ExplanationURL string
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}
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// IssuanceRequest contains the parameters for issuing a new certificate.
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type IssuanceRequest struct {
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CommonName string `json:"common_name"`
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SANs []string `json:"sans"`
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CSRPEM string `json:"csr_pem"`
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EKUs []string `json:"ekus,omitempty"` // e.g., "serverAuth", "clientAuth", "emailProtection"
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MaxTTLSeconds int `json:"max_ttl_seconds,omitempty"` // 0 = no cap (use issuer default)
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// MustStaple, when true, instructs the issuer to add the RFC 7633
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// must-staple extension (id-pe-tlsfeature) to the issued cert.
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// Plumbed from CertificateProfile.MustStaple at the service layer.
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// Issuers that don't support extension injection (Vault, EJBCA, etc.)
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// silently ignore this — must-staple is a local-issuer-only feature
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// in V2 since upstream connectors enforce their own extension policy.
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MustStaple bool `json:"must_staple,omitempty"`
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}
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// IssuanceResult contains the result of a successful certificate issuance.
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type IssuanceResult struct {
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CertPEM string `json:"cert_pem"`
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ChainPEM string `json:"chain_pem"`
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Serial string `json:"serial"`
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NotBefore time.Time `json:"not_before"`
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NotAfter time.Time `json:"not_after"`
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OrderID string `json:"order_id"`
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}
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// RenewalRequest contains the parameters for renewing a certificate.
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type RenewalRequest struct {
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CommonName string `json:"common_name"`
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SANs []string `json:"sans"`
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CSRPEM string `json:"csr_pem"`
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EKUs []string `json:"ekus,omitempty"` // e.g., "serverAuth", "clientAuth", "emailProtection"
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MaxTTLSeconds int `json:"max_ttl_seconds,omitempty"` // 0 = no cap (use issuer default)
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OrderID *string `json:"order_id,omitempty"`
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// MustStaple — same semantics as IssuanceRequest.MustStaple. The
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// renewal pipeline plumbs through the same CertificateProfile.MustStaple
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// field so renewed certs match their initial-issuance extension set.
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MustStaple bool `json:"must_staple,omitempty"`
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}
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// RevocationRequest contains the parameters for revoking a certificate.
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type RevocationRequest struct {
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Serial string `json:"serial"`
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Reason *string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
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}
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// OrderStatus contains the status of a pending issuance or renewal order.
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type OrderStatus struct {
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OrderID string `json:"order_id"`
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Status string `json:"status"`
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Message *string `json:"message,omitempty"`
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CertPEM *string `json:"cert_pem,omitempty"`
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ChainPEM *string `json:"chain_pem,omitempty"`
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Serial *string `json:"serial,omitempty"`
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NotBefore *time.Time `json:"not_before,omitempty"`
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NotAfter *time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"`
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UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
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}
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// RevokedCertEntry represents a revoked certificate for CRL generation.
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type RevokedCertEntry struct {
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SerialNumber *big.Int
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RevokedAt time.Time
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ReasonCode int
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}
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// OCSPSignRequest contains the parameters for signing an OCSP response.
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type OCSPSignRequest struct {
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CertSerial *big.Int
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CertStatus int // 0=good, 1=revoked, 2=unknown
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RevokedAt time.Time
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RevocationReason int
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ThisUpdate time.Time
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NextUpdate time.Time
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}
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