mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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aa139ee0d9
route + RFC 9266 channel binding + HTTP Basic enrollment-password +
per-source-IP failed-auth limit + per-(CN, sourceIP) sliding-window cap.
Two new shared packages so EST + Intune share infrastructure:
- internal/cms/ — RFC 9266 tls-exporter extractor (ExtractTLSExporter
with stdlib-panic recovery for synthetic ConnectionStates) +
CSR-side channel-binding parser via raw TBSCertificationRequestInfo
walk (the stdlib's csr.Attributes can't represent the OCTET STRING
binding value), VerifyChannelBinding composite, EmbedChannel-
BindingAttribute fixture helper, typed sentinel errors for missing
/ mismatch / not-TLS-1.3 mapped to HTTP 400 / 409 / 426 in handler.
- internal/trustanchor/ — extracted from scep/intune/trust_anchor*.go
so the EST mTLS sibling route + Intune dispatcher share the same
SIGHUP-reloadable PEM bundle primitive. intune.TrustAnchorHolder
is now `= trustanchor.Holder` (type alias) + NewTrustAnchorHolder =
trustanchor.New (function alias) — every existing call site compiles
unchanged. Intune's LoadTrustAnchor is a thin wrapper over
trustanchor.LoadBundle. White-box tests moved to the new package.
- internal/ratelimit/ — extracted from scep/intune/rate_limit.go (this
was Phase 4.1, in the same bundle). intune.PerDeviceRateLimiter
is now a thin wrapper preserving the (subject, issuer)→key
composition; EST handler reaches for SlidingWindowLimiter directly.
ESTHandler grew six optional fields wired by per-profile setters
(SetMTLSTrust / SetChannelBindingRequired / SetEnrollmentPassword /
SetSourceIPRateLimiter / SetPerPrincipalRateLimiter / SetLabelForLog)
plus four new mTLS-route methods (CACertsMTLS / SimpleEnrollMTLS /
SimpleReEnrollMTLS / CSRAttrsMTLS); shared internal pipeline
handleEnrollOrReEnroll(reEnroll, viaMTLS) keeps the auth/binding/
rate-limit gates DRY. New router method RegisterESTMTLSHandlers
registers /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/{cacerts,simpleenroll,
simplereenroll,csrattrs}; AuthExemptDispatchPrefixes extends the
no-auth chain to /.well-known/est-mtls.
cmd/server/main.go's EST loop wires per-profile mTLS holder +
channel-binding policy + per-principal limiter + (when EnrollmentPassword
non-empty) Basic + source-IP limiter; new preflightESTMTLSClientCATrust-
Bundle returns *trustanchor.Holder so SIGHUP rotates the EST mTLS
bundle live without restart. SCEP + EST mTLS profiles now share a
single union mtlsUnionPoolForTLS passed to buildServerTLSConfigWithMTLS
(replaces the protocol-specific scepMTLSUnionPoolForTLS); per-handler
re-verify enforces "cert must chain to THIS profile's bundle" so
cross-protocol bleed is blocked at the application layer even though
the TLS layer trusts certs from either pool's union.
Phase 3.3 source-IP failed-Basic limiter defaults: 10 attempts / 1h
/ 50k tracked IPs (no env var; tunable in a follow-up). Phase 4.2
per-principal limiter cap from CERTCTL_EST_PROFILE_<NAME>_RATE_
LIMIT_PER_PRINCIPAL_24H (existing field, Phase 1 shipped).
New tests:
- internal/cms/channelbinding_test.go: extractor + CSR-side parser +
composite + TLS-1.3 round-trip end-to-end + EmbedChannelBinding-
Attribute round-trip
- internal/trustanchor/holder_test.go: parseBundlePEM white-box +
LoadBundle + Holder Get/Pool/SetLabelForLog/Reload-happy/
Reload-keeps-old-on-failure/Reload-keeps-old-on-expired/
WatchSIGHUP-reloads-pool/WatchSIGHUP-stop-clean
- internal/api/handler/est_hardening_test.go: 16 named cases covering
mTLS no-trust-pool 500 + no-cert 401 + cross-profile cert 401 +
happy-path 200 + CACertsMTLS auth gate + CSRAttrsMTLS auth gate +
channel-binding required-absent-rejected + not-required-absent-
allowed + writeChannelBindingError mapping + Basic no-header 401
+ Basic wrong-password 401 + Basic correct-200 + Basic-no-password
no-gate + per-IP failed-attempt lockout 429 + per-principal
blocks-after-cap + different-principals-independent + no-limiter-
unbounded.
Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean
(excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build —
disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean for
cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/
cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green for cms/trustanchor/
api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/service. G-3
docs-drift guard reproduced locally clean (Phase 1 already
documented every new env var; Phases 2-4 added zero new env vars).
189 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
189 lines
6.5 KiB
Go
// Package ratelimit provides shared rate-limit primitives used by
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// authenticated-but-shared-credential code paths (SCEP/Intune
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// per-device challenge enrollment, EST per-principal CSR enrollment,
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// EST HTTP-Basic source-IP failed-auth limiter) where the threat
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// model is "single legitimate identity could mint enrollments
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// faster than any human/fleet workflow would."
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//
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// Origin: this package was extracted from
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// internal/scep/intune/rate_limit.go in the EST RFC 7030 hardening
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// master bundle Phase 4.1 — EST is the third caller after the
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// Intune dispatcher (per-device-GUID cap on enrollment) and the EST
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// per-principal cap (Phase 4.2). The original Intune-package type +
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// constructor + ErrRateLimited sentinel are preserved as type
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// aliases at internal/scep/intune/rate_limit.go so existing call
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// sites compile unchanged. New callers SHOULD use this package
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// directly.
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//
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// Algorithm: sliding window log. Each key maps to a bucket holding
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// timestamps within the configured window. On Allow, the bucket
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// prunes timestamps older than (now - window) and either appends +
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// returns nil, or rejects + returns ErrRateLimited when the
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// post-prune count is already at the cap. Exact (no token-leak
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// rounding); O(N_per_key) per-call but N is bounded by the cap, so
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// effectively O(1).
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//
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// Concurrency: safe for concurrent Allow calls. Internal map guarded
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// by sync.Mutex; per-key slices mutated only while the mutex is
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// held.
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//
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// Memory: bounded by the per-instance map cap (default 100,000 keys;
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// configurable). At-cap eviction drops the oldest entry by newest
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// timestamp — small janitor pass; rarely fires in practice because
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// the prune-on-Allow path keeps most buckets short-lived.
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package ratelimit
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import (
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"errors"
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"sync"
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"time"
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)
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// ErrRateLimited is returned by SlidingWindowLimiter.Allow when the
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// bucket for the given key is already at the cap. Callers can
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// errors.Is against this sentinel; the underlying message is stable
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// across the package's lifetime so test assertions can match on it.
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var ErrRateLimited = errors.New("ratelimit: per-key cap exceeded for the configured window")
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// SlidingWindowLimiter is the sliding-window-log rate limiter.
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//
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// Construct via NewSlidingWindowLimiter. The zero value is NOT
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// usable — the buckets map needs initialisation.
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type SlidingWindowLimiter struct {
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mu sync.Mutex
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buckets map[string][]time.Time // key → sliding window of timestamps
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maxN int // max enrollments per window
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window time.Duration // window length (default 24h)
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cap int // max keys before LRU eviction kicks in
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disabled bool // maxN <= 0 → all Allow calls return nil
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}
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// NewSlidingWindowLimiter returns a limiter with the given per-key
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// cap + window. maxN <= 0 disables the limiter (all Allow calls
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// return nil); this is operator opt-out for the rare case where the
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// per-key cap is undesirable (test harnesses, sketchpad deploys).
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//
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// Window defaults to 24h when zero. Map cap defaults to 100,000 when
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// zero (matches the SCEP/Intune replay cache cap).
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func NewSlidingWindowLimiter(maxN int, window time.Duration, mapCap int) *SlidingWindowLimiter {
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if window <= 0 {
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window = 24 * time.Hour
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}
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if mapCap <= 0 {
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mapCap = 100_000
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}
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return &SlidingWindowLimiter{
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buckets: make(map[string][]time.Time),
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maxN: maxN,
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window: window,
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cap: mapCap,
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disabled: maxN <= 0,
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}
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}
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// Allow reports whether an event keyed by `key` is permitted right
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// now. Returns nil when allowed (and records the timestamp in the
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// bucket) or ErrRateLimited when the bucket is at maxN.
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//
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// Empty key is treated as "skip the limiter" — the caller's
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// validation should have rejected an empty-key event already; this
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// is belt-and-suspenders so a single empty-key bucket doesn't
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// become a chokepoint for every empty-key event. SCEP/Intune
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// callers compose the key as `subject + "|" + issuer`; EST callers
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// compose `cn + "|" + sourceIP` or `sourceIP`-alone for the
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// failed-auth limiter.
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func (l *SlidingWindowLimiter) Allow(key string, now time.Time) error {
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if l.disabled {
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return nil
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}
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if key == "" {
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return nil
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}
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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// At-cap eviction: when the map is full, drop the oldest entry
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// by finding the bucket whose newest timestamp is the smallest.
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// O(N_keys) but rarely fires; the prune-on-Allow path keeps
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// most buckets short-lived.
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if len(l.buckets) >= l.cap {
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l.evictOldestLocked()
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}
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bucket := l.buckets[key]
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bucket = pruneOlderThan(bucket, now.Add(-l.window))
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if len(bucket) >= l.maxN {
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// Don't append; over the limit. Persist the pruned bucket so
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// the next call sees the most-recently-pruned state.
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l.buckets[key] = bucket
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return ErrRateLimited
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}
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bucket = append(bucket, now)
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l.buckets[key] = bucket
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return nil
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}
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// pruneOlderThan returns the slice with all entries strictly before
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// `cutoff` removed. Preserves order (timestamps are appended in
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// increasing time, so a single linear scan from the front suffices).
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func pruneOlderThan(b []time.Time, cutoff time.Time) []time.Time {
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i := 0
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for i < len(b) && b[i].Before(cutoff) {
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i++
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}
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if i == 0 {
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return b
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}
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// Copy-shrink to release the underlying-array memory eventually
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// (otherwise the slice would hold a reference to the older
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// entries indefinitely until a re-allocation).
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out := make([]time.Time, len(b)-i)
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copy(out, b[i:])
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return out
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}
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// evictOldestLocked drops the map entry whose newest timestamp is
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// the oldest. Called under l.mu. O(N_keys) per eviction; at-cap is
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// rare in practice (caps are sized for steady-state).
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func (l *SlidingWindowLimiter) evictOldestLocked() {
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var (
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oldestKey string
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oldestTs time.Time
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first = true
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)
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for k, b := range l.buckets {
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if len(b) == 0 {
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// Empty bucket — drop it immediately, no candidate scan needed.
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delete(l.buckets, k)
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return
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}
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newest := b[len(b)-1]
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if first || newest.Before(oldestTs) {
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oldestKey = k
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oldestTs = newest
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first = false
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}
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}
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if oldestKey != "" {
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delete(l.buckets, oldestKey)
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}
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}
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// Len returns the approximate number of distinct keys currently
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// tracked. For observability + tests; not load-stable under
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// concurrent Allow calls.
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func (l *SlidingWindowLimiter) Len() int {
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l.mu.Lock()
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defer l.mu.Unlock()
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return len(l.buckets)
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}
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// Disabled reports whether the limiter is in opt-out mode (maxN <= 0).
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// Useful for handler-side gating + admin-endpoint observability.
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func (l *SlidingWindowLimiter) Disabled() bool {
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return l.disabled
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}
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