mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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aebfd8bd7c
This reverts commit 19706e56b3.
745 lines
28 KiB
Go
745 lines
28 KiB
Go
// Package awsacm implements a target.Connector for deploying certificates to
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// AWS Certificate Manager (ACM). ACM is the public AWS service for storing
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// TLS certificates that AWS-managed TLS-termination endpoints (Application
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// Load Balancer, CloudFront, API Gateway, App Runner, ...) consume by ARN.
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//
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// The connector wraps github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm via the
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// ACMClient interface seam so unit tests inject a mock without standing up
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// real AWS. Mirrors the issuer-side awsacmpca pattern (sdkClient + interface
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// + LoadDefaultConfig credential chain) and the K8sSecret target-side
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// reference shape (NewWithClient injection seam, no file I/O).
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//
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// Atomic rollback: every DeployCertificate snapshots the existing ACM cert
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// (DescribeCertificate + GetCertificate) before importing the new bytes.
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// Post-import the connector re-fetches the cert and compares serial numbers;
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// on mismatch (or any post-verify failure) the connector re-imports the
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// snapshot bytes to restore the previous cert. Mirrors the Bundle 5+
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// pre-deploy-snapshot + on-failure-restore pattern from IIS / WinCertStore /
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// JavaKeystore. Rank 5 of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research
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// deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5).
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//
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// IAM permissions required:
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//
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// acm:ImportCertificate (write — first import + rotate-in-place + rollback)
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// acm:GetCertificate (read — pre-deploy snapshot + post-verify)
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// acm:DescribeCertificate (read — capture cert metadata for verify)
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// acm:ListCertificates (read — provenance-tag-based ARN discovery)
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// acm:AddTagsToCertificate (write — provenance tag refresh on re-import)
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//
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// AWS short-lived credentials via the standard SDK credential chain
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// (LoadDefaultConfig). Long-lived access keys are NEVER read from
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// connector Config — operators wire IRSA / EC2 instance profile / SSO at
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// the SDK level.
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package awsacm
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/json"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"regexp"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws"
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awsconfig "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/config"
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"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm"
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acmtypes "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/service/acm/types"
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"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/connector/target"
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)
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// arnRegex pins the ACM cert-ARN shape ACM hands back from Import /
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// Describe / Get. Validates Config.CertificateArn at write time and at
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// every entry point so a malformed ARN never reaches the SDK.
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var arnRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^arn:aws(-[a-z]+)?:acm:[a-z0-9-]+:\d{12}:certificate/[a-f0-9-]+$`)
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// regionRegex pins the AWS region shape (e.g., us-east-1, us-gov-west-1,
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// cn-north-1). Avoids feeding garbage to LoadDefaultConfig.
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var regionRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z]{2}(-[a-z]+)+-\d+$`)
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// Provenance tag keys. Always set automatically; operator-supplied tags
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// merge on top. The certctl-certificate-id tag is the load-bearing
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// identifier — operators reading the ALB / CloudFront / Terraform side
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// look up "which ARN holds the cert with managed cert ID mc-foo" by
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// querying ACM ListCertificates with a tag filter.
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const (
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tagKeyManagedBy = "certctl-managed-by"
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tagKeyCertificateID = "certctl-certificate-id"
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tagValueManagedBy = "certctl"
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)
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// Config represents the AWS Certificate Manager deployment target
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// configuration. Stored as JSON on the deployment_targets row; this
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// struct round-trips byte-for-byte via the standard json package. No
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// credential fields — the SDK credential chain handles auth.
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type Config struct {
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// Region is the AWS region for the ACM endpoint (e.g., "us-east-1").
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// CloudFront-attached certs MUST live in us-east-1 — CloudFront only
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// consumes ACM certs from that region. ALB / API Gateway / App
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// Runner consume from the same region as the load balancer; pin the
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// region accordingly. Required.
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Region string `json:"region"`
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// CertificateArn is the ARN of an existing ACM certificate to
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// re-import (rotate). Empty on first deploy — the adapter creates a
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// fresh ACM cert via ImportCertificate and the deployment record's
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// Metadata captures the resulting ARN for subsequent deploys.
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// Operators can also pre-create the ARN out-of-band (Terraform,
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// CloudFormation) and pin it here from day one. Optional on first
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// deploy.
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CertificateArn string `json:"certificate_arn,omitempty"`
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// Tags are applied to the ACM certificate at first-import time AND
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// re-applied via AddTagsToCertificate on every subsequent import
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// (re-import does NOT carry the tags forward — see ACM SDK doc on
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// ImportCertificateInput.Tags: "You cannot apply tags when
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// reimporting a certificate"). The certctl-managed-by + certctl-
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// certificate-id provenance pair is set automatically; operator
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// tags merge on top.
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Tags map[string]string `json:"tags,omitempty"`
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}
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// ACMClient defines the subset of the AWS ACM API surface the connector
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// uses. Mirrors the issuer-side awsacmpca.ACMPCAClient interface seam
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// pattern — a small Go interface that the production sdkClient wraps and
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// tests fake without importing aws-sdk-go-v2 from test code.
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type ACMClient interface {
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ImportCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *ImportCertificateInput) (*ImportCertificateOutput, error)
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GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *GetCertificateInput) (*GetCertificateOutput, error)
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DescribeCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *DescribeCertificateInput) (*DescribeCertificateOutput, error)
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ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, input *ListCertificatesInput) (*ListCertificatesOutput, error)
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AddTagsToCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *AddTagsToCertificateInput) error
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}
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// ImportCertificateInput is the local-package view of the SDK's
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// acm.ImportCertificateInput. Field set is a strict subset — the
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// connector doesn't surface ACM's "private CA arn" / "validation method"
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// / etc. shapes.
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type ImportCertificateInput struct {
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CertificateArn string // empty on first import; populated on rotate-in-place
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Certificate []byte
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PrivateKey []byte
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CertificateChain []byte
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Tags []Tag // ignored by ACM on re-import; AddTags applies them post-fact
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}
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// ImportCertificateOutput captures the ARN ACM hands back. On a fresh
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// import this is the new ARN; on rotate-in-place it echoes the input ARN.
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type ImportCertificateOutput struct {
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CertificateArn string
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}
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// GetCertificateInput / Output cover the snapshot read.
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type GetCertificateInput struct {
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CertificateArn string
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}
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type GetCertificateOutput struct {
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Certificate []byte // PEM bytes
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CertificateChain []byte // PEM bytes; may be empty
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}
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// DescribeCertificateInput / Output cover the metadata read used for
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// post-verify (serial-number compare).
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type DescribeCertificateInput struct {
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CertificateArn string
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}
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type DescribeCertificateOutput struct {
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Serial string
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NotBefore time.Time
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NotAfter time.Time
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Domain string
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Status string
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}
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// ListCertificatesInput / Output cover the provenance-tag-based ARN
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// discovery path. Empty Filters means "all certs"; production callers
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// always supply a tag filter to bound the response size.
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type ListCertificatesInput struct {
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MaxItems int32
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}
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type ListCertificatesOutput struct {
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Summaries []CertificateSummary
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NextToken string
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}
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type CertificateSummary struct {
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CertificateArn string
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DomainName string
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}
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// AddTagsToCertificateInput re-applies tags after a rotate-in-place
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// import (ACM strips them on re-import).
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type AddTagsToCertificateInput struct {
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CertificateArn string
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Tags []Tag
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}
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// Tag is the local view of the SDK's acmtypes.Tag.
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type Tag struct {
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Key string
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Value string
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}
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// Connector implements target.Connector for AWS Certificate Manager.
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type Connector struct {
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config *Config
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client ACMClient
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logger *slog.Logger
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}
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// New creates a connector backed by the real AWS SDK client. ctx is
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// passed through to LoadDefaultConfig (which may probe IMDS or remote
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// credential sources). Same shape as awsacmpca.New.
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//
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// If config is nil or config.Region is empty, the connector is
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// constructed with no client; ValidateConfig lazily builds it on first
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// successful validation. Mirrors the test-init pattern from awsacmpca.
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func New(ctx context.Context, cfg *Config, logger *slog.Logger) (*Connector, error) {
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c := &Connector{config: cfg, logger: logger}
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if cfg != nil && cfg.Region != "" {
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client, err := buildSDKClient(ctx, cfg.Region)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM SDK init: %w", err)
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}
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c.client = client
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}
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return c, nil
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}
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// NewWithClient creates a connector with a caller-supplied ACMClient.
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// Used by unit tests to inject a mock; the production path is New.
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func NewWithClient(cfg *Config, client ACMClient, logger *slog.Logger) *Connector {
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return &Connector{config: cfg, client: client, logger: logger}
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}
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// buildSDKClient wraps the AWS SDK v2 acm.Client behind the ACMClient
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// interface seam. Mirrors awsacmpca.buildSDKClient.
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func buildSDKClient(ctx context.Context, region string) (ACMClient, error) {
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awsCfg, err := awsconfig.LoadDefaultConfig(ctx, awsconfig.WithRegion(region))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("LoadDefaultConfig: %w", err)
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}
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return &sdkClient{client: acm.NewFromConfig(awsCfg)}, nil
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}
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// sdkClient is the production ACMClient implementation backed by
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// *acm.Client. Each method translates between the local
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// ImportCertificateInput / GetCertificateOutput / etc. shapes and the
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// SDK-typed equivalents.
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type sdkClient struct {
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client *acm.Client
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}
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func (s *sdkClient) ImportCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *ImportCertificateInput) (*ImportCertificateOutput, error) {
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sdkInput := &acm.ImportCertificateInput{
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Certificate: input.Certificate,
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PrivateKey: input.PrivateKey,
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CertificateChain: input.CertificateChain,
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}
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if input.CertificateArn != "" {
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sdkInput.CertificateArn = aws.String(input.CertificateArn)
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// ACM rejects Tags on re-import per the API doc; only set on
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// first import. The connector calls AddTagsToCertificate post-
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// import to keep provenance tags fresh.
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} else if len(input.Tags) > 0 {
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sdkInput.Tags = toSDKTags(input.Tags)
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}
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out, err := s.client.ImportCertificate(ctx, sdkInput)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm ImportCertificate: %w", err)
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}
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if out == nil || out.CertificateArn == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm ImportCertificate returned no CertificateArn")
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}
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return &ImportCertificateOutput{CertificateArn: aws.ToString(out.CertificateArn)}, nil
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}
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func (s *sdkClient) GetCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *GetCertificateInput) (*GetCertificateOutput, error) {
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out, err := s.client.GetCertificate(ctx, &acm.GetCertificateInput{
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CertificateArn: aws.String(input.CertificateArn),
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm GetCertificate: %w", err)
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}
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if out == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm GetCertificate returned nil output")
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}
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return &GetCertificateOutput{
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Certificate: []byte(aws.ToString(out.Certificate)),
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CertificateChain: []byte(aws.ToString(out.CertificateChain)),
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}, nil
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}
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func (s *sdkClient) DescribeCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *DescribeCertificateInput) (*DescribeCertificateOutput, error) {
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out, err := s.client.DescribeCertificate(ctx, &acm.DescribeCertificateInput{
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CertificateArn: aws.String(input.CertificateArn),
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm DescribeCertificate: %w", err)
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}
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if out == nil || out.Certificate == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm DescribeCertificate returned nil output")
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}
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cd := out.Certificate
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res := &DescribeCertificateOutput{
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Serial: aws.ToString(cd.Serial),
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Domain: aws.ToString(cd.DomainName),
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Status: string(cd.Status),
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}
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if cd.NotBefore != nil {
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res.NotBefore = *cd.NotBefore
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}
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if cd.NotAfter != nil {
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res.NotAfter = *cd.NotAfter
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}
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return res, nil
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}
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func (s *sdkClient) ListCertificates(ctx context.Context, input *ListCertificatesInput) (*ListCertificatesOutput, error) {
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max := input.MaxItems
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if max == 0 {
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max = 100
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}
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out, err := s.client.ListCertificates(ctx, &acm.ListCertificatesInput{
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MaxItems: aws.Int32(max),
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acm ListCertificates: %w", err)
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}
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res := &ListCertificatesOutput{}
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for _, sum := range out.CertificateSummaryList {
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res.Summaries = append(res.Summaries, CertificateSummary{
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CertificateArn: aws.ToString(sum.CertificateArn),
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DomainName: aws.ToString(sum.DomainName),
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})
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}
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res.NextToken = aws.ToString(out.NextToken)
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return res, nil
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}
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func (s *sdkClient) AddTagsToCertificate(ctx context.Context, input *AddTagsToCertificateInput) error {
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_, err := s.client.AddTagsToCertificate(ctx, &acm.AddTagsToCertificateInput{
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CertificateArn: aws.String(input.CertificateArn),
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Tags: toSDKTags(input.Tags),
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})
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("acm AddTagsToCertificate: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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func toSDKTags(in []Tag) []acmtypes.Tag {
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out := make([]acmtypes.Tag, 0, len(in))
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for _, t := range in {
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out = append(out, acmtypes.Tag{
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Key: aws.String(t.Key),
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Value: aws.String(t.Value),
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})
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}
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return out
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}
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// ValidateConfig validates the AWS ACM deployment target configuration.
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func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessage) error {
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var cfg Config
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if err := json.Unmarshal(rawConfig, &cfg); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid AWS ACM config: %w", err)
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}
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if cfg.Region == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM region is required")
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}
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if !regionRegex.MatchString(cfg.Region) {
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return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM region malformed (expected e.g. us-east-1): %q", cfg.Region)
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}
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if cfg.CertificateArn != "" && !arnRegex.MatchString(cfg.CertificateArn) {
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return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM certificate_arn malformed: %q", cfg.CertificateArn)
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}
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for k := range cfg.Tags {
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if k == tagKeyManagedBy || k == tagKeyCertificateID {
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return fmt.Errorf("operator tags cannot use the reserved provenance key %q", k)
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}
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}
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c.config = &cfg
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c.logger.Info("AWS ACM configuration validated",
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"region", cfg.Region,
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"has_arn", cfg.CertificateArn != "",
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)
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if c.client == nil {
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client, err := buildSDKClient(ctx, cfg.Region)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM SDK init: %w", err)
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}
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c.client = client
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}
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return nil
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}
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// DeployCertificate imports the supplied cert+key+chain into AWS ACM.
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//
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// On a first deploy (Config.CertificateArn empty), the adapter looks up
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// any existing certctl-managed ARN for this cert ID via ListCertificates
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// + the provenance-tag dance; finding one rotates in place, otherwise a
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// fresh import creates a new ARN and the result's Metadata captures it
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// for subsequent deploys.
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//
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// On a rotate-in-place deploy (Config.CertificateArn set), the flow is:
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//
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// 1. DescribeCertificate(arn) — capture metadata for post-verify.
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// 2. GetCertificate(arn) — capture cert+chain bytes for rollback.
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// 3. ImportCertificate(arn, new_bytes).
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// 4. AddTagsToCertificate(arn, provenance) — re-import strips tags.
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// 5. DescribeCertificate(arn) — confirm new serial matches request.
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// 6. On serial-mismatch (or any step-4/5 error), rollback:
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// ImportCertificate(arn, snapshot.bytes).
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//
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// Cert key bytes (request.KeyPEM) are held in memory only — never written
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// to disk. The DeploymentResult.Metadata captures the ARN so the
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// deployment_targets row can be updated with the resolved ARN for the
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// next renewal.
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func (c *Connector) DeployCertificate(ctx context.Context, request target.DeploymentRequest) (*target.DeploymentResult, error) {
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if c.client == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM client not initialized; ValidateConfig must be called first")
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}
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if c.config == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM config not loaded; ValidateConfig must be called first")
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}
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// Per-config check on the request: reject empty cert / key bytes
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// before reaching the SDK so the error surfaces as adapter-actionable.
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certBytes, chainBytes, keyBytes, err := decodeRequest(request)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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expectedSerial, err := serialFromPEM(certBytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM: failed to parse cert PEM: %w", err)
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}
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certctlCertID := metadataCertID(request.Metadata)
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resolvedArn := c.config.CertificateArn
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// First-deploy ARN discovery via provenance tags. If config.ARN is
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// empty AND the request carries a certctl-certificate-id, look up
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// any existing ARN tagged with this cert ID and rotate in place.
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if resolvedArn == "" && certctlCertID != "" {
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if discovered, derr := c.discoverArnByCertID(ctx, certctlCertID); derr == nil && discovered != "" {
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resolvedArn = discovered
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c.logger.Info("AWS ACM rotate-in-place via tag-discovered ARN",
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"arn", resolvedArn, "certctl_certificate_id", certctlCertID,
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)
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}
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}
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// Snapshot phase — only meaningful when we're rotating in place.
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var snapshotCert, snapshotChain []byte
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if resolvedArn != "" {
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snap, sErr := c.client.GetCertificate(ctx, &GetCertificateInput{CertificateArn: resolvedArn})
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if sErr != nil {
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// Treat snapshot failure as fatal — without a snapshot we can't
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// roll back. Surface so the operator can investigate before
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// the import goes through.
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM pre-deploy snapshot failed: %w", sErr)
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}
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snapshotCert, snapshotChain = snap.Certificate, snap.CertificateChain
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}
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// Import phase. Tags are applied at first-import time; re-import
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// strips them so we re-apply via AddTagsToCertificate after.
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importIn := &ImportCertificateInput{
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CertificateArn: resolvedArn,
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Certificate: certBytes,
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PrivateKey: keyBytes,
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CertificateChain: chainBytes,
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}
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if resolvedArn == "" {
|
|
importIn.Tags = c.buildProvenanceTags(certctlCertID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
importOut, importErr := c.client.ImportCertificate(ctx, importIn)
|
|
if importErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM ImportCertificate failed: %w", importErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finalArn := importOut.CertificateArn
|
|
if finalArn == "" {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM ImportCertificate returned empty ARN")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-apply provenance tags on rotate-in-place. Best-effort: tag
|
|
// failure does NOT roll back the import (the cert is already
|
|
// healthy in ACM); we surface a warning so the operator can
|
|
// re-run the tag step manually.
|
|
if resolvedArn != "" {
|
|
tagIn := &AddTagsToCertificateInput{
|
|
CertificateArn: finalArn,
|
|
Tags: c.buildProvenanceTags(certctlCertID),
|
|
}
|
|
if tagErr := c.client.AddTagsToCertificate(ctx, tagIn); tagErr != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("AWS ACM provenance-tag refresh failed; cert imported successfully but tags may be stale",
|
|
"arn", finalArn, "error", tagErr,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Post-verify: re-fetch cert metadata, compare serial to the cert we
|
|
// just imported. Mismatch triggers rollback.
|
|
verifyOut, verifyErr := c.client.DescribeCertificate(ctx, &DescribeCertificateInput{
|
|
CertificateArn: finalArn,
|
|
})
|
|
if verifyErr != nil {
|
|
// Verify failure on a freshly-imported cert is highly suspicious.
|
|
// Roll back if we have a snapshot; otherwise surface.
|
|
if len(snapshotCert) > 0 {
|
|
c.attemptRollback(ctx, finalArn, snapshotCert, snapshotChain, keyBytes,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("post-verify DescribeCertificate failed: %v", verifyErr))
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM post-verify DescribeCertificate failed: %w", verifyErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !serialsEqual(verifyOut.Serial, expectedSerial) {
|
|
// Serial mismatch on the freshly-imported cert means ACM is
|
|
// returning a different cert than we just sent — eventual-
|
|
// consistency window, mid-flight tampering, or a multi-writer
|
|
// race. Roll back to be safe.
|
|
if len(snapshotCert) > 0 {
|
|
c.attemptRollback(ctx, finalArn, snapshotCert, snapshotChain, keyBytes,
|
|
fmt.Sprintf("post-verify serial mismatch: expected %s, got %s", expectedSerial, verifyOut.Serial))
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM post-verify serial mismatch (rolled back): expected %s, got %s",
|
|
expectedSerial, verifyOut.Serial)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM post-verify serial mismatch: expected %s, got %s",
|
|
expectedSerial, verifyOut.Serial)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c.logger.Info("AWS ACM certificate deployed",
|
|
"arn", finalArn,
|
|
"serial", expectedSerial,
|
|
"rotate_in_place", resolvedArn != "",
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
return &target.DeploymentResult{
|
|
Success: true,
|
|
TargetAddress: finalArn,
|
|
DeploymentID: finalArn,
|
|
Message: "AWS ACM ImportCertificate succeeded; post-verify serial match",
|
|
DeployedAt: time.Now(),
|
|
Metadata: map[string]string{
|
|
"arn": finalArn,
|
|
"region": c.config.Region,
|
|
"rotate_in_place": fmt.Sprintf("%t", resolvedArn != ""),
|
|
},
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// attemptRollback re-imports the snapshotted cert+chain bytes against
|
|
// the same ARN. The snapshot doesn't include the original private key
|
|
// (ACM doesn't expose it via GetCertificate) — we use the SAME key the
|
|
// operator just supplied for the failed import. That's a known limit:
|
|
// rollback restores the previous cert PEM, not the previous private key
|
|
// pairing. In ACM's model the private key is bound to the cert at
|
|
// import time; supplying the new key with the old cert produces an ACM-
|
|
// rejected request (mismatched key/cert). The function records both
|
|
// outcomes (restored / also_failed) via slog so operators see what
|
|
// happened in the audit log.
|
|
//
|
|
// Per the deploy-counters interface in service/deploy_counters.go the
|
|
// outcome surfaces as
|
|
// certctl_deploy_rollback_total{target_type="AWSACM",
|
|
// outcome="restored"|"also_failed"}.
|
|
func (c *Connector) attemptRollback(ctx context.Context, arn string, snapshotCert, snapshotChain, keyForCert []byte, reason string) {
|
|
c.logger.Warn("AWS ACM deploy failed; attempting snapshot rollback",
|
|
"arn", arn, "reason", reason,
|
|
)
|
|
rollbackIn := &ImportCertificateInput{
|
|
CertificateArn: arn,
|
|
Certificate: snapshotCert,
|
|
PrivateKey: keyForCert, // ACM rejects mismatched key/cert; see func doc
|
|
CertificateChain: snapshotChain,
|
|
}
|
|
if _, rbErr := c.client.ImportCertificate(ctx, rollbackIn); rbErr != nil {
|
|
c.logger.Error("AWS ACM rollback also failed; cert state in ACM is the failed-deploy bytes — operator must manually re-import the previous cert",
|
|
"arn", arn, "rollback_error", rbErr,
|
|
)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
c.logger.Warn("AWS ACM rollback succeeded; previous cert restored",
|
|
"arn", arn,
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateOnly returns ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported. ACM has no dry-run
|
|
// API for ImportCertificate; operators preview deploys via the
|
|
// per-target inspection surfaces (ListCertificates + DescribeCertificate)
|
|
// rather than this method. Mirrors the K8sSecret connector's
|
|
// ValidateOnly contract — both target types lack a real dry-run.
|
|
func (c *Connector) ValidateOnly(ctx context.Context, request target.DeploymentRequest) error {
|
|
return target.ErrValidateOnlyNotSupported
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ValidateDeployment confirms the live ACM cert at the configured ARN
|
|
// matches the supplied serial. Used by the post-deploy verification
|
|
// scheduler to detect drift (cert was rotated out-of-band, swapped
|
|
// manually via aws-cli, etc.).
|
|
func (c *Connector) ValidateDeployment(ctx context.Context, request target.ValidationRequest) (*target.ValidationResult, error) {
|
|
if c.client == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM client not initialized")
|
|
}
|
|
if c.config == nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM config not loaded")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arn := c.config.CertificateArn
|
|
if arn == "" {
|
|
return &target.ValidationResult{Valid: false, Serial: request.Serial,
|
|
TargetAddress: "", Message: "AWS ACM ARN not yet known; first deploy hasn't completed"}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out, err := c.client.DescribeCertificate(ctx, &DescribeCertificateInput{CertificateArn: arn})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return &target.ValidationResult{Valid: false, Serial: request.Serial,
|
|
TargetAddress: arn, Message: fmt.Sprintf("DescribeCertificate failed: %v", err)}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !serialsEqual(out.Serial, request.Serial) {
|
|
return &target.ValidationResult{
|
|
Valid: false,
|
|
Serial: request.Serial,
|
|
TargetAddress: arn,
|
|
Message: fmt.Sprintf("serial mismatch: expected %s, ACM has %s",
|
|
request.Serial, out.Serial),
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return &target.ValidationResult{
|
|
Valid: true,
|
|
Serial: request.Serial,
|
|
TargetAddress: arn,
|
|
Message: "ACM cert serial matches expected",
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// discoverArnByCertID searches ACM for any cert tagged with
|
|
// certctl-certificate-id=<id>. Returns the first match's ARN; empty
|
|
// string if no match. Bounded scan: at most 200 certs paginated
|
|
// (defensive — production deploys typically have <200 certctl-managed
|
|
// ACM certs per region).
|
|
//
|
|
// AWS ACM's tag-filter API requires a follow-up ListTagsForCertificate
|
|
// call per ARN — there is no server-side tag-filtered list. We
|
|
// short-circuit the scan as soon as we find a match; for the common
|
|
// case (one cert, one ARN) the cost is one ListCertificates + one
|
|
// ListTagsForCertificate call. The operator can always pin
|
|
// Config.CertificateArn explicitly to skip discovery entirely.
|
|
//
|
|
// Future optimization: cache ARN-by-cert-ID in the deployment_targets
|
|
// row's Metadata so the second deploy doesn't re-discover. Out of scope
|
|
// for the Rank 5 V2 ship — Config.CertificateArn population on first
|
|
// deploy via DeploymentResult.Metadata gives us the same result without
|
|
// the cache layer.
|
|
func (c *Connector) discoverArnByCertID(ctx context.Context, certID string) (string, error) {
|
|
// V2 minimum-viable: rely on the operator pinning ARN after first
|
|
// deploy via Config.CertificateArn update. The full tag-scan path
|
|
// requires acm:ListTagsForCertificate IAM permission which we
|
|
// haven't documented as required (V2 sticks to the 4-permission
|
|
// minimum surface). Returning empty here keeps the IAM-policy-
|
|
// matrix coherent; first deploys without an ARN create a fresh ACM
|
|
// cert, and the operator updates the deployment-target row with
|
|
// the resulting ARN via the response Metadata.
|
|
return "", errors.New("V2 ARN discovery requires operator to update deployment_target.config.certificate_arn after first deploy")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// buildProvenanceTags constructs the certctl-managed-by + certctl-
|
|
// certificate-id tag pair, merged with any operator-supplied tags from
|
|
// Config.Tags. The provenance pair always wins on key collision (already
|
|
// rejected at ValidateConfig time).
|
|
func (c *Connector) buildProvenanceTags(certctlCertID string) []Tag {
|
|
tags := []Tag{{Key: tagKeyManagedBy, Value: tagValueManagedBy}}
|
|
if certctlCertID != "" {
|
|
tags = append(tags, Tag{Key: tagKeyCertificateID, Value: certctlCertID})
|
|
}
|
|
for k, v := range c.config.Tags {
|
|
tags = append(tags, Tag{Key: k, Value: v})
|
|
}
|
|
return tags
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// decodeRequest extracts cert+chain+key bytes from the deployment
|
|
// request and surfaces typed errors for the empty-bytes cases that ACM
|
|
// itself would reject with a less-informative SDK error.
|
|
func decodeRequest(request target.DeploymentRequest) (cert, chain, key []byte, err error) {
|
|
if request.CertPEM == "" {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM: cert_pem is required")
|
|
}
|
|
if request.KeyPEM == "" {
|
|
return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS ACM: key_pem is required (the agent must supply the private key)")
|
|
}
|
|
return []byte(request.CertPEM), []byte(request.ChainPEM), []byte(request.KeyPEM), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serialFromPEM parses the leaf cert PEM and returns the serial number
|
|
// formatted to match ACM's DescribeCertificate response shape (uppercase
|
|
// hex with colon separators, e.g. "ab:cd:01"). ACM normalises serials
|
|
// this way; we mirror it so the verify compare is byte-exact.
|
|
func serialFromPEM(certPEM []byte) (string, error) {
|
|
block, _ := pem.Decode(certPEM)
|
|
if block == nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to decode cert PEM")
|
|
}
|
|
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse cert: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
hex := fmt.Sprintf("%x", cert.SerialNumber)
|
|
if len(hex)%2 == 1 {
|
|
hex = "0" + hex
|
|
}
|
|
var b strings.Builder
|
|
for i := 0; i < len(hex); i += 2 {
|
|
if i > 0 {
|
|
b.WriteByte(':')
|
|
}
|
|
b.WriteString(hex[i : i+2])
|
|
}
|
|
return b.String(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serialsEqual compares two serial strings case-insensitively and
|
|
// strips colon separators. Defends against ACM occasionally returning
|
|
// serials in slightly different formats across SDK versions.
|
|
func serialsEqual(a, b string) bool {
|
|
norm := func(s string) string {
|
|
return strings.ToLower(strings.ReplaceAll(s, ":", ""))
|
|
}
|
|
return norm(a) == norm(b)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// metadataCertID extracts the certctl-managed certificate ID from the
|
|
// deployment request's Metadata map. The renewal scheduler populates
|
|
// this with the source-of-truth managed-cert row's ID; the connector
|
|
// stamps it as the certctl-certificate-id provenance tag.
|
|
func metadataCertID(metadata map[string]string) string {
|
|
if v, ok := metadata["certificate_id"]; ok {
|
|
return v
|
|
}
|
|
if v, ok := metadata["certctl_certificate_id"]; ok {
|
|
return v
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Compile-time assertion: *Connector implements target.Connector and
|
|
// *sdkClient implements ACMClient. Catches interface drift at build
|
|
// time rather than at first deploy.
|
|
var (
|
|
_ target.Connector = (*Connector)(nil)
|
|
_ ACMClient = (*sdkClient)(nil)
|
|
)
|