Files
certctl/deploy/test/healthcheck_test.go
T
shankar0123 86fffa305a fix(deploy,helm,docs): published-image HEALTHCHECK speaks HTTPS + Helm /ready path + docs HTTPS sweep (U-2)
Pre-U-2 the published `ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-server` image
shipped with `HEALTHCHECK CMD curl -f http://localhost:8443/health`.
The server has been HTTPS-only since the v2.2 HTTPS-Everywhere milestone
(`cmd/server/main.go::ListenAndServeTLS`, no plaintext fallback, TLS
1.3 pinned), so the probe failed on every interval and Docker marked
the container `unhealthy` indefinitely. Operators inside docker-
compose / Helm / the example stacks were unaffected — compose overrides
the HEALTHCHECK with `--cacert + https://`, Helm uses explicit
`httpGet` probes that ignore Docker's HEALTHCHECK, and every example
compose file overrides with `curl -sfk https://localhost:8443/health`.
But anyone running bare `docker run` / Docker Swarm / Nomad / ECS —
exactly the "I just pulled the published image" path — saw permanent
`unhealthy` status and (depending on orchestrator policy) a restart-
loop. (Audit: cat-u-healthcheck_protocol_mismatch in
coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md.)

Recon for U-2 surfaced two adjacent bugs from the same v2.2 milestone
gap, both bundled into this commit because they share the same root
cause and the same operator surface:

  1. Helm chart `server.readinessProbe.httpGet.path` pointed at
     `/readyz`, the kube-flavored convention. The certctl server
     doesn't register `/readyz` (only `/health` and `/ready` are
     wired and bypass the auth middleware — see
     internal/api/router/router.go:81 and cmd/server/main.go:920).
     K8s readiness probes therefore got 401 (api-key auth rejection)
     or 404 (when auth was disabled), pods stayed `NotReady`
     indefinitely, and Helm rollouts stalled.

  2. The agent image (`Dockerfile.agent`) had no HEALTHCHECK at all,
     so bare-`docker run` agents got zero health signal. The
     compose override at `deploy/docker-compose.yml:173` called
     `pgrep -f certctl-agent` against the agent image, but the
     agent image didn't ship `procps` — pgrep was missing too. The
     compose probe was a latent always-fail.

We fixed all three with the audit-recommended shape (option (a) — `-k`)
plus three structural backstops:

Files changed:

Phase 1 — Dockerfile fix:
- Dockerfile: HEALTHCHECK switched from `curl -f http://localhost:8443/
  health` to `curl -fsk https://localhost:8443/health`. `-k`
  (insecure) is acceptable because the probe is localhost-to-localhost:
  the same process serving the cert is being probed, no network hop.
  Pinning `--cacert` is not viable for the published image because
  the bootstrap cert is per-deploy (generated into the `certs` named
  volume on first up; operator-supplied via Helm's `existingSecret`
  or cert-manager). Long-form docblock cross-references the audit
  closure, the compose vs Helm vs examples coverage matrix, and the
  CI guardrail.
- Dockerfile.agent: added HEALTHCHECK using `pgrep -f certctl-agent`
  matching the compose pattern. Added `procps` to the runtime apk
  install — fixes both the new image-level HEALTHCHECK AND the
  pre-existing compose probe that was silently failing.

Phase 2 — Helm readiness probe path:
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: server.readinessProbe.httpGet.path
  changed from `/readyz` to `/ready`. Liveness probe path
  (`/health`) was correct and is unchanged. Probes block now carries
  an explanatory comment naming the registered no-auth probe routes
  and the U-2 closure rationale.

Phase 3 — Image-level integration tests:
- deploy/test/healthcheck_test.go (new, //go:build integration):
  TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckSpecUsesHTTPS builds the server
  image, inspects `Config.Healthcheck.Test` via `docker inspect`,
  and asserts the array contains `https://localhost:8443/health` and
  `-k`, and does NOT contain `http://localhost:8443/health`
  (positive + negative regression contracts).
  TestPublishedAgentImage_HealthcheckSpecExists builds the agent image
  and asserts the HEALTHCHECK uses `pgrep` against `certctl-agent`.
  Both tests `t.Skip` cleanly when docker isn't available (sandbox /
  CI without docker-in-docker) — verified locally: tests skip with the
  diagnostic and the suite returns PASS.
  TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckTransitionsToHealthy is a
  documented `t.Skip` placeholder until the harness wires a sidecar
  postgres for image-level smoke; the spec-level tests above cover the
  audit-flagged regression.

Phase 4 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new "Forbidden plaintext HEALTHCHECK
  regression guard (U-2)" step. Scoped patterns catch
  `HEALTHCHECK.*http://` and `curl -f http://localhost:8443/health`
  in any `Dockerfile*`. Comment lines exempt; docs/upgrade-to-tls.md
  out of scope (the post-cutover invariant string at line 182 is
  intentionally a documented expected-failure assertion). Verified
  locally on the real tree (passes) and against synthetic regressions
  (each fires the guard).

Phase 5 — Docs sweep:
- docs/connectors.md: 15 stale curl examples updated from
  `http://localhost:8443/...` to `https://localhost:8443/...` with
  `--cacert "$CA"` injected on every site. Added a one-time
  introductory note documenting the `$CA` extraction with
  `docker compose ... exec ... cat /etc/certctl/tls/ca.crt`,
  matching the pattern in docs/quickstart.md. Pre-U-2 these examples
  silently failed against the HTTPS listener.

Phase 6 — Release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: appended U-2 section to the existing [unreleased]
  block (immediately below the G-1 entry). Sections: explanatory
  blockquote covering all three bugs (primary + 2 adjacent), Fixed,
  Added, Changed.

Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go vet -tags integration ./deploy/test/ — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -tags integration -v -run TestPublishedServerImage|TestPublishedAgentImage ./deploy/test/ —
  three tests SKIP cleanly with "docker not available" diagnostic
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template smoke render — succeeds; rendered Deployment carries
  `path: /ready` and zero `/readyz` matches
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- CI guardrail mirror: clean on real tree, fires on synthetic
  regression patterns

Out of scope (intentionally untouched):
- cmd/server/main.go::ListenAndServeTLS — HTTPS-only is correct,
  this finding does NOT propose adding back a plaintext listener.
- deploy/docker-compose.yml:126 HEALTHCHECK — already correct.
- deploy/docker-compose.test.yml HEALTHCHECK blocks — already correct.
- All 5 examples/*/docker-compose.yml HEALTHCHECK overrides — already
  correct (they ALSO use `-fsk https://localhost:8443/health`).
- Helm server.livenessProbe.httpGet — already uses `scheme: HTTPS` +
  `path: /health`, correct.
- docs/upgrade-to-tls.md:182 `curl ... http://localhost:8443/health`
  invariant line — that's the expected-failure assertion for the
  post-cutover state ("plaintext is gone, expect Connection refused");
  intentionally left intact.
- Go production code — this is purely a deploy-image / probe / docs /
  Helm-chart fix.

Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
      §2 P1 cluster, cat-u-healthcheck_protocol_mismatch
      Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'change Dockerfile:80
      to CMD curl -kf https://localhost:8443/health'.
2026-04-25 12:02:18 +00:00

217 lines
8.5 KiB
Go

//go:build integration
// Package integration_test — image-level HEALTHCHECK contract.
//
// U-2 (P1, cat-u-healthcheck_protocol_mismatch): pre-U-2 the published
// server image's Dockerfile HEALTHCHECK called `curl -f http://localhost:
// 8443/health` against an HTTPS-only listener (HTTPS-Everywhere milestone,
// v2.2 / tag v2.0.47). Operators outside docker-compose / Helm saw the
// container reported as `unhealthy` indefinitely. The compose stack
// overrode this HEALTHCHECK with `--cacert + https://`; the Helm chart
// uses explicit `httpGet` probes that ignore Docker's HEALTHCHECK; the 5
// example compose files all override with `curl -sfk https://localhost:
// 8443/health`. So the observable failure was scoped to bare `docker run`
// / Docker Swarm / Nomad / ECS users — exactly the "I just pulled the
// published image" path.
//
// This file's tests pin the contract at the binary-image level. The
// matching CI grep guardrail in .github/workflows/ci.yml catches the
// regression at the Dockerfile-source level; both layers are needed
// because someone could replace the HEALTHCHECK line with a sibling
// broken pattern that the grep doesn't catch (e.g., a TCP-only check
// against the HTTPS port).
//
// Run alongside the rest of the integration suite:
//
// cd deploy/test && go test -tags integration -v -run Healthcheck
//
// The tests skip cleanly with t.Skip when docker is not available
// (CI without docker-in-docker, sandbox environments, etc.) so they
// don't block local development on machines without docker.
package integration_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
)
// dockerAvailable returns true when `docker version` returns 0.
// We cache it across tests in this file so the skip message prints once.
func dockerAvailable(t *testing.T) bool {
t.Helper()
cmd := exec.Command("docker", "version", "--format", "{{.Server.Version}}")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Logf("docker not available: %v\noutput: %s", err, string(out))
return false
}
return true
}
// dockerCmd runs `docker <args...>` with a 60s budget, returning stdout
// + stderr combined and the exit error if any. Used for short-lived
// probes (inspect, build, run -d).
func dockerCmd(t *testing.T, timeout time.Duration, args ...string) (string, error) {
t.Helper()
cmd := exec.Command("docker", args...)
done := make(chan struct{})
var out []byte
var err error
go func() {
out, err = cmd.CombinedOutput()
close(done)
}()
select {
case <-done:
return string(out), err
case <-time.After(timeout):
_ = cmd.Process.Kill()
t.Fatalf("docker %v timed out after %v", args, timeout)
return "", err
}
}
// TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckSpecUsesHTTPS performs the Dockerfile-
// source-level shipped-shape pin: the inspected image's Healthcheck.Test
// array MUST contain "https://localhost:8443/health" (and MUST NOT
// contain "http://localhost:8443/health"). This is the lightweight half
// of the contract — it doesn't require running the container, only
// building it. It catches the audit-flagged bug directly.
func TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckSpecUsesHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
if !dockerAvailable(t) {
t.Skip("docker not available — skipping image-level HEALTHCHECK test")
}
const imgTag = "certctl-u2-healthcheck-spec-test"
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = dockerCmd(t, 30*time.Second, "rmi", "-f", imgTag)
})
// Build the server image. Use the repo root as context (this test
// file lives at deploy/test/, the Dockerfile at the repo root).
buildOut, err := dockerCmd(t, 5*time.Minute,
"build", "-f", "../../Dockerfile", "-t", imgTag, "../..")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("docker build failed: %v\noutput:\n%s", err, buildOut)
}
// Inspect the shipped HEALTHCHECK metadata.
inspectOut, err := dockerCmd(t, 30*time.Second,
"inspect", "--format", "{{json .Config.Healthcheck}}", imgTag)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("docker inspect failed: %v\noutput:\n%s", err, inspectOut)
}
var hc struct {
Test []string
Interval int64
Timeout int64
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(strings.TrimSpace(inspectOut)), &hc); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("could not parse Healthcheck JSON %q: %v", inspectOut, err)
}
joined := strings.Join(hc.Test, " ")
// Positive contract.
if !strings.Contains(joined, "https://localhost:8443/health") {
t.Errorf("Healthcheck.Test does not target https://localhost:8443/health\nfull: %v", hc.Test)
}
// Negative contract — pre-U-2 regression shape MUST be absent.
if strings.Contains(joined, "http://localhost:8443/health") {
t.Errorf("Healthcheck.Test still contains the pre-U-2 plaintext shape: %v", hc.Test)
}
// `-k` (or `--insecure`) must be present because the bootstrap cert
// is per-deploy and the published image can't pin a CA bundle —
// see the U-2 closure docblock on Dockerfile and the audit doc.
if !strings.Contains(joined, "-k") && !strings.Contains(joined, "--insecure") {
t.Errorf("Healthcheck.Test omits -k / --insecure flag (required for self-signed bootstrap probe): %v", hc.Test)
}
}
// TestPublishedAgentImage_HealthcheckSpecExists pins the U-2 adjacent
// fix that added a HEALTHCHECK to the agent image. Pre-U-2 the agent
// image had no HEALTHCHECK declaration, so bare-`docker run` agents got
// `none` health status from Docker. Post-U-2 the agent uses pgrep to
// verify the process is alive (mirroring the docker-compose pattern at
// deploy/docker-compose.yml:173, which also became reliable post-U-2
// because procps is now installed in the runtime image).
func TestPublishedAgentImage_HealthcheckSpecExists(t *testing.T) {
if !dockerAvailable(t) {
t.Skip("docker not available — skipping image-level HEALTHCHECK test")
}
const imgTag = "certctl-u2-agent-healthcheck-spec-test"
t.Cleanup(func() {
_, _ = dockerCmd(t, 30*time.Second, "rmi", "-f", imgTag)
})
buildOut, err := dockerCmd(t, 5*time.Minute,
"build", "-f", "../../Dockerfile.agent", "-t", imgTag, "../..")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("docker build failed: %v\noutput:\n%s", err, buildOut)
}
inspectOut, err := dockerCmd(t, 30*time.Second,
"inspect", "--format", "{{json .Config.Healthcheck}}", imgTag)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("docker inspect failed: %v\noutput:\n%s", err, inspectOut)
}
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(inspectOut)
if trimmed == "null" || trimmed == "" {
t.Fatalf("agent image has no HEALTHCHECK (got %q) — U-2 adjacent fix regressed", inspectOut)
}
var hc struct {
Test []string
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(trimmed), &hc); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("could not parse Healthcheck JSON %q: %v", inspectOut, err)
}
joined := strings.Join(hc.Test, " ")
if !strings.Contains(joined, "pgrep") {
t.Errorf("agent Healthcheck.Test does not use pgrep (lost the process-presence shape): %v", hc.Test)
}
if !strings.Contains(joined, "certctl-agent") {
t.Errorf("agent Healthcheck.Test does not target the certctl-agent process name: %v", hc.Test)
}
}
// TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckTransitionsToHealthy is the
// runtime-level contract: the built image, when started, must transition
// to `healthy` within the start-period + 30s observability budget. This
// is the heavy test — it requires the server to actually start, which
// in turn requires either a reachable database OR a startup that fails
// gracefully enough to keep the HEALTHCHECK probe target alive.
//
// The container is started with CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL pointing at an
// unreachable host so the server fails its postgres bring-up — but
// importantly, fails AFTER the TLS listener has come up, because the
// HEALTHCHECK probe target is the TLS listener. We don't actually need
// the database to validate the HEALTHCHECK shape.
//
// IMPORTANT: this test is the runtime contract. If you're working on the
// server's startup ordering and the listener now comes up AFTER the
// database, this test must adapt — start a sidecar postgres via
// testcontainers-go (see internal/integration/lifecycle_test.go for the
// pattern) and connect the certctl-server container to it.
func TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckTransitionsToHealthy(t *testing.T) {
if !dockerAvailable(t) {
t.Skip("docker not available — skipping runtime HEALTHCHECK test")
}
if testing.Short() {
t.Skip("runtime HEALTHCHECK test takes ~45s; skipping under -short")
}
t.Skip("runtime probe contract not yet wired to a sidecar postgres; " +
"image-spec contract above (TestPublishedServerImage_HealthcheckSpecUsesHTTPS) " +
"covers the audit-flagged regression. Re-enable once the integration " +
"harness provisions postgres for image-level smoke.")
}