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01f6eb9d09
SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 5.6 follow-up.
Closes the 'lying field' gap from the original Phase 5.6 commit (b33b843).
That commit shipped CertificateProfile.MustStaple as a domain field +
IssuanceRequest.MustStaple as the issuer-interface field + the local
issuer's RFC 7633 extension generation + byte-exact tests against the
spec — but the service layer (SCEP + EST + agent + renewal) never read
profile.MustStaple and never set IssuanceRequest.MustStaple. Operators
who set the field got: a stored value, an API that returned it, docs
that promised it worked, and a cert with no extension. Worse than not
having the field at all.
Per the new operating rule landed in cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules
('Always take the complete path, not the easy path'), this commit closes
the wire end-to-end.
internal/service/renewal.go
* IssuerConnector interface signature gains a mustStaple bool param on
IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate. The original 'this is a wider
refactor' framing was overstated — it's one extra arg threaded
through six call sites, not a structural change.
internal/service/issuer_adapter.go
* IssuerConnectorAdapter.IssueCertificate + RenewCertificate accept
the new param + populate IssuanceRequest.MustStaple /
RenewalRequest.MustStaple. Connectors that don't honor extension
injection (Vault, EJBCA, ACME, etc.) silently ignore the field —
the Phase 5.6 commit's docblock already noted this.
internal/service/scep.go
* processEnrollment now reads profile.MustStaple alongside
profile.MaxTTLSeconds and threads it through the IssueCertificate
call. The SCEP path was the load-bearing one — the original Phase
5.6 docs example showed exactly this code shape but the wire was
never landed.
internal/service/est.go
* Same pattern as SCEP: read profile.MustStaple + thread to
IssueCertificate. Defense in depth so a deploy that mounts the
same profile across SCEP + EST gets consistent extension behavior.
internal/service/agent.go
* The fallback direct-issuer signing path in heartbeatPipeline reads
profile + threads MustStaple through. Server-mode keygen + ad-hoc
CSR submission paths both go through this.
internal/service/renewal.go (the renewal-loop side, not the interface)
* Both renewal call sites (server-CSR-generated + agent-CSR-submitted)
read profile.MustStaple + thread it through RenewCertificate. Renewed
certs match their initial-issuance extension set when the bound
profile changes mid-lifetime.
internal/service/scep_must_staple_test.go (new)
* TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer — end-to-end
integration test: profile.MustStaple=true → SCEP service →
mock IssuerConnector saw mustStaple=true. This is the test the
original Phase 5.6 commit should have shipped — proves the wire
reaches the connector.
* TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_NoMustStaplePropagatesFalse — companion
pinning the symmetric contract; the mock pre-sets LastMustStaple=true
so a stuck-at-true bug surfaces.
internal/service/testutil_test.go +
internal/service/m11c_crypto_enforcement_test.go +
internal/service/issuer_adapter_test.go +
cmd/server/preflight_test.go
* Mock + fake IssuerConnector implementations gain the new mustStaple
bool param. mockIssuerConnector + capturingIssuerConnector also gain
a LastMustStaple / lastMustStaple field used by the new integration
tests to assert the wire reached the connector.
* Existing test call sites for adapter.IssueCertificate /
adapter.RenewCertificate gain a trailing 'false' arg (mechanical bulk
edit, no behavior change).
Verification:
* gofmt + go vet + staticcheck clean for all touched paths.
* go test -short -count=1 green across cmd/agent / cmd/cli /
cmd/mcp-server / cmd/server / api/handler / api/middleware /
api/router / service / scheduler / pkcs7 / connector/issuer/local /
every connector subpackage / domain / crypto / mcp / repository.
* The new TestSCEPService_PKCSReq_PlumbsMustStapleToIssuer test passes,
proving the wire works end-to-end.
The follow-up rule from cowork/CLAUDE.md::Operating Rules — 'can an
operator flip the configurable bit and observe the behavior change
end-to-end with no further code changes?' — is now YES for must-staple
on the SCEP + EST + agent + renewal paths.
192 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
192 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/x509"
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"encoding/pem"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"strings"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// ESTService implements the EST (RFC 7030) enrollment protocol.
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// It delegates certificate operations to an existing IssuerConnector and records
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// enrollment events in the audit trail.
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type ESTService struct {
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issuer IssuerConnector
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issuerID string
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auditService *AuditService
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logger *slog.Logger
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profileID string // optional: constrain enrollments to a specific profile
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profileRepo repository.CertificateProfileRepository
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}
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// NewESTService creates a new ESTService for the given issuer connector.
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func NewESTService(issuerID string, issuer IssuerConnector, auditService *AuditService, logger *slog.Logger) *ESTService {
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return &ESTService{
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issuer: issuer,
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issuerID: issuerID,
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auditService: auditService,
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logger: logger,
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}
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}
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// SetProfileID constrains EST enrollments to a specific certificate profile.
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func (s *ESTService) SetProfileID(profileID string) {
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s.profileID = profileID
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}
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// SetProfileRepo sets the profile repository for crypto policy enforcement during enrollment.
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func (s *ESTService) SetProfileRepo(repo repository.CertificateProfileRepository) {
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s.profileRepo = repo
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}
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// GetCACerts returns the PEM-encoded CA certificate chain for this EST server.
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// RFC 7030 Section 4.1: /cacerts distributes the current CA certificates.
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func (s *ESTService) GetCACerts(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
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caPEM, err := s.issuer.GetCACertPEM(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get CA certificates from issuer %s: %w", s.issuerID, err)
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}
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if caPEM == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("issuer %s does not provide CA certificates for EST", s.issuerID)
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}
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return caPEM, nil
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}
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// SimpleEnroll processes an initial enrollment request.
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// RFC 7030 Section 4.2: /simpleenroll accepts a PKCS#10 CSR and returns a signed cert.
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func (s *ESTService) SimpleEnroll(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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return s.processEnrollment(ctx, csrPEM, "est_simple_enroll")
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}
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// SimpleReEnroll processes a re-enrollment request.
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// RFC 7030 Section 4.2.2: /simplereenroll is functionally identical to /simpleenroll
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// but is used when renewing an existing certificate.
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func (s *ESTService) SimpleReEnroll(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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return s.processEnrollment(ctx, csrPEM, "est_simple_reenroll")
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}
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// GetCSRAttrs returns the CSR attributes the server wants clients to include.
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// RFC 7030 Section 4.5: /csrattrs tells clients what to put in their CSR.
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// Returns nil if no specific attributes are required.
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func (s *ESTService) GetCSRAttrs(ctx context.Context) ([]byte, error) {
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// For now, we don't require specific CSR attributes.
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// In the future, this could return key type constraints from the profile.
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return nil, nil
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}
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// processEnrollment handles the common enrollment logic for both simpleenroll and simplereenroll.
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func (s *ESTService) processEnrollment(ctx context.Context, csrPEM string, auditAction string) (*domain.ESTEnrollResult, error) {
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// Parse the CSR to extract CN and SANs
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block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(csrPEM))
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if block == nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid CSR PEM")
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}
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csr, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(block.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse CSR: %w", err)
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}
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if err := csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("CSR signature verification failed: %w", err)
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}
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commonName := csr.Subject.CommonName
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if commonName == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("CSR must include a Common Name")
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}
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// Collect SANs
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var sans []string
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for _, dns := range csr.DNSNames {
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sans = append(sans, dns)
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}
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for _, ip := range csr.IPAddresses {
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sans = append(sans, ip.String())
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}
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for _, email := range csr.EmailAddresses {
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sans = append(sans, email)
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}
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for _, uri := range csr.URIs {
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sans = append(sans, uri.String())
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}
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// Validate CSR key algorithm/size against profile (crypto policy enforcement)
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var profile *domain.CertificateProfile
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var ekus []string
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if s.profileID != "" && s.profileRepo != nil {
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if p, profileErr := s.profileRepo.Get(ctx, s.profileID); profileErr == nil && p != nil {
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profile = p
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ekus = profile.AllowedEKUs
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}
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}
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if _, csrErr := ValidateCSRAgainstProfile(csrPEM, profile); csrErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("EST enrollment rejected: crypto policy violation",
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"action", auditAction,
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"common_name", commonName,
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"error", csrErr)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("EST enrollment rejected: %w", csrErr)
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}
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s.logger.Info("EST enrollment request",
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"action", auditAction,
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"common_name", commonName,
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"sans", strings.Join(sans, ","),
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"issuer", s.issuerID)
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// Resolve MaxTTL + must-staple from profile.
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// SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 5.6 follow-up: thread
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// profile.MustStaple through to the issuer so the local issuer can
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// add the RFC 7633 id-pe-tlsfeature extension.
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var (
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maxTTLSeconds int
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mustStaple bool
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)
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if profile != nil {
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maxTTLSeconds = profile.MaxTTLSeconds
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mustStaple = profile.MustStaple
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}
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// Issue the certificate via the configured issuer connector
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// EST enrollments use profile EKUs if available, otherwise default (serverAuth + clientAuth fallback)
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result, err := s.issuer.IssueCertificate(ctx, commonName, sans, csrPEM, ekus, maxTTLSeconds, mustStaple)
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Error("EST enrollment failed",
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"action", auditAction,
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"common_name", commonName,
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"error", err)
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("certificate issuance failed: %w", err)
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}
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// Audit the enrollment
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if s.auditService != nil {
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details := map[string]interface{}{
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"common_name": commonName,
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"sans": sans,
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"issuer_id": s.issuerID,
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"serial": result.Serial,
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"protocol": "EST",
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}
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if s.profileID != "" {
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details["profile_id"] = s.profileID
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}
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_ = s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, "est-client", "system", auditAction, "certificate", result.Serial, details)
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}
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s.logger.Info("EST enrollment successful",
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"action", auditAction,
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"common_name", commonName,
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"serial", result.Serial,
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"not_after", result.NotAfter)
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return &domain.ESTEnrollResult{
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CertPEM: result.CertPEM,
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ChainPEM: result.ChainPEM,
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}, nil
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}
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