Files
certctl/internal/cli/auth_scope_down_test.go
T
shankar0123 3c605d5618 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

166 lines
4.6 KiB
Go

package cli
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestSuggestRoleFromAuditEvents_TablePins the audit-event analyser
// classification rules. Pure function; no I/O. Adding a new role
// pattern means adding a row here.
func TestSuggestRoleFromAuditEvents_Table(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
events []AuditEventLite
wantRole string
reasonHint string
}{
{
name: "empty history → viewer",
events: nil,
wantRole: "viewer",
reasonHint: "no audit history",
},
{
name: "only cert.read → viewer",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "cert.read"},
{Action: "cert.read"},
{Action: "issuer.read"},
},
wantRole: "viewer",
reasonHint: "read-only",
},
{
name: "agent + cert.issue → agent",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "agent.heartbeat"},
{Action: "agent.job.poll"},
{Action: "cert.issue"},
{Action: "cert.read"},
},
wantRole: "agent",
reasonHint: "agent",
},
{
name: "cert lifecycle without admin → operator",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "cert.issue"},
{Action: "cert.revoke"},
{Action: "profile.edit"},
{Action: "target.edit"},
},
wantRole: "operator",
reasonHint: "lifecycle",
},
{
name: "any auth.role.assign → admin",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "auth.role.assign"},
},
wantRole: "admin",
reasonHint: "admin-only",
},
{
name: "any cert.bulk_revoke → admin",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "cert.bulk_revoke"},
},
wantRole: "admin",
reasonHint: "admin-only",
},
{
name: "ca.hierarchy.* → admin",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "ca.hierarchy.add_child"},
},
wantRole: "admin",
reasonHint: "admin-only",
},
{
name: "MCP-only history → mcp",
events: []AuditEventLite{
{Action: "mcp.list_certificates"},
{Action: "mcp.get_issuer"},
},
wantRole: "mcp",
reasonHint: "MCP",
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
role, reason := SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents(tc.events)
if role != tc.wantRole {
t.Errorf("role = %q, want %q (reason=%q)", role, tc.wantRole, reason)
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(reason), strings.ToLower(tc.reasonHint)) {
t.Errorf("reason %q does not contain hint %q", reason, tc.reasonHint)
}
})
}
}
// TestFilterScopeDownCandidates_HidesDemoAnon pins the invariant that
// the synthetic actor-demo-anon row never reaches the prompt loop.
func TestFilterScopeDownCandidates_HidesDemoAnon(t *testing.T) {
in := []AuthKeyEntry{
{ActorID: "alice", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
{ActorID: DemoAnonActorID, RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
{ActorID: "bob", RoleIDs: []string{"r-viewer"}},
}
got := filterScopeDownCandidates(in)
if len(got) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("got %d candidates, want 2", len(got))
}
for _, k := range got {
if k.ActorID == DemoAnonActorID {
t.Errorf("filter let actor-demo-anon through")
}
}
}
// TestBuildScopeDownPlan_KeepEmptyAndUnknown pins the prompt-loop
// behaviour: empty input or "keep" leaves the row alone; unknown role
// names also fall through (operator can re-run the flow).
func TestBuildScopeDownPlan_KeepEmptyAndUnknown(t *testing.T) {
keys := []AuthKeyEntry{
{ActorID: "alice", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
{ActorID: "bob", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
{ActorID: "carol", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}},
}
// alice keeps; bob → operator; carol → bogus role (no change).
in := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader("\noperator\nbogus\n"))
var out bytes.Buffer
plan, err := buildScopeDownPlan(keys, in, &out)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("plan err = %v", err)
}
if len(plan) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("plan size = %d, want 1 (only bob changes)", len(plan))
}
if plan[0].ActorID != "bob" || plan[0].TargetRole != "r-operator" {
t.Errorf("plan[0] = %+v, want bob → r-operator", plan[0])
}
}
// TestBuildScopeDownPlan_ApplyRolePrefix pins that the "operator"
// input becomes "r-operator" downstream — the API accepts the
// prefixed role IDs and the plan-builder normalizes.
func TestBuildScopeDownPlan_ApplyRolePrefix(t *testing.T) {
keys := []AuthKeyEntry{{ActorID: "alice", RoleIDs: []string{"r-admin"}}}
for _, role := range []string{"admin", "operator", "viewer", "agent", "mcp", "cli", "auditor"} {
in := bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader(role + "\n"))
var out bytes.Buffer
plan, err := buildScopeDownPlan(keys, in, &out)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("role=%s: %v", role, err)
}
if len(plan) != 1 || plan[0].TargetRole != "r-"+role {
t.Errorf("role=%s: plan[0].TargetRole = %q, want r-%s", role, plan[0].TargetRole, role)
}
}
}