Files
certctl/scripts/ci-guards
shankar0123 a923cf697c harden(auth): demo-mode residual-grants detector + cleanup endpoint + CI guard (A-8)
Audit 2026-05-11 A-8 closure. Closes the deferred Phase 2 leg of the
2026-05-10 HIGH-12 closure (2e97cc1) — production-startup observability
for actor-demo-anon residual grants + CI guard banning new synthetic-
admin code paths.

What this changes:

* cmd/server/preflight_demo_residual.go (new) runs after the DB pool +
  audit service are constructed and before the HTTPS listener starts.
  Under any non-'none' auth type it queries actor_roles for the
  synthetic actor-demo-anon and emits a WARN log + a categorized audit
  row (auth.demo_residual_grants_detected) listing every grant
  present. Migration 000029 unconditionally seeds the ar-demo-anon-admin
  row at install time, so EVERY production deploy will see this WARN
  on first boot; the intended cutover workflow is cleanup-once at
  production handover.

* CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_RESIDUAL_STRICT (new env var on AuthConfig,
  default false) pivots the WARN to fail-closed startup refusal for
  operators who want a paranoid posture against re-seeding.

* POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup (new handler at
  internal/api/handler/demo_residual.go) is an admin-class
  (auth.role.assign) endpoint that removes every actor-demo-anon row
  from actor_roles and returns {removed: int64}. Idempotent; refuses
  503 under Auth.Type=none (deleting the row would break the demo
  path); audit-logs every invocation including no-op zero-removed
  calls so the admin's action is always recorded.

* scripts/ci-guards/no-new-synthetic-admin.sh pins the 17-entry
  allowlist of source files that legitimately reference the
  actor-demo-anon literal. New runtime code paths that resolve to the
  synthetic actor (the same pattern that produced the original CRIT
  class) are rejected at PR time. CI workflow auto-picks the script
  via the existing scripts/ci-guards/*.sh loop in .github/workflows/
  ci.yml; no workflow edit needed.

Regression matrix:

* cmd/server/preflight_demo_residual_test.go — 7 tests covering the
  4 main behaviour branches (testcontainers-backed, testing.Short()-
  skipped: DemoModeActive_Skips, NoResidue_Passes, HasResidue_LogsAnd
  Audits, StrictMode_RefusesStartup, DeleteDemoAnonResidue_Idempotent)
  plus 3 pure-Go stdlib unit tests for the row-string formatter +
  nil-safety contracts on both helpers.

* internal/api/handler/demo_residual_test.go — 7 stdlib+httptest
  cases: HappyPath, Idempotent_ReturnsZero, RejectsInDemoMode (503),
  CleanupError_Surfaces500, NilCleanupFn (defensive 500),
  NilAuditWriter_DoesNotPanic, MissingActorContext (falls back to
  'unknown' actor in the audit row).

* internal/api/router/openapi_parity_test.go — new
  POST /api/v1/auth/demo-residual/cleanup entry plus 6 pre-existing
  pre-A-8 entries (oidc/test, jwks-status, users CRUD, runtime-config)
  that had drifted out of SpecParityExceptions; the parity test was
  red on dev/auth-bundle-2 before my work; this commit returns it to
  green with full per-entry justifications + parity-debt notes.

Docs:

* docs/operator/security.md — new 'Demo-to-production cutover (Audit
  2026-05-11 A-8)' section explaining the WARN message, the cleanup
  curl one-liner, the equivalent SQL, the strict-mode env var, and
  the CI guard.

* docs/operator/rbac.md — Last-reviewed bump + pointer to the new
  env var + the security.md section.

* cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md — HIGH-12 row gains an
  'A-8 follow-on CLOSED 2026-05-11' annotation describing the
  deferred Phase 2 leg now landed.

* CHANGELOG.md — Unreleased ### Security entry summarizing the four
  legs (detector + cleanup + strict-mode flag + CI guard) and the
  acquisition-readiness narrative this closes.

Operator-facing impact: this closes a credibility gap, not an
exploitable vulnerability. The residue requires a regression
elsewhere in the middleware chain to be exploitable. After this
fix, the canonical narrative ('RBAC primitive with no synthetic-
admin fallback') is fully true.

Refs cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-11/08-high-demo-mode-residual-
cleanup.md.
2026-05-11 11:45:54 +00:00
..
2026-05-05 18:18:29 +00:00
2026-05-05 18:18:38 +00:00

scripts/ci-guards/ — Regression-guard scripts

Each <id>.sh script in this directory pins one closed audit finding from regressing. CI runs the full set on every push via the Regression guards step in .github/workflows/ci.yml. Operators can run any script locally:

bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh

Contract

Every script in this directory MUST:

  1. Be exit-code 0 on a clean repo (no regression present).
  2. Be exit-code non-zero on regression, with a ::error:: annotation prefix so PR reviewers see the failing line in the GitHub Actions UI.
  3. Be runnable from repo root via bash scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh with NO arguments and NO env-var requirements. The CI loop step (for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do bash "$g"; done) iterates every .sh here without args; any script that requires an arg or env var WILL fail in that loop.
  4. Carry a head-comment block matching the in-source justification from the original ci.yml entry: the audit-finding reference, the closure rationale, the exempt-surface list (if any).
  5. Use set -e early to fail-fast on internal command errors.
  6. Produce no output on the happy path beyond a final echo "<id>: clean." confirmation line.

Helpers vs guards

Scripts that consume input artifacts (a test-output log, a coverage.out file) or env vars (PR_NUMBER, GH_TOKEN) are HELPERS, not guards. They live in scripts/, NOT scripts/ci-guards/.

Current helpers:

  • scripts/vendor-e2e-skip-check.sh — consumes test-output.log arg from the deploy-vendor-e2e job
  • scripts/coverage-pr-comment.sh — consumes coverage.out + PR_NUMBER + GH_TOKEN env from the go-build-and-test job
  • scripts/check-coverage-thresholds.sh — consumes coverage.out
    • .github/coverage-thresholds.yml
  • scripts/qa-doc-part-count.sh + scripts/qa-doc-seed-count.sh — invoked via make verify-docs pre-tag, not in CI

Adding a new guard

  1. Drop a new <id>.sh in this directory with the head-comment block describing the audit finding it closes.
  2. Make it executable: chmod +x scripts/ci-guards/<id>.sh.
  3. Verify it fails on a deliberate regression and passes on clean repo.
  4. CI auto-picks up new scripts via the for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh loop in the Regression guards step — no ci.yml change required.

The 22 guards in this directory

ID Finding Catches
G-1-jwt-auth-literal G-1 JWT silent auth downgrade "jwt" literal in additive auth-type surfaces
L-001-insecure-skip-verify L-001 unjustified InsecureSkipVerify InsecureSkipVerify: true without //nolint:gosec
H-001-bare-from H-001 (CWE-829) tag-swap attack Bare FROM line without @sha256 digest pin
M-012-no-root-user M-012 (CWE-250) container-as-root Dockerfile missing terminal USER <non-root>
H-009-readme-jwt H-009 README JWT advertising README.md re-introducing JWT-as-supported claim
G-2-api-key-hash-json G-2 cat-s5-apikey_leak api_key_hash in JSON-emitting surface
U-2-plaintext-healthcheck U-2 healthcheck protocol mismatch Plaintext http:// in HEALTHCHECK directive
U-3-migration-mount U-3 seed initdb schema drift Migration file mounted into postgres initdb
D-1-D-2-statusbadge-phantom D-1 + D-2 dead keys + TS phantoms StatusBadge dead keys + 5 Certificate / 5 Agent / 1 Issuer / 1 Notification phantom fields
L-1-bulk-action-loop L-1 client-side bulk loops for ... await triggerRenewal/updateCertificate in CertificatesPage
B-1-orphan-crud B-1 orphan-CRUD client fns 8 update/create/delete fns lose their page consumer
S-2-strings-contains-err S-2 brittle error-dispatch strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"|"violates foreign key") in handlers
G-3-env-docs-drift G-3 env-var docs drift CERTCTL_* env var defined OR documented but not both
test-naming-convention I-001-extended func TestXxx (lowercase first letter) — Go silently skips
S-1-hardcoded-source-counts S-1 stale numeric prose Hardcoded "N issuer connectors" / "N MCP tools" in README + docs
P-1-documented-orphan-fns P-1 documented orphans 16 read-fn names removed from client.ts exports
T-1-frontend-page-coverage T-1 untested frontend pages New page in web/src/pages/ without sibling .test.tsx and not on the deferred allowlist
bundle-8-L-015-target-blank-rel-noopener L-015 (CWE-1022) reverse-tabnabbing target="_blank" without rel="noopener noreferrer"
bundle-8-L-019-dangerously-set-inner-html L-019 (CWE-79) XSS dangerouslySetInnerHTML outside safeHtml.ts
bundle-8-M-009-bare-usemutation M-009 + M-029 mutation contract Bare useMutation() outside useTrackedMutation wrapper
H-1-encryption-key-min-length H-1 closure follow-up (post-Phase-5 surfacing) CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY literal in any deploy/docker-compose*.yml shorter than the 32-byte floor enforced by internal/config/config.go::Validate()
test-compose-scep-coherence post-Phase-5 surfacing of dead SCEP test config CERTCTL_SCEP_ENABLED=true in test compose without (a) a CI job that runs the SCEP integration test, (b) the ra.crt + ra.key + intune_trust_anchor.pem fixtures committed to deploy/test/fixtures/, AND (c) the matching volume mount

Guards explicitly NOT here

  • QA-doc Part-count drift + QA-doc seed-count drift — these protect docs-the-operator-reads, not anything the product depends on. Moved to make verify-docs (operator runs pre-tag, not on every push). See the ci-pipeline-cleanup spec, Phase 11.

Running the full set locally

for g in scripts/ci-guards/*.sh; do
  echo "=== $(basename "$g") ==="
  bash "$g" || echo "  FAILED"
done