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shankar0123
a849c8b8cf
Bundle 2 closure (2026-05-12 acquisition diligence audit). Closes the
"docker compose up == accidental production" hazard: pre-Bundle-2 the
base deploy/docker-compose.yml WAS the demo path (AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true + KEYGEN_MODE=server + DEMO_SEED=true + literal
change-me-... placeholder creds), the README claimed "drop the demo
overlay for a clean install", and ENVIRONMENTS.md table documented
auth-type default as api-key — three contradictory stories layered on
the same compose file.
Source findings closed:
R2 R3 C1 D9 finding-2 S9 (repo audit)
SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6 (cowork audit)
Compose split (deploy/docker-compose.yml + deploy/docker-compose.demo.yml):
The base now ships production-shaped — no AUTH_TYPE override, no
KEYGEN_MODE override, no DEMO_MODE_ACK, no DEMO_SEED, no literal
placeholder fallbacks. POSTGRES_PASSWORD / CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET /
CERTCTL_CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY / CERTCTL_API_KEY / CERTCTL_AGENT_ID
must come from deploy/.env (sample template in deploy/.env.example +
root .env.example). The demo overlay carries the full demo posture
(every env var + every placeholder credential) so the
`-f docker-compose.demo.yml` one-flag flip remains a zero-config
populated-dashboard path.
Fail-closed startup guards (internal/config/config.go::Validate):
Three new gates layered on the existing HIGH-12 demo-mode listen-bind
guard. All three exempt CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true so the demo overlay
keeps working:
• HIGH-6: AUTH_SECRET = "change-me-in-production" → refuse
• HIGH-6: CONFIG_ENCRYPTION_KEY = "change-me-32-char..." → refuse
• LOW-5: CORS_ORIGINS contains "*" (CWE-942 + CWE-352) → refuse
Visible DEMO MODE banner (cmd/server/main.go): every boot under
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true now emits a prominent WARN line with a 6-step
production-promotion checklist. The 2026-04-19 incident (a screenshot
run that kept running for three days) drove this; the per-startup
banner makes the posture unmissable in any log scraper.
Agent enrollment doc alignment:
• docs/reference/configuration.md L83: corrected the non-existent
URL `POST /api/v1/agents/register` to the real route
`POST /api/v1/agents`; added the bootstrap-token note and the
install-agent.sh handoff sequence.
• docs/reference/architecture.md L154: replaced "agents register
themselves at first heartbeat" (false — cmd/agent/main.go fail-
fasts when CERTCTL_AGENT_ID is unset) with the actual two-step
operator-driven flow (REST or GUI registration first, returned ID
fed to install-agent.sh second).
Tests + CI guard:
• 9 new TestValidate_Bundle2_* cases in internal/config/config_test.go
covering: placeholder-secret refused + demo-ack exempt; placeholder
encryption-key refused + demo-ack exempt; real key not mistaken for
placeholder; wildcard CORS refused + demo-ack exempt; wildcard mixed
into a concrete allowlist still refused; concrete allowlist accepted.
• scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh: greps the base
compose for any of the demo-mode env vars + placeholder credentials.
Comments stripped before checking so the narrative header in the
base file can still reference the overlay's posture in prose.
Cold-DB CI smoke (.github/workflows/ci.yml::cold-db-compose-smoke):
Switched to layering -f docker-compose.demo.yml on top of the base —
the new production base requires real env vars the smoke doesn't have,
and the smoke's purpose (catch migration-on-cold-DB regressions + the
bootstrap-token mint path) is orthogonal to which auth posture the
boot lands in.
Receipts:
• Current first-run truth table
compose flag → posture
-f docker-compose.yml (production)
→ requires .env;
fail-fasts on
missing AUTH_SECRET
/ CONFIG_ENCRYPTION
_KEY / POSTGRES
_PASSWORD; agent
fail-fasts on
missing AGENT_ID
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.demo.yml (demo)
→ zero-config;
AUTH_TYPE=none +
DEMO_MODE_ACK=true
+ KEYGEN=server +
DEMO_SEED=true;
boot banner WARN
-f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.dev.yml (dev)
→ base + PgAdmin
+ debug logging
-f docker-compose.test.yml (test, standalone)
→ production-shape
posture, real CA
backends
• Verification (PATH=/tmp/go/bin export GO* paths to /tmp):
gofmt -l # clean (no diffs)
go vet ./internal/config ./cmd/server # clean
go test -short -count=1 ./internal/config/... # PASS (cumulative +
all 9 new Bundle 2
cases green)
go test -short -count=1 # PASS (no regression
./internal/connector/target/configcheck in the Bundle 1 -
closure tests)
go build ./cmd/server ./cmd/agent # clean
./cmd/cli ./cmd/mcp-server
bash scripts/ci-guards/B2-compose-base-no-demo-env.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/H-1-encryption-key-min-length.sh # clean
bash scripts/ci-guards/G-3-env-docs-drift.sh # clean
Remaining operator warnings (not blocking; tracked in CLAUDE.md
"Open decisions"):
• The first `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d` against a
pre-Bundle-2 .env (placeholder values still in place) will now
fail-fast. This is the intended posture but operators upgrading
from v2.0.x via .env-from-old-master need to rotate before
upgrading. The CHANGELOG note for the v2.1.0 release should
call this out alongside Auth Bundle 2's other breaking changes.
Audit-Closes: BUNDLE-2 R2 R3 C1 D9 S9 SEC-H2 SEC-M1 SEC-M3 OPS-M3 LOW-5 HIGH-6
certctl Documentation
Last reviewed: 2026-05-12
The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.
For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo README.md at the root. For the marketing site, see certctl.io.
Getting Started
You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Concepts | TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary |
| Quickstart | Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour |
| Examples | Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer |
| Advanced demo | End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step |
| Why certctl | Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere |
Reference
You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Architecture | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
| Profiles | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (with profile-edit closure) |
| API | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
| CLI | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
| Configuration | CERTCTL_* environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
| MCP server | Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants |
| Release verification | Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure |
| Intermediate CA hierarchy | Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement |
| Auth standards implemented | RFC + CWE evidence for the API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass surface (NOT a compliance-mapping doc) |
| Deployment model | Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets |
| Vendor matrix | Tested vendor versions per target connector |
Connectors
The connector index is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.
Issuers (13 deep-dives): ACME · ADCS · AWS ACM Private CA · DigiCert · EJBCA / Keyfactor · Entrust · GlobalSign Atlas HVCA · Google CAS · Local CA · OpenSSL / Custom CA · Sectigo SCM · step-ca / Smallstep · Vault PKI
Targets (15 deep-dives): Apache · AWS Certificate Manager · Azure Key Vault · Caddy · Envoy · F5 BIG-IP · HAProxy · IIS · Java Keystore · Kubernetes Secrets · NGINX · Postfix / Dovecot · SSH (agentless) · Traefik · Windows Certificate Store
Protocols
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| ACME server | Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server |
| ACME server threat model | Security posture for the ACME server endpoint |
| SCEP server | RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route |
| SCEP for Microsoft Intune | Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook |
| EST server | RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding |
| CRL & OCSP | RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties |
| Async CA polling | Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors |
Operator
You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Security posture | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass, bootstrap |
| RBAC operator reference | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + day-0 bootstrap |
| Auth threat model | API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass — token forgery, session hijacking, IdP compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation |
| OIDC / SSO runbooks | Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace |
| Control plane TLS | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
| Database TLS | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
| Approval workflow | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + profile-edit closure |
| Helm deployment | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
| Performance baselines | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
| Auth benchmarks | Session + OIDC validation p99 targets and measured baselines |
| Legacy clients (TLS 1.2) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
Runbooks
| Runbook | When |
|---|---|
| Cloud targets | AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback |
| Expiry alerts | Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers |
| Disaster recovery | CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore |
Migration
You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.
| From | Doc |
|---|---|
| Certbot | migration/from-certbot.md |
| acme.sh | migration/from-acmesh.md |
| cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) | migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md |
| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | migration/acme-from-caddy.md |
| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md |
| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | migration/acme-from-traefik.md |
| API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0) | migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — AUDIT YOUR API KEYS post-upgrade |
| Enable OIDC SSO | migration/oidc-enable.md — step-by-step OIDC onboarding for an existing API-key + RBAC deployment |
Contributor
You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Testing strategy | What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan |
| Test environment | Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.) |
| QA prerequisites | Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars |
| QA test suite | qa_test.go reference for release QA |
| GUI QA checklist | Manual GUI verification pass for release |
| Release sign-off | Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification |
| CI pipeline | CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks |
| CI guards | Per-class CI guards (code-shape, contract-parity, build/dep, operational); how to add one |
Archive
Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.
| Doc | Why archived |
|---|---|
| Upgrade to TLS (v2.2) | Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure |
| Upgrade past v2 JWT removal | G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure |
Reading order by role
First-time operator: Concepts → Quickstart → Examples. About 90 minutes end to end.
Production operator: Architecture → Security posture → Control plane TLS → Disaster recovery runbook. About 4 hours end to end.
PKI engineer: ACME server → SCEP server → EST server → Intermediate CA hierarchy. About 6 hours end to end.
Contributor: Architecture → Testing strategy → Test environment → CI pipeline. About 3 hours end to end.