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1d01c87663
break-glass admin (Argon2id, lockout, default-OFF, surface-invisibility)
Phase 7 — OIDC first-admin bootstrap (Decision 3):
- Optional AdminBootstrapHook closure on *oidc.Service. When wired,
HandleCallback consults the hook AFTER group resolution + user
upsert and BEFORE the empty-mapping fail-closed check. Hook
receives (providerID, groups, userID); returns grantAdmin=true
when the user matches CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS AND no
admin exists yet in the tenant.
- cmd/server/main.go wires the hook as a closure that:
* Filters by CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID (if configured).
* Probes AdminExists via authActorRoleRepo (admin-already-exists
silently returns false; bootstrap mode is one-shot per tenant).
* Walks group intersection.
* On match: grants r-admin via authActorRoleRepo.Grant + emits
the bootstrap.oidc_first_admin audit row with
event_category=auth + INFO log.
- Coexists with the Bundle 1 env-var-token bootstrap. Both paths
can be configured; first match wins (admin-existence probe
short-circuits the second).
- HandleCallback's empty-mapping fail-closed check moved AFTER the
hook so a fresh deployment with zero group_role_mappings can
still mint the first admin.
- 5 tests in service_test.go: hook grants admin on match, hook
returns false preserves empty-mapping fail-closed, admin-already-
exists silently falls through to normal mapping, hook-error wraps
+ bubbles, idempotent when admin is already in the mapped role set.
Phase 7.5 — Break-glass admin (Decision 4, default-OFF):
Migration 000038 ships:
- breakglass_credentials table — at-most-one-credential-per-actor
(UNIQUE(actor_id)), Argon2id PHC-format password_hash, lockout
state machine (failure_count, locked_until, last_failure_at).
FK CASCADE on users(id) so deleting a user atomically removes
their credential.
- Two new permissions seeded into r-admin only:
auth.breakglass.admin — set/rotate/unlock/remove credentials.
auth.breakglass.login — actor uses break-glass to log in.
CanonicalPermissions extended in lockstep.
internal/auth/breakglass/service.go (~580 LOC):
- Service.Enabled() reflects CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED.
- SetPassword: Argon2id with OWASP 2024 params (m=64MiB, t=3, p=4,
salt=16 random bytes, output=32 bytes); per-password random salt;
PHC-format hash output. Min 12 / max 256 byte input.
- Authenticate: constant-time-compare via subtle.ConstantTimeCompare
on every code path. Identical 401 + identical timing across the
wrong-password / locked-account / non-existent-actor paths so an
attacker cannot probe whether a given actor has break-glass
configured. Non-existent-actor + locked-account paths run a
verifyDummy() Argon2id pass for timing parity. Lockout state
machine: failure_count++ on every wrong attempt; threshold (default
5) trips locked_until = NOW() + duration (default 15m). Successful
Authenticate resets the counter. Reset-window: failures aged out
after CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL (default 1h)
auto-reset on next attempt.
- Unlock + RemoveCredential: admin-only (auth.breakglass.admin
gated at the router via rbacGate). Audit rows on every operation.
- All public methods refuse to act when Enabled()==false (returns
ErrDisabled; the handler maps to HTTP 404 — surface invisibility).
internal/repository/postgres/breakglass.go ships the 5-method
postgres impl with atomic single-statement IncrementFailure (so
concurrent racing wrong-password attempts can't observe an
intermediate state and slip past the threshold) and idempotent
ResetFailureCount.
internal/api/handler/auth_breakglass.go ships the 4-endpoint HTTP
surface:
- POST /auth/breakglass/login (auth-exempt; 5/min rate-limited per
source IP via the existing rate limiter; returns 404 when
disabled). On success sets the post-login session cookie + CSRF
cookie via SessionService.Create + 204. On any failure:
uniform 401 + identical timing (the service has already audited
the specific failure category).
- POST /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials (auth.breakglass.admin)
- POST /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}/unlock
(auth.breakglass.admin)
- DELETE /api/v1/auth/breakglass/credentials/{actor_id}
(auth.breakglass.admin)
Admin endpoints share the surface-invisibility property: when
CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false, every admin endpoint also returns
404 (not 403) so probing via the admin surface gets the same signal
as probing the login endpoint.
Tests (internal/auth/breakglass/service_test.go):
All 8 Phase 7.5 spec-mandated negative cases:
1. Service.Enabled()==false → all ops return ErrDisabled.
2. Wrong password → ErrInvalidCredentials, failure_count++,
audit row with event_category=auth.
3. Failure_count exceeds threshold → locked, subsequent attempts
(including with the CORRECT password) return identical-shape
401 while the lockout window holds.
4. Lockout window expires → next attempt with correct password
succeeds + resets the counter.
5. Password < 12 bytes (or > 256 bytes) → ErrWeakPassword.
6. Password leak hygiene — the service has zero slog calls; the
audit-row map literal never includes the password plaintext.
7. Argon2id hash never appears in logs OR API responses — pinned
by `json:"-"` tag on BreakglassCredential.PasswordHash + a
belt-and-braces json.Marshal probe asserting the hash bytes
never appear in the marshaled output.
8. Constant-time-compare verified via timing-statistical test —
wrong-password vs no-credential paths take statistically
indistinguishable time (within 5x ratio). The verifyDummy()
hash compute on the no-credential + locked paths is what
keeps timing parity; absent that, an attacker could side-
channel "actor doesn't have a credential" via timing.
Plus coverage-lift batch covering: SetPassword first-time vs rotate,
no-caller-id rejection, no-target-id rejection, RNG failure surface,
Authenticate happy-path mints session, no-credential audit row,
session-mint-failure surface, FailureResetInterval recycle, Unlock
+ RemoveCredential happy paths, hash-format unit tests (round-trip,
mismatch, malformed/wrong-version/bad-base64 formats), nil-audit +
nil-session pass-through.
Coverage on internal/auth/breakglass/ at 91.5% per-statement (above
the Phase 7.5 spec ≥ 90% floor).
cmd/server/main.go wiring:
- Constructs breakglassRepo + breakglassService + breakglassHandler
after the OIDC service block.
- breakglassSessionMinterAdapter shim bridges *session.Service.Create
to the breakglass.SessionMinter port.
- Logs WARN at boot when CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=true (operator
visibility for the deliberate SSO-bypass).
internal/config/config.go gains:
- AuthConfig.BootstrapAdminGroups + BootstrapOIDCProviderID for
Phase 7 (CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_ADMIN_GROUPS comma-list +
CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_OIDC_PROVIDER_ID).
- AuthConfig.Breakglass nested struct with 4 env vars
(CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED + LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD + LOCKOUT_DURATION
+ LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL).
Router wiring:
- 4 new breakglass routes registered when reg.AuthBreakglass != nil;
public login route via direct r.mux.Handle (auth-exempt), 3 admin
routes via r.Register + rbacGate(auth.breakglass.admin).
- POST /auth/breakglass/login pinned in AuthExemptRouterRoutes
allowlist with Phase 7.5 justification.
- SpecParityExceptions extended with 4 new entries documenting
the Phase 7.5 deferral of full per-endpoint OpenAPI rows
(handler doc-block at the top of auth_breakglass.go is the
operator-facing reference).
Threat model (encoded in service.go + auth_breakglass.go doc-blocks
+ migration 000038 docstrings, to be promoted to docs/operator/auth-
threat-model.md in Phase 12):
- Break-glass is a deliberate bypass of the SSO security boundary.
An attacker who phishes the password OR finds it in a compromised
password manager bypasses MFA, OIDC, and every group-claim gate.
- Recommendation: keep CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED=false in steady-
state. Enable only during SSO-broken incidents. Disable after
recovery.
- WebAuthn pairing (v3 per Decision 12) is the load-bearing second
factor. Without it, break-glass is best treated as an emergency-
only path.
- Audit trail surfaces every break-glass action under
event_category=auth; the auditor role can monitor for unexpected
break-glass logins.
Verifications: gofmt clean, go vet clean across all touched packages,
go test -short -count=1 green across internal/auth/oidc (3.0s; new
Phase 7 hook tests integrated alongside the 21+ Phase 3 negatives),
internal/auth/breakglass (3.6s; 8 spec-mandated negatives + coverage
batch passing), internal/config + internal/domain/auth + internal/api/
router + internal/api/handler all green, no regressions in Bundle 1
packages.
107 lines
5.0 KiB
PL/PgSQL
107 lines
5.0 KiB
PL/PgSQL
-- 000038_breakglass_credentials.up.sql
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-- Auth Bundle 2 / Phase 7.5: break-glass admin (local password,
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-- Argon2id + lockout, default-OFF).
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--
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-- Decision 4: enabled per-deployment via CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_ENABLED;
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-- the entire surface is invisible (handler returns 404, not 403) when
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-- disabled. Paired with WebAuthn 2FA in v3 (Decision 12). Threat model
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-- explicit: enabling break-glass is a deliberate bypass of the SSO
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-- security boundary; an attacker who phishes the password OR finds it
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-- in a compromised password manager bypasses MFA, OIDC, and every
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-- group-claim gate. Operators turn it on during SSO incidents and
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-- turn it off after recovery.
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--
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-- Two things land here:
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--
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-- 1. breakglass_credentials table — at most one row per actor
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-- (UNIQUE(actor_id)). Stores the Argon2id PHC-format password
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-- hash + lockout state machine (failure_count, locked_until,
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-- last_failure_at). The service layer's Authenticate path does
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-- constant-time-compare against the hash AND maintains identical
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-- timing/error-shape parity for the wrong-password / locked-
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-- account / non-existent-actor paths so an attacker can't probe
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-- whether a given actor has break-glass configured.
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--
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-- 2. Two new permissions extending the canonical catalogue:
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-- auth.breakglass.admin — set/rotate/unlock/remove break-glass
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-- credentials. Granted to r-admin.
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-- auth.breakglass.login — the actor itself uses break-glass to
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-- log in. Granted automatically by
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-- SetPassword to the target actor's
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-- row in actor_roles (scope=global so
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-- the lockup state machine applies
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-- uniformly).
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--
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-- All operations idempotent. Wrapped in a single transaction.
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BEGIN;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- breakglass_credentials table
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-- =============================================================================
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS breakglass_credentials (
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-- id is the prefix-`bg-` opaque identifier. One row per actor;
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-- the (actor_id) UNIQUE index pins the cardinality.
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id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
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tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 't-default'
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REFERENCES tenants(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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-- actor_id references users(id); ON DELETE CASCADE so deleting a
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-- user atomically removes their break-glass credential.
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actor_id TEXT NOT NULL
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REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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-- Argon2id PHC-format string: $argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=4$
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-- <salt-base64>$<hash-base64>. NEVER stored in plaintext; the
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-- domain type's PasswordHash field is `json:"-"` so a misconfigured
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-- handler that marshals the row directly cannot wire-leak the hash.
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password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
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last_password_change_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
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-- Lockout state machine. failure_count increments on every wrong-
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-- password attempt; when it crosses CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_THRESHOLD
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-- (default 5) the row is locked for CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_DURATION
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-- (default 15m). After CERTCTL_BREAKGLASS_LOCKOUT_RESET_INTERVAL of
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-- idleness (default 1h since last_failure_at) the counter resets.
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failure_count INT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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locked_until TIMESTAMPTZ NULL,
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last_failure_at TIMESTAMPTZ NULL,
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CONSTRAINT breakglass_failure_count_non_negative
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CHECK (failure_count >= 0)
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);
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-- At-most-one-credential-per-actor invariant.
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CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_breakglass_credentials_actor_id
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ON breakglass_credentials (actor_id);
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-- Index for "is this actor currently locked" hot path during the
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-- Authenticate fast-fail check.
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CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_breakglass_credentials_locked_until
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ON breakglass_credentials (locked_until)
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WHERE locked_until IS NOT NULL;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Two new permissions extending the Bundle 1 + Bundle 2 catalogue.
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-- =============================================================================
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INSERT INTO permissions (id, name, namespace) VALUES
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('p-auth-breakglass-admin', 'auth.breakglass.admin', 'auth.breakglass'),
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('p-auth-breakglass-login', 'auth.breakglass.login', 'auth.breakglass')
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ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING;
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-- Grant auth.breakglass.admin to r-admin only by default. The role-
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-- permission API can rotate this post-deploy if the operator wants
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-- a dedicated "break-glass operator" role.
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INSERT INTO role_permissions (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id)
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SELECT 'r-admin', id, 'global', NULL
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FROM permissions
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WHERE id IN ('p-auth-breakglass-admin', 'p-auth-breakglass-login')
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ON CONFLICT (role_id, permission_id, scope_type, scope_id) DO NOTHING;
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COMMIT;
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