Files
certctl/internal/connector/issuer/local/ocsp_responder_test.go
T
shankar0123 a0b7f7da9d ocsp/responder: dedicated OCSP responder cert per issuer (RFC 6960 §2.6)
Phase 2 of the CRL/OCSP responder bundle. Stops signing OCSP responses
with the CA private key directly; the local issuer now bootstraps a
dedicated responder cert + key per issuer, persists them, and rotates
within a grace window before expiry.

Why this matters:

  - Every relying-party OCSP poll today triggers a CA-key signing op.
    With this change those polls hit a cheap responder key; the CA key
    only signs at responder bootstrap / rotation (rare).
  - When the CA key lives on an HSM (PKCS#11 driver, V3-Pro item 3),
    the dedicated responder removes the per-poll-HSM-op pressure.
  - Carries id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2.1) so OCSP clients
    do NOT recursively check the responder cert's revocation status.

What landed:

  * migration 000020_ocsp_responder.up.sql (+down) — ocsp_responders table
    keyed by issuer_id; rotated_from records the prior cert serial for
    audit; not_after index drives the rotation scheduler query
  * internal/domain/ocsp_responder.go — OCSPResponder type + NeedsRotation
    helper (configurable grace window; default 7 days before expiry)
  * internal/repository/postgres/ocsp_responder.go — Postgres impl with
    upsert-on-Put + ListExpiring for the future rotation scheduler
  * internal/repository/interfaces.go — OCSPResponderRepository interface
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/ocsp_responder.go — bootstrap +
    rotation logic; under c.mu so concurrent first-call OCSP requests
    don't double-bootstrap; recovers gracefully from corrupt key ref
    or corrupt cert PEM rather than failing the OCSP request
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/local.go:
    - Connector struct gains optional dependencies (ocspResponderRepo,
      signerDriver, issuerID, rotation grace, validity, key dir)
    - Set*() helpers for each dep matching the existing SCEPService
      pattern (SetProfileRepo / SetProfileID)
    - SignOCSPResponse refactored: ensureOCSPResponder dispatches on
      whether deps are wired; fallback path (deps unset) preserves
      pre-Phase-2 behavior of signing with CA key directly
  * internal/connector/issuer/local/ocsp_responder_test.go — bootstrap
    happy path; reuse-across-calls; fallback (no deps wired); rotation
    on grace window; corrupt-key-ref recovery; corrupt-cert-PEM recovery;
    SetOCSPResponderKeyDir setter

Coverage: local issuer 86.3% (above CI floor of 86; was 86.5% before
Phase 2 added ~140 LoC of new code). The recovered-from-drop tests are
real behavior tests of the new error paths I introduced, not
coverage-game artifacts.

Backward compat: unchanged for any caller that doesn't wire the
responder deps. The factory at internal/connector/issuerfactory/factory.go
still calls local.New(&cfg, logger) with no responder wiring; OCSP
responses continue to be signed by the CA key directly until the
operator wires the deps. cmd/server/main.go wiring lands in Phase 3
alongside the CRL cache service.
2026-04-28 23:55:52 +00:00

368 lines
13 KiB
Go

package local_test
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/asn1"
"encoding/pem"
"io"
"log/slog"
"math/big"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/issuer/local"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/crypto/signer"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// fakeResponderRepo is an in-memory repository.OCSPResponderRepository
// for tests that exercise the responder bootstrap path without needing
// a real Postgres + testcontainers harness. The Postgres impl is
// covered by the testcontainers tests in
// internal/repository/postgres/ocsp_responder_test.go (CI only — needs
// Docker).
type fakeResponderRepo struct {
mu sync.Mutex
rows map[string]*domain.OCSPResponder
putCount int // bumped on every Put for assertion
getCount int
}
func newFakeResponderRepo() *fakeResponderRepo {
return &fakeResponderRepo{rows: map[string]*domain.OCSPResponder{}}
}
func (r *fakeResponderRepo) Get(ctx context.Context, issuerID string) (*domain.OCSPResponder, error) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.getCount++
if row, ok := r.rows[issuerID]; ok {
// Return a copy so callers can't mutate our state.
copy := *row
return &copy, nil
}
return nil, nil
}
func (r *fakeResponderRepo) Put(ctx context.Context, responder *domain.OCSPResponder) error {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.putCount++
copy := *responder
r.rows[responder.IssuerID] = &copy
return nil
}
func (r *fakeResponderRepo) ListExpiring(ctx context.Context, grace time.Duration, now time.Time) ([]*domain.OCSPResponder, error) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
var out []*domain.OCSPResponder
threshold := now.Add(grace)
for _, row := range r.rows {
if !row.NotAfter.After(threshold) {
copy := *row
out = append(out, &copy)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// helper: build a Connector wired for the responder bootstrap path.
func newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t *testing.T) (*local.Connector, *fakeResponderRepo) {
t.Helper()
conn := local.New(&local.Config{
CACommonName: "Test Local CA",
ValidityDays: 30,
}, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
repo := newFakeResponderRepo()
driver := signer.NewMemoryDriver()
conn.SetOCSPResponderRepo(repo)
conn.SetSignerDriver(driver)
conn.SetIssuerID("iss-test-local")
return conn, repo
}
// helper: forge an OCSP request for a given serial. The local connector's
// SignOCSPResponse takes a typed request struct, not raw OCSP bytes.
func ocspReqFor(serial *big.Int, status int) issuer.OCSPSignRequest {
now := time.Now().UTC()
return issuer.OCSPSignRequest{
CertSerial: serial,
CertStatus: status,
ThisUpdate: now,
NextUpdate: now.Add(24 * time.Hour),
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Phase-2 bootstrap path coverage.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestSignOCSPResponse_DedicatedResponder_Bootstrapped(t *testing.T) {
conn, repo := newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t)
ctx := context.Background()
respBytes, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(0xDEAD), 0))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignOCSPResponse: %v", err)
}
if len(respBytes) == 0 {
t.Fatal("OCSP response is empty")
}
// Verify the responder row was persisted.
if repo.putCount != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected exactly 1 Put on first call, got %d", repo.putCount)
}
row, _ := repo.Get(ctx, "iss-test-local")
if row == nil {
t.Fatal("responder row was not persisted")
}
if row.KeyAlg != "ECDSA-P256" {
t.Errorf("KeyAlg = %q, want ECDSA-P256 (the bootstrap default)", row.KeyAlg)
}
if row.NotAfter.Sub(row.NotBefore) < 24*time.Hour {
t.Errorf("validity window too short: %v", row.NotAfter.Sub(row.NotBefore))
}
// Parse the responder cert and check the OCSP-specific properties.
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(row.CertPEM))
if block == nil {
t.Fatal("responder CertPEM is not PEM")
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse responder cert: %v", err)
}
// EKU must include OCSPSigning per RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2.
hasOCSPSigning := false
for _, eku := range cert.ExtKeyUsage {
if eku == x509.ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning {
hasOCSPSigning = true
break
}
}
if !hasOCSPSigning {
t.Error("responder cert missing ExtKeyUsageOCSPSigning")
}
// id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck (RFC 6960 §4.2.2.2.1) — verify the extension OID
// shows up in the cert's Extensions list. The Go stdlib does not
// promote this extension into a typed field; check ExtraExtensions
// equivalent via the raw Extensions slice.
noCheckOID := asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 3, 6, 1, 5, 5, 7, 48, 1, 5}
hasNoCheck := false
for _, ext := range cert.Extensions {
if ext.Id.Equal(noCheckOID) {
hasNoCheck = true
break
}
}
if !hasNoCheck {
t.Error("responder cert missing id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension")
}
// The OCSP response should be signed by the responder cert, not by
// the CA cert. Parse the response with the issuer cert as the trust
// anchor — ocsp.ParseResponse reads the certificates field from the
// response itself and verifies the chain back to issuer.
caPEM, err := conn.GetCACertPEM(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetCACertPEM: %v", err)
}
caBlock, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(caPEM))
caCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(caBlock.Bytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse CA cert: %v", err)
}
parsedResp, err := ocsp.ParseResponse(respBytes, caCert)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseResponse with CA as issuer: %v", err)
}
if parsedResp.SerialNumber.Cmp(big.NewInt(0xDEAD)) != 0 {
t.Errorf("response serial mismatch: got %v want %v", parsedResp.SerialNumber, 0xDEAD)
}
if parsedResp.Status != ocsp.Good {
t.Errorf("response status = %d, want Good (0)", parsedResp.Status)
}
// The response's Certificate field should be the responder cert
// (NOT the CA cert) — that's the proof the dedicated-responder
// path was taken.
if parsedResp.Certificate == nil {
t.Fatal("OCSP response did not include the responder cert")
}
if parsedResp.Certificate.Subject.CommonName == caCert.Subject.CommonName {
t.Errorf("OCSP response was signed by the CA, not by a dedicated responder cert")
}
}
func TestSignOCSPResponse_DedicatedResponder_ReusedAcrossCalls(t *testing.T) {
conn, repo := newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t)
ctx := context.Background()
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
_, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(int64(i+1)), 0))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignOCSPResponse[%d]: %v", i, err)
}
}
// Bootstrap on first call only — subsequent calls should reuse the
// persisted responder. putCount > 1 means we re-bootstrapped (bug).
if repo.putCount != 1 {
t.Errorf("putCount = %d, want 1 (responder should be reused across calls)", repo.putCount)
}
}
func TestSignOCSPResponse_FallbackPath_NoResponderDeps(t *testing.T) {
// Construct a connector WITHOUT responder deps wired. SignOCSPResponse
// must fall back to the historical CA-key-direct path and not error.
conn := local.New(&local.Config{ValidityDays: 30}, slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
ctx := context.Background()
respBytes, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(0xCAFE), 0))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fallback SignOCSPResponse: %v", err)
}
if len(respBytes) == 0 {
t.Fatal("fallback OCSP response is empty")
}
// The fallback path uses the CA cert as the responder — the response
// bytes parse against the CA cert successfully.
caPEM, err := conn.GetCACertPEM(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetCACertPEM: %v", err)
}
block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(caPEM))
caCert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse CA cert: %v", err)
}
if _, err := ocsp.ParseResponse(respBytes, caCert); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("fallback OCSP response should validate against CA cert: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSignOCSPResponse_DedicatedResponder_RecoversFromCorruptKeyRef(t *testing.T) {
// Simulate the failure mode where the persisted responder row points
// at a key the signer driver can't load (e.g., operator deleted the
// key file out from under us). The bootstrap path should recover by
// generating a fresh responder rather than failing the OCSP request.
conn, repo := newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t)
ctx := context.Background()
// Pre-populate the repo with a stale row whose KeyPath the
// MemoryDriver doesn't know about. MemoryDriver.Load returns an
// "unknown ref" error for any ref it didn't issue.
stale := &domain.OCSPResponder{
IssuerID: "iss-test-local",
CertPEM: "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nbm90LWEtcmVhbC1jZXJ0\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
CertSerial: "01",
KeyPath: "mem-NEVER-ISSUED",
KeyAlg: "ECDSA-P256",
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(30 * 24 * time.Hour), // far future, NOT in rotation grace
}
if err := repo.Put(ctx, stale); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed stale row: %v", err)
}
repo.putCount = 0 // reset so the bootstrap-triggered Put is the only one we count
// First SignOCSPResponse should detect the bad KeyPath, log a warning,
// and bootstrap a fresh responder.
if _, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(0xBEEF), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignOCSPResponse should recover from corrupt key ref, got: %v", err)
}
if repo.putCount != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected fresh bootstrap on corrupt key ref, putCount=%d", repo.putCount)
}
row := repo.rows["iss-test-local"]
if row.CertSerial == "01" {
t.Error("responder row was not replaced after corrupt key ref recovery")
}
}
func TestSignOCSPResponse_DedicatedResponder_KeyDirSetter(t *testing.T) {
// Pin the SetOCSPResponderKeyDir path. The MemoryDriver doesn't
// honor the dir (it generates in-memory refs), so this is purely a
// no-side-effect coverage pin for the setter.
conn, _ := newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t)
conn.SetOCSPResponderKeyDir(t.TempDir())
if _, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(context.Background(), ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(7), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignOCSPResponse with key dir set: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSignOCSPResponse_DedicatedResponder_RecoversFromCorruptCertPEM(t *testing.T) {
// Companion to the corrupt-key-ref test: this time the key loads
// fine but the persisted CertPEM is not a CERTIFICATE block. The
// bootstrap should detect via parseSinglePEMCert and re-issue.
conn, repo := newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t)
ctx := context.Background()
// Generate a real key via the MemoryDriver so the load succeeds, then
// pair it with an INVALID cert PEM (PRIVATE KEY block instead of
// CERTIFICATE). MemoryDriver.Generate stores the key under a fresh
// "mem-N" ref; we capture that ref by triggering a Generate and
// pulling the row out of the repo.
if _, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(1), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("seed bootstrap: %v", err)
}
row := repo.rows["iss-test-local"]
row.CertPEM = "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nbm9wZQ==\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
repo.rows["iss-test-local"] = row
repo.putCount = 0
if _, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(2), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("SignOCSPResponse should recover from corrupt cert PEM, got: %v", err)
}
if repo.putCount != 1 {
t.Errorf("expected fresh bootstrap on corrupt cert PEM, putCount=%d", repo.putCount)
}
}
func TestSignOCSPResponse_DedicatedResponder_RotatesWithinGrace(t *testing.T) {
conn, repo := newConnectorWithResponderDeps(t)
ctx := context.Background()
// Use a short validity + matching grace so the first bootstrap
// produces a cert that immediately falls inside the rotation
// window on the next call. validity = 5m, grace = 10m → freshly-
// bootstrapped cert expires in 5m which is < 10m grace → rotate.
conn.SetOCSPResponderValidity(5 * time.Minute)
conn.SetOCSPResponderRotationGrace(10 * time.Minute)
if _, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(1), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first SignOCSPResponse: %v", err)
}
firstSerial := repo.rows["iss-test-local"].CertSerial
// Second call: rotation triggers because the first cert is in the
// grace window. The new row's RotatedFrom should equal the first
// cert's serial.
if _, err := conn.SignOCSPResponse(ctx, ocspReqFor(big.NewInt(2), 0)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second SignOCSPResponse (rotation): %v", err)
}
if repo.putCount < 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected rotation to trigger a second Put, got putCount=%d", repo.putCount)
}
row := repo.rows["iss-test-local"]
if row.CertSerial == firstSerial {
t.Errorf("CertSerial unchanged across rotation: %q", row.CertSerial)
}
if row.RotatedFrom != firstSerial {
t.Errorf("RotatedFrom = %q, want %q (the first cert's serial)", row.RotatedFrom, firstSerial)
}
}