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shankar0123
a0404f2d21
Sprint 4 unified-master-audit closure. Three claim-truth-alignment
findings whose README edits land on shared lines, bundled into one
commit.
ARCH-004 — 'full REST API exposed as MCP tools' overclaim:
Pre-fix the README said 'the full REST API is exposed as MCP
tools'; the actual MCP coverage is 162 tools / 220 routes
(~74%). The remaining gap is intentional: protocol-conformance
endpoints (ACME/SCEP/EST/OCSP/CRL), browser-only auth flow,
health/ready, and streaming/binary downloads — categories that
don't fit the request-response JSON tool shape.
Fix:
- README L78 qualified to 'the bulk of the REST API surface'
with explicit numbers + pointer to the new coverage doc.
- New docs/reference/mcp-coverage.md publishes the exclusion
categories with rationale + the canonical commands to
re-derive route + tool counts.
- New scripts/ci-guards/mcp-coverage-parity.sh fails the build
if the tool count drops below (routes − exclusions − 40-slack),
so a future regression that drops 50+ tools surfaces in CI.
Verified locally: clean at 162 tools / 220 routes / 37
intentional exclusions.
SEC-003-K8S — Kubernetes Secrets connector is a runtime stub:
Pre-fix README L67 marketed 'fifteen native target connectors'
with Kubernetes Secrets in the list, but realK8sClient's CRUD
methods returned 'real Kubernetes client not implemented' in
production. Per the audit's option (b) recommendation: downgrade
marketing + runtime-guard the stub.
Fix:
- README L12 + L67: 'fourteen production-ready native deployment-
target connectors plus Kubernetes Secrets (preview)'.
- k8ssecret.New() now refuses to construct unless
CERTCTL_K8SSECRET_PREVIEW_ACK=true is set, mirroring the
SEC-H3 ACK pattern. NewWithClient path (test injection)
unchanged.
- docs/reference/connectors/index.md moves Kubernetes Secrets
out of the canonical fourteen-target list into a new 'Preview
connectors' subsection.
- Regression tests in k8ssecret_test.go pin the new gate
(rejects without ACK, accepts with ACK, still rejects nil
config even with ACK).
ARCH-003 — CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=server breaks the blanket claim:
Pre-fix README L12 + L82 said 'private keys stay on your
infrastructure' and 'never touch the control plane' as blanket
promises. Flipping CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=server makes the control
plane mint keys in process memory — breaking the claim — and
the only signal was a boot-time slog WARN. An operator who set
the flag and didn't read logs ran in silent contradiction to the
marketed posture.
Fix:
- config.Validate() refuses to accept KeygenMode='server'
unless DemoModeAck=true (mirroring SEC-H3). Production
deploys (the default Mode='agent' path) are unaffected.
- README L12 + L82 qualified: 'In agent-mode (the default),
private keys ...; a demo-only CERTCTL_KEYGEN_MODE=server
flag mints keys server-side, refuses to start without an
explicit CERTCTL_DEMO_MODE_ACK=true acknowledgement.'
- Regression tests for the new Validate gate land in
config_test.go (note: gate tests landed in the ARCH-002
commit because of contiguous-hunk constraint at the bottom
of the file).
Closes ARCH-004, SEC-003-K8S, ARCH-003.
certctl Documentation
Last reviewed: 2026-05-12
The full docs index, organized by audience. Pick the section that matches what you need to do; each link below opens a focused doc rather than a wall of text.
For the elevator pitch and quickstart commands, see the repo README.md at the root. For the marketing site, see certctl.io.
Getting Started
You're new to certctl, just cloned the repo, or want to understand what it does before installing.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Concepts | TLS certificates explained for beginners — CAs, ACME, EST, private keys, the full glossary |
| Quickstart | Five-minute setup with Docker Compose, dashboard tour, API tour |
| Examples | Five turnkey scenarios — ACME+NGINX, wildcard DNS-01, private CA+Traefik, step-ca+HAProxy, multi-issuer |
| Advanced demo | End-to-end certificate lifecycle with technical depth at each step |
| Why certctl | Positioning vs ACME clients, agent-based SaaS, enterprise platforms; when to look elsewhere |
Reference
You're operating certctl in production or building integrations and need authoritative technical detail.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Architecture | System design, data flow, security model, deployment topologies |
| Profiles | CertificateProfile policy object — issuer wiring, EKUs, RequiresApproval gate (with profile-edit closure) |
| API | OpenAPI 3.1 spec, integration patterns, client SDK generation |
| CLI | certctl-cli command reference and CI/CD integration patterns |
| Configuration | CERTCTL_* environment variable reference (scheduler, rate limits, deploy verify, audit, agent) |
| MCP server | Model Context Protocol integration for AI assistants |
| Release verification | Cosign / SLSA / SBOM verification procedure |
| Intermediate CA hierarchy | Multi-level CA tree management — RFC 5280 §3.2/§4.2.1.9/§4.2.1.10 enforcement |
| Auth standards implemented | RFC + CWE evidence for the API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass surface (NOT a compliance-mapping doc) |
| Deployment model | Atomic write, post-deploy verify, rollback semantics across all targets |
| Vendor matrix | Tested vendor versions per target connector |
Connectors
The connector index is the canonical catalog (interfaces, registry, scanners, plus an inline reference per built-in). Per-connector deep-dive siblings cover operator-grade material — vendor edges, troubleshooting, rotation playbooks, when-to-use vs alternatives.
Issuers (13 deep-dives): ACME · ADCS · AWS ACM Private CA · DigiCert · EJBCA / Keyfactor · Entrust · GlobalSign Atlas HVCA · Google CAS · Local CA · OpenSSL / Custom CA · Sectigo SCM · step-ca / Smallstep · Vault PKI
Targets (15 deep-dives): Apache · AWS Certificate Manager · Azure Key Vault · Caddy · Envoy · F5 BIG-IP · HAProxy · IIS · Java Keystore · Kubernetes Secrets · NGINX · Postfix / Dovecot · SSH (agentless) · Traefik · Windows Certificate Store
Protocols
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| ACME server | Run certctl as an RFC 8555 + RFC 9773 ARI ACME server |
| ACME server threat model | Security posture for the ACME server endpoint |
| SCEP server | RFC 8894 native SCEP server — RA cert config, multi-profile dispatch, must-staple, mTLS sibling route |
| SCEP for Microsoft Intune | Intune-specific deployment guide — NDES replacement playbook |
| EST server | RFC 7030 EST server — 802.1X / Wi-Fi enrollment, IoT bootstrap, channel binding |
| CRL & OCSP | RFC 5280 CRL + RFC 6960 OCSP responder for relying parties |
| Async CA polling | Bounded polling for async-CA issuer connectors |
Operator
You're running certctl in production and need operational guidance.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Security posture | Auth, rate limits, encryption at rest, key rotation, RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass, bootstrap |
| Secret custody | Where private keys live; FileDriver vs HSM/KMS; encryption wire format; env-seeded vs DB-seeded plaintext policy |
| Observability | Metrics surface, Prometheus exposition vs client_golang, tracing scope, log structure, rate-limit semantics across restarts/replicas |
| RBAC operator reference | Roles, permissions, scopes, scope-down + day-0 bootstrap |
| Auth threat model | API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + break-glass — token forgery, session hijacking, IdP compromise, role-grant abuse, bootstrap-token leak, audit-mutation |
| OIDC / SSO runbooks | Per-IdP setup guides — Keycloak, Authentik, Okta, Auth0, Entra ID, Google Workspace |
| Control plane TLS | Self-signed bootstrap, operator-supplied Secret, cert-manager Certificate CR |
| Database TLS | PostgreSQL transport encryption |
| Approval workflow | Two-person integrity gate for high-stakes issuance + profile-edit closure |
| Helm deployment | Kubernetes installation via the bundled chart |
| Performance baselines | Operator-runnable benchmarks for regression spot checks |
| Auth benchmarks | Session + OIDC validation p99 targets and measured baselines |
| Legacy clients (TLS 1.2) | Reverse-proxy runbook for embedded EST/SCEP clients on TLS 1.2 |
Runbooks
| Runbook | When |
|---|---|
| Cloud targets | AWS ACM + Azure Key Vault deployment, debugging, rollback |
| Expiry alerts | Per-policy multi-channel routing matrix, severity tiers |
| Disaster recovery | CRL cache, OCSP responder cert, CA private-key rotation, Postgres restore |
| Config-encryption upgrade | Force v1/v2 → v3 re-seal across the database; passphrase rotation procedure |
| PostgreSQL backup | Operator-run backup recipe (docker-compose + Kubernetes); recommended cadence; quarterly DR dry-run |
Migration
You're moving from another cert-management tool to certctl, or running both in parallel.
| From | Doc |
|---|---|
| Certbot | migration/from-certbot.md |
| acme.sh | migration/from-acmesh.md |
| cert-manager (coexistence, not replacement) | migration/cert-manager-coexistence.md |
| Caddy ACME (point Caddy at certctl) | migration/acme-from-caddy.md |
| cert-manager ACME (point cert-manager at certctl) | migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md |
| Traefik ACME (point Traefik at certctl) | migration/acme-from-traefik.md |
| API keys → RBAC (v2.0.x → v2.1.0) | migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — AUDIT YOUR API KEYS post-upgrade |
| Enable OIDC SSO | migration/oidc-enable.md — step-by-step OIDC onboarding for an existing API-key + RBAC deployment |
Contributor
You're contributing to certctl, running tests locally, or trying to understand the CI pipeline.
| Doc | What it covers |
|---|---|
| Testing strategy | What we test and why; per-PR fast gates vs daily deep-scan |
| Test environment | Local environment with real CAs (Pebble, step-ca, etc.) |
| QA prerequisites | Before running QA: stack boot, demo data baseline, env vars |
| QA test suite | qa_test.go reference for release QA |
| GUI QA checklist | Manual GUI verification pass for release |
| Release sign-off | Release-day checklist — code state, automated gates, manual QA, artefact verification |
| CI pipeline | CI shape, regression guards, adding new checks |
| CI guards | Per-class CI guards (code-shape, contract-parity, build/dep, operational); how to add one |
Archive
Historical docs preserved for reference. Most operators don't need these.
| Doc | Why archived |
|---|---|
| Upgrade to TLS (v2.2) | Pre-v2.2 HTTPS-everywhere upgrade procedure |
| Upgrade past v2 JWT removal | G-1 milestone JWT auth removal procedure |
Reading order by role
First-time operator: Concepts → Quickstart → Examples. About 90 minutes end to end.
Production operator: Architecture → Security posture → Control plane TLS → Disaster recovery runbook. About 4 hours end to end.
PKI engineer: ACME server → SCEP server → EST server → Intermediate CA hierarchy. About 6 hours end to end.
Contributor: Architecture → Testing strategy → Test environment → CI pipeline. About 3 hours end to end.