Files
certctl/internal/connector/notifier/email/email.go
T
shankar0123 3853b7460c security: reject CRLF/NUL in email headers to prevent SMTP injection (fixes H-3)
H-3 in certctl-audit-report.md: caller-supplied From/To/Subject were
interpolated directly into the SMTP DATA payload and handed to
client.Mail / client.Rcpt with no sanitization, allowing an attacker
who controls any of those values to inject extra headers (Bcc:,
Reply-To:), split the message body (CRLFCRLF), or tamper with the
SMTP envelope. CWE-113.

Fix:
- New package helper internal/validation.ValidateHeaderValue(field,
  value). Rejects CR ("\r"), LF ("\n"), and NUL ("\x00") with an error
  that names the offending field but does NOT echo the raw value,
  so log readers cannot be attacked with injected content. Silent
  stripping was considered and rejected: authentication-relevant
  headers must fail visibly.
- Two-layer defense in internal/connector/notifier/email/email.go:
    (1) primary guard at the top of sendEmail / sendHTMLEmail, which
        blocks tampering of the SMTP envelope (client.Mail, client.Rcpt)
        since net/smtp does not sanitize those arguments; and
    (2) defense-in-depth guard inside formatEmailMessage /
        formatHTMLEmailMessage, catching any future caller that
        bypasses sendEmail. Both format functions now return an error.
- Body content is intentionally NOT validated — CR/LF in body is legal
  RFC 5322 content and net/smtp handles dot-stuffing.

Tests:
- internal/validation/headers_test.go: 3 functions (AcceptsSafeInput,
  RejectsControlCharacters, DefaultFieldName) covering plain ASCII,
  UTF-8 multibyte, tabs, typical email addresses, CRLF injection,
  lone CR, lone LF, NUL, CRLFCRLF body split, trailing CR, leading LF.
  Each reject case asserts the field name IS in the error and the
  raw offending value IS NOT (anti-log-injection).
- internal/connector/notifier/email/email_test.go: added
  TestEmail_FormatEmailMessage_RejectsCRLFInjection and
  TestEmail_FormatHTMLEmailMessage_RejectsCRLFInjection. Existing
  format tests updated for the new (bytes, error) signature.

Wire-format invariants preserved:
- SMTP DATA headers still use CRLF separators and RFC 1123Z Date
  (unchanged).
- Content-Type headers unchanged (text/plain for plain, text/html +
  MIME-Version: 1.0 for HTML).
- No change to message encoding or transport.

Verification (Go 1.25.9 linux-arm64, parent e9947dc):
- go build ./...                                 clean
- go vet ./...                                   clean
- go test -race ./internal/validation/...        ok
- go test -race ./internal/connector/notifier/email/...   ok
- go test -race ./internal/connector/notifier/webhook/... ok
- Per-layer coverage gates all pass:
    validation  95.1% (+0.7 vs baseline 94.4%)
    email       39.7% (+1.4 vs baseline 38.3%)
    service     67.8% (unchanged)
    handler     78.6% (unchanged)
    middleware  80.0% (unchanged)
    domain      92.7% (unchanged)
- govulncheck ./...                              No vulnerabilities found
- golangci-lint run ./internal/validation/... ./internal/connector/notifier/email/...
                                                 0 issues

Operational note: SMTP sends that would previously deliver a
tampered message now fail fast at the notifier with a clear error.
Operators who were relying on header-injection-shaped inputs (there
should be none in practice — all callers are internal certctl code)
will see "failed to format message: <field> contains disallowed
control character" in logs.

Scope: H-3 only. H-4 (webhook SSRF) follows in a separate commit.
2026-04-17 00:08:20 +00:00

419 lines
12 KiB
Go

package email
import (
"context"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"net/smtp"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/connector/notifier"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/validation"
)
// Config represents the email notifier configuration.
type Config struct {
SMTPHost string `json:"smtp_host"`
SMTPPort int `json:"smtp_port"`
Username string `json:"username"`
Password string `json:"password"`
FromAddress string `json:"from_address"`
UseTLS bool `json:"tls"`
}
// Connector implements the notifier.Connector interface for email notifications.
// It sends alert and event notifications via SMTP.
type Connector struct {
config *Config
logger *slog.Logger
}
// New creates a new email notifier with the given configuration and logger.
func New(config *Config, logger *slog.Logger) *Connector {
return &Connector{
config: config,
logger: logger,
}
}
// ValidateConfig checks that the SMTP server is reachable and credentials are valid.
// It attempts to connect to the SMTP server to verify connectivity.
func (c *Connector) ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, rawConfig json.RawMessage) error {
var cfg Config
if err := json.Unmarshal(rawConfig, &cfg); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid email config: %w", err)
}
if cfg.SMTPHost == "" || cfg.SMTPPort == 0 || cfg.FromAddress == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("email smtp_host, smtp_port, and from_address are required")
}
c.logger.Info("validating email configuration",
"smtp_host", cfg.SMTPHost,
"smtp_port", cfg.SMTPPort)
// Test SMTP connectivity with timeout
addr := net.JoinHostPort(cfg.SMTPHost, strconv.Itoa(cfg.SMTPPort))
conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", addr, 10*time.Second)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to reach SMTP server %s: %w", addr, err)
}
defer conn.Close()
c.config = &cfg
c.logger.Info("email configuration validated")
return nil
}
// SendAlert sends an alert notification via SMTP.
// It formats the alert as an email message and sends it to the recipient.
func (c *Connector) SendAlert(ctx context.Context, alert notifier.Alert) error {
c.logger.Info("sending email alert",
"alert_id", alert.ID,
"severity", alert.Severity,
"recipient", alert.Recipient)
// Format email subject and body
subject := fmt.Sprintf("[%s] %s", strings.ToUpper(alert.Severity), alert.Subject)
body := c.formatAlertBody(alert)
// Send email
if err := c.sendEmail(ctx, alert.Recipient, subject, body); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("failed to send alert email",
"alert_id", alert.ID,
"error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to send alert email: %w", err)
}
c.logger.Info("alert email sent successfully",
"alert_id", alert.ID,
"recipient", alert.Recipient)
return nil
}
// SendEvent sends an event notification via SMTP.
// It formats the event as an email message and sends it to the recipient.
func (c *Connector) SendEvent(ctx context.Context, event notifier.Event) error {
c.logger.Info("sending email event",
"event_id", event.ID,
"event_type", event.Type,
"recipient", event.Recipient)
// Format email subject and body
subject := fmt.Sprintf("[Event] %s", event.Subject)
body := c.formatEventBody(event)
// Send email
if err := c.sendEmail(ctx, event.Recipient, subject, body); err != nil {
c.logger.Error("failed to send event email",
"event_id", event.ID,
"error", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to send event email: %w", err)
}
c.logger.Info("event email sent successfully",
"event_id", event.ID,
"recipient", event.Recipient)
return nil
}
// sendEmail sends an email message using the configured SMTP server.
// It handles both TLS and plain authentication modes.
//
// Header values (From, To, Subject) are validated up-front to reject CR, LF,
// and NUL characters. This blocks SMTP header injection (CWE-113) and also
// prevents injection into the SMTP envelope commands MAIL FROM and RCPT TO,
// since net/smtp does not sanitize those inputs itself.
func (c *Connector) sendEmail(ctx context.Context, to, subject, body string) error {
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid sender: %w", err)
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid recipient: %w", err)
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid subject: %w", err)
}
addr := net.JoinHostPort(c.config.SMTPHost, strconv.Itoa(c.config.SMTPPort))
// Connect to SMTP server
var auth smtp.Auth
if c.config.Username != "" && c.config.Password != "" {
auth = smtp.PlainAuth("", c.config.Username, c.config.Password, c.config.SMTPHost)
}
var conn net.Conn
var err error
if c.config.UseTLS {
// Connect with TLS
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
ServerName: c.config.SMTPHost,
}
conn, err = tls.Dial("tcp", addr, tlsConfig)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect via TLS: %w", err)
}
} else {
// Connect without TLS
conn, err = net.Dial("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect: %w", err)
}
}
defer conn.Close()
// Create SMTP client
client, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, c.config.SMTPHost)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create SMTP client: %w", err)
}
defer client.Close()
// Authenticate if credentials provided
if auth != nil {
if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("SMTP authentication failed: %w", err)
}
}
// Send email
if err := client.Mail(c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set sender: %w", err)
}
if err := client.Rcpt(to); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set recipient: %w", err)
}
wc, err := client.Data()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get data writer: %w", err)
}
defer wc.Close()
// Format and write email headers and body. The format function
// re-validates header values as defense-in-depth; the early-return
// above should have already caught any injection attempt.
message, err := c.formatEmailMessage(c.config.FromAddress, to, subject, body)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to format message: %w", err)
}
if _, err := wc.Write(message); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write message: %w", err)
}
if err := client.Quit(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to quit SMTP: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// sendHTMLEmail sends an HTML email message using the configured SMTP server.
// Used by the digest service for rich HTML digest emails.
//
// Header values (From, To, Subject) are validated up-front to reject CR, LF,
// and NUL characters. This blocks SMTP header injection (CWE-113) and also
// prevents injection into the SMTP envelope commands MAIL FROM and RCPT TO,
// since net/smtp does not sanitize those inputs itself.
func (c *Connector) sendHTMLEmail(ctx context.Context, to, subject, htmlBody string) error {
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid sender: %w", err)
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid recipient: %w", err)
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid subject: %w", err)
}
addr := net.JoinHostPort(c.config.SMTPHost, strconv.Itoa(c.config.SMTPPort))
var auth smtp.Auth
if c.config.Username != "" && c.config.Password != "" {
auth = smtp.PlainAuth("", c.config.Username, c.config.Password, c.config.SMTPHost)
}
var conn net.Conn
var err error
if c.config.UseTLS {
tlsConfig := &tls.Config{
ServerName: c.config.SMTPHost,
}
conn, err = tls.Dial("tcp", addr, tlsConfig)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect via TLS: %w", err)
}
} else {
conn, err = net.Dial("tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect: %w", err)
}
}
defer conn.Close()
client, err := smtp.NewClient(conn, c.config.SMTPHost)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create SMTP client: %w", err)
}
defer client.Close()
if auth != nil {
if err := client.Auth(auth); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("SMTP authentication failed: %w", err)
}
}
if err := client.Mail(c.config.FromAddress); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set sender: %w", err)
}
if err := client.Rcpt(to); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set recipient: %w", err)
}
wc, err := client.Data()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get data writer: %w", err)
}
defer wc.Close()
// The format function re-validates header values as defense-in-depth;
// the early-return above should have already caught any injection attempt.
message, err := c.formatHTMLEmailMessage(c.config.FromAddress, to, subject, htmlBody)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to format message: %w", err)
}
if _, err := wc.Write(message); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to write message: %w", err)
}
if err := client.Quit(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to quit SMTP: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// formatEmailMessage formats an email message with standard headers.
// It rejects any header value containing CR, LF, or NUL bytes to prevent
// SMTP header injection (CWE-113). See internal/validation.ValidateHeaderValue.
// The body is not validated — CR/LF in the body is legitimate content, and
// SMTP dot-stuffing / length framing are handled by net/smtp.
func (c *Connector) formatEmailMessage(from, to, subject, body string) ([]byte, error) {
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", from); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
message := fmt.Sprintf(
"From: %s\r\nTo: %s\r\nSubject: %s\r\nDate: %s\r\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\r\n\r\n%s",
from,
to,
subject,
time.Now().Format(time.RFC1123Z),
body,
)
return []byte(message), nil
}
// formatHTMLEmailMessage formats an HTML email message with MIME headers.
// It rejects any header value containing CR, LF, or NUL bytes to prevent
// SMTP header injection (CWE-113). See internal/validation.ValidateHeaderValue.
// The HTML body is not validated at this layer — CR/LF in HTML content is
// legitimate, and SMTP dot-stuffing / length framing are handled by net/smtp.
func (c *Connector) formatHTMLEmailMessage(from, to, subject, htmlBody string) ([]byte, error) {
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("From", from); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("To", to); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := validation.ValidateHeaderValue("Subject", subject); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
message := fmt.Sprintf(
"From: %s\r\nTo: %s\r\nSubject: %s\r\nDate: %s\r\nMIME-Version: 1.0\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n\r\n%s",
from,
to,
subject,
time.Now().Format(time.RFC1123Z),
htmlBody,
)
return []byte(message), nil
}
// formatAlertBody formats an alert notification as email body text.
func (c *Connector) formatAlertBody(alert notifier.Alert) string {
body := fmt.Sprintf(`
Certificate Alert Notification
================================
Alert ID: %s
Type: %s
Severity: %s
Created: %s
Subject: %s
Message:
%s
%s
`, alert.ID, alert.Type, alert.Severity, alert.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), alert.Subject, alert.Message, c.formatMetadata(alert.Metadata))
return body
}
// formatEventBody formats an event notification as email body text.
func (c *Connector) formatEventBody(event notifier.Event) string {
certInfo := ""
if event.CertificateID != nil {
certInfo = fmt.Sprintf("Certificate ID: %s\n", *event.CertificateID)
}
body := fmt.Sprintf(`
Certificate Event Notification
================================
Event ID: %s
Type: %s
Created: %s
%sSubject: %s
Body:
%s
%s
`, event.ID, event.Type, event.CreatedAt.Format(time.RFC3339), certInfo, event.Subject, event.Body, c.formatMetadata(event.Metadata))
return body
}
// formatMetadata formats metadata as a readable string.
func (c *Connector) formatMetadata(metadata map[string]string) string {
if len(metadata) == 0 {
return ""
}
metadataStr := "\nMetadata:\n"
for key, value := range metadata {
metadataStr += fmt.Sprintf(" %s: %s\n", key, value)
}
return metadataStr
}