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shankar0123
99a012e3be
Bundle 1 / Phase 0: pure refactor splitting auth surface out of internal/api/middleware so Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles, permissions, scoped grants) have a clean home. Moved to internal/auth/: NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig, NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin. Added testfixtures.go (WithActor / WithAdmin / WithActorAdmin) so handler tests don't construct context manually. Stayed in internal/api/middleware/: RequestID, Logging, NewLogging, Recovery, RateLimitConfig, NewRateLimiter (now imports auth.GetUser for per-user keying per audit Category C), CORSConfig, NewCORS, ContentType, CORS, GetRequestID, responseWriter, Chain, audit middleware (now imports auth.GetUser). Updated 22 caller files across cmd/, internal/api/handler/, internal/api/middleware/, internal/mcp/. Existing m008_admin_gate_test.go now scans for auth.IsAdmin( substring; Phase 3 will further evolve to track auth.RequirePermission. Behavior unchanged: all handler / middleware / service / connector / cmd / mcp tests pass with no test-logic edits, only import-path renames. Phase 0 exit criteria: internal/auth/ exists with 6 files; middleware.go went 575 -> 422 lines (auth-related ~150 lines moved out); grep -rE 'middleware\.(GetUser|IsAdmin|UserKey|AdminKey|NamedAPIKey|HashAPIKey|NewAuth)' returns 0 hits; context.WithValue(.*middleware.UserKey/AdminKey) returns 0 hits; go vet ./... clean; go test -short ./... green across all packages tested. Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Per cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md, do not merge to master without (1) make verify green, (2) >= 2 external testers confirm, (3) >= 90% coverage on internal/auth/ in .github/coverage-thresholds.yml.
29 lines
913 B
Go
29 lines
913 B
Go
package auth
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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)
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// NamedAPIKey represents a named API key with optional admin flag.
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//
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// Name is the canonical actor identity propagated through the request
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// context (UserKey) and into the audit trail. Two NamedAPIKey rows
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// MAY share a Name during a rotation overlap window per audit L-004
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// (CWE-924); both keys validate to the same actor + admin flag so the
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// per-user rate-limit bucket stays consistent during rotation.
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type NamedAPIKey struct {
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Name string
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Key string
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Admin bool
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}
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// HashAPIKey computes the SHA-256 hash of an API key for secure storage.
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// We use SHA-256 rather than bcrypt because API keys are high-entropy
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// random strings (not user-chosen passwords), so rainbow tables and
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// brute-force attacks are not a practical concern.
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func HashAPIKey(key string) string {
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(key))
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return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
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}
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