Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/auth.go
T
shankar0123 3ef45e2ad4 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

529 lines
17 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
authsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service/auth"
)
// AuthHandler exposes the RBAC primitive over HTTP. Bundle 1 Phase 4 wires
// the routes registered by HandlerRegistry under /v1/auth/*.
//
// Every mutating endpoint runs through the service layer, which enforces
// the privilege-escalation guard (callers need auth.role.assign for
// Grant/Revoke, auth.role.create/edit/delete for the role lifecycle,
// auth.key.* for key management). Read endpoints require auth.role.list.
//
// The /v1/auth/me endpoint has no permission requirement (every
// authenticated caller can read their own permissions); this is the
// query the GUI uses to gate affordance rendering.
type AuthHandler struct {
roles AuthRoleService
perms AuthPermissionService
actors AuthActorRoleService
checker auth.PermissionChecker
}
// AuthRoleService is the service-layer dependency the AuthHandler uses
// for role + role-permission lifecycle. Mirrors internal/service/auth.
type AuthRoleService interface {
List(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
Get(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
Create(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
Update(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) error
ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
}
// AuthPermissionService exposes the canonical permission catalogue.
type AuthPermissionService interface {
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
IsRegistered(name string) bool
}
// AuthActorRoleService manages role grants on actors and surfaces the
// effective-permissions query the GUI's /v1/auth/me handler uses.
type AuthActorRoleService interface {
Grant(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
Revoke(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, roleID string) error
ListForActor(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error)
// ListKeys (Bundle 1 Phase 7) returns every actor in the tenant
// with at least one role grant. The CLI's `auth keys list` and
// scope-down helper consume this. The synthetic actor-demo-anon
// row is included; the CLI filters it out of the interactive
// prompt loop.
ListKeys(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error)
}
// NewAuthHandler constructs an AuthHandler with the service-layer
// dependencies wired in cmd/server/main.go.
func NewAuthHandler(
roles AuthRoleService,
perms AuthPermissionService,
actors AuthActorRoleService,
checker auth.PermissionChecker,
) AuthHandler {
return AuthHandler{
roles: roles,
perms: perms,
actors: actors,
checker: checker,
}
}
// =============================================================================
// JSON request / response shapes
// =============================================================================
type roleResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
func roleToResponse(r *authdomain.Role) roleResponse {
return roleResponse{
ID: r.ID,
TenantID: r.TenantID,
Name: r.Name,
Description: r.Description,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
}
}
type permissionResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Namespace string `json:"namespace"`
}
func permToResponse(p *authdomain.Permission) permissionResponse {
return permissionResponse{ID: p.ID, Name: p.Name, Namespace: p.Namespace}
}
type rolePermissionResponse struct {
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
PermissionID string `json:"permission_id"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
}
func rolePermToResponse(g *authdomain.RolePermission) rolePermissionResponse {
return rolePermissionResponse{
RoleID: g.RoleID,
PermissionID: g.PermissionID,
ScopeType: string(g.ScopeType),
ScopeID: g.ScopeID,
}
}
type createRoleRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
type updateRoleRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
type addPermissionRequest struct {
Permission string `json:"permission"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty"` // defaults to "global"
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
}
type assignRoleRequest struct {
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
}
type meResponse struct {
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
Admin bool `json:"admin"` // back-compat with /v1/auth/check
Roles []string `json:"roles"`
EffectivePermissions []effectivePermissionPayload `json:"effective_permissions"`
}
type effectivePermissionPayload struct {
Permission string `json:"permission"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
}
// =============================================================================
// Handlers
// =============================================================================
// ListRoles handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles.
// Permission: auth.role.list (enforced at the service layer).
func (h AuthHandler) ListRoles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roles, err := h.roles.List(r.Context(), caller)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
out := make([]roleResponse, 0, len(roles))
for _, role := range roles {
out = append(out, roleToResponse(role))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"roles": out})
}
// GetRole handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
func (h AuthHandler) GetRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
role, err := h.roles.Get(r.Context(), caller, id)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
perms, err := h.roles.ListPermissions(r.Context(), caller, id)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
permResponses := make([]rolePermissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
for _, p := range perms {
permResponses = append(permResponses, rolePermToResponse(p))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
"role": roleToResponse(role),
"permissions": permResponses,
})
}
// CreateRole handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles.
func (h AuthHandler) CreateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
var req createRoleRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.Name) == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role name is required")
return
}
role := &authdomain.Role{Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
if err := h.roles.Create(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, roleToResponse(role))
}
// UpdateRole handles PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
func (h AuthHandler) UpdateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
var req updateRoleRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
role := &authdomain.Role{ID: id, Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
if err := h.roles.Update(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, roleToResponse(role))
}
// DeleteRole handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
func (h AuthHandler) DeleteRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
if err := h.roles.Delete(r.Context(), caller, id); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// ListPermissions handles GET /api/v1/auth/permissions.
func (h AuthHandler) ListPermissions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, err := callerFromRequest(r); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
perms, err := h.perms.List(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
out := make([]permissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
for _, p := range perms {
out = append(out, permToResponse(p))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"permissions": out})
}
// ListKeys handles GET /api/v1/auth/keys (Bundle 1 Phase 7).
// Permission: auth.role.list. Returns every distinct actor in the
// tenant with at least one role grant — the CLI's `auth keys list`
// and scope-down flow consume this.
func (h AuthHandler) ListKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
keys, err := h.actors.ListKeys(r.Context(), caller)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
type keyEntry struct {
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
RoleIDs []string `json:"role_ids"`
}
out := make([]keyEntry, 0, len(keys))
for _, k := range keys {
out = append(out, keyEntry{
ActorID: k.ActorID,
ActorType: string(k.ActorType),
TenantID: k.TenantID,
RoleIDs: k.RoleIDs,
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"keys": out})
}
// AddRolePermission handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions.
func (h AuthHandler) AddRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roleID := r.PathValue("id")
var req addPermissionRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
if req.Permission == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "permission is required")
return
}
scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(req.ScopeType)
if scopeType == "" {
scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
}
if err := h.roles.AddPermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, req.Permission, scopeType, req.ScopeID); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// RemoveRolePermission handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}.
func (h AuthHandler) RemoveRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roleID := r.PathValue("id")
permName := r.PathValue("perm")
scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(r.URL.Query().Get("scope_type"))
if scopeType == "" {
scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
}
var scopeID *string
if v := r.URL.Query().Get("scope_id"); v != "" {
scopeID = &v
}
if err := h.roles.RemovePermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, permName, scopeType, scopeID); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// AssignRoleToKey handles POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles.
// {id} is the API-key actor name (e.g. "alice", "ops-admin"); the
// service layer resolves to the actor_roles row.
func (h AuthHandler) AssignRoleToKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
var req assignRoleRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
if req.RoleID == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
return
}
ar := &authdomain.ActorRole{
ActorID: keyID,
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
RoleID: req.RoleID,
}
if err := h.actors.Grant(r.Context(), caller, ar); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// RevokeRoleFromKey handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}.
func (h AuthHandler) RevokeRoleFromKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
roleID := r.PathValue("role_id")
if err := h.actors.Revoke(r.Context(), caller, keyID, domain.ActorTypeAPIKey, roleID); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// Me handles GET /api/v1/auth/me. Returns the current actor's effective
// permissions plus admin flag (back-compat with /v1/auth/check). No
// permission required: every authenticated caller can read their own.
func (h AuthHandler) Me(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roles, err := h.actors.ListForActor(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roleIDs := make([]string, 0, len(roles))
hasAdmin := false
for _, role := range roles {
roleIDs = append(roleIDs, role.RoleID)
if role.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
hasAdmin = true
}
}
effective, err := h.actors.EffectivePermissions(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
payload := make([]effectivePermissionPayload, 0, len(effective))
for _, p := range effective {
payload = append(payload, effectivePermissionPayload{
Permission: p.PermissionName,
ScopeType: string(p.ScopeType),
ScopeID: p.ScopeID,
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResponse{
ActorID: caller.ActorID,
ActorType: string(caller.ActorType),
TenantID: caller.TenantID,
Admin: hasAdmin,
Roles: roleIDs,
EffectivePermissions: payload,
})
}
// =============================================================================
// Helpers
// =============================================================================
// callerFromRequest builds an authsvc.Caller from request context. The
// auth middleware (Phase 3) populates ActorIDKey / ActorTypeKey /
// TenantIDKey on every authenticated request. Returns auth.ErrNoActor
// when no actor is in context (handler returns 401).
func callerFromRequest(r *http.Request) (*authsvc.Caller, error) {
ctx := r.Context()
actorID := auth.GetActorID(ctx)
if actorID == "" {
return nil, auth.ErrNoActor
}
actorType := auth.GetActorType(ctx)
if actorType == "" {
actorType = auth.ActorTypeAPIKey
}
tenantID := auth.GetTenantID(ctx)
return &authsvc.Caller{
ActorID: actorID,
ActorType: domain.ActorType(actorType),
TenantID: tenantID,
}, nil
}
// writeAuthError translates service-layer + repository sentinel errors
// into HTTP status codes. Any non-mapped error is 500.
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrNoActor), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrUnauthenticated):
Error(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Authentication required")
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrForbidden), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrSelfRoleAssignment):
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error())
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrInvalidPermission):
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthNotFound):
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Not found")
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor):
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, err.Error())
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthUnknownPermission):
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
default:
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error")
}
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v interface{}) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}