mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
synced 2026-06-07 13:51:36 +00:00
9c1d446e40
The pre-G-1 config validator accepted CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt and the
startup log faithfully echoed 'authentication enabled type=jwt'.
Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT auth was on. It wasn't.
The auth-middleware wiring at cmd/server/main.go unconditionally routed
every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of
cfg.Auth.Type. So CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt quietly compared the incoming
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' against whatever string the operator put
in CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who
treated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET as a *signing* secret (because they thought
they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key.
A security finding masquerading as a config option.
We chose the audit-recommended structural fix: remove the option, fail
fast at startup, and add the gateway-fronting pattern as the documented
forward path. Implementing JWT middleware would have meant jwks vs
static-secret rotation, claim mapping, expiry enforcement, audience and
issuer validation, key rollover semantics, and regression coverage at the
same depth as the existing api-key path — a feature, not a fix. Operators
who genuinely need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium /
Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Same
shape works on docker-compose and Helm.
The change is comprehensive across 7 phases — every surface that
mentioned 'jwt' as a certctl-auth-type is updated, plus structural
backstops (typed enum, runtime guard, helm template validation, CI grep
guard) so the lie can't reappear.
Files changed:
Phase 1 — production code (typed enum + jwt removal):
- internal/config/config.go: AuthType typed alias + AuthTypeAPIKey /
AuthTypeNone constants + ValidAuthTypes() helper. Validate() routes
literal 'jwt' through a dedicated multi-line diagnostic naming the
authenticating-gateway pattern, then cross-checks against
ValidAuthTypes(). Secret-required branch simplified to api-key-only.
Field comment on AuthConfig.Type rewritten to drop jwt and point at
the gateway pattern.
- internal/api/middleware/middleware.go: AuthConfig.Type field comment
references the typed config.AuthType constants.
- internal/api/handler/health.go: same treatment for HealthHandler.AuthType.
- cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime switch immediately after
config.Load() — exits 1 on any unsupported auth-type that bypassed the
validator. Auth-disabled startup log explicitly names the
authenticating-gateway pattern.
Phase 2 — tests (Red→Green, contract pinning):
- internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated
(two table rows pinning the dedicated G-1 error fires regardless of
whether Secret is set), TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (property
guard against future re-introduction),
TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None (allowed-set contract),
TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType (pins non-jwt invalid values still
hit the generic invalid-auth-type error). Removed the prior
TestValidate_JWTAuth_MissingSecret happy-path since its premise is
inverted post-G-1.
- internal/api/handler/health_test.go: removed
TestAuthInfo_ReturnsAuthType_JWT (which baked the silent-downgrade lie
into the regression suite). Pre-existing _APIKey test continues to
cover the api-key happy path.
Phase 3 — spec, docs, env templates:
- api/openapi.yaml: auth_type enum dropped to [api-key, none] with
inline comment naming the G-1 closure.
- .env.example (root): CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block rewritten to drop
jwt and point at the gateway pattern; secret-required conditional
simplified to api-key-only.
- docs/architecture.md: middleware-stack bullet rewritten to drop the
JWT mention; new H3 'Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)'
section explaining the design rationale and listing oauth2-proxy /
Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium / Authelia / Caddy
forward_auth / Apache mod_auth_openidc / nginx auth_request as the
standard fronting options.
- docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md (new ~125 lines): migration guide
with preconditions, what-changes, both recovery paths, complete
docker-compose oauth2-proxy walkthrough, Traefik ForwardAuth and Envoy
ext_authz patterns, rollback posture.
Phase 4 — Helm chart (template validation + docs):
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: new certctl.validateAuthType
helper mirroring the existing certctl.tls.required pattern. Fails
template render on any server.auth.type outside {api-key, none} with
a multi-line diagnostic.
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-deployment.yaml,
server-configmap.yaml, server-secret.yaml: invoke the helper at the
top of each template that depends on .Values.server.auth.type.
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: auth: block comment expanded with the
G-1 rationale and gateway-pattern cross-reference.
- deploy/helm/CHART_SUMMARY.md: server.auth.type table row now surfaces
the allowed set and points at the upgrade doc.
- deploy/helm/certctl/README.md: new 'JWT / OIDC via authenticating
gateway' section with a Kubernetes-flavored oauth2-proxy + certctl
walkthrough.
Phase 5 — release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: new [unreleased] top entry with Breaking / Removed /
Added / Changed sections; explicit pointer at
docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md from the Breaking subsection.
Phase 6 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new 'Forbidden auth-type literal regression
guard (G-1)' step. Scoped patterns catch the actual regression shapes
(map literal, slice literal, switch case, OpenAPI enum, env-file
default, AuthType('jwt') cast). Comments and the dedicated rejection
branch are intentionally exempt; connector-package JWT references
(Google OAuth2 / step-ca) are exempt as out-of-scope external
protocols. Verified locally: the guard passes on the actual tree and
fires on all 4 synthetic regression patterns.
Out of scope (explicitly untouched):
- internal/connector/discovery/gcpsm/gcpsm.go — Google OAuth2 service-
account JWT (external protocol).
- internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas.go — same.
- internal/connector/issuer/stepca/stepca.go — step-ca's provisioner
one-time-token JWT for /sign API.
- docs/test-env.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/features.md — describe
external CAs' use of JWT, not certctl's auth shape.
- Implementing actual JWT middleware. Feature, not a fix.
Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -short -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/... — clean
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template with auth.type=api-key — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=none — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=jwt — fails with validateAuthType
diagnostic (exit 1)
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- CI guardrail mirror — clean on real tree, fires on all 4 synthetic
regression patterns
- Smoke test: 'CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt ./certctl-server' exits non-zero
with: 'Failed to load configuration: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no
longer accepted (G-1 silent auth downgrade): no JWT middleware ships
with certctl. To use JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) in
front of certctl and set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the upstream.
See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" and
docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough'
config pkg coverage: ValidAuthTypes 100%, Validate 94.7%, total 75.5%.
Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
§2 P1 cluster, cat-g-jwt_silent_auth_downgrade
Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'Remove jwt from
validAuthTypes until middleware ships'.
526 lines
15 KiB
YAML
526 lines
15 KiB
YAML
# Default values for certctl Helm chart
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# This is a YAML-formatted file.
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# Declare variables to be passed into your templates.
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# Namespace override (optional)
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namespace: ""
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# Global configuration
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commonLabels: {}
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imagePullSecrets: []
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nameOverride: ""
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fullnameOverride: ""
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# ==============================================================================
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# Certctl Server Configuration
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# ==============================================================================
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server:
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# Number of replicas (for HA deployments)
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replicas: 1
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# Image configuration
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image:
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repository: ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl
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tag: "" # defaults to Chart.appVersion
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pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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# Server port
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port: 8443
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# Resource requests and limits
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 100m
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memory: 128Mi
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limits:
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cpu: 500m
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memory: 512Mi
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# Pod security context
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securityContext:
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runAsNonRoot: true
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runAsUser: 1000
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runAsGroup: 1000
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fsGroup: 1000
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readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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capabilities:
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drop:
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- ALL
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# Liveness and readiness probes (HTTPS-only as of v2.2)
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livenessProbe:
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httpGet:
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path: /health
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port: https
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scheme: HTTPS
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initialDelaySeconds: 10
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periodSeconds: 10
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timeoutSeconds: 5
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failureThreshold: 3
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readinessProbe:
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httpGet:
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path: /readyz
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port: https
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scheme: HTTPS
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initialDelaySeconds: 5
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periodSeconds: 5
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timeoutSeconds: 3
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failureThreshold: 2
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# TLS configuration — REQUIRED. HTTPS is the only supported mode (v2.2+).
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# Operator must configure EXACTLY ONE of:
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# (a) server.tls.existingSecret: <name> # pre-existing kubernetes.io/tls Secret
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# (b) server.tls.certManager.enabled: true # provision a cert-manager Certificate CR
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# Refusing to set either makes `helm template` fail with a diagnostic pointing at docs/tls.md.
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tls:
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# Name of a pre-existing Secret (type kubernetes.io/tls) holding tls.crt + tls.key (+ optional ca.crt).
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# Leave empty to fall through to the cert-manager path.
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existingSecret: ""
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# Mount path for the TLS Secret inside the server + agent containers.
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mountPath: /etc/certctl/tls
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# cert-manager auto-provisioning. Opt-in (off by default per milestone §3.4).
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certManager:
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enabled: false
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# Secret name the cert-manager Certificate CR writes into. Agents and the server
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# both read from this Secret. If empty, defaults to "<fullname>-tls".
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secretName: ""
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# Cert-manager issuer reference.
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issuerRef:
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name: "" # e.g. "letsencrypt-prod" or "internal-ca"
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kind: ClusterIssuer # ClusterIssuer or Issuer
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group: cert-manager.io
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# Subject fields on the issued cert.
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commonName: "certctl-server"
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dnsNames:
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- certctl-server
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- localhost
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# Certificate lifetime + renewal window.
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duration: 2160h # 90 days
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renewBefore: 360h # 15 days
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# Service type (ClusterIP, LoadBalancer, NodePort)
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service:
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type: ClusterIP
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port: 8443
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annotations: {}
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# Authentication configuration.
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# Valid types: "api-key" (production) or "none" (demo only — disables
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# authentication on the API and logs a loud Warn at server startup).
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# For JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway in front of certctl
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# (oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium)
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# and set type=none here so the gateway terminates federated identity.
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# See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern".
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#
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# G-1 (P1): pre-G-1 the chart accepted server.auth.type=jwt and the
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# certctl-server container silently routed every request through the
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# api-key bearer middleware — silent auth downgrade. Post-G-1 the
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# chart's `certctl.validateAuthType` template helper rejects any value
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# outside {api-key, none} at template time. See
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# docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md if you previously set type=jwt.
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auth:
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type: api-key
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apiKey: "" # REQUIRED when type=api-key (set via --set or values override).
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# Logging configuration
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logging:
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level: info # debug, info, warn, error
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format: json # json or text
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# SMTP configuration for email notifications (optional)
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smtp:
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enabled: false
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host: ""
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port: 587
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username: ""
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password: ""
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fromAddress: ""
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useTLS: true
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# Certificate digest digest (periodic email summary)
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digest:
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enabled: false
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interval: "24h"
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recipients: []
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# Example:
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# - admin@example.com
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# - ops@example.com
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# Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) configuration
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est:
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enabled: false
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issuerID: "iss-local"
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profileID: ""
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# Rate limiting configuration
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rateLimiting:
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rps: 100 # Requests per second
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burst: 200 # Burst capacity
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# Network scanning configuration
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networkScan:
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enabled: false
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interval: "6h"
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# Certificate key generation mode
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keygen:
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mode: agent # Options: agent (production), server (demo with warning)
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# CORS configuration
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cors:
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origins: "" # Comma-separated list, empty means deny all cross-origin requests
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# Issuer connectors configuration
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issuer:
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local:
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enabled: true
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# For sub-CA mode, provide these paths:
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# caCertPath: /path/to/ca.crt
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# caKeyPath: /path/to/ca.key
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acme:
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enabled: false
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directoryURL: ""
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email: ""
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challengeType: "http-01" # Options: http-01, dns-01, dns-persist-01
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# DNS configuration (for dns-01 or dns-persist-01)
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# dnsPresentScript: /path/to/dns-present.sh
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# dnsCleanupScript: /path/to/dns-cleanup.sh
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# dnsPropagationWait: "30s"
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# dnsPersistIssuerDomain: "validation.example.com"
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# EAB configuration (for ZeroSSL, Google Trust Services, etc.)
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# eabKid: ""
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# eabHmac: ""
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stepca:
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enabled: false
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# rootCAPath: /path/to/root_ca.crt
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# intermediateCAPath: /path/to/intermediate_ca.crt
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# provisionerName: ""
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# provisionerPassword: ""
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openssl:
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enabled: false
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# signScript: /path/to/sign.sh
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# revokeScript: /path/to/revoke.sh
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# crlScript: /path/to/crl.sh
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# timeoutSeconds: 30
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# Notifier connectors configuration
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notifiers:
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slack:
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enabled: false
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# webhookUrl: ""
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# channel: ""
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# username: ""
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# iconEmoji: ""
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teams:
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enabled: false
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# webhookUrl: ""
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pagerduty:
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enabled: false
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# routingKey: ""
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# severity: warning
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opsgenie:
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enabled: false
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# apiKey: ""
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# priority: P3
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# Additional environment variables
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# Will be passed as-is to the server container
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env: {}
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# Example:
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# CERTCTL_SCHEDULER_RENEWAL_CHECK_INTERVAL: "1h"
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# CERTCTL_DATABASE_MAX_CONNS: "25"
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# Additional volume mounts for custom configurations
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# volumeMounts: []
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# - name: ca-cert
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# mountPath: /etc/ssl/certs/ca.crt
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# subPath: ca.crt
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# Additional volumes
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# volumes: []
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# - name: ca-cert
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# secret:
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# secretName: ca-cert
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# ==============================================================================
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# PostgreSQL Configuration
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# ==============================================================================
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postgresql:
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# Enable/disable PostgreSQL (set to false if using external database)
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enabled: true
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# Image configuration
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image:
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repository: postgres
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tag: "16-alpine"
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pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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# Authentication
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auth:
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database: certctl
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username: certctl
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# REQUIRED — set via `--set postgresql.auth.password=<value>` or values override.
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#
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# WARNING (U-1): rotating this value after first deploy does NOT change the
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# database password. The `postgres:16-alpine` image runs `initdb` only when
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# /var/lib/postgresql/data is empty, so POSTGRES_PASSWORD is written into
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# pg_authid exactly once — on the first boot of the StatefulSet's PVC.
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# Subsequent rollouts pick up the new env value in the postgres container
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# but the certctl-server container's CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL also picks up
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# the new value, while pg_authid still expects the old one — leading to
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# `pq: password authentication failed for user "certctl"` (SQLSTATE 28P01).
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#
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# The certctl-server emits guidance via internal/repository/postgres/db.go::
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# wrapPingError when it sees SQLSTATE 28P01 at startup. To resolve in a
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# Helm deployment:
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# - Non-destructive (preferred for environments with data):
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# kubectl exec -it <release>-postgres-0 -- \
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# psql -U certctl -c "ALTER ROLE certctl PASSWORD '<new>';"
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# then update the secret/values to match and let the certctl-server
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# pod restart against the matching credential.
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# - Destructive (DESTROYS DATA — only acceptable on dev/demo PVCs):
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# helm uninstall <release> && \
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# kubectl delete pvc -l app.kubernetes.io/name=certctl,app.kubernetes.io/component=postgres && \
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# helm install <release> ... # PVC re-creates empty, initdb seeds new password
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password: ""
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# Storage configuration
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storage:
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size: 10Gi
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storageClass: "" # Uses default StorageClass if empty
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# deleteOnTermination: false # Keep data on Helm uninstall
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# Resource requests and limits
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 100m
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memory: 256Mi
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limits:
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cpu: 500m
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memory: 512Mi
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# Pod security context
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securityContext:
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runAsNonRoot: true
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runAsUser: 999
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runAsGroup: 999
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fsGroup: 999
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# Liveness and readiness probes
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livenessProbe:
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exec:
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command:
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- /bin/sh
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- -c
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- pg_isready -U certctl -d certctl
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initialDelaySeconds: 10
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periodSeconds: 10
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timeoutSeconds: 5
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failureThreshold: 3
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readinessProbe:
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exec:
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command:
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- /bin/sh
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- -c
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- pg_isready -U certctl -d certctl
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initialDelaySeconds: 5
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periodSeconds: 5
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timeoutSeconds: 3
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failureThreshold: 2
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# Service configuration
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service:
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type: ClusterIP
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port: 5432
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# PostgreSQL-specific settings
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postgresqlConfig: {}
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# Example:
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# max_connections: "200"
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# shared_buffers: "256MB"
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# ==============================================================================
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# Certctl Agent Configuration
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# ==============================================================================
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agent:
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# Enable/disable agent deployment
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enabled: true
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# Deployment strategy: DaemonSet (recommended) or Deployment
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kind: DaemonSet # Options: DaemonSet, Deployment
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# Image configuration
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image:
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repository: ghcr.io/shankar0123/certctl-agent
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tag: "" # defaults to Chart.appVersion
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pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
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# Number of replicas (for Deployment kind; ignored for DaemonSet)
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replicas: 1
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# Resource requests and limits
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resources:
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requests:
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cpu: 50m
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memory: 64Mi
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limits:
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cpu: 200m
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memory: 256Mi
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# Pod security context
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securityContext:
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runAsNonRoot: true
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runAsUser: 1000
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runAsGroup: 1000
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fsGroup: 1000
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readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
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allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
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capabilities:
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drop:
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- ALL
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# Agent name (can be overridden per pod via StatefulSet ordinals)
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name: "" # If empty, uses release name
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# Key storage directory
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keyDir: /var/lib/certctl/keys
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# Certificate discovery directories (comma-separated)
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discoveryDirs: ""
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# Example: "/etc/ssl/certs,/etc/pki/tls"
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|
|
|
# Node selector for agent pods (for DaemonSet)
|
|
nodeSelector: {}
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# node-role.kubernetes.io/worker: "true"
|
|
|
|
# Tolerations for agent pods
|
|
tolerations: []
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# - key: node-role
|
|
# operator: Equal
|
|
# value: worker
|
|
# effect: NoSchedule
|
|
|
|
# Affinity rules
|
|
affinity: {}
|
|
|
|
# Additional environment variables
|
|
env: {}
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# Ingress Configuration
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
ingress:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
className: ""
|
|
annotations: {}
|
|
# kubernetes.io/ingress.class: nginx
|
|
|
|
# Optional cert-manager integration for the public-facing Ingress cert.
|
|
# This is completely independent of server.tls.* — the Ingress terminates
|
|
# an *additional* TLS hop between the internet and the in-cluster Service.
|
|
# Leave disabled unless an Ingress is exposing certctl to the outside world.
|
|
certManager:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
issuerRef:
|
|
name: "" # e.g. "letsencrypt-prod"
|
|
kind: ClusterIssuer # ClusterIssuer or Issuer
|
|
hosts:
|
|
- host: certctl.local
|
|
paths:
|
|
- path: /
|
|
pathType: Prefix
|
|
tls: []
|
|
# - secretName: certctl-tls
|
|
# hosts:
|
|
# - certctl.local
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# Service Account Configuration
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
serviceAccount:
|
|
create: true
|
|
annotations: {}
|
|
name: "" # defaults to release name if empty
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# RBAC Configuration
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
rbac:
|
|
create: true
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# Kubernetes Secrets Target Connector
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
kubernetesSecrets:
|
|
# Enable RBAC rules for managing TLS Secrets
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# Pod Disruption Budget (for HA deployments)
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
podDisruptionBudget:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
minAvailable: 1
|
|
# maxUnavailable: 1
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# Monitoring Configuration
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
monitoring:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
# Prometheus ServiceMonitor
|
|
serviceMonitor:
|
|
enabled: false
|
|
interval: 30s
|
|
scrapeTimeout: 10s
|
|
# labels: {}
|
|
# selector: {}
|
|
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
# Advanced Configuration
|
|
# ==============================================================================
|
|
|
|
# Node affinity for server pods
|
|
nodeAffinity: {}
|
|
|
|
# Pod affinity for server pods
|
|
podAffinity: {}
|
|
|
|
# Pod anti-affinity for server pods (for HA)
|
|
podAntiAffinity: {}
|
|
# Example:
|
|
# podAntiAffinity:
|
|
# preferredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution:
|
|
# - weight: 100
|
|
# podAffinityTerm:
|
|
# labelSelector:
|
|
# matchExpressions:
|
|
# - key: app.kubernetes.io/name
|
|
# operator: In
|
|
# values:
|
|
# - certctl
|
|
# topologyKey: kubernetes.io/hostname
|
|
|
|
# Custom labels for all resources
|
|
customLabels: {}
|
|
|
|
# Custom annotations for all resources
|
|
customAnnotations: {}
|