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certctl/deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl
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shankar0123 9c1d446e40 fix(security,config): remove unimplemented JWT auth-type, close silent downgrade (G-1)
The pre-G-1 config validator accepted CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt and the
startup log faithfully echoed 'authentication enabled type=jwt'.
Reasonable people read that and concluded JWT auth was on. It wasn't.
The auth-middleware wiring at cmd/server/main.go unconditionally routed
every request through the api-key bearer middleware regardless of
cfg.Auth.Type. So CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt quietly compared the incoming
'Authorization: Bearer <token>' against whatever string the operator put
in CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET — real JWT clients got 401, and operators who
treated CERTCTL_AUTH_SECRET as a *signing* secret (because they thought
they were configuring JWT) had effectively handed an attacker an api-key.
A security finding masquerading as a config option.

We chose the audit-recommended structural fix: remove the option, fail
fast at startup, and add the gateway-fronting pattern as the documented
forward path. Implementing JWT middleware would have meant jwks vs
static-secret rotation, claim mapping, expiry enforcement, audience and
issuer validation, key rollover semantics, and regression coverage at the
same depth as the existing api-key path — a feature, not a fix. Operators
who genuinely need JWT/OIDC front certctl with an authenticating gateway
(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium /
Authelia) and run the upstream certctl with CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none. Same
shape works on docker-compose and Helm.

The change is comprehensive across 7 phases — every surface that
mentioned 'jwt' as a certctl-auth-type is updated, plus structural
backstops (typed enum, runtime guard, helm template validation, CI grep
guard) so the lie can't reappear.

Files changed:

Phase 1 — production code (typed enum + jwt removal):
- internal/config/config.go: AuthType typed alias + AuthTypeAPIKey /
  AuthTypeNone constants + ValidAuthTypes() helper. Validate() routes
  literal 'jwt' through a dedicated multi-line diagnostic naming the
  authenticating-gateway pattern, then cross-checks against
  ValidAuthTypes(). Secret-required branch simplified to api-key-only.
  Field comment on AuthConfig.Type rewritten to drop jwt and point at
  the gateway pattern.
- internal/api/middleware/middleware.go: AuthConfig.Type field comment
  references the typed config.AuthType constants.
- internal/api/handler/health.go: same treatment for HealthHandler.AuthType.
- cmd/server/main.go: defense-in-depth runtime switch immediately after
  config.Load() — exits 1 on any unsupported auth-type that bypassed the
  validator. Auth-disabled startup log explicitly names the
  authenticating-gateway pattern.

Phase 2 — tests (Red→Green, contract pinning):
- internal/config/config_test.go: TestValidate_JWTAuth_RejectedDedicated
  (two table rows pinning the dedicated G-1 error fires regardless of
  whether Secret is set), TestValidAuthTypesDoesNotContainJWT (property
  guard against future re-introduction),
  TestValidAuthTypesIsExactly_APIKey_None (allowed-set contract),
  TestValidate_GenericInvalidAuthType (pins non-jwt invalid values still
  hit the generic invalid-auth-type error). Removed the prior
  TestValidate_JWTAuth_MissingSecret happy-path since its premise is
  inverted post-G-1.
- internal/api/handler/health_test.go: removed
  TestAuthInfo_ReturnsAuthType_JWT (which baked the silent-downgrade lie
  into the regression suite). Pre-existing _APIKey test continues to
  cover the api-key happy path.

Phase 3 — spec, docs, env templates:
- api/openapi.yaml: auth_type enum dropped to [api-key, none] with
  inline comment naming the G-1 closure.
- .env.example (root): CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE comment block rewritten to drop
  jwt and point at the gateway pattern; secret-required conditional
  simplified to api-key-only.
- docs/architecture.md: middleware-stack bullet rewritten to drop the
  JWT mention; new H3 'Authenticating-gateway pattern (JWT, OIDC, mTLS)'
  section explaining the design rationale and listing oauth2-proxy /
  Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium / Authelia / Caddy
  forward_auth / Apache mod_auth_openidc / nginx auth_request as the
  standard fronting options.
- docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md (new ~125 lines): migration guide
  with preconditions, what-changes, both recovery paths, complete
  docker-compose oauth2-proxy walkthrough, Traefik ForwardAuth and Envoy
  ext_authz patterns, rollback posture.

Phase 4 — Helm chart (template validation + docs):
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/_helpers.tpl: new certctl.validateAuthType
  helper mirroring the existing certctl.tls.required pattern. Fails
  template render on any server.auth.type outside {api-key, none} with
  a multi-line diagnostic.
- deploy/helm/certctl/templates/server-deployment.yaml,
  server-configmap.yaml, server-secret.yaml: invoke the helper at the
  top of each template that depends on .Values.server.auth.type.
- deploy/helm/certctl/values.yaml: auth: block comment expanded with the
  G-1 rationale and gateway-pattern cross-reference.
- deploy/helm/CHART_SUMMARY.md: server.auth.type table row now surfaces
  the allowed set and points at the upgrade doc.
- deploy/helm/certctl/README.md: new 'JWT / OIDC via authenticating
  gateway' section with a Kubernetes-flavored oauth2-proxy + certctl
  walkthrough.

Phase 5 — release surface:
- CHANGELOG.md: new [unreleased] top entry with Breaking / Removed /
  Added / Changed sections; explicit pointer at
  docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md from the Breaking subsection.

Phase 6 — CI guardrail:
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: new 'Forbidden auth-type literal regression
  guard (G-1)' step. Scoped patterns catch the actual regression shapes
  (map literal, slice literal, switch case, OpenAPI enum, env-file
  default, AuthType('jwt') cast). Comments and the dedicated rejection
  branch are intentionally exempt; connector-package JWT references
  (Google OAuth2 / step-ca) are exempt as out-of-scope external
  protocols. Verified locally: the guard passes on the actual tree and
  fires on all 4 synthetic regression patterns.

Out of scope (explicitly untouched):
- internal/connector/discovery/gcpsm/gcpsm.go — Google OAuth2 service-
  account JWT (external protocol).
- internal/connector/issuer/googlecas/googlecas.go — same.
- internal/connector/issuer/stepca/stepca.go — step-ca's provisioner
  one-time-token JWT for /sign API.
- docs/test-env.md, docs/connectors.md, docs/features.md — describe
  external CAs' use of JWT, not certctl's auth shape.
- Implementing actual JWT middleware. Feature, not a fix.

Verification (all gates pass):
- go build ./... — clean
- go vet ./... — clean
- go test -short ./... — every package green
- go test -short -race ./internal/config/... ./internal/api/... — clean
- govulncheck ./... — no vulnerabilities in our code
- helm lint deploy/helm/certctl/ — clean
- helm template with auth.type=api-key — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=none — renders OK
- helm template with auth.type=jwt — fails with validateAuthType
  diagnostic (exit 1)
- python3 yaml.safe_load on api/openapi.yaml — parses
- CI guardrail mirror — clean on real tree, fires on all 4 synthetic
  regression patterns
- Smoke test: 'CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt ./certctl-server' exits non-zero
  with: 'Failed to load configuration: CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=jwt is no
  longer accepted (G-1 silent auth downgrade): no JWT middleware ships
  with certctl. To use JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway
  (oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) in
  front of certctl and set CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none on the upstream.
  See docs/architecture.md "Authenticating-gateway pattern" and
  docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough'

config pkg coverage: ValidAuthTypes 100%, Validate 94.7%, total 75.5%.

Refs: coverage-gap-audit-2026-04-24-v5/unified-audit.md
      §2 P1 cluster, cat-g-jwt_silent_auth_downgrade
      Audit recommendation followed verbatim: 'Remove jwt from
      validAuthTypes until middleware ships'.
2026-04-25 00:22:23 +00:00

195 lines
7.1 KiB
Smarty

{{/*
Expand the name of the chart.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.name" -}}
{{- default .Chart.Name .Values.nameOverride | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Create a default fully qualified app name.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.fullname" -}}
{{- if .Values.fullnameOverride }}
{{- .Values.fullnameOverride | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- else }}
{{- $name := default .Chart.Name .Values.nameOverride }}
{{- if contains $name .Release.Name }}
{{- .Release.Name | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- else }}
{{- printf "%s-%s" .Release.Name $name | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Create chart name and version as used by the chart label.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.chart" -}}
{{- printf "%s-%s" .Chart.Name .Chart.Version | replace "+" "_" | trunc 63 | trimSuffix "-" }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Common labels
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.labels" -}}
helm.sh/chart: {{ include "certctl.chart" . }}
{{ include "certctl.selectorLabels" . }}
{{- if .Chart.AppVersion }}
app.kubernetes.io/version: {{ .Chart.AppVersion | quote }}
{{- end }}
app.kubernetes.io/managed-by: {{ .Release.Service }}
{{- with .Values.commonLabels }}
{{ toYaml . }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Selector labels for the main service (server, agent, postgres)
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.selectorLabels" -}}
app.kubernetes.io/name: {{ include "certctl.name" . }}
app.kubernetes.io/instance: {{ .Release.Name }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Server selector labels
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.serverSelectorLabels" -}}
{{ include "certctl.selectorLabels" . }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: server
{{- end }}
{{/*
Agent selector labels
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.agentSelectorLabels" -}}
{{ include "certctl.selectorLabels" . }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: agent
{{- end }}
{{/*
PostgreSQL selector labels
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.postgresSelectorLabels" -}}
{{ include "certctl.selectorLabels" . }}
app.kubernetes.io/component: postgres
{{- end }}
{{/*
Service account name
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.serviceAccountName" -}}
{{- if .Values.serviceAccount.create }}
{{- default (include "certctl.fullname" .) .Values.serviceAccount.name }}
{{- else }}
{{- default "default" .Values.serviceAccount.name }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Server image
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.serverImage" -}}
{{- $image := .Values.server.image }}
{{- printf "%s:%s" $image.repository (coalesce $image.tag .Chart.AppVersion) }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Agent image
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.agentImage" -}}
{{- $image := .Values.agent.image }}
{{- printf "%s:%s" $image.repository (coalesce $image.tag .Chart.AppVersion) }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
PostgreSQL image
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.postgresImage" -}}
{{- $image := .Values.postgresql.image }}
{{- printf "%s:%s" $image.repository $image.tag }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Database connection string
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.databaseURL" -}}
postgres://{{ .Values.postgresql.auth.username }}:$(POSTGRES_PASSWORD)@{{ include "certctl.fullname" . }}-postgres:5432/{{ .Values.postgresql.auth.database }}?sslmode=disable
{{- end }}
{{/*
Server URL (for agents). HTTPS-only as of v2.2 see docs/tls.md.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.serverURL" -}}
https://{{ include "certctl.fullname" . }}-server:{{ .Values.server.service.port }}
{{- end }}
{{/*
TLS Secret name resolver.
Operator-facing precedence:
1. server.tls.existingSecret operator points at a pre-existing kubernetes.io/tls Secret
2. server.tls.certManager.secretName explicit secret name for the cert-manager Certificate CR
3. "<fullname>-tls" default when cert-manager is enabled but secretName is blank
Never emits an empty string that case is already excluded by certctl.tls.required below,
which must be invoked by any template that depends on the resolved secret name.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.tls.secretName" -}}
{{- if .Values.server.tls.existingSecret -}}
{{- .Values.server.tls.existingSecret -}}
{{- else if .Values.server.tls.certManager.secretName -}}
{{- .Values.server.tls.certManager.secretName -}}
{{- else -}}
{{- printf "%s-tls" (include "certctl.fullname" .) -}}
{{- end -}}
{{- end }}
{{/*
TLS configuration gate.
HTTPS is the only supported listener mode (v2.2+). The server refuses to start
without a cert/key pair mounted at server.tls.mountPath, so `helm template` /
`helm install` must fail loudly at render-time rather than shipping a broken
Deployment that crash-loops with "tls config required".
Operators MUST configure EXACTLY ONE of:
(a) server.tls.existingSecret: <name-of-kubernetes.io/tls-secret>
(b) server.tls.certManager.enabled: true (+ issuerRef.name populated)
Any template that mounts the TLS Secret must call
`{{ include "certctl.tls.required" . }}` at the top so this guard runs once
per affected resource. No-op when configured correctly.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.tls.required" -}}
{{- if and (not .Values.server.tls.existingSecret) (not .Values.server.tls.certManager.enabled) -}}
{{- fail "\n\ncertctl refuses to start without TLS.\n\nSet EXACTLY ONE of:\n --set server.tls.existingSecret=<your-kubernetes.io/tls-secret-name>\nOR\n --set server.tls.certManager.enabled=true \\\n --set server.tls.certManager.issuerRef.name=<your-issuer-or-clusterissuer>\n\nSee docs/tls.md for the full setup walkthrough, including bootstrap\nguidance for air-gapped clusters without cert-manager.\n" -}}
{{- end -}}
{{- if and .Values.server.tls.certManager.enabled (not .Values.server.tls.certManager.issuerRef.name) -}}
{{- fail "\n\nserver.tls.certManager.enabled=true but server.tls.certManager.issuerRef.name is empty.\n\nSet:\n --set server.tls.certManager.issuerRef.name=<your-issuer-or-clusterissuer>\n\nSee docs/tls.md.\n" -}}
{{- end -}}
{{- end }}
{{/*
Auth-type validation gate.
G-1 (P1): pre-G-1 the chart accepted server.auth.type=jwt and the
certctl-server container silently routed every request through the
api-key bearer middleware (no JWT impl ships with certctl). Post-G-1
the chart fails at template-time with a pointer at the authenticating-
gateway pattern. The valid set must stay in sync with
internal/config.ValidAuthTypes() in the Go binary; if you add a value
there you must add it here too (and update the property test in
internal/config/config_test.go that pins both surfaces).
Any template that consumes .Values.server.auth.type should call
`{{ include "certctl.validateAuthType" . }}` at the top so this guard
runs once per affected resource. No-op when configured correctly.
*/}}
{{- define "certctl.validateAuthType" -}}
{{- $valid := list "api-key" "none" -}}
{{- if not (has .Values.server.auth.type $valid) -}}
{{- fail (printf "\n\nserver.auth.type=%q is not supported (valid: %v).\n\nFor JWT/OIDC, run an authenticating gateway in front of certctl\n(oauth2-proxy / Envoy ext_authz / Traefik ForwardAuth / Pomerium) and\nset server.auth.type=none here so the gateway terminates federated\nidentity. See docs/architecture.md \"Authenticating-gateway pattern\"\nand docs/upgrade-to-v2-jwt-removal.md for the migration walkthrough.\n\nG-1 audit closure: pre-G-1 the chart accepted type=jwt and the binary\nsilently downgraded to api-key middleware. The chart now fails at\ntemplate time so misconfigured deployments cannot ship.\n" .Values.server.auth.type $valid) -}}
{{- end -}}
{{- end }}