Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/m008_admin_gate_test.go
T
shankar0123 99a012e3be auth-bundle-1 Phase 0: extract internal/auth/ from middleware package
Bundle 1 / Phase 0: pure refactor splitting auth surface out of internal/api/middleware so Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles, permissions, scoped grants) have a clean home.

Moved to internal/auth/: NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig, NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin. Added testfixtures.go (WithActor / WithAdmin / WithActorAdmin) so handler tests don't construct context manually.

Stayed in internal/api/middleware/: RequestID, Logging, NewLogging, Recovery, RateLimitConfig, NewRateLimiter (now imports auth.GetUser for per-user keying per audit Category C), CORSConfig, NewCORS, ContentType, CORS, GetRequestID, responseWriter, Chain, audit middleware (now imports auth.GetUser).

Updated 22 caller files across cmd/, internal/api/handler/, internal/api/middleware/, internal/mcp/. Existing m008_admin_gate_test.go now scans for auth.IsAdmin( substring; Phase 3 will further evolve to track auth.RequirePermission. Behavior unchanged: all handler / middleware / service / connector / cmd / mcp tests pass with no test-logic edits, only import-path renames.

Phase 0 exit criteria: internal/auth/ exists with 6 files; middleware.go went 575 -> 422 lines (auth-related ~150 lines moved out); grep -rE 'middleware\.(GetUser|IsAdmin|UserKey|AdminKey|NamedAPIKey|HashAPIKey|NewAuth)' returns 0 hits; context.WithValue(.*middleware.UserKey/AdminKey) returns 0 hits; go vet ./... clean; go test -short ./... green across all packages tested.

Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Per cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md, do not merge to master without (1) make verify green, (2) >= 2 external testers confirm, (3) >= 90% coverage on internal/auth/ in .github/coverage-thresholds.yml.
2026-05-09 15:51:31 +00:00

175 lines
6.3 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"go/parser"
"go/token"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"sort"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Bundle C / Audit M-008: pin the admin-gated handler set.
//
// The audit's request is "Admin-gated operation role-gate test coverage
// needs verification". Verified-already-clean recon: only one handler
// in internal/api/handler/ calls auth.IsAdmin to gate access:
// bulk_revocation.go — which has 3 dedicated tests
// (NonAdmin_Returns403, AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403,
// AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) covering all three branches.
//
// This test enforces the invariant going forward by walking every
// .go file in this package, finding every auth.IsAdmin call
// site, and asserting the file appears in AdminGatedHandlers below.
// Adding a new auth.IsAdmin call without updating the constant
// AND adding a parallel test triplet fails CI.
// AdminGatedHandlers is the documented allowlist of handler files that
// gate access on auth.IsAdmin. Every entry MUST have:
// - a non-admin-rejection test ("_NonAdmin_Returns403")
// - an explicit-false-admin-rejection test ("_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403")
// - an admin-allowed actor-attribution test ("_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor")
//
// Keys are the handler filenames; values are short descriptions of why
// the gate exists. health.go is an INFORMATIONAL caller of IsAdmin (it
// surfaces the flag to the GUI but does not gate) — explicitly excluded.
var AdminGatedHandlers = map[string]string{
"bulk_revocation.go": "M-003: bulk revocation is fleet-scale destructive — admin-only",
"admin_crl_cache.go": "CRL/OCSP-Responder Phase 5: cache state reveals issuer set + CRL cadence — admin-only",
"admin_scep_intune.go": "SCEP RFC 8894 + Intune master bundle Phase 9.2 + Phase 9 follow-up: profiles + stats endpoints reveal per-profile RA cert expiries + Intune trust anchor expiries + mTLS bundle paths; reload-trust is a privileged action — admin-only",
"admin_est.go": "EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 7.2: profiles endpoint reveals per-profile counter snapshot + mTLS trust-anchor expiries + auth modes; reload-trust is a privileged action — admin-only",
"intermediate_ca.go": "Rank 8: CA hierarchy management mints sub-CA certs that become trust roots for every downstream leaf — admin-only fleet-scale destructive surface",
}
// InformationalIsAdminCallers is the documented allowlist of files that
// call auth.IsAdmin without using the result to gate access. The
// only legitimate use of an informational call is reporting the flag to
// a downstream consumer (e.g. health.go::AuthCheck reports admin to the
// GUI so it can hide admin-only buttons).
var InformationalIsAdminCallers = map[string]string{
"health.go": "informational: reports admin flag to GUI for affordance gating, no server-side gate",
}
func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_PinExpectedSet(t *testing.T) {
actual, err := scanIsAdminCallers(".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("scan handler dir: %v", err)
}
expected := append([]string(nil), keys(AdminGatedHandlers)...)
expected = append(expected, keys(InformationalIsAdminCallers)...)
sort.Strings(actual)
sort.Strings(expected)
if !slicesEqual008(actual, expected) {
t.Errorf(
"auth.IsAdmin call sites changed:\n"+
" actual: %v\n"+
" expected: %v\n"+
"\n"+
"If you added a new admin gate, append it to AdminGatedHandlers AND\n"+
"add the 3-test triplet (_NonAdmin_Returns403 / _AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 /\n"+
"_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor) — see bulk_revocation_handler_test.go for\n"+
"the template.\n"+
"\n"+
"If you added an informational caller (no gating), append to\n"+
"InformationalIsAdminCallers with a justification.",
actual, expected)
}
}
func TestM008_AdminGatedHandlers_HaveTripletTests(t *testing.T) {
for handlerFile := range AdminGatedHandlers {
base := strings.TrimSuffix(handlerFile, ".go")
// Look for the 3-test triplet in the corresponding _test.go file
// or in any test file in the package — bulk_revocation_handler_test.go
// follows a slightly different naming convention.
matches, err := filepath.Glob("*_test.go")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("glob: %v", err)
}
var foundNonAdmin, foundExplicitFalse, foundAdminPermitted bool
for _, m := range matches {
body, err := os.ReadFile(m)
if err != nil {
continue
}
s := string(body)
// Look for tests that mention the handler base name + the
// expected suffix. Loose match because some test files use
// _Handler_NonAdmin and others use _NonAdmin.
if strings.Contains(s, "NonAdmin_Returns403") {
foundNonAdmin = true
}
if strings.Contains(s, "AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403") {
foundExplicitFalse = true
}
if strings.Contains(s, "AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor") {
foundAdminPermitted = true
}
}
if !foundNonAdmin {
t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_NonAdmin_Returns403 test", base)
}
if !foundExplicitFalse {
t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_AdminExplicitFalse_Returns403 test", base)
}
if !foundAdminPermitted {
t.Errorf("admin-gated handler %s lacks a *_AdminPermitted_ForwardsActor test", base)
}
}
}
// --- helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
func scanIsAdminCallers(dir string) ([]string, error) {
entries, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var out []string
fset := token.NewFileSet()
for _, e := range entries {
name := e.Name()
if !strings.HasSuffix(name, ".go") || strings.HasSuffix(name, "_test.go") {
continue
}
body, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dir, name))
if err != nil {
continue
}
_, parseErr := parser.ParseFile(fset, filepath.Join(dir, name), body, parser.SkipObjectResolution)
if parseErr != nil {
continue
}
// Substring-match auth.IsAdmin — cheap and sufficient
// because the import path is fixed and there's no aliasing
// shenanigans elsewhere in this package.
if strings.Contains(string(body), "auth.IsAdmin(") {
out = append(out, name)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func keys(m map[string]string) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for k := range m {
out = append(out, k)
}
return out
}
func slicesEqual008(a, b []string) bool {
if len(a) != len(b) {
return false
}
for i := range a {
if a[i] != b[i] {
return false
}
}
return true
}