Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/bulk_revocation.go
T
shankar0123 99a012e3be auth-bundle-1 Phase 0: extract internal/auth/ from middleware package
Bundle 1 / Phase 0: pure refactor splitting auth surface out of internal/api/middleware so Bundle 2 (OIDC + sessions) and the broader RBAC primitive (roles, permissions, scoped grants) have a clean home.

Moved to internal/auth/: NamedAPIKey, HashAPIKey, AuthConfig, NewAuthWithNamedKeys, NewAuth, UserKey, AdminKey, GetUser, IsAdmin. Added testfixtures.go (WithActor / WithAdmin / WithActorAdmin) so handler tests don't construct context manually.

Stayed in internal/api/middleware/: RequestID, Logging, NewLogging, Recovery, RateLimitConfig, NewRateLimiter (now imports auth.GetUser for per-user keying per audit Category C), CORSConfig, NewCORS, ContentType, CORS, GetRequestID, responseWriter, Chain, audit middleware (now imports auth.GetUser).

Updated 22 caller files across cmd/, internal/api/handler/, internal/api/middleware/, internal/mcp/. Existing m008_admin_gate_test.go now scans for auth.IsAdmin( substring; Phase 3 will further evolve to track auth.RequirePermission. Behavior unchanged: all handler / middleware / service / connector / cmd / mcp tests pass with no test-logic edits, only import-path renames.

Phase 0 exit criteria: internal/auth/ exists with 6 files; middleware.go went 575 -> 422 lines (auth-related ~150 lines moved out); grep -rE 'middleware\.(GetUser|IsAdmin|UserKey|AdminKey|NamedAPIKey|HashAPIKey|NewAuth)' returns 0 hits; context.WithValue(.*middleware.UserKey/AdminKey) returns 0 hits; go vet ./... clean; go test -short ./... green across all packages tested.

Branch: dev/auth-bundle-1. Per cowork/auth-bundle-1-prompt.md, do not merge to master without (1) make verify green, (2) >= 2 external testers confirm, (3) >= 90% coverage on internal/auth/ in .github/coverage-thresholds.yml.
2026-05-09 15:51:31 +00:00

177 lines
6.3 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// BulkRevocationService defines the service interface for bulk certificate revocation.
type BulkRevocationService interface {
BulkRevoke(ctx context.Context, criteria domain.BulkRevocationCriteria, reason string, actor string) (*domain.BulkRevocationResult, error)
}
// BulkRevocationHandler handles HTTP requests for bulk revocation operations.
type BulkRevocationHandler struct {
svc BulkRevocationService
}
// NewBulkRevocationHandler creates a new BulkRevocationHandler.
func NewBulkRevocationHandler(svc BulkRevocationService) BulkRevocationHandler {
return BulkRevocationHandler{svc: svc}
}
// bulkRevokeRequest represents the JSON request body for bulk revocation.
type bulkRevokeRequest struct {
Reason string `json:"reason"`
ProfileID string `json:"profile_id,omitempty"`
OwnerID string `json:"owner_id,omitempty"`
AgentID string `json:"agent_id,omitempty"`
IssuerID string `json:"issuer_id,omitempty"`
TeamID string `json:"team_id,omitempty"`
CertificateIDs []string `json:"certificate_ids,omitempty"`
}
// BulkRevoke handles bulk certificate revocation.
// POST /api/v1/certificates/bulk-revoke
//
// M-003: admin-only. Bulk revocation is a fleet-scale destructive operation —
// a non-admin caller must not be able to invalidate certificates across
// profiles/owners/agents. The gate is enforced here (before body parsing) so a
// non-admin never sees its request criteria evaluated.
func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevoke(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
// M-003: admin-only gate. Non-admin callers are rejected before any
// criteria/body processing to avoid leaking validation behavior to
// unauthorized actors.
if !auth.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
"Bulk revocation requires admin privileges",
requestID)
return
}
var req bulkRevokeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
return
}
// Validate reason is present
if req.Reason == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Revocation reason is required", requestID)
return
}
// Validate reason is a valid RFC 5280 code
if !domain.IsValidRevocationReason(req.Reason) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid revocation reason: "+req.Reason, requestID)
return
}
criteria := domain.BulkRevocationCriteria{
ProfileID: req.ProfileID,
OwnerID: req.OwnerID,
AgentID: req.AgentID,
IssuerID: req.IssuerID,
TeamID: req.TeamID,
CertificateIDs: req.CertificateIDs,
}
// Safety guard: at least one criterion required
if criteria.IsEmpty() {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "At least one filter criterion is required (profile_id, owner_id, agent_id, issuer_id, team_id, or certificate_ids)", requestID)
return
}
// Extract actor from auth context (M-002: named-key identity → audit trail)
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
result, err := h.svc.BulkRevoke(r.Context(), criteria, req.Reason, actor)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Bulk revocation failed: "+err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, result)
}
// BulkRevokeEST handles EST-source-scoped bulk certificate revocation.
// POST /api/v1/est/certificates/bulk-revoke
//
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 11.2.
//
// Identical to BulkRevoke above but the Source criterion is pinned to
// CertificateSourceEST so the operation only affects certs the EST
// service stamped at issuance time. Operators who want to revoke
// "every cert this device family ever issued through EST" hit this
// endpoint with a profile_id / owner_id / etc. criterion + the
// handler narrows the result set to EST-only.
//
// Same M-008 admin-gate as the generic BulkRevoke. Audit action
// emitted by the service is `est_bulk_revoke` (typed code from Phase
// 11.3) so operators grep on the action string distinguishes
// EST-bulk-revoke from the generic bulk-revoke.
func (h BulkRevocationHandler) BulkRevokeEST(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
if !auth.IsAdmin(r.Context()) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusForbidden,
"EST bulk revocation requires admin privileges", requestID)
return
}
var req bulkRevokeRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body", requestID)
return
}
if req.Reason == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Revocation reason is required", requestID)
return
}
if !domain.IsValidRevocationReason(req.Reason) {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid revocation reason: "+req.Reason, requestID)
return
}
criteria := domain.BulkRevocationCriteria{
ProfileID: req.ProfileID,
OwnerID: req.OwnerID,
AgentID: req.AgentID,
IssuerID: req.IssuerID,
TeamID: req.TeamID,
CertificateIDs: req.CertificateIDs,
// Pin Source to EST — operators MUST also supply at least one
// narrower criterion (criteria.IsEmpty intentionally excludes
// Source so a Source-only request is still rejected as too
// broad). This protects against "revoke every EST cert in the
// fleet" via a malformed body.
Source: domain.CertificateSourceEST,
}
if criteria.IsEmpty() {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
"At least one narrower criterion is required (profile_id, owner_id, agent_id, issuer_id, team_id, or certificate_ids); EST bulk-revoke is implicitly Source-scoped to EST",
requestID)
return
}
actor := resolveActor(r.Context())
result, err := h.svc.BulkRevoke(r.Context(), criteria, req.Reason, actor)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "EST bulk revocation failed: "+err.Error(), requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, result)
}