Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/audit.go
T
shankar0123 3c605d5618 auth-bundle-1 Phase 6-7-8: bootstrap path + scope-down CLI + auditor-role split
# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap

* internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface +
  EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption
  via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC-
  first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy.
* BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's
  CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API
  key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin
  via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just-
  minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and
  records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth.
* internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface +
  StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore
  (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth
  middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can
  extend the lookup table at runtime.
* migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with
  (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by,
  created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent.
* /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both
  routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes
  allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap;
  the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body.
* Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND
  admin actors already exist (config drift signal).
* Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong
  token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption,
  admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor-
  name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps
  guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status
  201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog +
  audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects
  slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope.

# Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI

* GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by
  ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per
  (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold.
  Permission: auth.role.list.
* internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown
  (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config),
  AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The
  synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive /
  bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly.
* SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of
  audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role
  (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason.
  Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP
  → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent;
  otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications.
* CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys
  scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'.
* CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS
  call-out + four flow examples.

# Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column

* migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE
  audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT
  'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config)
  + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes
  for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration
  000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is
  not blocked).
* domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty);
  domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants.
* AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent;
  legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle).
  Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService)
  switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...).
* GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query
  param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value),
  dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated
  with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema.
* Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category;
  AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory
  gates the WHERE clause.
* Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing,
  back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values
  accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the
  field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly
  audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from
  viewer except audit.read).

# Cross-phase wiring

* HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires
  the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted
  assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the
  keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos).
* AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys
  to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated.
* fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain
  RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing
  tests untouched.

# Verifications

* gofmt -l: clean across every modified file.
* go vet ./...: clean.
* staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli +
  service + repository + cmd + domain: clean.
* go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched
  package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler,
  internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth,
  internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres,
  cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware,
  cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
2026-05-09 20:15:43 +00:00

127 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/api/middleware"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
)
// AuditService defines the service interface for audit event operations.
type AuditService interface {
ListAuditEvents(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
GetAuditEvent(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.AuditEvent, error)
// ListAuditEventsByCategory (Bundle 1 Phase 8) returns audit
// rows whose event_category column matches eventCategory.
// eventCategory is one of "cert_lifecycle", "auth", "config";
// empty string returns all categories. Used by the auditor role
// (filtered to "auth" via /v1/audit?category=auth).
ListAuditEventsByCategory(ctx context.Context, eventCategory string, page, perPage int) ([]domain.AuditEvent, int64, error)
}
// AuditHandler handles HTTP requests for audit event operations.
type AuditHandler struct {
svc AuditService
}
// NewAuditHandler creates a new AuditHandler with a service dependency.
func NewAuditHandler(svc AuditService) AuditHandler {
return AuditHandler{svc: svc}
}
// ListAuditEvents lists audit events.
// GET /api/v1/audit?page=1&per_page=50&category=auth
//
// Bundle 1 Phase 8 adds the optional `category` query parameter for
// auditor-role filtering. Allowed values: cert_lifecycle, auth, config.
// Unknown values surface 400 so misuse is caught loud (instead of
// silently returning all rows).
func (h AuditHandler) ListAuditEvents(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
page := 1
perPage := 50
query := r.URL.Query()
if p := query.Get("page"); p != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(p); err == nil && parsed > 0 {
page = parsed
}
}
if pp := query.Get("per_page"); pp != "" {
if parsed, err := strconv.Atoi(pp); err == nil && parsed > 0 && parsed <= 500 {
perPage = parsed
}
}
category := query.Get("category")
if category != "" {
switch category {
case domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle, domain.EventCategoryAuth, domain.EventCategoryConfig:
// ok
default:
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest,
"Invalid category — allowed: cert_lifecycle, auth, config",
requestID)
return
}
}
var (
events []domain.AuditEvent
total int64
err error
)
if category != "" {
events, total, err = h.svc.ListAuditEventsByCategory(r.Context(), category, page, perPage)
} else {
events, total, err = h.svc.ListAuditEvents(r.Context(), page, perPage)
}
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Failed to list audit events", requestID)
return
}
response := PagedResponse{
Data: events,
Total: total,
Page: page,
PerPage: perPage,
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, response)
}
// GetAuditEvent retrieves a single audit event by ID.
// GET /api/v1/audit/{id}
func (h AuditHandler) GetAuditEvent(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodGet {
Error(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "Method not allowed")
return
}
requestID := middleware.GetRequestID(r.Context())
id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/v1/audit/")
parts := strings.Split(id, "/")
if len(parts) == 0 || parts[0] == "" {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Audit event ID is required", requestID)
return
}
id = parts[0]
event, err := h.svc.GetAuditEvent(r.Context(), id)
if err != nil {
ErrorWithRequestID(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Audit event not found", requestID)
return
}
JSON(w, http.StatusOK, event)
}