Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/auth.go
T
shankar0123 1697845493 fix(auth): wire RevokeAllForActor + RotateCSRFToken to mutation paths
Closes HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit.

HIGH-1: breakglass.Service.SetPassword and RemoveCredential now call
sessions.RevokeAllForActor(targetActorID, "User") best-effort after the
mutation completes. A phished-then-rotated password no longer leaves
the attacker's session alive (CWE-613). Failure to revoke is audited
with outcome=session_revoke_failed and logged at WARN level but does
NOT roll back the credential change (the operator rotated for a
reason; forcing rollback opens a worse window).

- breakglass.SessionMinter interface extended with RevokeAllForActor.
- cmd/server/main.go::breakglassSessionMinterAdapter gains the bridge
  to session.Service.RevokeAllForActor.
- stubSessions in service_test.go tracks revokeAllIDs / revokeAllTypes
  / revokeAllErr.
- Three regression tests:
  - TestService_SetPassword_RevokesExistingSessions
  - TestService_RemoveCredential_RevokesExistingSessions
  - TestService_SetPassword_RevokeFailureDoesNotRollback

HIGH-2: New session.Service.RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx, actorID,
actorType) int method walks ListByActor and rotates the CSRF token on
every active (non-revoked, non-expired) row. Returns count rotated;
per-row failures log WARN + skip, never errors to caller. New
handler.CSRFRotator interface + AuthHandler.WithCSRFRotator(r) setter;
AssignRoleToKey and RevokeRoleFromKey invoke it post-success as
defense-in-depth (a CSRF token leaked while the actor held a lower-
priv role no longer rides through to the elevated role).

- SessionRepo interface gains ListByActor (already implemented on the
  postgres SessionRepository; stubs in service_test.go + bench_test.go
  updated to match).
- cmd/server/main.go calls .WithCSRFRotator(sessionService) on the
  AuthHandler.
- Two regression tests:
  - TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_RotatesAllActiveRows (asserts revoked /
    expired / other-actor rows are skipped)
  - TestRotateCSRFTokenForActor_NoSessionsReturnsZero

Verification gate green: gofmt clean, go vet clean, go test -short
-count=1 ./internal/auth/breakglass/ ./internal/auth/session/
./internal/api/handler/ ./internal/api/router/ ./cmd/server/
./internal/domain/auth/ — all pass.

CRIT-1..CRIT-5 + HIGH-1 + HIGH-2 of the 2026-05-10 audit now closed
on this branch. Spec at
cowork/auth-bundles-fixes-2026-05-10/06-high-1-2-revoke-and-rotate.md.

Refs: cowork/auth-bundles-audit-2026-05-10.md HIGH-1 HIGH-2
2026-05-10 20:43:45 +00:00

567 lines
19 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain"
authdomain "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/domain/auth"
"github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/repository"
authsvc "github.com/certctl-io/certctl/internal/service/auth"
)
// AuthHandler exposes the RBAC primitive over HTTP. Bundle 1 Phase 4 wires
// the routes registered by HandlerRegistry under /v1/auth/*.
//
// Every mutating endpoint runs through the service layer, which enforces
// the privilege-escalation guard (callers need auth.role.assign for
// Grant/Revoke, auth.role.create/edit/delete for the role lifecycle,
// auth.key.* for key management). Read endpoints require auth.role.list.
//
// The /v1/auth/me endpoint has no permission requirement (every
// authenticated caller can read their own permissions); this is the
// query the GUI uses to gate affordance rendering.
type AuthHandler struct {
roles AuthRoleService
perms AuthPermissionService
actors AuthActorRoleService
checker auth.PermissionChecker
// csrfRotator is the optional session-CSRF-rotation hook called
// post-role-mutation. Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-2 closure — when an
// actor's role set changes, every active session's CSRF token is
// rotated as defense-in-depth against token leak preceding the
// privilege change. Nil-safe: when unset (pre-Bundle-2 wiring,
// tests that don't care about CSRF), the wires are no-ops.
csrfRotator CSRFRotator
}
// CSRFRotator is the projection of *session.Service used by AuthHandler
// to rotate CSRF tokens across an actor's active sessions after a role
// mutation. RotateCSRFTokenForActor returns the count of rotated rows
// and NEVER errors out — rotation is defense-in-depth and must not
// block the role mutation that triggered it.
type CSRFRotator interface {
RotateCSRFTokenForActor(ctx context.Context, actorID, actorType string) int
}
// AuthRoleService is the service-layer dependency the AuthHandler uses
// for role + role-permission lifecycle. Mirrors internal/service/auth.
type AuthRoleService interface {
List(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]*authdomain.Role, error)
Get(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) (*authdomain.Role, error)
Create(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
Update(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, role *authdomain.Role) error
Delete(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, id string) error
ListPermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID string) ([]*authdomain.RolePermission, error)
AddPermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
RemovePermission(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, roleID, permName string, scopeType authdomain.ScopeType, scopeID *string) error
}
// AuthPermissionService exposes the canonical permission catalogue.
type AuthPermissionService interface {
List(ctx context.Context) ([]*authdomain.Permission, error)
IsRegistered(name string) bool
}
// AuthActorRoleService manages role grants on actors and surfaces the
// effective-permissions query the GUI's /v1/auth/me handler uses.
type AuthActorRoleService interface {
Grant(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, ar *authdomain.ActorRole) error
Revoke(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType, roleID string) error
ListForActor(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]*authdomain.ActorRole, error)
EffectivePermissions(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller, actorID string, actorType domain.ActorType) ([]repository.EffectivePermission, error)
// ListKeys (Bundle 1 Phase 7) returns every actor in the tenant
// with at least one role grant. The CLI's `auth keys list` and
// scope-down helper consume this. The synthetic actor-demo-anon
// row is included; the CLI filters it out of the interactive
// prompt loop.
ListKeys(ctx context.Context, caller *authsvc.Caller) ([]repository.ActorWithRoles, error)
}
// NewAuthHandler constructs an AuthHandler with the service-layer
// dependencies wired in cmd/server/main.go.
func NewAuthHandler(
roles AuthRoleService,
perms AuthPermissionService,
actors AuthActorRoleService,
checker auth.PermissionChecker,
) AuthHandler {
return AuthHandler{
roles: roles,
perms: perms,
actors: actors,
checker: checker,
}
}
// WithCSRFRotator returns a copy of the handler with the CSRF-rotation
// hook installed. Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-2 closure — production wiring
// in cmd/server/main.go calls this with the post-Bundle-2
// session.Service; pre-Bundle-2 deployments + tests can leave the
// rotator nil and the role-mutation handlers simply skip rotation.
func (h AuthHandler) WithCSRFRotator(r CSRFRotator) AuthHandler {
h.csrfRotator = r
return h
}
// =============================================================================
// JSON request / response shapes
// =============================================================================
type roleResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt string `json:"updated_at"`
}
func roleToResponse(r *authdomain.Role) roleResponse {
return roleResponse{
ID: r.ID,
TenantID: r.TenantID,
Name: r.Name,
Description: r.Description,
CreatedAt: r.CreatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
UpdatedAt: r.UpdatedAt.UTC().Format("2006-01-02T15:04:05Z07:00"),
}
}
type permissionResponse struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
Name string `json:"name"`
Namespace string `json:"namespace"`
}
func permToResponse(p *authdomain.Permission) permissionResponse {
return permissionResponse{ID: p.ID, Name: p.Name, Namespace: p.Namespace}
}
type rolePermissionResponse struct {
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
PermissionID string `json:"permission_id"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
}
func rolePermToResponse(g *authdomain.RolePermission) rolePermissionResponse {
return rolePermissionResponse{
RoleID: g.RoleID,
PermissionID: g.PermissionID,
ScopeType: string(g.ScopeType),
ScopeID: g.ScopeID,
}
}
type createRoleRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
type updateRoleRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
}
type addPermissionRequest struct {
Permission string `json:"permission"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type,omitempty"` // defaults to "global"
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
}
type assignRoleRequest struct {
RoleID string `json:"role_id"`
}
type meResponse struct {
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
Admin bool `json:"admin"` // back-compat with /v1/auth/check
Roles []string `json:"roles"`
EffectivePermissions []effectivePermissionPayload `json:"effective_permissions"`
}
type effectivePermissionPayload struct {
Permission string `json:"permission"`
ScopeType string `json:"scope_type"`
ScopeID *string `json:"scope_id,omitempty"`
}
// =============================================================================
// Handlers
// =============================================================================
// ListRoles handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles.
// Permission: auth.role.list (enforced at the service layer).
func (h AuthHandler) ListRoles(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roles, err := h.roles.List(r.Context(), caller)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
out := make([]roleResponse, 0, len(roles))
for _, role := range roles {
out = append(out, roleToResponse(role))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"roles": out})
}
// GetRole handles GET /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
func (h AuthHandler) GetRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
role, err := h.roles.Get(r.Context(), caller, id)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
perms, err := h.roles.ListPermissions(r.Context(), caller, id)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
permResponses := make([]rolePermissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
for _, p := range perms {
permResponses = append(permResponses, rolePermToResponse(p))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{
"role": roleToResponse(role),
"permissions": permResponses,
})
}
// CreateRole handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles.
func (h AuthHandler) CreateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
var req createRoleRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
if strings.TrimSpace(req.Name) == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role name is required")
return
}
role := &authdomain.Role{Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
if err := h.roles.Create(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, roleToResponse(role))
}
// UpdateRole handles PUT /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
func (h AuthHandler) UpdateRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
var req updateRoleRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
role := &authdomain.Role{ID: id, Name: req.Name, Description: req.Description}
if err := h.roles.Update(r.Context(), caller, role); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, roleToResponse(role))
}
// DeleteRole handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}.
func (h AuthHandler) DeleteRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
id := r.PathValue("id")
if err := h.roles.Delete(r.Context(), caller, id); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// ListPermissions handles GET /api/v1/auth/permissions.
func (h AuthHandler) ListPermissions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if _, err := callerFromRequest(r); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
perms, err := h.perms.List(r.Context())
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
out := make([]permissionResponse, 0, len(perms))
for _, p := range perms {
out = append(out, permToResponse(p))
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"permissions": out})
}
// ListKeys handles GET /api/v1/auth/keys (Bundle 1 Phase 7).
// Permission: auth.role.list. Returns every distinct actor in the
// tenant with at least one role grant — the CLI's `auth keys list`
// and scope-down flow consume this.
func (h AuthHandler) ListKeys(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
keys, err := h.actors.ListKeys(r.Context(), caller)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
type keyEntry struct {
ActorID string `json:"actor_id"`
ActorType string `json:"actor_type"`
TenantID string `json:"tenant_id"`
RoleIDs []string `json:"role_ids"`
}
out := make([]keyEntry, 0, len(keys))
for _, k := range keys {
out = append(out, keyEntry{
ActorID: k.ActorID,
ActorType: string(k.ActorType),
TenantID: k.TenantID,
RoleIDs: k.RoleIDs,
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]interface{}{"keys": out})
}
// AddRolePermission handles POST /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions.
func (h AuthHandler) AddRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roleID := r.PathValue("id")
var req addPermissionRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
if req.Permission == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "permission is required")
return
}
scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(req.ScopeType)
if scopeType == "" {
scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
}
if err := h.roles.AddPermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, req.Permission, scopeType, req.ScopeID); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// RemoveRolePermission handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/roles/{id}/permissions/{perm}.
func (h AuthHandler) RemoveRolePermission(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roleID := r.PathValue("id")
permName := r.PathValue("perm")
scopeType := authdomain.ScopeType(r.URL.Query().Get("scope_type"))
if scopeType == "" {
scopeType = authdomain.ScopeTypeGlobal
}
var scopeID *string
if v := r.URL.Query().Get("scope_id"); v != "" {
scopeID = &v
}
if err := h.roles.RemovePermission(r.Context(), caller, roleID, permName, scopeType, scopeID); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// AssignRoleToKey handles POST /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles.
// {id} is the API-key actor name (e.g. "alice", "ops-admin"); the
// service layer resolves to the actor_roles row.
func (h AuthHandler) AssignRoleToKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
var req assignRoleRequest
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "Invalid request body")
return
}
if req.RoleID == "" {
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "role_id is required")
return
}
ar := &authdomain.ActorRole{
ActorID: keyID,
ActorType: authdomain.ActorTypeValue(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey),
RoleID: req.RoleID,
}
if err := h.actors.Grant(r.Context(), caller, ar); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-2 closure — rotate CSRF across every
// active session of the target actor. Non-blocking (per-row
// failures are logged inside RotateCSRFTokenForActor but the
// return value isn't an error). API-key actors typically have no
// sessions (Bearer-only) so this is a no-op for them.
if h.csrfRotator != nil {
_ = h.csrfRotator.RotateCSRFTokenForActor(r.Context(), keyID, string(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// RevokeRoleFromKey handles DELETE /api/v1/auth/keys/{id}/roles/{role_id}.
func (h AuthHandler) RevokeRoleFromKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
keyID := r.PathValue("id")
roleID := r.PathValue("role_id")
if err := h.actors.Revoke(r.Context(), caller, keyID, domain.ActorTypeAPIKey, roleID); err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
// Audit 2026-05-10 HIGH-2 closure — rotate CSRF post-revoke.
if h.csrfRotator != nil {
_ = h.csrfRotator.RotateCSRFTokenForActor(r.Context(), keyID, string(domain.ActorTypeAPIKey))
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
}
// Me handles GET /api/v1/auth/me. Returns the current actor's effective
// permissions plus admin flag (back-compat with /v1/auth/check). No
// permission required: every authenticated caller can read their own.
func (h AuthHandler) Me(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
caller, err := callerFromRequest(r)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roles, err := h.actors.ListForActor(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
roleIDs := make([]string, 0, len(roles))
hasAdmin := false
for _, role := range roles {
roleIDs = append(roleIDs, role.RoleID)
if role.RoleID == authdomain.RoleIDAdmin {
hasAdmin = true
}
}
effective, err := h.actors.EffectivePermissions(r.Context(), caller, caller.ActorID, caller.ActorType)
if err != nil {
writeAuthError(w, err)
return
}
payload := make([]effectivePermissionPayload, 0, len(effective))
for _, p := range effective {
payload = append(payload, effectivePermissionPayload{
Permission: p.PermissionName,
ScopeType: string(p.ScopeType),
ScopeID: p.ScopeID,
})
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, meResponse{
ActorID: caller.ActorID,
ActorType: string(caller.ActorType),
TenantID: caller.TenantID,
Admin: hasAdmin,
Roles: roleIDs,
EffectivePermissions: payload,
})
}
// =============================================================================
// Helpers
// =============================================================================
// callerFromRequest builds an authsvc.Caller from request context. The
// auth middleware (Phase 3) populates ActorIDKey / ActorTypeKey /
// TenantIDKey on every authenticated request. Returns auth.ErrNoActor
// when no actor is in context (handler returns 401).
func callerFromRequest(r *http.Request) (*authsvc.Caller, error) {
ctx := r.Context()
actorID := auth.GetActorID(ctx)
if actorID == "" {
return nil, auth.ErrNoActor
}
actorType := auth.GetActorType(ctx)
if actorType == "" {
actorType = auth.ActorTypeAPIKey
}
tenantID := auth.GetTenantID(ctx)
return &authsvc.Caller{
ActorID: actorID,
ActorType: domain.ActorType(actorType),
TenantID: tenantID,
}, nil
}
// writeAuthError translates service-layer + repository sentinel errors
// into HTTP status codes. Any non-mapped error is 500.
func writeAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, err error) {
switch {
case errors.Is(err, auth.ErrNoActor), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrUnauthenticated):
Error(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "Authentication required")
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrForbidden), errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrSelfRoleAssignment):
Error(w, http.StatusForbidden, err.Error())
case errors.Is(err, authsvc.ErrInvalidPermission):
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthNotFound):
Error(w, http.StatusNotFound, "Not found")
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthDuplicateName), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthRoleInUse), errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthReservedActor):
Error(w, http.StatusConflict, err.Error())
case errors.Is(err, repository.ErrAuthUnknownPermission):
Error(w, http.StatusBadRequest, err.Error())
default:
Error(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Internal error")
}
}
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, status int, v interface{}) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
w.WriteHeader(status)
_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(v)
}