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# Phase 6 — day-0 admin bootstrap * internal/auth/bootstrap/ (new package): Strategy interface + EnvTokenStrategy with constant-time compare, one-shot consumption via sync.Mutex, optional admin-existence probe. Bundle 2's OIDC- first-admin will plug in alongside as an alternate Strategy. * BootstrapService.ValidateAndMint: validates the operator's CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, mints a 32-byte (64-hex-char) random API key value, persists the SHA-256 hash to api_keys, grants r-admin via actor_roles, AddHashed's the runtime keystore so the just- minted key authenticates the next request without restart, and records bootstrap.consume to the audit trail with category=auth. * internal/auth/keystore.go (new): KeyStore interface + StaticKeyStore (immutable env-var-only path) + MutableKeyStore (env-var keys + DB-loaded api_keys + runtime AddHashed). The auth middleware now consumes a KeyStore so the bootstrap path can extend the lookup table at runtime. * migrations/000031_api_keys.up/down.sql: api_keys table with (id, name UNIQUE, key_hash UNIQUE, tenant_id, admin, created_by, created_at, expires_at, last_used_at). Idempotent. * /v1/auth/bootstrap GET (probe) + POST (mint) — auth-exempt. Both routes documented in api/openapi.yaml + AuthExemptRouterRoutes allowlist updated. The token never leaves internal/auth/bootstrap; the minted plaintext key flows only into the HTTP response body. * Startup warning emitted when CERTCTL_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN is set AND admin actors already exist (config drift signal). * Tests: 4 strategy invariants (empty token born disabled, wrong token=ErrInvalidToken without consumption, one-shot consumption, admin-exists closes path), 5 service tests (happy path + actor- name validation + propagation of strategy errors + nil-deps guard + 32-byte entropy budget), 8 HTTP-handler tests (status 201/410/401/400 mapping + token-leak hygiene scan of slog + audit details + Location header). Token-leak test redirects slog.Default to a buffer for the test scope. # Phase 7 — API-key migration + scope-down CLI * GET /v1/auth/keys handler + service method ListKeys backed by ActorRoleRepository.ListDistinctActors. Returns one row per (actor_id, actor_type) pair with the slice of role IDs they hold. Permission: auth.role.list. * internal/cli/auth_scope_down.go: AuthListKeys, AuthScopeDown (interactive), AuthScopeDownNonInteractive (JSON config), AuthScopeDownSuggest (--suggest with optional --apply). The synthetic actor-demo-anon is filtered out of every interactive / bulk path; non-interactive flow logs and skips it explicitly. * SuggestRoleFromAuditEvents (pure function): walks 30 days of audit events per actor and returns the narrowest matching role (admin / mcp / viewer / agent / operator) plus a one-line reason. Classification: any admin-shaped action wins; otherwise all-MCP → mcp; all-read-only → viewer; all-agent-shaped → agent; otherwise operator. Test table pins all six classifications. * CLI subcommand tree extended: 'auth keys list' + 'auth keys scope-down [--non-interactive <cfg>] [--suggest [--apply]]'. * CHANGELOG.md leads v2.1.0 with the SECURITY: AUDIT YOUR API KEYS call-out + four flow examples. # Phase 8 — auditor role + event_category column * migrations/000032_audit_category.up/down.sql: ALTER TABLE audit_events ADD COLUMN event_category TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'cert_lifecycle' + CHECK constraint (cert_lifecycle/auth/config) + (event_category) and (event_category, timestamp DESC) indexes for the auditor-filter query path. WORM trigger from migration 000018 continues to enforce append-only at the DB layer (DDL is not blocked). * domain.AuditEvent gains EventCategory string (omitempty); domain.EventCategoryCertLifecycle / Auth / Config constants. * AuditService.RecordEventWithCategory sibling of RecordEvent; legacy callers stay on RecordEvent (defaults to cert_lifecycle). Auth callers (RoleService, ActorRoleService, BootstrapService) switched to RecordEventWithCategory(..., 'auth', ...). * GET /v1/audit?category=<cat>: handler accepts the optional query param, validates against the enum (400 on invalid value), dispatches through ListAuditEventsByCategory. OpenAPI updated with the new query param + AuditEvent.event_category schema. * Postgres AuditRepository.Create now writes event_category; AuditRepository.List filters on it; AuditFilter.EventCategory gates the WHERE clause. * Tests: 5 audit-category-filter HTTP tests (dispatch routing, back-compat fallback, 400 for invalid values, all 3 enum values accepted, page+category combine, JSON output surfaces the field). 3 auditor-role invariants (auditor holds exactly audit.read+audit.export, no mutating perms, disjoint from viewer except audit.read). # Cross-phase wiring * HandlerRegistry.Bootstrap field added; cmd/server/main.go wires the bootstrap service ahead of RegisterHandlers (extracted assembleNamedAPIKeys helper into auth_backfill.go, moved the keystore + bootstrap construction up alongside the auth repos). * AuthCheckResolver / AuthActorRoleService extended with ListKeys to satisfy the Phase 7 surface; existing fakes updated. * fakeAudit + mockAuditService stubs in tests gain RecordEventWithCategory + ListAuditEventsByCategory; existing tests untouched. # Verifications * gofmt -l: clean across every modified file. * go vet ./...: clean. * staticcheck across internal/auth + handler + router + cli + service + repository + cmd + domain: clean. * go test -short -count=1: green across every Bundle-1-touched package — internal/auth (incl. bootstrap), internal/api/handler, internal/api/router, internal/cli, internal/service/auth, internal/service, internal/domain/auth, internal/repository/postgres, cmd/server, cmd/cli, plus internal/scheduler, internal/api/middleware, cmd/agent, internal/mcp.
160 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
160 lines
6.2 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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)
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// AuthConfig holds configuration for the legacy NewAuth shim.
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//
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// G-1 (P1): valid Type values are "api-key" or "none" only. "jwt" was
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// removed because no JWT middleware ships with certctl (silent auth
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// downgrade pre-G-1). The single source of truth for the allowed set
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// lives at internal/config.AuthType / config.ValidAuthTypes(); prefer
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// those constants over string literals when comparing.
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//
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// Bundle 2 will extend ValidAuthTypes() with "oidc"; Bundle 1 leaves
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// the surface unchanged.
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type AuthConfig struct {
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Type string // "api-key" or "none" (see config.AuthType constants)
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Secret string // The raw API key or comma-separated list of valid API keys
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}
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// NewAuthWithNamedKeys creates an authentication middleware that validates
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// Bearer tokens against a set of named API keys. Each key carries a name
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// (propagated as the actor via context) and an admin flag (consulted by
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// authorization gates such as bulk revocation).
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//
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// When namedKeys is empty the returned middleware is a no-op pass-through,
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// which is used in demo/development mode (CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none). When one
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// or more keys are provided, requests must include a matching Bearer token
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// or they are rejected with 401.
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//
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// Bundle 1 Phase 3 extends Middleware with the RBAC primitive. This
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// function continues to exist as the API-key validator; Phase 3 wraps it
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// with the role lookup that populates the future ActorIDKey / RolesKey
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// context values.
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func NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys []NamedAPIKey) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if len(namedKeys) == 0 {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return next
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}
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}
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if len(namedKeys) == 1 {
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slog.Warn("only one API key configured — consider adding a rotation key for zero-downtime rotation")
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}
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return NewAuthWithKeyStore(NewStaticKeyStore(namedKeys))
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}
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// NewAuthWithKeyStore is the Bundle-1 Phase-6 entry point. It builds a
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// Bearer-token middleware whose lookup table is supplied by the caller
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// instead of being baked into the closure. Production wiring passes a
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// MutableKeyStore so the bootstrap path can mint new admin keys at
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// runtime; tests pass a StaticKeyStore for the immutable case. A nil
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// store yields the demo-mode pass-through (matches NewAuthWithNamedKeys
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// with an empty slice).
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func NewAuthWithKeyStore(store KeyStore) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if store == nil {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return next }
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}
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if authHeader == "" {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Bearer realm="certctl"`)
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Authorization header required"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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if len(authHeader) < 8 || authHeader[:7] != "Bearer " {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid Authorization header format, expected: Bearer <token>"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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token := authHeader[7:]
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matched, ok := store.LookupByHash(HashAPIKey(token))
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if !ok {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
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http.Error(w, `{"error":"Invalid API key"}`, http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Bundle 1 Phase 0 legacy UserKey/AdminKey + Phase 3 RBAC
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// ActorIDKey/ActorTypeKey/TenantIDKey are populated on every
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// authenticated request so downstream RequirePermission +
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// audit-attribution code see a consistent actor.
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ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), UserKey{}, matched.Name)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, matched.Admin)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, matched.Name)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAPIKey)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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// NewDemoModeAuth returns a middleware that injects the synthetic
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// `actor-demo-anon` identity into every request context. Used when
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// CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is configured (the demo path) so that
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// RBAC-gated handlers see an admin-equivalent caller without operator
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// configuration.
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//
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// The synthetic actor is seeded by migration 000029_rbac.up.sql with
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// the admin role at global scope, so RequirePermission resolves
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// every gated request as an admin. The reserved-actor guard in the
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// service layer prevents the API from accidentally mutating this
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// actor's role assignments.
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//
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// Production deployments MUST NOT use this middleware. The cmd/server
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// startup wires it only when CERTCTL_AUTH_TYPE=none is explicitly
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// configured.
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func NewDemoModeAuth() func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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ctx := r.Context()
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserKey{}, DemoAnonActorID)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, AdminKey{}, true)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorIDKey{}, DemoAnonActorID)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ActorTypeKey{}, ActorTypeAnonymous)
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey{}, DefaultTenantID)
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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}
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// NewAuth is a legacy shim that converts a comma-separated Secret list into
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// synthesized legacy-key-N named entries and delegates to NewAuthWithNamedKeys.
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// It preserves the pre-M-002 behavior for callers that still pass raw AuthConfig
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// (primarily cmd/server/main_test.go). The synthesized actor is "legacy-key-N"
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// rather than the old hardcoded "api-key-user" so audit events carry
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// meaningful identity even on the legacy path.
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//
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// Deprecated: Use NewAuthWithNamedKeys with explicit NamedAPIKey entries.
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func NewAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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if cfg.Type == "none" {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return next
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}
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}
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var namedKeys []NamedAPIKey
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idx := 0
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for _, k := range strings.Split(cfg.Secret, ",") {
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k = strings.TrimSpace(k)
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if k == "" {
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continue
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}
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namedKeys = append(namedKeys, NamedAPIKey{
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Name: fmt.Sprintf("legacy-key-%d", idx),
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Key: k,
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Admin: false,
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})
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idx++
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}
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return NewAuthWithNamedKeys(namedKeys)
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}
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