README:
- Rewrite Status block: drop the stale 'federated identity not yet
shipped' line; flag v2.1.0 OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout
+ break-glass as early-access; encourage GitHub issues for IdP
rough edges. (A1 framing — keep early-access umbrella, no
SAML/WebAuthn/JIT roadmap teaser.)
- Add OIDC SSO bullet to 'What it does' covering per-IdP runbooks,
group-claim → role mapping, AES-256-GCM client_secret encryption,
JWKS auto-refresh, PKCE-S256, RFC 9700 §4.7.1 pre-login binding,
RFC 9207 iss check, __Host- cookies, CSRF rotation, idle+absolute
expiry, BCL, break-glass admin.
- Update Security paragraph: three auth paths (API keys / OIDC /
break-glass), HMAC-signed sessions, CSRF rotation, RFC OIDC BCL.
- Correct CI coverage thresholds against
.github/coverage-thresholds.yml (service 70%, handler 75%,
crypto 88%, auth packages 85-95%); 'static analysis' replaces
the inflated '11 linters' claim (actual count is 4 active).
Docs B3 sweep — strip operator-facing 'Bundle N' / 'Phase N' tags:
- docs/operator/auth-threat-model.md — rewrite intro; rename 5 H2
sections (API-key + RBAC defenses / OIDC + sessions + break-glass
defenses / OIDC + sessions threat catalogue / Closed federated-
identity threats / Future-work threats); clean ~12 H3/prose hits.
- docs/operator/rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from intro,
scope_id deferral note, MCP tools section, day-0 bootstrap, and
'Where to look next'.
- docs/operator/auth-benchmarks.md — drop 'Phase 14' framing from
title intro, hardware floor caption, result table caption,
methodology, and pre-merge audit section.
- docs/operator/security.md — already cleaned earlier this session
(RBAC / day-0 / approval-bypass / OIDC federation / sessions /
OIDC first-admin / break-glass H3s).
- docs/operator/oidc-runbooks/{index,keycloak,authentik,okta,
azure-ad}.md — strip Auth Bundle 2 framing + Phase 10/3/4
references; replace with feature-name prose.
- docs/operator/legacy-clients-tls-1.2.md — drop Bundle F / M-023
audit-reference framing; keep CWE-326.
- docs/operator/database-tls.md — drop Bundle B / M-018 framing
from intro + Helm section.
- docs/operator/runbooks/disaster-recovery.md — drop 'Production
hardening II Phase 10' status callout.
- docs/migration/oidc-enable.md — retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO';
strip Bundle 1/2 framing from prereqs, troubleshooting, related
docs; update __Host- cookie callout from 'audit MED-14' to
v2.1.0-BREAKING.
- docs/migration/api-keys-to-rbac.md — strip Bundle 1 framing from
intro, migration table, IsAdmin section, and cross-references.
- docs/migration/acme-from-cert-manager.md — strip residual
'Phase 5' tags from cert-manager integration test references.
- docs/reference/configuration.md — retitle Auth section.
- docs/reference/profiles.md — strip Bundle 1 Phase 9 framing
from RequiresApproval section + Related list.
- docs/reference/auth-standards-implemented.md — rewrite intro
(API-key + RBAC + OIDC + sessions + back-channel logout +
break-glass); rename 'Bundle 1 (RBAC) standards covered
separately' H2; clean per-row Phase references.
- docs/README.md — rewrite nav-table entries to drop Bundle 1/2
parentheticals; retitle 'Enable OIDC SSO' migration entry.
No code or test changes; pure operator-facing prose polish for
the v2.1.0 tag.
5.1 KiB
Database TLS — Postgres Transport Encryption
Last reviewed: 2026-05-05
Audit reference: CWE-319 (Cleartext transmission of sensitive information).
certctl talks to Postgres over a single connection-string URL controlled by the
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL env var. The sslmode query parameter on that URL
selects the transport-encryption posture. The bundled deployment artifacts
(Helm chart, docker-compose) historically hard-coded sslmode=disable;
current builds expose that as an operator-facing knob with a documented
default and explicit opt-in / opt-out paths for the four real-world
deployment shapes.
Quick reference
| Deployment shape | Default sslmode |
When to change |
|---|---|---|
| Helm chart, bundled Postgres, in-cluster | disable |
When the cluster does not provide pod-network encryption (CNI without WireGuard / IPSec) and the workload handles sensitive data. |
| Helm chart, external Postgres (RDS / Cloud SQL / Azure DB) | not auto-set | Always set to verify-full and provide the cloud provider's server CA bundle. |
| docker-compose, bundled Postgres on docker bridge | disable |
Demo/dev only; not a deployment shape we expect operators to harden. |
| docker-compose / k8s with external Postgres | not auto-set | Always set CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL to a connection string with sslmode=verify-full. |
sslmode values come from lib/pq (the underlying driver). The full set is:
disable, allow, prefer, require, verify-ca, verify-full.
verify-ca is the floor for sensitive-data transport; verify-full
is the floor for systems exposed to spoofing risk (it adds hostname
validation against the server cert's CN/SAN).
Helm chart
The chart exposes two values under postgresql.tls:
postgresql:
tls:
mode: disable # disable | require | verify-ca | verify-full
caSecretRef: "" # Secret with ca.crt key (required for verify-ca / verify-full)
The chart pipes postgresql.tls.mode into the ?sslmode= parameter of the
generated CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL (see templates/_helpers.tpl::certctl.databaseURL).
For external Postgres, set postgresql.enabled: false and override
server.env.CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL directly with the full connection string —
the operator authoring an external-DB values file owns the entire URL.
Example: external RDS with verify-full
postgresql:
enabled: false # Disable bundled Postgres
server:
env:
CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL: |
postgres://certctl:STRONGPW@my-db.cabc12345.us-east-1.rds.amazonaws.com:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full
# Provide the AWS RDS root CA bundle as a secret + mount.
# AWS publishes per-region root certs at https://truststore.pki.rds.amazonaws.com/
extraVolumes:
- name: rds-ca
secret:
secretName: rds-ca-bundle # kubectl create secret generic rds-ca-bundle --from-file=ca.crt=...
extraVolumeMounts:
- name: rds-ca
mountPath: /etc/postgresql-ca
readOnly: true
# lib/pq honors PGSSLROOTCERT for the verify-{ca,full} CA bundle path.
server:
env:
PGSSLROOTCERT: /etc/postgresql-ca/ca.crt
docker-compose (development / demo)
The bundled deploy/docker-compose.yml keeps sslmode=disable as the default
because the Postgres container shares the docker bridge network with the certctl
server and the compose file is not a production deployment artifact. To opt in:
export CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL='postgres://certctl:certctl@postgres:5432/certctl?sslmode=verify-full'
docker compose up
Verification
For any non-disable mode, confirm the connection actually negotiated TLS:
# From inside the certctl-server container or any host with psql + the same URL:
psql "$CERTCTL_DATABASE_URL" -c "SELECT ssl, version, cipher FROM pg_stat_ssl WHERE pid = pg_backend_pid();"
# Expected output for verify-full: ssl=t, version=TLSv1.3 (or TLSv1.2), cipher=...
If ssl=f appears, the connection silently fell back to plaintext — investigate
the cert chain or sslmode value before treating the deployment as PCI-compliant.
What this does NOT cover
- Postgres-to-Postgres replication — if you run a replica, replica-primary
TLS is configured via the Postgres server itself (
pg_hba.conf+ssl=on); it is independent of certctl'sCERTCTL_DATABASE_URL. - Backup transport —
pg_dump/pg_basebackuphonor the samesslmodeparameter when invoked with the URL form, but the bundled chart's backup story (if any) is operator-owned. - Encryption at rest —
sslmodeis a transport concern only. Disk encryption is the cloud provider's storage layer (RDS, EBS, etc.) or the operator's Postgres TDE / disk LUKS / etc.
Reverting
If sslmode=verify-full causes connection failures (most common: missing CA
bundle, wrong hostname), drop temporarily to sslmode=require to confirm TLS
is at least negotiated, then add the CA bundle and ratchet back up. Never
revert to sslmode=disable on a system carrying real cert metadata —
audit_events alone contains enough operator/issuer/target identity to justify
TLS in any scoped environment.