- Add how/why technical breakdowns to every step in demo-advanced.md: handler→service→repository code paths, SQL details, security reasoning, field-by-field explanations, and architectural design decisions - Convert all ASCII box diagrams to Mermaid across docs: architecture.md (9 diagrams), demo-advanced.md (6), concepts.md (1) - Diagram types: flowcharts, sequence diagrams, ER diagram, state machine - Remove placeholder Support & Community section from README - Zero ASCII box-drawing characters remaining in docs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
17 KiB
Architecture Guide
Overview
Certctl is a certificate management platform with a decoupled control-plane and agent architecture. The control plane orchestrates certificate issuance and renewal, while agents deployed across your infrastructure handle key generation, certificate deployment, and local validation — private keys never leave the infrastructure they were generated on.
New to certificates? Read the Concepts Guide first.
Design Principles
- Zero Private Key Exposure — Private keys are generated and managed only on agents, never sent to the control plane
- Decoupled Operations — Agents operate autonomously; the control plane coordinates but doesn't block agent function
- Audit-First — Complete traceability of all issuance, deployment, and rotation events
- Connector Architecture — Pluggable issuers, targets, and notifiers for extensibility
- Self-Hosted — No cloud lock-in; run with Docker Compose, Kubernetes, or bare metal
System Components
flowchart TB
subgraph "Control Plane"
API["REST API\n(Go net/http, :8443)"]
SVC["Service Layer"]
REPO["Repository Layer\n(database/sql + lib/pq)"]
SCHED["Background Scheduler\n4 loops"]
DASH["Web Dashboard\n(React SPA)"]
end
subgraph "Data Store"
PG[("PostgreSQL 16\n14 tables\nTEXT primary keys")]
end
subgraph "Agent Fleet"
A1["Agent: nginx-prod\n(heartbeat + work poll)"]
A2["Agent: f5-prod"]
A3["Agent: iis-prod"]
end
subgraph "Issuer Backends"
CA1["Local CA\n(crypto/x509)"]
CA2["ACME\n(Let's Encrypt)"]
CA3["Vault PKI\n(future)"]
end
subgraph "Target Systems"
T1["NGINX\n(SSH + reload)"]
T2["F5 BIG-IP\n(REST API)"]
T3["IIS\n(WinRM)"]
end
DASH --> API
API --> SVC
SVC --> REPO
REPO --> PG
SCHED --> SVC
SVC -->|"Issue/Renew"| CA1 & CA2 & CA3
A1 & A2 & A3 -->|"CSR + Heartbeat"| API
API -->|"Cert + Chain\n(NO private key)"| A1 & A2 & A3
A1 -->|"Deploy"| T1
A2 -->|"Deploy"| T2
A3 -->|"Deploy"| T3
Control Plane (Server)
The control plane is a Go HTTP server backed by PostgreSQL. It manages state (certificates, agents, targets, issuers, policies), orchestrates issuance by coordinating with CAs through issuer connectors, tracks jobs for certificate issuance/renewal/deployment workflows, maintains an immutable audit trail, and dispatches work via a background scheduler.
The server exposes a REST API under /api/v1/ and optionally serves the web dashboard as static files from the web/ directory.
Key internals: The server uses Go 1.22's net/http stdlib routing (no external router framework), structured logging via slog, and a handler → service → repository layered architecture. Handlers define their own service interfaces for clean dependency inversion.
Agents
Lightweight Go processes that run on or near your infrastructure. An agent generates private keys locally, creates CSRs, receives signed certificates from the control plane, deploys them to target systems, and reports status back. Agents communicate with the control plane via HTTP and authenticate with API keys.
The agent runs two background loops: a heartbeat (every 60 seconds) to signal it's alive, and a work poll (every 30 seconds) to check for pending jobs.
Web Dashboard
A single-page React application served as a static HTML file (web/index.html). It communicates with the REST API and provides a visual interface for certificate inventory, agent status, job monitoring, audit trail, policy management, and notifications.
The dashboard includes a demo mode that activates when the API is unreachable — it renders realistic mock data for screenshots and offline presentations.
PostgreSQL Database
All state is stored in PostgreSQL 16. The schema uses TEXT primary keys (not UUIDs) with human-readable prefixed IDs like mc-api-prod, t-platform, o-alice.
erDiagram
teams ||--o{ owners : "has members"
teams ||--o{ managed_certificates : "owns"
owners ||--o{ managed_certificates : "responsible for"
issuers ||--o{ managed_certificates : "signs"
renewal_policies ||--o{ managed_certificates : "governs"
managed_certificates ||--o{ certificate_versions : "has versions"
managed_certificates ||--o{ certificate_target_mappings : "deployed to"
deployment_targets ||--o{ certificate_target_mappings : "receives"
agents ||--o{ deployment_targets : "manages"
managed_certificates ||--o{ jobs : "triggers"
policy_rules ||--o{ policy_violations : "produces"
managed_certificates ||--o{ policy_violations : "violates"
managed_certificates ||--o{ audit_events : "logged in"
managed_certificates ||--o{ notification_events : "generates"
teams {
text id PK
text name
text description
}
owners {
text id PK
text name
text email
text team_id FK
}
managed_certificates {
text id PK
text name
text common_name
text[] sans
text environment
text owner_id FK
text team_id FK
text issuer_id FK
text renewal_policy_id FK
text status
timestamp expires_at
jsonb tags
}
certificate_versions {
text id PK
text certificate_id FK
text serial_number
text fingerprint_sha256
text pem_chain
text csr_pem
}
agents {
text id PK
text name
text hostname
text status
text api_key_hash
}
deployment_targets {
text id PK
text name
text type
text agent_id FK
jsonb config
}
issuers {
text id PK
text name
text type
jsonb config
boolean enabled
}
jobs {
text id PK
text type
text certificate_id FK
text target_id FK
text status
int attempts
}
policy_rules {
text id PK
text name
text type
jsonb config
boolean enabled
}
policy_violations {
text id PK
text certificate_id FK
text rule_id FK
text message
text severity
}
audit_events {
text id PK
text actor
text actor_type
text action
text resource_type
text resource_id
jsonb details
}
notification_events {
text id PK
text type
text certificate_id FK
text channel
text recipient
text status
}
Migrations are idempotent (IF NOT EXISTS on all CREATE statements, ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING on all seed data) so they're safe to run multiple times — important for Docker Compose where both initdb and the server may run the same SQL.
Data Flow: Certificate Lifecycle
1. Create Managed Certificate
sequenceDiagram
participant U as User / API Client
participant API as REST API
participant SVC as CertificateService
participant DB as PostgreSQL
participant AUD as AuditService
U->>API: POST /api/v1/certificates<br/>{name, common_name, sans, ...}
API->>SVC: Create(ctx, certificate)
SVC->>SVC: Validate required fields
SVC->>DB: INSERT INTO managed_certificates
SVC->>AUD: Create(audit_event: certificate_created)
AUD->>DB: INSERT INTO audit_events
SVC-->>API: ManagedCertificate
API-->>U: 201 Created + JSON body
2. Agent Requests Certificate (CSR → Issuance)
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Agent
participant API as Control Plane API
participant ISS as Issuer Connector
participant DB as PostgreSQL
A->>A: Generate RSA-2048 key pair
A->>A: Create CSR (CN + SANs, public key only)
A->>API: POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/csr<br/>{csr_pem: "-----BEGIN..."}
API->>API: Validate CSR format
API->>ISS: IssueCertificate(IssuanceRequest{CSR})
ISS-->>API: IssuanceResult{cert_pem, chain_pem, serial, not_after}
API->>DB: INSERT INTO certificate_versions
API->>DB: UPDATE managed_certificates SET status='Active'
API->>DB: INSERT INTO audit_events
API-->>A: {certificate_pem, chain_pem}<br/>(NO private key in response)
A->>A: Store cert.pem + chain.pem locally
Note over A: key.pem stays on agent<br/>Never transmitted anywhere
A->>A: Deploy to target system
3. Deploy Certificate to Target
The agent deploys certificates using target connectors. Each connector knows how to push certificates to a specific system:
- NGINX: Writes cert/chain files to disk, validates config with
nginx -t, reloads withnginx -s reloadorsystemctl reload nginx - F5 BIG-IP: Calls the F5 REST API to upload certificate and update virtual server bindings
- IIS: Uses WinRM to import the certificate into the Windows certificate store and bind it to an IIS site
The agent handles both the certificate (public) and the private key (local only). The control plane never sees the private key.
4. Automatic Renewal
The control plane runs a scheduler with four background loops:
flowchart LR
subgraph "Scheduler (Background Goroutines)"
R["Renewal Checker\n⏱ every 1h"]
J["Job Processor\n⏱ every 30s"]
H["Agent Health\n⏱ every 2m"]
N["Notification Processor\n⏱ every 1m"]
end
R -->|"Find expiring certs\nCreate renewal jobs"| DB[("PostgreSQL")]
J -->|"Process pending jobs\nCoordinate issuance"| DB
H -->|"Check heartbeat staleness\nMark agents offline"| DB
N -->|"Send pending notifications\nEmail / Webhook"| DB
| Loop | Interval | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Renewal checker | 1 hour | Finds certificates approaching expiry, creates renewal jobs |
| Job processor | 30 seconds | Processes pending jobs (issuance, renewal, deployment) |
| Agent health check | 2 minutes | Marks agents as offline if heartbeat is stale |
| Notification processor | 1 minute | Sends pending notifications via configured channels |
When the renewal checker finds a certificate within its renewal window (e.g., 30 days before expiry), it creates a renewal job. The job processor picks it up, coordinates with the issuer, and triggers deployment. All steps are logged in the audit trail and generate notifications.
Connector Architecture
Certctl uses connector interfaces for extensibility. Each connector type has a standard interface that implementations must satisfy.
flowchart TB
subgraph "Issuer Connectors"
direction TB
II["IssuerConnector Interface\nIssueCertificate() | RenewCertificate()\nRevokeCertificate() | GetOrderStatus()"]
II --> LC["Local CA"]
II --> ACME["ACME v2"]
II --> VP["Vault PKI (future)"]
end
subgraph "Target Connectors"
direction TB
TI["TargetConnector Interface\nDeployCertificate()\nValidateDeployment()"]
TI --> NG["NGINX"]
TI --> F5["F5 BIG-IP"]
TI --> IIS["IIS"]
end
subgraph "Notifier Connectors"
direction TB
NI["NotifierConnector Interface\nSendAlert() | SendEvent()"]
NI --> EM["Email (SMTP)"]
NI --> WH["Webhook (HTTP)"]
NI --> SL["Slack (future)"]
end
Issuer Connector
Handles certificate issuance from CAs.
type Connector interface {
ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error
IssueCertificate(ctx context.Context, request IssuanceRequest) (*IssuanceResult, error)
RenewCertificate(ctx context.Context, request RenewalRequest) (*IssuanceResult, error)
RevokeCertificate(ctx context.Context, request RevocationRequest) error
GetOrderStatus(ctx context.Context, orderID string) (*OrderStatus, error)
}
Built-in issuers: Local CA (self-signed, for development/demos) and ACME (Let's Encrypt, Sectigo, etc., in progress).
Target Connector
Deploys certificates to infrastructure. Note: the interface does NOT include private keys — agents handle keys locally.
type Connector interface {
ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error
DeployCertificate(ctx context.Context, request DeploymentRequest) (*DeploymentResult, error)
ValidateDeployment(ctx context.Context, request ValidationRequest) (*ValidationResult, error)
}
Built-in targets: NGINX, F5 BIG-IP, IIS.
Notifier Connector
Sends alerts about certificate lifecycle events.
type Connector interface {
ValidateConfig(ctx context.Context, config json.RawMessage) error
SendAlert(ctx context.Context, alert Alert) error
SendEvent(ctx context.Context, event Event) error
}
Built-in notifiers: Email (SMTP) and Webhook (HTTP POST).
See the Connector Development Guide for details on building custom connectors.
Security Model
Private Key Management
flowchart LR
subgraph "Agent (Your Infrastructure)"
GEN["1. GENERATE\ncrypto/rsa 2048-bit"]
STORE["2. STORE\nFile perms 0600"]
USE["3. USE\nCSR gen + deployment"]
ROT["4. ROTATE\nDelete old after renewal"]
end
subgraph "Control Plane (certctl-server)"
CP["Only sees:\n• Certificates (public)\n• Chains (public)\n• CSRs (public key only)"]
end
GEN --> STORE --> USE --> ROT
USE -.->|"CSR (public key only)"| CP
CP -.->|"Signed cert + chain"| USE
style CP fill:#fee,stroke:#c33
style GEN fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3
style STORE fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3
style USE fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3
style ROT fill:#efe,stroke:#3c3
Private keys follow a strict lifecycle:
- Generated on the agent — never sent to the control plane
- Stored on the agent — file permissions 0600, owned by the agent process user
- Used by the agent — for deployment to targets and CSR generation
- Rotated by the agent — old keys deleted after successful renewal
The control plane only ever handles public material: certificates, chains, and CSRs. This is a deliberate architectural decision — even if the control plane database is compromised, no private keys are exposed.
Authentication
- API clients → Server: API key in
Authorization: Bearerheader, ornonefor demo mode - Agent → Server: API key registered at agent creation, included in all requests
- Server → Issuers: ACME account key, or connector-specific credentials
- Agent → Targets: SSH keys, API tokens, WinRM credentials (stored locally on agent)
Audit Trail
Every action is recorded as an immutable audit event:
{
"id": "audit-001",
"actor": "o-alice",
"actor_type": "User",
"action": "certificate_created",
"resource_type": "certificate",
"resource_id": "mc-api-prod",
"details": {"environment": "production"},
"timestamp": "2026-03-14T10:30:00Z"
}
Audit events cannot be modified or deleted. They support filtering by actor, action, resource type, resource ID, and time range.
API Design
All endpoints are under /api/v1/ and follow consistent patterns:
- List:
GET /api/v1/{resources}— returns{data: [...], total, page, per_page} - Get:
GET /api/v1/{resources}/{id}— returns the resource - Create:
POST /api/v1/{resources}— returns the created resource with201 - Update:
PUT /api/v1/{resources}/{id}— returns the updated resource - Delete:
DELETE /api/v1/{resources}/{id}— returns204(soft delete/archive) - Actions:
POST /api/v1/{resources}/{id}/{action}— returns202for async operations
Resources: certificates, issuers, targets, agents, jobs, policies, teams, owners, audit, notifications.
Health checks live outside the API prefix: GET /health and GET /ready.
Deployment Topologies
Docker Compose (Development / Small Deployments)
flowchart TB
subgraph "Docker Network (certctl-network)"
SERVER["certctl-server\n:8443\nAPI + Dashboard"]
PG[("PostgreSQL\n:5432\nSchema + Seed Data")]
AGENT["certctl-agent\nHeartbeat + Work Poll"]
end
USER["Browser / curl"] -->|"HTTP :8443"| SERVER
SERVER -->|"SQL"| PG
AGENT -->|"HTTP (internal)"| SERVER
Production (Kubernetes)
flowchart TB
subgraph "Kubernetes Cluster"
subgraph "Control Plane"
DEP["Deployment\ncertctl-server\nreplicas: 2+"]
CM["ConfigMap\nIssuer/target configs"]
SEC["Secret\nAPI keys, ACME creds"]
end
subgraph "Data"
SS[("StatefulSet\nPostgreSQL\nprimary + replica")]
end
subgraph "Agent Fleet"
DS["DaemonSet\ncertctl-agent\n(infra nodes)"]
end
end
ING["Ingress\n+ TLS termination"] --> DEP
DEP --> SS
DEP --> CM & SEC
DS --> DEP
For production, you would also add an ingress controller, TLS termination for the certctl API itself, and external PostgreSQL (RDS, Cloud SQL, etc.).
What's Next
- Quick Start — Get certctl running locally
- Advanced Demo — Issue a certificate end-to-end
- Connector Guide — Build custom connectors