Files
certctl/internal/api/handler/est_serverkeygen_test.go
T
shankar0123 8bc9f4eed8 EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phases 5-7: end-to-end serverkeygen
+ profile-driven csrattrs + admin observability with per-status
counters + reload-trust endpoint.

Phase 5 — RFC 7030 §4.4 server-driven key generation:
- internal/pkcs7/envelopeddata_builder.go is the inverse of the
  existing parser/decryptor: AES-256-CBC content cipher + RSA PKCS#1
  v1.5 keyTrans + per-call random IV. Round-trip pinned in test
  (BuildEnvelopedData → ParseEnvelopedData → Decrypt returns the
  original plaintext byte-for-byte).
- ESTService.SimpleServerKeygen runs the full §4.4 flow: parse client
  CSR → require RSA pubkey for keyTrans → resolve per-profile
  algorithm (RSA-2048 default; honors AllowedKeyAlgorithms) → in-
  memory keygen → re-build CSR with server pubkey → run existing
  issuer pipeline → marshal PKCS#8 → CMS-EnvelopedData wrap to a
  synthetic recipient cert wrapping the device's CSR-supplied pubkey
  → zeroize plaintext + PKCS#8 bytes → return CertPEM + ChainPEM
  + EncryptedKey. Typed sentinels ErrServerKeygenRequiresKey-
  Encipherment / ErrServerKeygenUnsupportedAlgorithm /
  ErrServerKeygenDisabled.
- ESTHandler.ServerKeygen + ServerKeygenMTLS emit RFC 7030 §4.4.2
  multipart/mixed with random per-response boundary; per-profile
  SetServerKeygenEnabled gate returns 404 when off (defense in depth
  even if the route was registered).
- New routes POST /.well-known/est/[<PathID>/]serverkeygen +
  /.well-known/est-mtls/<PathID>/serverkeygen; openapi.yaml +
  openapi-parity guard updated.

Phase 6 — Real csrattrs implementation:
- New CertificateProfile.RequiredCSRAttributes []string + migration
  000022_certificate_profiles_csrattrs.up.sql. The migration also
  lands the previously-unwired must_staple column (closes the 5.6
  follow-up loop where the field shipped at the domain + service
  layer but the postgres scan/insert/update never persisted it).
- domain.EKUStringToOID + AttributeStringToOID lookup tables: id-kp-*
  EKUs (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.12) + RFC 5280 DN attributes + RFC 2985
  PKCS#10 attributes + Microsoft Intune device-serial OID.
- ESTService.GetCSRAttrs replaces the v2.0.x nil/204 stub with a
  profile-derived SEQUENCE OF OID ASN.1 marshal. Unknown EKU /
  attribute strings dropped + warning-logged so a typo doesn't take
  down the entire endpoint.

Phase 7 — Admin observability + counters + reload-trust:
- internal/service/est_counters.go: estCounterTab (sync/atomic; 12
  named labels) + ESTStatsSnapshot per-profile shape +
  ESTService.Stats(now) zero-allocation accessor + ReloadTrust()
  SIGHUP-equivalent + SetESTAdminMetadata setter.
- Counter ticks wired into processEnrollment + SimpleServerKeygen at
  every success/failure leg.
- internal/api/handler/admin_est.go mirrors AdminSCEPIntune verbatim:
  Profiles + ReloadTrust handlers + AdminESTServiceImpl. Both
  endpoints admin-gated (M-008 triplet pinned + admin_est.go added
  to AdminGatedHandlers).
- New routes GET /api/v1/admin/est/profiles + POST /api/v1/admin/
  est/reload-trust; openapi.yaml documented; openapi-parity guard
  reproduced clean.
- cmd/server/main.go grows estServices map populated by the per-
  profile EST loop + handed to AdminEST. New MTLSTrust() +
  HasMTLSTrust() accessors on ESTHandler so main.go can pull the
  trust holder for the admin-metadata wire-up.
- Per-profile counter isolation regression test
  (internal/service/est_profile_counter_isolation_test.go) proves
  a future shared-counter refactor would fail at compile-time
  pointer-identity check.

Pre-commit verification (sandbox): gofmt clean, go vet clean
(excluding repository/postgres which the sandbox can't build —
disk-space testcontainers download), staticcheck clean across
cms/trustanchor/api/handler/api/router/scep/intune/ratelimit/
service/pkcs7/domain/cmd/server, go test -short -count=1 green
for every non-postgres package. G-3 docs-drift guard reproduced
locally clean (Phases 5-7 added zero new env vars; Phase 1
already documented per-profile SERVER_KEYGEN_ENABLED).

Spec preserved at cowork/est-rfc7030-hardening-prompt.md. Phases
8-13 (GUI ESTAdminPage / CLI+MCP / libest e2e / bulk revocation /
docs/est.md / release prep) remain — post-2.1.0 work.
2026-04-29 23:57:45 +00:00

279 lines
9.7 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"crypto/x509/pkix"
"encoding/pem"
"errors"
"io"
"mime"
"mime/multipart"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/pkcs7"
)
// EST RFC 7030 hardening master bundle Phase 5.3 — serverkeygen tests.
// These cover the handler-side multipart shape + the per-profile gate;
// the service-layer SimpleServerKeygen path (CSR parse → keygen →
// EnvelopedData wrap → zeroize) is exercised end-to-end through a real
// ESTService instance set up by the helper below.
// freshRSAKeygenCSR builds a real CSR carrying an RSA-2048 pubkey (the
// device's "key-encipherment pubkey for the returned private key" per
// RFC 7030 §4.4.2 — non-RSA fails the BUILDER's RSA-only contract).
// Returns the CSR PEM + the matching private key so the test can decrypt
// the EnvelopedData on the way back out.
func freshRSAKeygenCSR(t *testing.T, cn string) (string, *rsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, tmpl, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificateRequest: %v", err)
}
return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: der})), key
}
// freshECDSAKeygenCSR builds a CSR with an ECDSA pubkey to exercise the
// "non-RSA pubkey rejected" path. RFC 7030 §4.4.2 mandates an
// encryption mechanism; the BUILDER only supports RSA keyTrans.
func freshECDSAKeygenCSR(t *testing.T, cn string) string {
t.Helper()
key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ecdsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.CertificateRequest{Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn}}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, tmpl, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificateRequest: %v", err)
}
return string(pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: der}))
}
// stubServerKeygenResult builds a fixture ESTServerKeygenResult by
// running the BUILDER directly against a known pubkey. Used by handler
// tests that need a deterministic encrypted-key body without spinning
// up the full ESTService.
func stubServerKeygenResult(t *testing.T, recipientPub *rsa.PublicKey, plaintext []byte, certPEM string) *domain.ESTServerKeygenResult {
t.Helper()
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: bigOne(),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "stub-recipient"},
Issuer: pkix.Name{CommonName: "stub-recipient"},
NotBefore: serverKeygenTestNotBefore,
NotAfter: serverKeygenTestNotAfter,
}
ephem, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ephem signer: %v", err)
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, recipientPub, ephem)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create recipient: %v", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse recipient: %v", err)
}
wire, err := pkcs7.BuildEnvelopedData(plaintext, cert, rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildEnvelopedData: %v", err)
}
return &domain.ESTServerKeygenResult{
CertPEM: certPEM,
EncryptedKey: wire,
}
}
func TestServerKeygen_NotEnabled_404(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockESTService{}
h := NewESTHandler(svc) // SetServerKeygenEnabled NOT called → off
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/est/corp/serverkeygen",
strings.NewReader(generateTestCSRPEM(t)))
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{HandshakeComplete: true, Version: tls.VersionTLS13}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServerKeygen(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 404 (gate off)", w.Code)
}
}
func TestServerKeygen_HappyPath_200_MultipartShape(t *testing.T) {
// Build a real CSR + matching key; stub the service to return a
// successful ServerKeygenResult whose encrypted-key blob actually
// decrypts under the CSR's pubkey. Pin the multipart body shape.
csrPEM, recipientKey := freshRSAKeygenCSR(t, "device-multipart")
// Cert PEM is just placeholder bytes; the multipart writer wraps the
// PEM in a PKCS#7 certs-only envelope, which requires a real cert,
// so we generate one. (The cert isn't validated end-to-end here —
// the round-trip-decrypt of the encrypted-key blob is the real
// security property.)
caCert, caKey := freshRSARecipient(t)
caPEMBytes := pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: caCert.Raw})
_ = caKey
plaintext := []byte("PKCS#8 private key bytes (test fixture)")
stub := stubServerKeygenResult(t, &recipientKey.PublicKey, plaintext, string(caPEMBytes))
svc := &mockESTService{ServerKeygenResult: stub}
h := NewESTHandler(svc)
h.SetServerKeygenEnabled(true)
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/est/corp/serverkeygen",
strings.NewReader(csrPEM))
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{HandshakeComplete: true, Version: tls.VersionTLS13}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServerKeygen(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200; body = %q", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
ct := w.Header().Get("Content-Type")
if !strings.HasPrefix(ct, "multipart/mixed") {
t.Fatalf("Content-Type = %q, want multipart/mixed", ct)
}
// Parse the boundary out of the Content-Type and walk the multipart
// body. RFC 7030 §4.4.2 mandates two parts: cert + encrypted key.
_, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(ct)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseMediaType: %v", err)
}
mr := multipart.NewReader(w.Body, params["boundary"])
parts := make(map[string][]byte)
for {
part, err := mr.NextPart()
if err == io.EOF {
break
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NextPart: %v", err)
}
smimeType := smimeTypeFor(t, part.Header.Get("Content-Type"))
body, _ := io.ReadAll(part)
parts[smimeType] = body
}
if _, ok := parts["certs-only"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("missing cert part in multipart body; parts=%v", mapKeys(parts))
}
if _, ok := parts["enveloped-data"]; !ok {
t.Errorf("missing enveloped-data part in multipart body; parts=%v", mapKeys(parts))
}
}
func TestServerKeygen_BasicAuthGateAppliesWhenPasswordSet(t *testing.T) {
svc := &mockESTService{ServerKeygenResult: &domain.ESTServerKeygenResult{}}
h := NewESTHandler(svc)
h.SetServerKeygenEnabled(true)
h.SetEnrollmentPassword("hunter2")
csrPEM, _ := freshRSAKeygenCSR(t, "no-auth-test")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/est/corp/serverkeygen",
strings.NewReader(csrPEM))
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{HandshakeComplete: true, Version: tls.VersionTLS13}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServerKeygen(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401 (Basic gate not satisfied)", w.Code)
}
}
func TestServerKeygen_NonRSAPubkey_400(t *testing.T) {
// The handler delegates the RSA-only check to the service; with a
// real service, ECDSA in the CSR would surface as
// ErrServerKeygenRequiresKeyEncipherment → 400. Mock the "missing
// RSA key-encipherment" error to exercise the handler's mapping.
svc := &mockESTService{
ServerKeygenErr: errors.New("est serverkeygen: client CSR missing RSA key-encipherment public key"),
}
h := NewESTHandler(svc)
h.SetServerKeygenEnabled(true)
csrPEM := freshECDSAKeygenCSR(t, "ecdsa-csr-test")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/est/corp/serverkeygen",
strings.NewReader(csrPEM))
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{HandshakeComplete: true, Version: tls.VersionTLS13}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServerKeygen(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 400 (RSA-only refusal)", w.Code)
}
}
func TestServerKeygenMTLS_RequiresClientCert(t *testing.T) {
s := newHardeningTestSetup(t) // existing helper from est_hardening_test.go
svc := &mockESTService{ServerKeygenResult: &domain.ESTServerKeygenResult{}}
h := NewESTHandler(svc)
h.SetServerKeygenEnabled(true)
h.SetMTLSTrust(s.trustPool)
csrPEM, _ := freshRSAKeygenCSR(t, "mtls-no-cert")
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/.well-known/est-mtls/corp/serverkeygen",
strings.NewReader(csrPEM))
req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{HandshakeComplete: true, Version: tls.VersionTLS13}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.ServerKeygenMTLS(w, req)
if w.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("status = %d, want 401 (no client cert)", w.Code)
}
}
// ---- helpers ----
// freshRSARecipient lives in pkcs7's test files — re-implement here to
// avoid cross-package test imports. Same shape: 2048-bit RSA + minimal
// self-signed cert.
func freshRSARecipient(t *testing.T) (*x509.Certificate, *rsa.PrivateKey) {
t.Helper()
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("rsa.GenerateKey: %v", err)
}
tmpl := &x509.Certificate{
SerialNumber: bigOne(),
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "ca-recipient"},
Issuer: pkix.Name{CommonName: "ca-recipient"},
NotBefore: serverKeygenTestNotBefore,
NotAfter: serverKeygenTestNotAfter,
IsCA: true,
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
}
der, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, tmpl, tmpl, &key.PublicKey, key)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("CreateCertificate: %v", err)
}
cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(der)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseCertificate: %v", err)
}
return cert, key
}
func smimeTypeFor(t *testing.T, ct string) string {
t.Helper()
_, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(ct)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseMediaType(%q): %v", ct, err)
}
return params["smime-type"]
}
func mapKeys[K comparable, V any](m map[K]V) []K {
out := make([]K, 0, len(m))
for k := range m {
out = append(out, k)
}
return out
}