mirror of
https://github.com/shankar0123/certctl.git
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8a56a78282
Closes Rank 5 (Azure half) of the 2026-05-03 Infisical deep-research deliverable (cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5). Pre-fix, certctl had no path to deploy certs to Azure-managed TLS- termination endpoints (Application Gateway / Front Door / App Service / Container Apps) — operators terminating TLS at Azure had to use manual `az keyvault certificate import` invocations or external automation. This commit lands the SDK-driven Azure Key Vault target connector that closes the gap, mirroring the AWS ACM target shape shipped in commitedf6bee. Architecture: - internal/connector/target/azurekv/azurekv.go — Connector wraps *azcertificates.Client behind the KeyVaultClient interface seam (mirrors awsacm's ACMClient + awsacmpca's ACMPCAClient). Lives in azurekv.go alongside the PFX (PKCS#12) wrapping helper that bundles the operator-supplied PEM cert + chain + key into the base64-PFX wire format azcertificates.ImportCertificate accepts. - internal/connector/target/azurekv/sdk_client.go — SDK-loading code isolated so the test path (NewWithClient) compiles without pulling azcore + azidentity transitive deps into the test binary. DefaultAzureCredential / ManagedIdentityCredential / EnvironmentCredential / WorkloadIdentityCredential selected via Config.CredentialMode (closed enum). - Pre-deploy snapshot via GetCertificate(name, "" /* latest */) so on-import-failure rollback restores the previous cert. Mirrors Bundle 5+. The Azure-specific quirk: rollback creates a NEW VERSION (Key Vault doesn't support version-restore without soft-delete recovery, which we keep off the minimum-RBAC surface). Operators reading audit dashboards see e.g. v1=initial, v2=failed-renewal, v3=rollback-of-v2; the certctl-managed-by + certctl-certificate-id provenance tags + future certctl-rollback-of metadata tag let an operator filter rollback artifacts. - Provenance tags identical to AWS ACM (certctl-managed-by=certctl + certctl-certificate-id=<mc-id>), automatically applied on every import. Key Vault carries tags forward across versions (unlike ACM which strips on re-import), so no separate AddTags call is required. - DeploymentRequest.KeyPEM held in agent memory only; PFX wrapping happens in-memory via software.sslmate.com/src/go-pkcs12. No disk write. Tests: - azurekv_test.go: 13-subtest happy-path + validation matrix — ValidateConfig (success / missing-vault-url / malformed-vault- url / missing-cert-name / invalid-credential-mode / reserved- tag rejection), DeployCertificate (fresh import / rollback-on- serial-mismatch / empty-key-rejected / no-client-rejected / SDK-error-surfaced), ValidateOnly (returns sentinel), ValidateDeployment (serial match / mismatch). - All tests use the NewWithClient injection seam; no real-Azure API calls. - go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/azurekv/... green. Wiring: - internal/domain/connector.go: TargetTypeAzureKeyVault = "AzureKeyVault". - internal/service/target.go: validTargetTypes set extended. - cmd/agent/main.go::createTargetConnector: AzureKeyVault case arm mirroring the AWSACM shape exactly. - cmd/agent/agent_test.go::TestCreateTargetConnector_AllSupported Types: AzureKeyVault added to the type matrix + the InvalidJSON matrix (16 supported target types now, up from 15). go.mod / go.sum: - github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azcore v1.20.0 (direct). - github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/azidentity v1.13.1 (direct). - github.com/Azure/azure-sdk-for-go/sdk/security/keyvault/ azcertificates v1.4.0 (direct). The deprecated /keyvault/azcertificates path appears as a transitive indirect via Microsoft's microsoft-authentication-library-for-go; we use the new /security/keyvault/ path exclusively. Documentation: - docs/connectors.md "Azure Key Vault" section: config table, RBAC role recipe (off-the-shelf "Key Vault Certificates Officer" or custom role with 3 data-plane actions), AKS workload-identity / managed-identity / service-principal / default credential recipes, atomic-rollback contract + Azure-version semantics explanation, soft-delete caveat, App Gateway / Front Door Terraform attachment snippet, threat model carve-outs (no disk writes, mandatory provenance tags, no long-lived secrets in Config), 5-bullet procurement checklist crib. Out of scope (intentional, flagged in V3-Pro forward path): - Azure Front Door direct-attach (UpdateRoutingConfig — different Azure RBAC scope). - App Gateway / App Service auto-bind (V3-Pro auto-attach). - Soft-delete recovery (acm:RecoverDeletedCertificate-equivalent requires extra RBAC; V2 keeps minimum-permission surface). - GCP Certificate Manager (separate cloud, separate connector). Verified locally: - gofmt clean. - go vet ./internal/connector/target/azurekv/... ./internal/domain/... ./internal/service/... ./cmd/agent/... clean. - go test -short -count=1 ./internal/connector/target/azurekv/... ./cmd/agent/... green (all 16 supported target types instantiate via the agent factory). Reference: cowork/infisical-deep-research-results.md Part 5 Rank 5. Acquisition prompt: cowork/rank-5-aws-acm-azure-kv-target-adapters-prompt.md. Companion commit (AWS half):edf6bee.
485 lines
16 KiB
Go
485 lines
16 KiB
Go
package service
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/crypto"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/domain"
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"github.com/shankar0123/certctl/internal/repository"
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)
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// ErrAgentNotFound is returned by [TargetService.CreateTarget] when the caller
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// references an agent_id that is empty or does not correspond to a registered
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// agent. The handler layer maps this to HTTP 400 via [errors.Is]. See C-002 in
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// cowork/certctl-coverage-gap-audit.md — this sentinel replaces a silent
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// Postgres FK violation (23503 → HTTP 500) with a deterministic 400.
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var ErrAgentNotFound = errors.New("referenced agent does not exist")
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// validTargetTypes is the set of allowed target types for validation.
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var validTargetTypes = map[domain.TargetType]bool{
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domain.TargetTypeNGINX: true,
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domain.TargetTypeApache: true,
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domain.TargetTypeHAProxy: true,
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domain.TargetTypeF5: true,
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domain.TargetTypeIIS: true,
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domain.TargetTypeTraefik: true,
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domain.TargetTypeCaddy: true,
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domain.TargetTypeEnvoy: true,
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domain.TargetTypePostfix: true,
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domain.TargetTypeDovecot: true,
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domain.TargetTypeSSH: true,
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domain.TargetTypeWinCertStore: true,
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domain.TargetTypeJavaKeystore: true,
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domain.TargetTypeKubernetesSecrets: true,
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domain.TargetTypeAWSACM: true,
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domain.TargetTypeAzureKeyVault: true,
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}
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// isValidTargetType checks if a type string is a known target type.
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func isValidTargetType(t domain.TargetType) bool {
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return validTargetTypes[t]
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}
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// TargetService provides business logic for deployment target management.
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//
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// The encryptionKey field holds the raw passphrase (not a pre-derived 32-byte
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// key). Per-ciphertext salt derivation is performed inside
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// [crypto.EncryptIfKeySet] / [crypto.DecryptIfKeySet] on each call. See M-8
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// in certctl-audit-report.md.
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type TargetService struct {
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targetRepo repository.TargetRepository
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agentRepo repository.AgentRepository
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auditService *AuditService
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encryptionKey string
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logger *slog.Logger
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}
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// NewTargetService creates a new target service. The encryptionKey is the raw
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// passphrase; it MUST NOT be pre-derived via crypto.DeriveKey (that was the
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// v1 behavior, replaced in M-8 with per-ciphertext random salt).
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func NewTargetService(
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targetRepo repository.TargetRepository,
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auditService *AuditService,
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agentRepo repository.AgentRepository,
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encryptionKey string,
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logger *slog.Logger,
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) *TargetService {
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return &TargetService{
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targetRepo: targetRepo,
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agentRepo: agentRepo,
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auditService: auditService,
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encryptionKey: encryptionKey,
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logger: logger,
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}
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}
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// List returns a paginated list of deployment targets.
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func (s *TargetService) List(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]*domain.DeploymentTarget, int64, error) {
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if page < 1 {
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page = 1
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}
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if perPage < 1 {
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perPage = 50
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}
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targets, err := s.targetRepo.List(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list targets: %w", err)
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}
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total := int64(len(targets))
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start := (page - 1) * perPage
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if start >= int(total) {
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return nil, total, nil
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}
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end := start + perPage
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if end > int(total) {
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end = int(total)
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}
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return targets[start:end], total, nil
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}
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// Get retrieves a deployment target by ID.
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func (s *TargetService) Get(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get target %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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return target, nil
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}
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// Create validates and stores a new deployment target, encrypting sensitive config.
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func (s *TargetService) Create(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, actor string) error {
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if target.Name == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("target name is required")
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}
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if !isValidTargetType(target.Type) {
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return fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", target.Type)
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}
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if target.ID == "" {
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target.ID = generateID("target")
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}
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now := time.Now()
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if target.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.CreatedAt = now
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}
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if target.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.UpdatedAt = now
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}
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if target.TestStatus == "" {
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target.TestStatus = "untested"
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}
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if target.Source == "" {
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target.Source = "database"
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}
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// Encrypt the full config and store redacted version in config column
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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encrypted, _, err := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(target.Config), s.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", err)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(target.Config)
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Create(ctx, target); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to create target: %w", err)
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}
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if s.auditService != nil {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "create_target", "target", target.ID, nil); auditErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Update modifies an existing deployment target. Handles "********" preservation for sensitive fields.
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func (s *TargetService) Update(ctx context.Context, id string, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, actor string) error {
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if target.Name == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("target name is required")
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}
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target.ID = id
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target.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
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// If config contains "********" values, merge with existing decrypted config
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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mergedConfig, err := s.mergeRedactedConfig(ctx, id, target.Config)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to merge config: %w", err)
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}
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// Encrypt the merged config
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encrypted, _, encErr := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet(mergedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
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if encErr != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", encErr)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(json.RawMessage(mergedConfig))
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, target); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to update target %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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if s.auditService != nil {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "update_target", "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Delete removes a deployment target.
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func (s *TargetService) Delete(ctx context.Context, id string, actor string) error {
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if err := s.targetRepo.Delete(ctx, id); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to delete target %s: %w", id, err)
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}
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if s.auditService != nil {
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if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, actor, domain.ActorTypeUser, "delete_target", "target", id, nil); auditErr != nil {
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s.logger.Error("failed to record audit event", "error", auditErr)
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// TestConnection tests a target's connectivity by checking the assigned agent's heartbeat status.
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// Target connectors run on agents, not on the server, so we can't instantiate a connector here.
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// Instead, we verify the agent is online and reachable.
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func (s *TargetService) TestConnection(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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target, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("target not found: %w", err)
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}
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if target.AgentID == "" {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("target has no assigned agent")
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}
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agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
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if err != nil {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent not found: %w", err)
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}
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// I-004: AgentRepository.Get intentionally surfaces retired rows (the banner
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// + 410 Gone paths need to see them). A test against a retired agent can
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// never succeed — the agent is tombstoned, will never heartbeat again, and
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// any active targets have already been cascade-retired alongside it. Fail
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// fast with an explicit message instead of falling through to the Status /
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// heartbeat checks, which would produce a misleading "agent is Offline" or
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// "heartbeat stale" diagnostic.
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if agent.IsRetired() {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s is retired", agent.ID)
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}
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if agent.Status != domain.AgentStatusOnline {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s is %s (expected Online)", agent.ID, agent.Status)
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}
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// Check heartbeat freshness (agent must have heartbeated within the last 5 minutes)
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if agent.LastHeartbeatAt != nil {
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if time.Since(*agent.LastHeartbeatAt) > 5*time.Minute {
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "failed")
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return fmt.Errorf("assigned agent %s last heartbeat was %s ago (stale)", agent.ID, time.Since(*agent.LastHeartbeatAt).Round(time.Second))
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}
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}
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s.updateTestStatus(ctx, target, "success")
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return nil
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}
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// ListTargets returns paginated targets (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) ListTargets(ctx context.Context, page, perPage int) ([]domain.DeploymentTarget, int64, error) {
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// Bundle E / Audit L-020: page/perPage are unused; the underlying repo
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// List() does not yet take pagination params. Marked explicitly so
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// ineffassign sees no dead store and future maintainers see the
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// vestigial params rather than a misleading default-applied clamp.
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_ = page
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_ = perPage
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targets, err := s.targetRepo.List(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("failed to list targets: %w", err)
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}
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total := int64(len(targets))
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var result []domain.DeploymentTarget
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for _, t := range targets {
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if t != nil {
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result = append(result, *t)
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}
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}
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return result, total, nil
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}
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// GetTarget returns a single target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) GetTarget(ctx context.Context, id string) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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return s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
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}
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// CreateTarget creates a new target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) CreateTarget(ctx context.Context, target domain.DeploymentTarget) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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if !isValidTargetType(target.Type) {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported target type: %s", target.Type)
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}
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// C-002: enforce agent_id FK at service layer so we return a clean 400
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// instead of bubbling a Postgres 23503 foreign-key violation out as 500.
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// The schema (migrations/000001 line 104) declares agent_id TEXT NOT NULL
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// with a FK to agents(id); we mirror that contract here for deterministic
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// error mapping.
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if target.AgentID == "" {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: agent_id is required", ErrAgentNotFound)
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}
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agent, err := s.agentRepo.Get(ctx, target.AgentID)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s", ErrAgentNotFound, target.AgentID)
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}
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// I-004: refuse to attach new targets to a retired agent. The agent is
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// tombstoned and no deployments would ever succeed against it; letting a
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// row slip past here would immediately be cascade-retired on the next
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// dependency sweep and confuse operators ("why is this brand-new target
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// already retired?"). Treating retired agents as "not found" for creation
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// purposes keeps the error surface tight and matches the default-list
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// contract established by repository.AgentRepository.List.
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if agent.IsRetired() {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s (retired)", ErrAgentNotFound, target.AgentID)
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}
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if target.ID == "" {
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target.ID = generateID("target")
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}
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now := time.Now()
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if target.CreatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.CreatedAt = now
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}
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if target.UpdatedAt.IsZero() {
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target.UpdatedAt = now
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}
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if target.TestStatus == "" {
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target.TestStatus = "untested"
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}
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if target.Source == "" {
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target.Source = "database"
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}
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// GUI-created targets should be enabled by default.
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// Go's bool zero value is false, which overrides the DB default when explicitly inserted.
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if target.Source == "database" && !target.Enabled {
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target.Enabled = true
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}
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// Encrypt config
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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encrypted, _, err := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet([]byte(target.Config), s.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", err)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(target.Config)
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Create(ctx, &target); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create target: %w", err)
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}
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return &target, nil
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}
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// UpdateTarget modifies a target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) UpdateTarget(ctx context.Context, id string, target domain.DeploymentTarget) (*domain.DeploymentTarget, error) {
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target.ID = id
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target.UpdatedAt = time.Now()
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// Merge redacted fields with existing config
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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mergedConfig, err := s.mergeRedactedConfig(ctx, id, target.Config)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to merge config: %w", err)
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}
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encrypted, _, encErr := crypto.EncryptIfKeySet(mergedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
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if encErr != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt config: %w", encErr)
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}
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target.EncryptedConfig = encrypted
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target.Config = redactConfigJSON(json.RawMessage(mergedConfig))
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}
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if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, &target); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update target: %w", err)
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}
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return &target, nil
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}
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// DeleteTarget removes a target (handler interface method).
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func (s *TargetService) DeleteTarget(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
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return s.targetRepo.Delete(ctx, id)
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}
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// --- Internal helpers ---
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// getDecryptedConfig returns the decrypted config JSON for a target.
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func (s *TargetService) getDecryptedConfig(target *domain.DeploymentTarget) (json.RawMessage, error) {
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if len(target.EncryptedConfig) > 0 {
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decrypted, err := crypto.DecryptIfKeySet(target.EncryptedConfig, s.encryptionKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return json.RawMessage(decrypted), nil
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}
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if len(target.Config) > 0 {
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return target.Config, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return json.RawMessage("{}"), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// mergeRedactedConfig merges incoming config (which may have "********" values)
|
|
// with the existing decrypted config so sensitive fields are preserved.
|
|
func (s *TargetService) mergeRedactedConfig(ctx context.Context, id string, incoming json.RawMessage) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
// Parse incoming config
|
|
var incomingMap map[string]interface{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(incoming, &incomingMap); err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: incoming config is not a JSON object, using as-is", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check if any values are "********"
|
|
hasRedacted := false
|
|
for _, v := range incomingMap {
|
|
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == "********" {
|
|
hasRedacted = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !hasRedacted {
|
|
return incoming, nil // No redacted values, use incoming as-is
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load existing target to get real values
|
|
existing, err := s.targetRepo.Get(ctx, id)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: could not load existing target, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
existingConfig, err := s.getDecryptedConfig(existing)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: could not decrypt existing config, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var existingMap map[string]interface{}
|
|
if err := json.Unmarshal(existingConfig, &existingMap); err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Warn("mergeRedactedConfig: existing config is not a JSON object, redacted values will be lost", "target", id, "error", err)
|
|
return incoming, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Merge: for each "********" value in incoming, use existing value
|
|
for k, v := range incomingMap {
|
|
if str, ok := v.(string); ok && str == "********" {
|
|
if existingVal, exists := existingMap[k]; exists {
|
|
incomingMap[k] = existingVal
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return json.Marshal(incomingMap)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// updateTestStatus updates the test_status and last_tested_at fields in the database
|
|
// and records an audit event.
|
|
func (s *TargetService) updateTestStatus(ctx context.Context, target *domain.DeploymentTarget, status string) {
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
target.TestStatus = status
|
|
target.LastTestedAt = &now
|
|
target.UpdatedAt = now
|
|
if err := s.targetRepo.Update(ctx, target); err != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Error("failed to update test status", "target", target.ID, "status", status, "error", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Record audit event for connection test
|
|
if s.auditService != nil {
|
|
action := "target_test_connection_" + status
|
|
details := map[string]interface{}{"target_type": string(target.Type), "result": status, "agent_id": target.AgentID}
|
|
if auditErr := s.auditService.RecordEvent(ctx, "system", domain.ActorTypeSystem, action, "target", target.ID, details); auditErr != nil {
|
|
s.logger.Error("failed to record test connection audit event", "error", auditErr)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|